Nautical fault : a historical and multi-jurisdictional study of the exemption for errors relating to navigation and management of the vessel in modern carriage law by Rochester, Vanessa
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 
of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author. 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
DOCSMTL: 2874745\1
Nautical Fault
A Historical and Multi-jurisdictional Study of the Exemption for Errors 
Relating to Navigation and Management of the Vessel in Modern 
Carriage Law
Vanessa Rochester
B.A., B.C.L., LL.B., LL.M
Member of the Quebec Bar
Associate, Ogilvy Renault LLP
Thesis Presented for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in the Department of Commercial Law
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN
February 2008
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
ii
Abstract
Nautical fault is the favourite problem child of many commentators and interests in the 
shipping industry. The debate surrounding the nautical fault exemption has recently been 
revived in the context of the negotiation and drafting of the UNCITRAL Draft 
Convention on the Carriage of Goods [Wholly or Partly] [By Sea]. Indeed, the concept of 
nautical fault has been debated in academic, legislative, and industry circles for decades, 
with the issue resurfacing each time an attempt is made to modernize the law of carriage 
of goods by sea, either domestically or internationally. The frequency of debate by no 
means implies a comprehensive understanding of nautical fault. Rather, the importance of 
nautical fault and the role it plays in modern carriage law is often misunderstood and 
underplayed. The majority of commentators and cargo interests view the nautical fault 
exemption solely as an anachronistic holdover from an earlier era in shipping. 
This thesis challenges the modern assumptions surrounding nautical fault by 
demonstrating both its importance and it relevance to the modern law of carriage of 
goods by sea. This thesis therefore attempts to reconcile all the factors impacting and 
impacted by nautical fault, and provide a clear, complete and comprehensive study of the 
exemption. It examines the history, rationale, and jurisprudence underlying the nautical 
fault exemption. It investigates the challenges posed by failed attempts to modernize 
international carriage law and unilateral actions by a variety states. Finally, it recognizes 
the importance of uniformity in international carriage of goods, an ideal currently under 
siege for which the UNCITRAL Draft Convention provides little relief. 
Legislators and drafting committees have at times differed in their approaches to the 
nautical fault exemption, thus undermining the uniformity that had been achieved in the 
international carriage of goods by sea during the first half of the 20th century. Only armed 
with an understanding of the scope, meaning and pervasive nature of the nautical fault 
exemption, can legislators and drafting committees hope to achieve a workable solution, 
palatable to both carrier and cargo interests, to the increasing disunity plaguing carriage 
today. 
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Further, the shipping industry and the interests involved have changed dramatically since 
the emergence of the nautical fault exemption in the 19th century. An examination of the 
historical development of carrier liability and nautical fault provides a background 
against which a discussion of recent developments may unfold. This thesis considers the 
lessons learned along with those that ought to have been learned, during past attempts at 
creating a modern, uniform law of carriage. We are currently entering uncharted waters 
with respect to the UNCITRAL Draft Convention, and therefore this thesis investigates 
the this recent push for harmonization and its impact on nautical fault. 
This thesis concludes with the proposal that nautical fault is an integral part of the law of 
carriage whose importance must not be underestimated, and as such a careful 
examination of any and all implications of the removal of the exemption from uniform 
law is recommended.  
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Introduction
In antiquity, carriage of goods by sea was instrumental in the development of 
large-scale commerce. In modern times, sea carriage remains the foundation upon which 
global commerce is built. Central to the shipping industry is the relationship between 
cargo interests and carriers. This relationship, governed by contract, domestic law and 
international law, has at its very core the balance between the obligations incumbent on 
the carrier and the limitations and exemptions from which he benefits. Of those 
exemptions, one that has been a central issue in carriage litigation for well over a century 
is nautical fault. This exemption has its roots in the exculpatory clauses incorporated by 
shipowners into bills of lading in the 19th century. The modern incarnation of nautical 
fault is found enacted in Article IV(2) of the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules, which 
provides “Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising 
or resulting from: (a) Act, neglect, or default of the master, mariner, pilot, or the servants 
of the carrier in the navigation or in the management of the ship.” 
Nautical fault, despite its longstanding presence in shipping practice, statutory 
instruments, and uniform liability regimes, is a subject of controversy. It is an issue that is 
frequently discussed; yet often misunderstood. Too easily dismissed as an anachronistic 
holdover from the time of wooden ships and iron men, commentators have the tendency 
to underplay both its importance and relevance to the modern law of carriage. The same 
may be said of legislators. On two separate occasions, UNCITRAL drafting committees 
have declined to include the nautical fault exemption in uniform law. The first 
instrument, the Hamburg Rules, failed to gain widespread acceptance. The second 
instrument, the Draft Convention on the Carriage of Goods [Wholly or Partly] [By Sea], 
was completed by the Working Group in January 2008, and is due to be presented for 
consideration during the 41st Session of the Commission in 2008. As such, a detailed 
study of nautical fault is long overdue. This thesis grapples with the issues surrounding 
the nautical fault exemption from many perspectives: historical, multi-jurisdictional, 
international, political and comparative. It endeavours to recast the debate surrounding 
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nautical fault, which has been distorted by assumptions and misunderstandings, by 
examining the exemption fully and in context. 
Against this background, the first Chapter traces the historical development of the 
carrier’s liability and the origins of the exemption for nautical fault. It outlines the 
transition from onerous carrier liability under common law to widespread freedom of 
contract as a result of technological advancements in shipping and the increase in world 
trade. It considers the impetus for exemption’s first appearance in statutory form in the 
United States Harter Act of 1893, along with the proliferation of domestic legislation that 
followed. Chapter 2 examines the factors impacting the negotiation and drafting of the 
Hague Rules, with a particular focus on the nautical fault exemption. This foundational 
chapter details the emergence of an incredibly successful uniform liability regime 
governing the carriage of goods by sea. It provides, therefore, a comparative base for 
assessing subsequent efforts at achieving a harmonized carriage regime. Chapter 3 delves 
into the rationale for the nautical fault exemption, accounting for all motivating factors, 
including political, commercial, and practical ones.  In Chapter 4, the author undertakes a 
comparative and multi-jurisdictional study of the meaning of the nautical fault 
exemption. All aspects of the exemption are examined in great detail, providing useful 
insights into the operation of nautical fault in a number of key common law and civil law 
jurisdictions. For further clarity and understanding, Chapter 5 considers the application of 
the exemption for nautical fault within the context of certain common errors that have 
been judicially considered over the past century.  Chapter 6 explains and illustrates the 
manner in which nautical fault has been expanded and applied in contexts other than as a 
defence to cargo claims under bills of lading. It demonstrates that by virtue of the 
exemption’s incorporation into charterparties and its employment in the recovery of 
general average contributions, nautical fault has permeated the shipping industry far 
beyond the traditional bill of lading relationship. In contrast to the previous chapter, 
Chapter 7 addresses the allegations of a recent narrowing of the nautical fault exemption. 
It canvasses the impact of recent uniform law along with judicial trends, in order to 
uncover whether such allegations are truly well founded. Chapter 8 addresses the genesis, 
the drafting process, the politics and the failure of the Hamburg Rules. Building on the 
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discussion of the Hague Rules in Chapter 2, the forces giving rise to the two carriage 
regimes are compared and distinguished. It seeks to understand how the fault-based 
liability regime and the absence of nautical fault contributed to the failure of the 
Hamburg Rules. Chapter 9 draws extensively from the law of multiple jurisdictions in 
examining the recent trend in unilateral adoption of carriage regimes. Domestic carriage 
regimes are reflective of modern commercial compromises made by national shipping 
interests, and as such serve as potential indicators for international reforms in carriage of 
goods by sea.   Chapter 10 examines the UNCITRAL Draft Convention on the Carriage 
of Goods, in particular highlighting the removal of nautical fault and the emergence of 
freedom of contract. It concludes by asking whether the drafters of this new Convention 
have failed to learn from the lessons of the Hamburg Rules. Chapter 11 builds on the 
foregoing conclusions by addressing the question of whether one can justify a change 
with regard to nautical fault, in light of the key findings and ideas of this thesis. It 
examines the implications of change, along with the realities facing the shipping industry 
today. The final Chapter makes general observations concerning the future of nautical 
fault, the quest for uniformity in the law of international carriage of goods by sea and the 
UNCITRAL Draft Convention. Challenging the common perception of nautical fault, it 
proposes that nautical fault is an important and integral part of maritime law. As such, it 
concludes by proposing a careful examination of the ramifications of any change, and an 
informed and measured approach to the debate surrounding nautical fault.
If one were to state the principal purpose of this thesis, it would be to provide and 
contribute to a greater understanding of the nautical fault exemption and its meaning 
within the law of carriage of goods by sea. This previously nonexistent study on nautical 
fault provides practitioners, legislators and commentators with a wealth of information 
and the tools with which to address nautical fault both in the context of private practice 
and legal reform. 
A few comments about the multi-jurisdictional nature of this thesis are in order. 
This thesis considers the law and doctrine of many jurisdictions, with a particular focus 
on the United Kingdom, United States, France, Canada and other Commonwealth 
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nations. Rather than divide each chapter, multiple jurisdictions are considered as one 
body of material, and mention is made only where differences emerge or where 
comparative scholarship is instructive. The result is most encouraging. With the 
exception of certain minor variations in the interpretation of the Hague Rules, and in 
particular nautical fault, one finds that overall the similarities greatly outnumber the 
differences. Moreover, the frequency with which French authors and jurists refer to 
English and American authors and jurisprudence, and vice versa, is impressive, and 
stands as a shining example of many decades of the successful functioning of uniform 
law in this area.
Finally, by way of introduction to the subject, the etymology of the term “nautical 
fault” bears consideration. Today, the term is in essence synonym us with the exemption 
found in Art. IV(2)(a) of the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules. Nautical fault is a direct 
English translation of the French terminology: faute nautique. It is derived from the 
wording in the French law of the 2nd of April, 1936, which incorporated the articles of the 
Hague Rules into French domestic law.1 In the original French language version of the 
Hague Rules, the phrase “fautes commises dans l’administration et la navigation du 
naivre” was used,2 however concerns were raised by the French Parliament about the 
  
1 Marais, G. Les Transports de Marchandises Par Mer et Jurisprudence: Loi du 2 Avril 1936 (1948) Pichon 
& Durand-Auzias, Paris, at p. 41. Note that in France laws are identified by the date on which they are 
passed, and not the name of the particular Act or Statute. 
2 This was not without contention. French representatives contested the wording during the three years of 
diplomatic conferences leading up the 1924 Hague Rules. Comité Maritime International, The Travaux 
Preparatoires of the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills 
of Lading of 25 August 1924, The Hague Rules, and of the Protocols of 23 February 1968 and 21 
December 1979, The Hague-Visby Rules (1997) CMI Headquarters Pub., Antwerpen, Belgium, at p. 393, 
contains the objection made in 1921 by Mr. Dor concerning the wording: “I shall be extremely obliged to 
Sir Norman Hill if he tells me how we are going to translate into French “navigation and management.” I 
have tried for the last ten years, and have not succeeded. If you say “navigation and administration du 
navire”, that is no good, because “administration” is too wide, and it will cover negligence in respect of the 
cargo. For instance, we had a great number of cases in which the Marseilles Court were holding that 
“management” did not cover shortage of the cargo, and the Aix Court of Appeal for a good many years 
held that the Marseilles Court was wrong, and that “navigation” being the nautical side of the ship, 
“management” would most surely mean the “administration”, and therefore covered all the handling of the 
cargo and covered the cargo of shortage of cargo. So that if we had cargo, so many bags, missing, it was 
covered by the exception “management.” Of course it was wrong, and after a good many years the Court of 
Appeal of Aix recognized it was wrong. But if you put it in French, “administration”, it would certainly 
cover the handling of the cargo. If you put “navigation and direction du navire”, it does not mean much. 
What is the “direction du naivre”? Our distinction of course is between what we call “fautes nautiques” and 
“fautes  commerciales”, the nautical faults and the commercial faults; but that is not translation. We cannot 
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potential difficulties concerning the interpretation of the word “administration”,3 which 
does not necessarily have exactly the same meaning as the English term “management”. 
The French Parliament felt that “administration du navire” may be interpreted far too 
broadly and would therefore exonerate the carrier from liability for errors relating to the 
stowage of goods.4 A simpler formula was devised for the domestic legislation using the 
term “nautical fault” to refer to all faults or errors in the navigation or management of the 
vessel, while the term “commercial fault” or faute commerciale was used to refer to faults 
or errors in relation to the loading, handling, stowing, caring for, and discharging of the 
cargo. Moreover, the French legislature sought to use the term faute nautique as it was 
familiar to the French judiciary, on the basis that it had previously been used in certain 
bills of lading.5 It has been noted by French commentators that the meaning of the term 
faute nautique in their domestic law corresponds exactly with the meaning of the 
expression used in Art. IV(2)(a) of the Hague Rules.6 Ripert explains that “[t]his 
difference of expression should not be considered as difference of substance: ‘fautes 
nautiques’ are both ‘fautes’ of navigation and ‘in the management’.”7 The direct English 
language translation of the term has since become popular for use when referring to the 
notion of exemption for errors in navigation or management of the vessel.8
     
translate the rule which reads “act, neglect and default of the master”, and so on, “in the navigation or in the 
management of the ship” by just the “fautes commerciales” of the master or pilot or mariners. Therefore, I 
would be much obliged to Sir Norman Hill if he would give me the way to translate it. You must not forget 
that this is not only a question between British shipowners and cargo owners.” 
3 Marais, G. Les Transports de Marchandises Par Mer et Jurisprudence: Loi du 2 Avril 1936 (1948) Pichon 
& Durand-Auzias, Paris, at p. 41. 
4 Wolfson, R. “The English and French Carriage of Goods by Sea Enactments” (1955) 4 Int’l & Comp. 
L.Q. 508, at p. 525. 
5 Chaiban, C. Causes Legales D’Exoneration du Transporteur Maritime dans le Transport de 
Merchandises (1965) Pichon & Durand-Auzias, Paris, at p. 76. 
6 Marais, G. Les Transports de Marchandises Par Mer et Jurisprudence: Loi du 2 Avril 1936 (1948) Pichon 
& Durand-Auzias, Paris, at p. 41; Fraikin, G. & Lafrage, G.H. “Le Transport Sous Connaissement En Droit 
Francais” in Le Transport Maritime Sous Connaissement A L’Heure Du Marche Commun (1966) M. De 
Juglart & P. De La Pradelle (Eds.), Pichon & Durand-Auzias, Paris, at p. 213, where Fraikin and Lafrage 
confirm that it is now a given that faute nautique corresponds exactly with error in the navigation or 
management of the vessel as found in the Hague Rules.
7 The great French commentator Ripert, as quoted in Wolfson, R. “The English and French Carriage of 
Goods by Sea Enactments” (1955) 4 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 508, at p. 525. 
8 See for example:  Weitz, L. “International Maritime Law: The Nautical Fault Debate” (1998) 22 Tul. Mar. 
L.J. 581; Japikse, R.E. “Deck Cargo Exclusion, Nautical Fault Exemption, Fire Exception” in The 
Hamburg Rules: A Choice for the EEC? (1994) European Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, Maklu, 
Antwerpen. In Treitel, G., & Reynolds, F. Carver on Bills of Lading (2001) Sweet & Maxwell, London, at 
p. 501, Carver notes that the exemption of 4(2)(a) is “sometimes referred to by the briefer French phrase 
‘faute nautique’ or ‘nautical fault’.” 
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Chapter 1
The Historical Development of Carrier Liability and the Nautical Fault 
Exemption
Compared to many fundamental concepts in maritime law that have their roots in 
antiquity, nautical fault is a relatively recent construct. As maritime law developed, 
through antiquity and into the Middle Ages, carriers had few exceptions to liability. By 
the 16th and 17th centuries in Europe and America, at common law, carriers remained 
burdened with strict liability for the goods they carried. To mediate the effects of the 
common law, shipowners began to insert exculpatory clauses into their bills of lading 
during the 19th century. The nautical fault exemption was therefore born out of the ability 
of the 19th century shipowners to contractually limit their liability, and within decades 
had found its way into national legislation and subsequently international uniform law. 
1.1. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CARRIER LIABILITY
“In the dawn of recorded history, when mythology and history were too 
intermingled to separate the legendary from the authentic, commerce by means of ships 
was drawing the nations together.”9 In 2650 B.C. an unknown scribe listed the 
accomplishments of Pharaoh Snefru, which included importing forty ships filled with 
cedar logs from Phoenicia.10 Despite the rise of large-scale ocean commerce during the 
Late Bronze age in Egypt and the Middle East, by the last millennium B.C. the 
Phoenicians, Judeans, Greeks and Etruscans had overshadowed the early Egyptian 
prominence in commercial shipping.11 Although there had undoubtedly been a large body 
of pre-existing customary law,12 it was during this period that written maritime law, and 
  
9 Hughes, R. Handbook of Admiralty Law, 2nd Ed. (1920) West Pub. Co., St. Paul, Minnesota, at p. 1.
10 Gold, E. Maritime Transport: The Evolution of International Marine Policy and Shipping Law (1981) 
Lexington Books, Toronto, at p. 2-3. 
11 Ibid.
12 In fact, not only was there a common custom of seamen and merchants in existence, there had also been 
earlier examples of written maritime law. For example, The Law of Babylon, codified by Hammurabi 
around 2200 B.C. but based on earlier Sumerian laws, included rules regarding collisions, botomry, and 
reimbursement for leased vessels (Ibid. at p. 5). 
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in particular the Rhodian Laws, emerged.13 There is debate surrounding their origin, with 
authors placing their emergence at differing dates ranging between the 2nd and the 9th
centuries B.C.14 Many view Rhodian Law as the first authoritative and comprehensive 
maritime code, regulating not only Greek and then Roman commerce, but forming the 
basis for maritime law for the next one thousand years.15 It is, however, difficult to 
discern the extent of the influence of Rhodian Law on subsequent legal systems, as the 
majority of the laws were lost by modern times, and the remainder survive only through 
the Digest of Justinian, compiled by the Roman Emperor Justinian during the 6th century 
A.D.16 Nevertheless, we do see the impact of the Rhodian law on Roman law, as Roman 
jurists considered that “all nautical matters in litigation are decided by the Rhodian law 
unless some other is found contrary thereto…”17
Roman law on maritime matters has been described as “[a] well-developed 
system of commercial law [that] defined the rights and obligations of the parties to 
commercial and maritime contracts, and embodies whatever the Romans found useful in 
Greek law and practice.”18 This included such topics as general average; “shipowner’s 
responsibility; ownership of ships; charterparties; freight; collision; salvage; and 
  
13 Tetley, W. Maritime Liens and Claims 2nd Ed. (1998) Blais, Montreal, Canada, at p. 7; Hare, J. Shipping 
Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, (1999) Juta & Co, Cape Town, at p. 5. 
14 For example Tetley, ibid, dates their origin to 800 B.C., while Hare, ibid, notes that they were compiled 
in the 3rd or 2nd century B.C.; Gold, E. Maritime Transport: The Evolution of International Marine Policy 
and Shipping Law (1981) Lexington Books, Toronto, at p. 7, dates them as well to the 3rd or 2nd century 
B.C.; Fayle, E. A Short History of the World’s Shipping Industry (1933) Dial Press, New York, at p. 58, 
places their emergence in the 3rd and 4th century B.C.; Gilmore, G. & Black, C. The Law of Admiralty 2nd
Ed. (1975) Foundation, Minneola, N.Y, at p. 3, are fairly critical of the date, commenting: “A strong 
tradition says that a maritime code was promulgated by the Island of Rhodes, in the Eastern Mediterranean, 
at the height of its power; the ridiculously early date of 900 B.C. has even been assigned to this 
suppositious code – a date accepted uncritically by some legal scholars.”
15 Flanders, H. A Treatise on Maritime Law (1852) Little, Boston and Co., Boston, at p. 4; See Gold, ibid, 
who states “These excellent [Rhodian] laws not only served as a rule of conduct to the ancient maritime 
states, but, as will appear from the attentive comparison of them, have been the basis of all modern 
regulations respecting navigation and commerce.” There are those however, who question whether the 
Rhodian code actually existed, see for example Gilmore & Black, ibid at p. 3-4. 
16 Hare, J. Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, (1999) Juta & Co, Cape Town, at p. 
5; Flanders, ibid at p. 4-5. The Rhodian laws were arranged under one title, De Lege Rhodia de Jactu, 
meaning ‘Of the Rhodian Law of Jettison’.  (Tetley, W. Maritime Liens and Claims 2nd Ed. (1998) Blais, 
Montreal, Canada, at p. 8). 
17 Quoted in Gold, E. Maritime Transport: The Evolution of International Marine Policy and Shipping Law
(1981) Lexington Books, Toronto, at p. 12; Tetley, ibid at p. 8 quotes Emperor Antninus as stating “I, 
indeed, am Lord of the World, but the law is lord of the sea. Let it be judged by Rhodian Law, prescribed 
concerning nautical matters, so far as no one of our laws is opposed.”
18 Fayle, E. A Short History of the World’s Shipping Industry (1933) Dial Press, New York, at p. 57. 
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maritime loans.”19 With respect to liability for the cargo, a Roman vessel was not obliged 
to accept cargo, however once it agreed to carry the cargo, the shipowner and crew 
became responsible for its safekeeping.20 The shipowner was viewed as insuring the 
safety of the goods delivered and obligated to prevent fraud and robbery.21 Where there 
was loss or damage to goods, the shipowner was liable to cargo interests under action de 
recepto, or praetorian action.22 The shipowner’s liability was not absolute, and Roman 
law provided for exemptions in certain situations. By the time of the Digests of Justinian, 
losses resulting from shipwrecks and pirate attacks were excused on the basis of vis 
major.23 Many owners sailed aboard their own ships, managing the business of carriage, 
however a large number of shipowners “were capitalists pure and simple who took no 
part in the management of their ship but let them out on hire…to people with more 
knowledge of the business.”24 Similar to modern times, the charterer was obligated to pay 
hire, and once having done so, the charterer could then employ the ship as he pleased and 
receive all the freight.25 Importantly, charterers were treated under Roman law as the 
owner of the vessel, and as such were liable to cargo interests in the same manner as the 
owner.26 A contract for freight, recorded in a written “charter-party”, dating from 236 
A.D., provides an interesting example.27 The charterparty provided for a specified voyage 
at a lump sum of freight, 100 drachmas of silver, where the captain of the vessel, who 
was also the shipowner, bound himself to “provide adequate equipment and a proper 
crew, to load the goods in two days, and to deliver them safe and undamaged by 
  
19Hare, J. Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, (1999) Juta & Co, Cape Town, at p. 5, 
where Hare describes the various maritime legal provisions and topics found in the Digests of Justinian.
20 Gold, E. Maritime Transport: The Evolution of International Marine Policy and Shipping Law (1981) 
Lexington Books, Toronto, at p. 14. 
21 Mandelbaum, S. “International Ocean Shipping and Risk Allocation for Cargo Loss, Damage and Delay: 
A U.S. Approach to COGSA, Hague-Visby, Hamburg and the Multimodal Rules” (1995) 5 J. Transnational 
L. & Policy 1, at p. 8
22 Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, 
and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 8-9. 
23 Gold, E. Maritime Transport: The Evolution of International Marine Policy and Shipping Law (1981) 
Lexington Books, Toronto, at p. 14. Gold notes however, that in earlier Roman law, shipwreck was not an 
excuse to liability for cargo loss or damage; Mandelbaum, S. “International Ocean Shipping and Risk 
Allocation for Cargo Loss, Damage and Delay: A U.S. Approach to COGSA, Hague-Visby, Hamburg and 
the Multimodal Rules” (1995) 5 J. Transnational L. & Policy 1, at p. 8.
24 Fayle, E. A Short History of the World’s Shipping Industry (1933) Dial Press, New York, at p. 58. 
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid at p. 59. 
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seawater.”28 Roman law, strikingly similar to modern carriage law in many ways, 
provided a well-organized and comprehensive body of maritime law that served as a key 
influence in subsequent maritime codes and laws. 
As the Roman Empire disintegrated, Europe was plunged into the Dark Ages and 
wide-scale shipping and commerce suffered.29 It has been said that “[t]he merchant dared 
not risk his person or property in foreign ports.”30 Nevertheless, maritime law was never 
extinguished and several early maritime codes did emerge between the 7th and the 9th
centuries.31 What is most significant of the time, was that with the end of the Roman 
Empire coastal communities in the Mediterranean reorganized into city-states. These new 
city-states, particularly the Italian ones, gained commercial power during the Crusades by 
providing marine transportation as well as goods and supplies.32 By the 11th and 12th
centuries this had resulted in competitive wealthy trading centres with large fleets, 
consequently; “maritime law was quickly codified and maritime courts sprang up in most 
of the cities.”33
There are a large number of Mediterranean sea-codes and compilations,34 among 
the most important hail from Venice, Amalfi, Trani on the Adriatic coast, Pisa, Genoa, 
  
28 Ibid. Interestingly, the charterparty also provided that if unloading at the port of discharge was not 
completed within four days, the merchant must pay the owner 16 drachmas per diem as demurrage. 
29 Dotson, J. Freight Rates and Shipping Practices in the Medieval Mediterranean (1969) Ph.D. Thesis, 
John Hopkins University, at p. 13, who states that between the 5th and 10th centuries commerce suffered a 
severe decline, noting in particular the raids from Normans and Moslems that seared the coasts of Italy, 
Southern France and the Iberian Peninsula. 
30 Flanders, H. A Treatise on Maritime Law (1852) Little, Boston and Co., Boston, at p. 6. Flanders also 
described the treatment if shipwrecked. The goods were confiscated, and in certain places shipwrecked 
persons were enslaved. (Ibid).  
31 The Byzantine Rhodian Sea Law, which was a codification of earlier Rhodian law along with newer 
customs and usages, appeared between 7th and the 9th centuries (Tetley, W. Maritime Liens and Claims 2nd
Ed. (1998) Blais, Montreal, Canada, at p. 10; Hare, J. Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South 
Africa, (1999) Juta & Co, Cape Town, at p. 6; Dotson, J. Freight Rates and Shipping Practices in the 
Medieval Mediterranean (1969) Ph.D. Thesis, John Hopkins University, at p. 8). Building on the Byzantine 
Rhodian Sea Law, was the 9th century Basilica, a large codification of Byzantine law under Emperor Basil 
I, which contained a collection of maritime provisions containing a reinterpretation of the Byzantine 
Rhodian Sea Law (Gold, E. Maritime Transport: The Evolution of International Marine Policy and 
Shipping Law (1981) Lexington Books, Toronto, at p. 16; Tetley, ibid at p. 11; Dotson, ibid.).
32 Gilmore, G. & Black, C. The Law of Admiralty 2nd Ed. (1975) Foundation, Mineola, N.Y, at p. 4; Gold, 
ibid at p. 18. 
33 Gold, ibid.
34 Hare, J. Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, (1999) Juta & Co, Cape Town, at p. 6, 
noting a dozen. 
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Marseille, Jerusalem, Barcelona and the island of Oleron.35 Much has been written about 
the codes, in particular the Consolato del Mare of Barcelona and the Rolls of Oléron, 
which contain principles of law and reported cases.36 Not only are the codes a key source 
for the development of modern maritime law, they also provide in certain instances, 
detailed information on the developments at the time. During the later middle ages, or 
medieval period, as trade flourished in the city-states, shipping became increasingly 
regulated. “[T]he regulations of the Italian City States, at any rate, for ensuring the safety 
of life and property at sea were directly in advance of anything known to English Law a 
hundred years ago.”37 For example, the Venetian Statutes provided for limits with respect 
to length and breadth of ships of various sizes, and elaborate regulations on equipment, 
ballasting, stowage and manning.38 In essence, the Venetian Statutes ensured that vessels 
were seaworthy, fully equipped and properly manned. Moreover, contracts of the time 
also addressed the vessel’s seaworthiness. Often the freight contract or charterparty 
included a clause whereby the shipowner undertook to ensure that his vessel was 
seaworthy, properly equipped and fully manned.39 This was intended to secure the safe 
arrival of the merchant’s cargo.40 Interestingly, Genoese contracts from the 13th century 
were often very detailed with regard to the condition of the vessel,41 while Venetian 
contracts tended to be much less detailed due to the fact that such matters were closely 
  
35 See Gold, E. Maritime Transport: The Evolution of International Marine Policy and Shipping Law
(1981) Lexington Books, Toronto, at p. 18-19, who briefly describes each of the cities, except Barcelona, 
and their contribution. Barcelona, and its contribution, the Consolato del Mare, is discussed at p. 27. 
36 Tetley, W. Maritime Liens and Claims 2nd Ed. (1998) Blais, Montreal, Canada, at p. 13-21; Hare, J. 
Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, (1999) Juta & Co, Cape Town, at p. 7-8; 
Gilmore, G. & Black, C. The Law of Admiralty 2nd Ed. (1975) Foundation, Mineola, N.Y, at p. 5-7; Gold, 
ibid at p. 27-28. 
37 Fayle, E. A Short History of the World’s Shipping Industry (1933) Dial Press, New York, at p. 75-76.
38 Fayle, ibid, describes the detail in which the regulations prescribed equipment requirements, the 
supervising of ballasting, and safety requirements such as the towing of a long boat behind the vessel. 
39 Dotson, J. Freight Rates and Shipping Practices in the Medieval Mediterranean (1969) Ph.D. Thesis, 
John Hopkins University, at p. 90.
40 Ibid, at p. 68. 
41 Dotson, ibid, at p. 90 provides an excerpt from a 13th century Genoese contract specifying that the two 
galleys are to be provided with “three boats of eight oars for each boat, and well prepared, armed and 
furnished with one hundred men for each galley with its boat, for each galley twenty of the men are to be 
furnished with armour and [another] twenty [are to be] arbalesters with arbalest of double wood or of horn 
and all the rest of the men are to be armed with fressetis and lances with all the gear and necessities 
sufficient for each galley and with oars necessary for rowing ad planum et aposticium and with sails and 
anchors and cables and all other gear to sufficiency.”
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regulated in Venice.42 In addition, it was practice in Genoa, for the contracts to provide 
for inspections, particularly in cases of voyages overseas to Africa and the Levant.43 A 
representative committee, composed of two to four merchants whose goods were aboard 
the vessel, would inspect the total equipment of the vessel.44 Without the consent of the 
committee, the ship was not allowed to sail, nor could the shipowners delay the sailing 
beyond the date fixed by the contract.45 There were also increased documentary 
requirements. Many of the city-states made it compulsory for vessels to carry a Scribe, 
who kept a book or register detailing the charterparties and agreements along with their 
terms, the crew information, and all goods aboard the vessel including identifying marks 
and their owners.46 An extract from this book was issued to the cargo owners as a 
receipt.47
The liability of a shipowner for loss or damage to goods remained predominantly 
unchanged from Roman times. In general, shipowners were liable for damage to goods, 
but not for the consequences of acts of God or force majeure.48 There were, however, 
variations. For example, under Venetian law, the shipowner was not liable for damage to 
silk goods carried on deck with the shipper’s consent.49 As well, shipowners began to 
benefit from global limitations on liability. The Consulato del Mare provided that the 
liability of each owner or co-owner of the vessel was limited to the value of their share of 
the vessel.50 Similarly, a 13th century Reglement de Valence provided that “The ship 
  
42 Ibid, at p. 91. 
43 Byrne, E. Genoese Shipping in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries (1930) Mediaeval Academy of 
America, Cambridge, Massachusetts, at p. 34. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid, at p. 35. 
46 Mankabady, S. “Comments on the Hamburg Rules” in The Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by 
Sea (1978) S. Mankabady (Ed.), British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Chameleon Press, 
London, at p. 28; Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The 
Hague, Hague-Visby, and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 10; Fayle, E. A 
Short History of the World’s Shipping Industry (1933) Dial Press, New York, at p. 78; Kendall, L. & 
Buckley, J. The Business of Shipping 7th Ed. (2001) Cornell Maritime Press, Maryland, at p. 337.  
47 Mankabady, ibid; Karan, ibid. 
48 Fayle, E. A Short History of the World’s Shipping Industry (1933) Dial Press, New York, at p. 79. Where, 
however, the act of god necessitated sacrifices for the common safety, those losses would fall under general 
average requiring pro rata contributions from cargo interests and the shipowner (Ibid). 
49 Ibid, at p. 78. 
50 Lustgarten, L. “The Liability of the Carrier by Water in Quebec” (1963) B.C.L. Thesis, McGill 
University, at p. 44. 
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owners have no liability than up to their share in the ship – the master of the ship cannot 
make liable the land property of the ship owner without his consent.”51
Liability was also addressed by contract. A charterparty made in 1263 for a 
voyage between Pisa and Bugea, contained a clause stipulating that the shipowner will 
“observe all terms of the contract unless prevented by tempest or other Act of God. The 
penalty for any default is to be double damages.”52 Contractual liability clauses are also 
found in the judgements of the Rolls of Oléron, which reflect a similar legal situation to 
that prevailing in the Mediterranean in the middle ages.53 Due to the prevalence of the 
wine trade in that region, many charterparty clauses relating to liability specifically 
addressed the wine trade.54 For example, liability for loss or damage caused by negligent 
stowage of the casks or using insufficient tackle for discharge was specifically provided 
for by contract.55 Perhaps the strictest liability of the middle ages was found in the 
decrees issued by the Council of the Hanseatic League,56 where calling at an unscheduled 
port or selling the goods without permission was punishable by death.57  
The body of maritime law that emerged from Europe in the middle ages, in 
particular Consolato del Mare of Barcelona and the Rolls of Oléron, served as an 
important basis for later European law. It has been noted that “[t]he maritime laws of 
England and France share a common source, because the written maritime laws of both 
countries began with the Roles of Oléron.”58 In England, the primary source of maritime 
law, was a collection of prior laws that included the Rolls of Oléron, entitled the Black 
Book of Admiralty, compiled sometime during the 14th and 15th centuries.59 During that 
  
51 Ibid.
52 Fayle, E. A Short History of the World’s Shipping Industry (1933) Dial Press, New York, at p. 82. 
53 Ibid, at p. 96. 
54 Ibid, at p. 97. 
55 Ibid.
56 The Hanseatic towns, Hamburg, Lubec, Bremen and others formed a league that stretched from the 
bottom of the Baltic to Cologne on the Rhine (Flanders, H. A Treatise on Maritime Law (1852) Little, 
Boston and Co., Boston, at p. 21-22). 
57 Flanders, ibid.
58 Tetley, W. Maritime Liens and Claims 2nd Ed. (1998) Blais, Montreal, Canada, at p. 27. 
59 Gold, E. Maritime Transport: The Evolution of International Marine Policy and Shipping Law (1981) 
Lexington Books, Toronto, at p. 39, states that it was compiled during the 14th century, and later elaborated 
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time, there was a struggle for jurisdiction between the Courts of Admiralty and the 
common law courts, or Courts of Common Pleas, which continued well into the 19th
century. 60 By the mid-17th century, the Admiralty jurisdiction was significantly reduced, 
and it remained so for the next two hundred years.61 As such, by the mid-17th century in 
England, the jurisdiction of the courts of common law had been extended to include 
maritime litigation.62 The English courts, “by adopting the common carrier’s liability by 
land as the origin of the custom at common law, obliged carrier’s to deliver goods in the 
same state as that in which they had received them, and imposed strict liability on all of 
them regardless of whether they were common carriers or not.”63 There is debate as to the 
origin and the legal foundation of the strict liability of the common carrier;64 however, 
     
during the 15th century. While Tetley, ibid, at p. 31, states that it was first compiled during the reign of 
Henry the VI in the 15th century. 
60 Tetley, ibid, at p. 33-35; Hare, J. Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, (1999) Juta & 
Co, Cape Town, at p. 11-12. 
61 Tetley, ibid, at p. 33; Hare, ibid, at p. 12.
62 Gorton, L. The Concept of the Common Carrier in Anglo-American Law (1971) Laromedelaferl, 
Gothenburg, at p. 94. 
63 Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, 
and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 11. Interestingly enough, “in 
maritime law, there is no good reason for distinguishing between a common carrier, who is a person not 
having any right to refuse to carry goods, and a private carrier, who is one reserving the right to accept 
cargo interests offers, because both of them are carriers undertaking to transport cargo by sea, this 
separation belongs to land transport rather than sea carriage.” (Karan, ibid, at p. 11, f.n. 15). Other authors 
have argued that there is no reason why a carrier should not be characterized as a common carrier, citing 
19th century jurisprudence holding a shipowner liable as a common carrier for refusing to carry the plaintiff 
and his luggage by sea. (Glass, D. & Cashmore, C. Introduction to the Law of Carriage of Goods (1989) 
Sweet & Maxwell, London, at p. 160.) Nevertheless, the distinction between common carriage and private 
carriage has taken on meaning over time. Essentially, all shipowners who “offer their ships as general ships 
for the transit of the goods of any shipper” are common carriers. (Boyd, S. Scrutton on Charterparties and 
Bills of Lading, 20th Ed. (1996) Sweet & Maxwell, London, at p. 200). Where a ship is chartered to one 
shipper and contains an express stipulation in the contract of affreightment, the law does not consider him 
to be a common carrier (Boyd, ibid, at p. 201). The distinction between private and public carriage has 
implications with respect to liability: “The common carrier was chargeable as an insurer of the goods, 
accountable for any damage or loss happening in the course of the conveyance. There were only narrow 
exceptions to this liability…By contrast, the shipowner engaged in private carriage was not subject to 
insurer’s liability, but was only liable for loss or damage to the extent this was proximately caused by a 
breach of an obligation contained in a contract of carriage.” (Bauer, G. “The Measure of Liability for Cargo 
Damage Under Charter Parties: A Second Look” (1990) 21 JMLC 397, at p. 398, quoting Professor 
Schoenbaum). 
64 In Nugent v. Smith (1876) 1 C.P.D. 423 at p. 430, Cockburn C.J. opined that “the strict liability of 
carriers was introduced by custom in the reigns of Elizabeth I and James I as an exception to the ordinary 
rule that bailees were bound to use ordinary care.” (Boyd, S. Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of 
Lading, 20th Ed. (1996) Sweet & Maxwell, London, at p. 203). This view is opposed by Oliver Wendell 
Holmes who argues that strict liability actually predates the law of bailment, and thus the present liability 
of common carriers is a survival of the old law (Holmes, O. The Common Law (1881) Little Brown, 
Boston, at p. 184). For a comprehensive and in-depth discussion of the different theories surrounding the 
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several authors have generally characterized the carrier’s liability as arising from the 
breach of the bailment relationship.65 Moreover, aside from the legal foundation 
underlying the carrier-shipper relationship, there was also a public policy rationale behind 
the onerous liability placed on carriers:  “at common law it was believed that a cargo 
owner who shipped his goods by a marine carrier should be afforded special protection; 
he was prevented, by geographic remoteness, from closely supervising the passage of his 
goods and he was particularly susceptible to collusion between dishonest carriers and 
thieves.”66 The carrier was, however, afforded a measure of protection at common law. 
The carrier would not be held liable for cargo damage provided the damage resulted 
from: i) an act of god, ii) act of public enemies, iii) shipper’s fault, or iv) inherent vice of 
the goods.67 The carrier only benefited from the four exemptions provided that neither his 
fault, nor the fault of his servants, had contributed to the loss.68 In all other instances, the 
carrier was liable regardless of the absence of fault. Given that strict liability was a fairly 
     
origin of carrier liability see Ping-fat, S. Carrier’s Liability under the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg 
Rules (2002) Kluwer Law International, The Hague, at pp. 2 – 9.
65 Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, 
and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 11; De Wit, R. Multimodal 
Transport: Carrier Liability and Documentation (1995) LLP, London, at p. 29. 
66 Sturley, M. Benedict on Admiralty, 6th Ed., Volume 2A (1990) Matthew Bender & Co, New York, at p. 
2-1.  This is essentially a restatement of the original justification for the liability of common carriers. Lord 
Holt in Coggs v. Bernard (1703) 2 Ld.Raym. 909 (K.B.) at p. 918 opined that the reason for the common 
carrier’s liability is to avoid “collusion whereby the carrier may contrive to be robbed on purpose and share 
the spoil.” See also Gilles, S. “Negligence, Strict Liability, and the Cheapest Cost-Avoider” (1992) 78 Va. 
L. Rev. 1291, at p. 1362 – 1367, who examines the rationale in Coggs v. Bernard, along with other 18th
century common carrier liability cases, in the context of a cheapest cost-avoider analysis. 
67 Sturley, M. “History of COGSA and the Hague Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 1, at p. 4; The list of the 
exemptions vary slightly, with Scrutton and Knauth omitting ‘shipper’s fault’ (Boyd, S. Scrutton on 
Charterparties and Bills of Lading, 20th Ed. (1996) Sweet & Maxwell, London, at p. 200; Knauth, A. The 
American Law of Ocean Bills of Lading, 4th Ed. (1953) AMC, Baltimore, at p. 116), and Karan adding a 5th
exemption: general average (Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: 
The Hague, Hague-Visby, and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, p. 12), while 
Carver added jettison (Treitel, G., & Reynolds, F. Carver on Bills of Lading (2001) Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, at p. 421-422). Lord Tenterden, also lists what appears to be the classic three exemptions: “it thus 
appears that at common law a shipowner, like a common carrier, insures the goods he carrier against all 
events but the vice of the goods themselves (b), the act of God (c), or the King’s enemies.” (Tenterden, 
Lord C. A Treatise of the Law Relative to Merchant Ships and Seamen (1901) Shaw & Sons, London, at p. 
586).   
68 There appears to be a divergence in the literature concerning the burden proof with regard to the carrier’s 
fault and the availability of the exemptions. In Sturley, M. “History of COGSA and the Hague Rules” 
(1991) 22 JMLC 1, at p. 4, it is the carrier that must prove that its negligence had not contributed to the loss 
or damage in order to benefit from the exemptions. Where as according to Karan, the carrier was able to 
benefit from the exemptions provided cargo interests were unable to prove that the loss or damage had been 
occasioned by the fault of the carrier (Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime 
Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at 
p. 12). 
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rare occurrence at that time, in many instances carriers have been described as an 
“insurer” of the goods.69 This level of strict liability imposed on the carrier was not 
unique to England; rather this approach was adopted both in common law nations, 
including the United States,70 and in civilian nations.71
Although a similar level of strict liability was found in French law, the theoretical 
foundation for such liability in France differed slightly from the English approach. In 
France, the droit commun places the carrier under a very strict obligation de résultat, 
meaning that “the contracting party undertakes a duty to obtain the required result”.72 The 
shipowner is therefore under the obligation to ensure that the cargo is delivered in the 
same quantity and condition to the specified destination. The result is that the carrier is 
presumed liable for any loss or damage to the goods unless he can prove that he falls 
within the narrow range of exonerating circumstances that amount to forces majeures or 
cas fortuits.73 Note that the notion of forces majeure, it stricter than the notion of act of 
God, in that it must be imprévisible, or unforeseeable, and inévitable, or inevitable.74
Other continental systems, such as Dutch law and Belgian law, held the carrier liable in 
  
69 Knauth, A. The American Law of Ocean Bills of Lading, 4th Ed. (1953) AMC, Baltimore, at p. 116; 
Maude, F. & Polluck, C. Law of Merchant Shipping (1881) Henry Sweet, London, at p. 76; Temperley, R. 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924 (1932) Steven & Sons, London, at pp. 44-45; Tenterden, Lord C. A 
Treatise of the Law Relative to Merchant Ships and Seamen (1901) Shaw & Sons, London,, at p. 586; Best
CJ in Riley v. Horne (1828) 130 ER 1044 (Com Pleas), at p. 1045 held that the carrier is liable as “an 
insurer” with the rationale being, “In a state of society such as that we live in – in which we are supplied 
with the necessaries and conveniences of life by an interchange of the produce of the soil and industry of 
every part of the world – so much property must be entrusted to carriers, that is of great importance that the 
laws relating to the carriage of goods should be rendered simple and intelligible; and that they should be 
such as to provide for the safe conveyance of property…”; The United States Supreme Court in Niagara v. 
Cordes, 62 U.S. 7 (1858) held that common carriers by water, like common carriers by land, in the absence 
of legislative provisions providing otherwise, are insurers of the goods, and as such are liable for all loss or 
damage. 
70 Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, 
and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 12.
71 Sturley, M. “History of COGSA and the Hague Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 1, at p. 4. 
72 De Wit, R. Multimodal Transport: Carrier Liability and Documentation (1995) LLP, London, at p. 33-
34.
73 Song, S. A Comparative Study on Maritime Cargo Carrier’s Liability in Anglo-American and French 
Laws (1970) PhD Thesis, Cornell University, Ann Arbor, Michigan Arbor, Michigan, at p. 124; De Wit, 
ibid, at p. 34 provides the four exceptions: cas fortuity, force majeure, vice proper de la chose and faute 
d’un tiers ou de créancier. The first two translate to coincidence and overwhelming force, which are 
considered to be when there is a force against which the debtor is helpless. While the third is inherent 
defect, and the fourth is fault of the creditor. 
74 Clarke, M.A. Aspects of the Hague Rules: A Comparative Study in English and French Law (1976) 
Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, at p. 121. 
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the same manner as under the French droit commun.75 German law did as well, holding 
the shipowner liable for loss or damage to goods, unless the existence of overwhelming 
force, or force majeure, or inherent vice of the goods or their packing, could be proven.76
In England, the common law emphasised the care and custody of the goods, as 
exemplified by the characterization of the carrier as a bailee for reward,77 conversely in 
France the emphasis was placed on the seaworthiness of the ship.78 The suitability of the 
ship was paramount, deriving from the notion of louage de chose, or letting, wherein the 
thing let would be fit for the purpose intended, thus a horse would be sound for ridding 
and a vessel fit for the sea.79 This principle is found in the French maritime legislation of 
the time. In 1681, Louis the XIV, under the direction of the Finance Minister Colbert, 
promulgated L’Ordonnace de la Marine, which was a national maritime code unique on 
the continent at the time.80 It had its roots in Roman law, the Hanseatic League, Rolls of 
Oléron, and the Consolato del Mare,81 but for the first time a code was created that 
“would complete the law already in existence and would reconcile and digest the great 
variety of ancient customary usages into one consistent and uniform body of positive 
legislation.”82 Article 12 of L’Ordonnace de la Marine stipulated that “Le capitaine perd 
son fret et répond des dommages-intérêts de l’affréteur, si celui-ci prouve que lorsque le 
  
75 De Wit, R. Multimodal Transport: Carrier Liability and Documentation (1995) LLP, London, at p. 34. 
76 Ibid, at p. 35. This however changed with the 1897 Handelsgesetzbuch, or German Commercial Code, 
where the carrier became liable for loss or damage caused by circumstances which a normally diligent 
carrier could not avoid (Ibid). 
77 Coggs v. Bernard (1703) 2 Ld.Raym. 909 (K.B.), at p. 918 “The law charges this person, thus entrusted, 
to carry goods against all events, but acts of God, and of the enemies of the king. For though the force be 
never so great, as if an irresistible multitude of people should rob him, nevertheless he is chargeable.”
78 Clarke, M.A. Aspects of the Hague Rules: A Comparative Study in English and French Law (1976) 
Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, at p. 113. 
79 Ibid, at p. 114. 
80 Li, M. L’Etat de Navigabilité du Navire (2005) D.E.S.S. Thesis, Université de Droit, D’Economie et des 
Sciences D’Aix-Marseille, France. Available online at: www.cdmt.droit.u-3mrs.fr, at p. 5; Hughes, R. 
Handbook of Admiralty Law, 2nd Ed. (1920) West Pub. Co., St. Paul, Minnesota, at p. 6 has rather 
whimsically commented that “The Ordonnance de la Marine of Louis XIV vindicates France from the 
charge that her people are not fitted for maritime enterprise. It was published in 1681, and is a learned and 
accurate digest of marine law and usages.” Flanders, H. A Treatise on Maritime Law (1852) Little, Boston 
and Co., Boston, at p. 24, has described L’Ordonnance as a “monument of wisdom and learning.”
81 Gold, E. Maritime Transport: The Evolution of International Marine Policy and Shipping Law (1981) 
Lexington Books, Toronto, at p. 54; Tetley, W. Maritime Liens and Claims 2nd Ed. (1998) Blais, Montreal, 
Canada, at p. 24. 
82 Gold, ibid. 
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navire a fait voile, it était hors d’état de naviguer.”83 Thus, should the shipper be able to 
demonstrate that when the vessel set sail she was unseaworthy, the Captain forfeits his 
right to freight and is responsible for any damages suffered by the shipper. Later, this 
exact provision was reproduced in Article 297 of the French code de commerce of 
1807.84
A brief review of certain key developments in carrier liability over the last few 
thousand years, demonstrates that in effect, carrier liability for loss or damage to goods 
remained fairly consistent.  The nature and number of exempted perils fluctuated from 
Roman times, to Medieval Europe, to the common law liability of England, America and 
Continental Europe, however at no time was the carrier’s own fault or negligence 
excused. Carrier’s liability, which for two thousand years had in effect been strict 
liability, was about to change. This change would come about not through judicial or 
legislative means, but rather through changes in market forces brought on by 
advancements in shipping. 
1.2. THE CONTRACTUAL ORIGINS OF THE NAUTICAL FAULT 
EXEMPTION
At common law, the carrier is entitled to limit his liability for nautical fault.85 In 
order to minimize exposure to liability under the common law regime, contractual 
exemptions from liability in the bills of lading became popular practice near the end of 
  
83 Li, M. L’Etat de Navigabilité du Navire (2005) D.E.S.S. Thesis, Université de Droit, D’Economie et des 
Sciences D’Aix-Marseille, France. Available online at: www.cdmt.droit.u-3mrs.fr, at p. 5; Clarke, M.A. 
Aspects of the Hague Rules: A Comparative Study in English and French Law (1976) Martinus Nijhoff, 
The Hague, at p. 114.
84 Clarke, ibid; Li, ibid; Tetley, W. “The Lack of Uniformity and the Very Unfortunate State of Maritime 
Law in Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom and France” [1987] LMCLQ 340, at p. 342, has 
argued that the 1807 code de commerce is one of the great national laws, on the basis of its international 
and long-term success. 
85 Lyon v Mells (1804) 102 ER 1134 (K.B.), per Lord Ellenborough at 1138; Steel v State Line SS Co 
(1877) 3 A.C. 72 (H.L.), at 88 per Lord Blackburn; See Ping-fat, S. Carrier’s Liability under the Hague, 
Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules (2002) Kluwer Law International, The Hague, at p. 90.  
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the nineteenth century.86 Previously, in the mid 18th century, carriers had attempted to 
escape the severe common law liability through contractual exemptions, however, the 
adverse reactions from cargo interests restricted this practice.87 The only exemption the 
shipowner was able to secure in the 18th century was for liability as a result of “dangers 
of the sea.”88 Indeed, a bill of lading issued in 1713 stipulated that the shipowner was not 
responsible for cargo loss or damage resulting from “the Danger of the Seas”.89 In the 
intervening century however, the nature of shipping fundamentally changed. The 
financial position of the shipowner was greatly improved both by technological 
advancements in shipping, such as steam power and steel,90 and by the increase in world 
trade.91 As the shipowner’s bargaining power increased, the scope of his liability to cargo 
interests decreased. In its initial form, the exemption only provided an excuse for “errors 
in navigation” where there had been no negligence on the part of the shipowner, however 
as the carriers’ bargaining power increased this was expanded over time to include errors 
in management.92 The exemption clause for ‘error in navigation and management of the 
vessel’ therefore “originated in the nineteenth century subsequent to the advent of 
  
86 Tetley, W. Marine Cargo Claims, 4th Ed., Ch. 16, at p. 2. Available online only at: 
http://tetley.law.mcgill.ca/maritime; Wilson, J.F. Carriage of Goods by Sea, 3rd Ed. (1998) Pitman, 
London, at p. 256. 
87 Todd, P. Modern Bills of Lading, 2nd Ed. (1990) Blackwell Law, Oxford, at p. 136; As a result of a 1795 
case, Smith v. Sheppard, wherein the strict liability of carriers was exemplified, the shipowners became so 
alarmed that, according to Lord Tenterden, they attempted to have a bill passed that would limit their 
common law liability. The bill passed the Commons but was thrown out by the Lords, and thus the 
shipowners were left attempting to alter their liability by contract. (Boyd, S. Scrutton on Charterparties 
and Bills of Lading, 20th Ed. (1996) Sweet & Maxwell, London, at p. 208). 
88 Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, 
and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 13.
89 Kendall, L. & Buckley, J. The Business of Shipping 7th Ed. (2001) Cornell Maritime Press, Maryland, at 
p. 339-340. 
90 McDowell, C. & Gibbs, H. Ocean Transportation (1954) McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, at pp. 27-
30 describes the advent of the steamship in 1807 and subsequent developments throughout the 19th century. 
Palmer, S. Politics, Shipping and the Repeal of the Navigation Laws (1990) Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, at p. 8, notes that the fist commercial use of steam was the Clyde, that went into service in 
1812. It nevertheless took time to develop. Steam use on the Irish Sea and coastal routes developed in the 
1920s, with the trans-Atlantic trade developing only in the 1940s. (Palmer, ibid¸ at p. 8). 
91 Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, 
and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 13. 
92 Wilson, J.F. Carriage of Goods by Sea, 3rd Ed. (1998) Pitman, London, at p. 256; Gosse Millerd v. 
Canadian Government Merchant Marine [1927] 29 Ll. L. Rep. 190 (C.A.), at p. 91, Lord Justice Scrutton 
discussed the original wording of the contractual exemption: “The original wording of the English bills was 
either ‘perils of navigation’, ‘negligence in navigations’, ‘negligence in the cause of the voyage’.”
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steamships and the handling of complicated machinery.”93 As the nature of shipping 
fundamentally changed, the documentation changed along with it: “The rapid 
development of ocean steamers, built of iron and steel, with Scotch boilers, reciprocating 
engines and screw propellers, in the decades following the Civil War, resulted in a great 
expansion of safe and rapid ocean trade, accompanied by an elaboration of shipping 
documents, banker’s drafts, bills of lading, insurance policies, and devices for the 
assertion of subrogated tort and contract claims for losses and damages and for avoiding 
or defending such claims.”94 It has been noted that by virtue of the superior bargaining 
power of the ship owners, extensive exculpatory clauses were inserted into the bills of 
lading resulting in virtually little or no liability on the part of the carriers.95 In particular, 
  
93 Lee, S & Kim, S. “A Carrier’s Liability for Commercial Default and Default in Navigation or 
Management of the Vessel.” (2000) 27 Transp. L.J. 205 at p. 210. 
94 Knauth, A. The American Law of Ocean Bills of Lading, 4th Ed. (1953) AMC, Baltimore, at p. 119. 
95 Sturley, M. Benedict on Admiralty, 6th Ed., Volume 2A (1990) Matthew Bender & Co, New York, at p. 
2-1 to 2-2. Knauth, A. The American Law of Ocean Bills of Lading, 4th Ed. (1953) AMC, Baltimore, at p 
116, has noted that a shipowner was able to carry goods “when he liked, as he liked, and wherever he 
liked.”  The lack of responsibility on the part of carriers has been judicially noticed in a rather amusing 
fashion by the 9th Circuit in Tessler Bros v. Italpacific Line 1974 AMC 937; 494 F.2d 438 (9 Cir 1974): 
“The plight of cargo owners was aptly expressed in Them Damaged Cargo Blues, by James A. Quinby: 
It is much to be regretted, 
That your goods are slightly wetted, 
But our lack of liability is plain. 
For our latest Bill of Lading, 
Which is proof against evading, 
Bears exceptions for sea water, rust and rain. 
Also sweat, contamination, 
Fire and all depreciation, 
That we’ve ever seen or heard of on a ship. 
And our due examination, 
Which we made at destination, 
Shows your cargo much improved by the trip. 
It really is a crime, 
That you’re wasting all your time, 
For our Bill of Lading clauses make it plain, 
That from ullage, rust or seepage, 
Water, sweat or just plain leakage,
Act of God, restraint of princess, theft or war, 
Loss, damage or detention, 
Lock out, strike or circumvention, 
Blockade, interdict or loss twixt ship and shore,
Quarantine or heavy weather, 
Fog and rain or both together, 
We’re protected from all these and many more. 
And it’s very plain to see, 
That our liability, 
As regards your claim is absolutely nil. 
So try your underwriter, 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
20
shipowners inserted clauses exempting themselves from the negligence of both 
themselves and their servants.96 The exemption clauses had become all encompassing, so 
much so that it inspired one commentator remark that “there seems to be no other 
obligation on a ship owner than to receive the freight.”97 The analysis regarding the 
liability of the shipowner therefore shifted from a fault based analysis to a contractual 
analysis. Lord Tenterden remarked at the time that “The question is, not whether the loss 
happened by reason of the negligence of the persons employed in the conveyance of the 
goods, but whether it was occasioned by any of those causes, which either according to 
the general rules of law, or the particular contract of the parties, afford an excuse for the 
non-performance of the contract.”98 With regard to relations between the parties, the 
result of the proliferation of exemption clauses proved chaotic. At the time, US Congress 
remarked that bankers were in doubt as to the validity of their security against bills of 
lading, the cargo underwriters were unaware of the risks they had covered when issuing 
the policies, and carriers and shippers were in constant litigation.99
In France, the provisions of the code de commerce with their focus on the vessel 
proved to be inadequate to deal with the expanding liner trade, and therefore the carrier’s 
liability became rooted in the general law of obligations,100 found in article 1147 of the 
code civil.101 The result is that carriage was subject to the general law of contractual 
     
He’s a friendly sort of blighter, 
And is pretty sure to grin and foot the bill.”
(Also quoted in Kendall, L. & Buckley, J. The Business of Shipping 7th Ed. (2001) Cornell Maritime Press, 
Maryland, at p. 334.) 
96 Tenterden, Lord C. A Treatise of the Law Relative to Merchant Ships and Seamen, 14th Ed. (1901) Shaw 
& Sons, London, at p. 587. 
97 Scrutton, T. Charterparties and Bill of Lading (1984) at p. 210, as cited in Lee, S & Kim, S. “A Carrier’s 
Liability for Commercial Default and Default in Navigation or Management of the Vessel.” (2000) 27 
Transp. L.J. 205, at p. 209.
98 Tenterden, Lord C. A Treatise of the Law Relative to Merchant Ships and Seamen, 14th Ed. (1901) Shaw 
& Sons, London, at p. 579. 
99 79 Cong. Rec. 4757, quoted in Sturley, M. Benedict on Admiralty, 6th Ed., Volume 2A (1990) Matthew 
Bender & Co, New York, at p. 2-3. See also Wolfson, R. “The English and French Carriage of Goods by 
Sea Enactments” (1955) 4 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 508, at p. 508, describing the demand for legislative action 
to remove the chaos and abuse that had resulted from the existence of an unlimited freedom of contract. 
100 Clarke, M.A. Aspects of the Hague Rules: A Comparative Study in English and French Law (1976) 
Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, at p. 115. 
101 French Civil Code, 1804, art. 1147: Le débiteur est condamné, s’il y a lieu, au payment de dommages et 
intérêts, soit à raison de l’inexécution de l’obligation, soit à raison du retard dans l’exécution, toutes les 
fois qu’il ne justifie pas que l’inexécution provident d’une cause étrangère qui ne peut lui être imputée, 
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obligations, with the carrier’s primary obligation under contract to deliver the goods at 
the destination in the same good order and condition as received, failing that he was 
presumed liable, unless he could prove that his failure to perform his obligation was due 
to a cause étrangère.102 Carriers were nevertheless able to make use of exemption 
clauses, as art. 1134 of the code civil espoused the general principle of freedom of 
contract.103 Shippers protested that such exemption clauses were against public order,104
however, the French Cour de Cassation upheld exemption clauses inserted in bills of 
lading.105
The repercussions of the changes in shipping were not only amongst the parties to 
the bills of lading, but became a concern amongst certain governments at the time. 
Despite having a strong merchant fleet in the earlier part of the 19th century,106 by the mid 
19th century however the American owned fleet began to decrease in size as wealthy 
investors found more profitable alternatives in railroads and factories.107 What did remain 
of the American flag merchant fleet was all but destroyed by the Civil War several years 
later.108 The decline in the American fleet was drastic. “Whereas in 1860 two thirds of all 
     
encore qu’il n’y ait aucune mauvaise foi de sa part. [Author’s translation: The debtor is ordered to pay 
damages and interest, should there be any, that result from his failure to perform the obligation, or by his 
delay in performance, provided the failure to perform cannot be justified by a cause étrangère and an 
absence of bad faith on his part.]
102 Clarke, M.A. Aspects of the Hague Rules: A Comparative Study in English and French Law (1976) 
Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, at p. 116. 
103 Art. 1134 of the French Civil Code, 1804, espoused the general principle of contractual freedom, 
provided it is not illegal or contrary to public policy.
104 Sauvage, F. Du Transport des Merchandises par Mer (1955) Pichon et Durand-Auzias, Paris, at p. 8. 
105 It was held by the Cour de Cassation on several occasions in the late 19th century that carriers were 
entitled to rely on the faults of their master and crew. The Cour de Cassation accepted the validity of the 
exoneration clause in their decision of 23 février 1864, D. 1864.1.167, while in their decision of 23 juillet 
1878, S. 1879.1.423, they set aside a judgment by the Tribunal de Commerce d’Algiers holding that an 
exemption for the fault of the crew was contrary to public order. (Song, S. A Comparative Study on 
Maritime Cargo Carrier’s Liability in Anglo-American and French Laws (1970) PhD Thesis, Cornell 
University, Ann Arbor, Michigan, at p. 219 and p.220); See also Sauvage, F. Les Clauses de Non-
Responsabilité des Fautes dans le Contrat de Transport Par Mer en France et a L’Étranger (1910) Pichon 
et Durand-Auzias, Paris, at p. 127-129, detailing judgments from the late 19th century validating exemption 
clauses. 
106 McDowell, C. & Gibbs, H. Ocean Transportation (1954) McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, at p. 21 
describes 1800-1840 as the most glorious period in American Maritime history, with over 90% of the 
country’s imports and exports carried on American vessels. 
107 Sweeney. J “The Prism of COGSA” (1999) 30 JMLC 543, at p. 549. 
108 The American Civil War began in 1861 and lasted until 1865. Sweeney. ibid, at p. 551; McDowell, C. & 
Gibbs, H. Ocean Transportation (1954) McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York, at p. 20-23, describing the 
changes in American shipping from the war of Independence to the Civil War; Safford, J. “The Decline of 
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export and import tonnage was carried in American bottoms, this had fallen by 1866 to 
thirty percent, and nine years later to twenty-seven percent…The decline continued at a 
precipitous rate; in 1881 it was sixteen percent and in 1910 it was but 8.7 percent.”109
Conversely, Great Britain’s merchant fleet, supported by the Royal Navy, “ruled the 
waves”.110 In the mid-19th century, the British fleet was more than twice the size of its 
nearest maritime rival, the United States.111 Not only was the British fleet superior in size 
and numbers but in organization as well, for in 1874, the first modern P&I Club, 
Steamship Owners’ Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association was organized.112
By the late 19th century, cargo owning and shipping interests were lobbying the 
United States government to alter the balance that had become so heavily weighted in 
favour of the British shipowners113 Similarly, French shippers were not pleased with the 
situation, however unlike their American counterparts, they had managed to obtain a few 
measures of protection through legislation.114 A particular point of indignation was a 
     
the American Merchant Marine, 1850-1914: A Historiographical Appraisal” in Change and Adaptation in 
Maritime History: The North Atlantic Fleets in the Nineteenth Century (1985) Fischer, L. & Panting, G. 
(Eds.) Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. Johns, at p. 53, noting that the Civil War wreaked havoc 
on the American shipping industry; Kendall, L. & Buckley, J. The Business of Shipping 7th Ed. (2001) 
Cornell Maritime Press, Maryland, at p. 8. 
109 Safford, J. “The Decline of the American Merchant Marine, 1850-1914: A Historiographical Appraisal” 
in Change and Adaptation in Maritime History: The North Atlantic Fleets in the Nineteenth Century (1985) 
Fischer, L. & Panting, G. (Eds.) Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. Johns, at p. 53. 
110 Sweeney. J “The Prism of COGSA” (1999) 30 JMLC 543, at p. 551. By 1900, it has been estimated that 
52% of the world’s shipping was carried by the British merchant marine (Howarth, Sovereign of the Seas, 
at cited by Sweeney, J. “Happy Birthday Harter: A Reappraisal of the Harter Act on its 100th Anniversary” 
(1993) 24 JMLC 1, at p. 9, f.n. 39). It has also been estimated that at the time, that nearly all of the 
American export trade was carried by 20 British liner companies (Knauth, A. The American Law of Ocean 
Bills of Lading, 4th Ed. (1953) AMC, Baltimore, at p. 120). 
111 Palmer, S. Politics, Shipping and the Repeal of the Navigation Laws (1990) Manchester University 
Press, Manchester, at p. 1-2; Palmer, S. “The British Shipping Industry, 1850-1914” in Change and 
Adaptation in Maritime History: The North Atlantic Fleets in the Nineteenth Century (1985) Fischer, L. & 
Panting, G. (Eds), Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. Johns, at p. 89 noting that “the sailing 
tonnage of the United States amounted to 1.5. million tons against Britain’s 3.4 million.”
112 Sweeney. J “The Prism of COGSA” (1999) 30 JMLC 543, at p. 552. 
113 US cargo interests, however, were not the only ones lobbying their government. In 1890, the Glasgow 
Corn Trade Association complained to the British Prime Minister that “carrier’s bills of lading are so 
unreasonable and unjust in their terms as to exempt [the carriers] from almost every conceivable risk and 
responsibility.” (Sturley, M. “History of COGSA and the Hague Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 1, at p. 10). 
French cargo interests shared the same concerns as well (Ibid). 
114 The position of the shippers was recognized in article 353 of the code commercial which allowed 
insurance against the negligence or faults of the master and crew, which is significant given that French 
public policy was opposed to allowing insurance against negligence. As well, the shipper had the benefit of 
articles 221 and 222 of the code commerciale which imposed heavy personal responsibility on the master 
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result of the appearance of bills of lading “which not only excused the carrier from every 
negligence, but also imposed a lien on the cargo for any indebtedness of the cargo owner, 
whether connected with the particular shipment or wholly unrelated thereto...”115 In 1889, 
the Supreme Court of the United States, proceeded in a unanimous decision to invalidate 
exemption clauses for negligence on the grounds of public policy.116 In effect, these 
clauses became valid on one side of the Atlantic and invalid on the other, as British 
courts were willing to enforce such clauses on the basis of liberty or freedom of contract, 
much as their French counterparts had.117 In response to the decisions of the American 
courts, British carriers began inserting forum selection clauses stipulating England and 
applicable law clauses providing for English law.118 It has been noted that “before the 
American courts could invalidate these new clauses in turn, Congress acted to protect
     
where there was loss or damage to cargo. (Song, S. A Comparative Study on Maritime Cargo Carrier’s 
Liability in Anglo-American and French Laws (1970) PhD Thesis, Cornell University, Ann Arbor, 
Michigan, at p. 220)
115 Knauth, A. The American Law of Ocean Bills of Lading, 4th Ed. (1953) AMC, Baltimore, at p. 120. 
116 Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Insurance Co., 129 U.S. 397 (1889). In this instance 
cargo, shipped in a British ship from New York to Liverpool, was lost due to the negligent actions of the 
crew in grounding the vessel near Holyhead, Wales. The bill of lading contained a clause exempting the 
shipowner from “negligence, default, or error in judgment of the master, mariners, engineers, or others of 
the crew…” (Ibid. at p. 438). Justice Gray wrote “…the ordinary contract of a carrier does involve an 
obligation on his part to use due care and skill in navigating the vessel and carrying the goods; and as it is 
everywhere held, an exception, in the bill of lading, of perils of the sea or other specified perils does not 
excusing him from that obligation, or exempt him from liability for loss or damage from one of those perils 
to which the negligence of himself or his servants has contributed…It [is] against the public policy of the 
law to allow stipulations which will relieve [the carrier] from the exercise of care or diligence, or which, in 
other words, will excuse it for negligence in the performance of its duty, the company remains liable for 
such negligence.” (Ibid at p. 438 and 441). It should be noted though that the U.S. Federal Courts had been 
invalidating such clauses on the grounds of public policy for decades prior to the Supreme Court judgment. 
See Niagara v. Cordes, 62 US 7 (1858), as well as The Branthford City, 29 F 373 (1886). 
117 See The Ferro [1893] P. 38, enforcing and applying such a clause, as well as Tattersall v. National 
Steamship Co. (1884) 12 Q.B. Div. 297. See also Lord Justice Scrutton opining on the acceptability of such 
defences in the 19th cen. English courts in Gosse, Millerd, Ltd. v. Canadian Government Merchant Marine 
(1927) 29 Ll. L. Rep. 190 at pp. 190-191 (H.L.). It has been noted however, that with regard to the 
enforcement of such clauses that the English courts were more lenient then their French counterparts, and 
thus English carriers were subject to less liability than the French shipowners. (Clarke, M.A. Aspects of the 
Hague Rules: A Comparative Study in English and French Law (1976) Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, at p. 
117). 
118 Sweeney, J. “Happy Birthday Harter: A Reappraisal of the Harter Act on its 100th Anniversary” (1993) 
24 JMLC 1. at p. 8. 
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American public policy.”119 The result, the Harter Act, has been described as “originally 
conceived as an instrument of international trade war.”120
1.3. INCORPORATION INTO STATUTE: THE HARTER ACT
The drafters of the Harter Act were not the first to contemplate a compromise 
between cargo and carriers in the form of certain mandatory duties, in exchange for 
exemption regarding matters of navigation. In 1882, a committee established by the 
International Law Association, consisting of Liverpool merchants, shipowners, 
underwriters and lawyers prepared a model bill of lading that could be adopted 
voluntarily by shipping interests that included such as compromise.121 “The carrier should 
be liable for negligence ‘in all matters relating to the ordinary course of the voyage’ such 
as the stowage and care of cargo, but should be exempt from liability for ‘accidents of 
navigation’ even though losses might be attributable to the negligence of the crew.”122
The International Law Association’s efforts in the end were unsuccessful, as a final 
agreement was never reached.123 One of the notable shortcomings was the fact that the 
different interests of various trades were not taken into consideration.124 The initiatives of 
the International Law Association did not go unnoticed by the United States, as a 
Congressional Report on the first bill concerning exemption clauses in bills of lading did 
note their efforts.125
  
119 Ibid. Technically, Sweeney’s statement should be restricted to the U.S. courts, as the U.S. Federal Court 
had already held in 1886 that the exclusive law and jurisdiction clauses were against public policy. See The 
Branthford City 29 F 373 (1886). 
120 Yiannopolous, A. Negligence Clauses in Ocean Bills of Lading (1962) Louisiana State University Press, 
Louisiana, at p. 46. 
121 Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, 
and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 15; Sturley, M. “History of COGSA 
and the Hague Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 1, at p. 6-7; Mandelbaum, S. “International Ocean Shipping and 
Risk Allocation for Cargo Loss, Damage and Delay: A U.S. Approach to COGSA, Hague-Visby, Hamburg 
and the Multimodal Rules” (1995) 5 J. Transnational L. & Policy 1, at p. 10. 
122 Sturley, ibid.
123 This was owing to difficulties of the parties to reach consensus concerning the division of liability and 
exemptions (Ibid).
124 Comité Maritime International, The Travaux Preparatoires of the International Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading of 25 August 1924, The Hague Rules, and of 
the Protocols of 23 February 1968 and 21 December 1979, The Hague-Visby Rules (1997) CMI 
Headquarters Pub., Antwerpen, Belgium, at p. 17. 
125 Sturley, M. “History of COGSA and the Hague Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 1, at p. 10, f.n. 61. 
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Nevertheless, the first truly successful compromise between the carriers and 
shipping interests was achieved when the Harter Act was enacted in 1893.126 It has been 
described as follows: “[A] shipowner should not be entitled to contract out of liability to 
exercise due diligence to make the ship seaworthy but that, once the voyage had begun, 
he should be entitled to rely on certain exemptions including those of negligent 
navigation and negligent management of the ship.”127 This compromise bore itself out in 
the wording of s.3 of the Harter Act, entitled “Limitation of Liability for Errors of 
Navigation, Dangers of the Sea and Acts of God” which stipulated: “If the owner of 
vessel transporting merchandise or property to or from any port in the United States of 
America shall exercise due diligence to make the said vessel in all respects seaworthy and 
properly manned, equipped and supplied, neither the vessel, her owner or owners, agent, 
or charterers, shall become or be held responsible for damage or loss resulting from faults 
or errors in navigation or in the management of said vessel…”.128  
The primary purpose of the bill, that was to become the Harter Act, was the 
protection of United States cargo owners against the English monopoly.129 Congressman 
Harter explained to the House: “[The bill] is a measure which deprives nobody of any 
right, but which by its operation deprive some foreign steamship companies of certain 
privileges which for many years they have exercised, to the great disadvantage of 
American commerce.”130 Similarly, Justice Brown, in The Delaware, when opining on 
the Harter Act commented that “the evil to be remedied being one produced by the 
  
126 “It was the first national statute which established a compromise between carriers’ and shippers’ 
interests by mitigating the strict nature of the common law, limiting the long list of exemption clauses, and 
nullifying unreasonable clauses in the list.” Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime 
Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at 
p. 19. See also Wheeler, E. “The Harter Act: Recent Legislation in the United States Respecting Bills of 
Lading” (1899) 33 ALR 801, at p. 801. 
127 Diamond, A. “The Hague-Visby Rules” [1978] LMLCQ 225, at p. 263. 
128 46 U.S.C. § 192.  
129 Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, 
and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 20; Sturley, M. “History of COGSA 
and the Hague Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 1, at p. 13. In particular, the Bill was regarded as a trade protection 
measure, particularly for Midwestern grain farmers and flour millers (Sturley, ibid). 
130 Sturley, ibid.
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oppressive clauses forced upon the shippers of goods by the vessel owners.”131
Originally, the bill strongly favoured cargo interests, prohibiting clauses that weakened or 
reduced the obligations to furnish a seaworthy vessel or reduced the obligation to care for 
the cargo.132 There was concern however that the objective of the bill would impede the 
ability of United States shipowners to compete with the English carriers, therefore 
exemptions such as nautical fault were added,133 and the absolute duty to furnish a 
seaworthy ship was reduced to a due diligence obligation.134 Congressman Lind, 
speaking to the House on the Senate amendments to the bill, explained the rationale: 
“Now, after a master, owner, or charterer has taken every precaution that human 
ingenuity can suggest in equipping, manning, and in furnishing his vessel, nevertheless, if 
out on the high seas in stress of weather or in storms, when every man is worn out with 
watching, if a man falls asleep on the watch or commits any fault f navigation whereby 
injury results, the master, owner, or charterer is held responsible under the law. To this 
extent the bill relieves domestic shipping from those burdens.”135 The original nautical 
fault exemption was narrower as it excused the carrier from liability “for damage or loss 
resulting from error of judgment in navigation or in the management of said vessel, if 
navigated with ordinary skill and care.”136 The exemption was expanded when the bill 
was amended by the Senate to cover “loss or damage resulting from faults or errors in 
navigation or in the management” of the vessel thus removing the qualification that it be 
navigated with ordinary care or skill.137 Carver has characterized the reasoning at the time 
for the nautical fault exemption as resulting from “partly the idea that the master when at 
sea was out of control of the carrier, partly an assumption that it was difficult to prove 
what a master should have done in particular circumstances, and also an assumption that 
the master and crew would in any case act prudently in navigation in the interests of their 
  
131 The Delaware, 161 U.S. 459 (1896) at p. 474.
132 Sturley, M. “History of COGSA and the Hague Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 1, at p. 12. 
133 Sweeney, J. “Happy Birthday Harter: A Reappraisal of the Harter Act on its 100th Anniversary” (1993) 
24 JMLC 1, at p. 12.
134 Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, 
and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 20.
135 Quoted in Sweeney, J. “Happy Birthday Harter: A Reappraisal of the Harter Act on its 100th
Anniversary” (1993) 24 JMLC 1, at p. 12, f.n. 49.
136 Michael Harter introducing the legislation, H.R. 9176, 52d Cong., 1st Sess (1892), as quoted by Sturley, 
M. “History of COGSA and the Hague Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 1, at p. 12-13, quoted also by Sweeney, 
ibid, at p. 12-13.  
137 Sturley, ibid, at p. 14. 
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own safety and that of the owner’s property.”138 It has been argued however that the 
eventual scope of the provision was intended to be significantly less expansive. 
“Apparently, with negligent navigation the drafters had in mind the idea of immunizing 
the owners only from liability for catastrophic losses in collisions or groundings, but they 
used language which could easily be expanded to include all acts of seamanship 
occurring on a vessel.”139 Although, this is difficult to confirm as “the record is 
lamentably void as to the bargaining that produced these policy-based defences in the 
unreported committee hearings and unrecorded proceedings in the House and Senate.”140
After the Senate had amended the bill, it was viewed that “the result was a more balanced 
compromise between cargo and carrier interests.”141 The amended bill passed through the 
Senate without debate, the House concurred with the amendments without any dissent, 
and therefore President Harrison signed it on the 13th of February 1893.142
1.4. PROLIFERATION OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION
The Harter Act proved to influence other nations, as just over a decade later 
similar legislation had been enacted in several countries.143 Australia,144 New Zealand,145
Canada,146 and Morocco,147 Fiji,148 all adopted legislation styled after Harter.149 Other 
  
138 Treitel, G., & Reynolds, F. Carver on Bills of Lading (2001) Sweet & Maxwell, London, at p. 447. 
139 Sweeney, J. “UNCITRAL and The Hamburg Rules – The Risk Allocation Problem in Maritime 
Transport of Goods” (1991) 22 JMLC 511, at p. 516.
140 Sweeney. J “The Prism of COGSA” (1999) 30 JMLC 543, at p. 553-554.
141 Sturley, M. “History of COGSA and the Hague Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 1, at p. 13, although Sturley 
notes that regardless of the compromise the prime purpose remained the protection of domestic cargo 
interests from British carriers. 
142 Sturley, ibid, at p. 14; Sweeney, J. “Happy Birthday Harter: A Reappraisal of the Harter Act on its 100th
Anniversary” (1993) 24 JMLC 1, at p. 12-13.
143 Sweeney. J “The Prism of COGSA” (1999) 30 JMLC 543, at p. 555; Knauth, A. The American Law of 
Ocean Bills of Lading, 4th Ed. (1953) AMC, Baltimore, at p. 122; Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under 
International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen 
Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 20; Sturley, ibid, at p. 15-18. 
144 Sea Carriage of Goods Act, 3 Commonwealth Acts 37 (1904). 
145 Shipping and Seaman Act, Acts No. 96, (1903). 
146 Water Carriage of Goods Act, 9&10 Edw. VII , ch. 61 (1910).
147 Code de Commerce Maritime (Maritime Commercial Code), 1919. 
148 Fiji Ordinance XIV of 1906. 
149 Treitel, G., & Reynolds, F. Carver on Bills of Lading (2001) Sweet & Maxwell, London, at p. 448; 
Sweeney. J “The Prism of COGSA” (1999) 30 JMLC 543, at p. 555; Knauth, A. The American Law of 
Ocean Bills of Lading, 4th Ed. (1953) AMC, Baltimore, at p. 122; Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under 
International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen 
Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 20; Sturley, M. “History of COGSA and the Hague Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 1, at 
p. 15-18. Note that Cole, S. The Hague Rules Explained: Being the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924 
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nations, such as Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, South 
Africa, Spain and Sweden, had all contemplated introducing legislation modelled after 
the Harter Act.150 The Harter Act was not simply copied; rather several nations altered 
the provisions to a certain extent,151 in most cases rendering them more onerous on the 
carrier.152 The Canadian Water Carriage of Goods Act of 1910, altered the benefits for 
both cargo interests and carriers.153 With regard to cargo interests, forum selection 
clauses that lessened the jurisdiction of the Canadian courts were prohibited,154 and a 
specific package limitation was added in order to prevent carriers from inserting clauses 
in the bill of lading limiting his liability to a lower amount.155 With regard to carriers, 
they benefited from an expanded list of exemption clauses.156 It was this formula found in 
the Canadian Water Carriage of Goods Act, that ultimately formed for the basis for the 
Hague Rules. Although the Hague Rules did differ in certain respects from the Canadian 
     
(1925) Effingham Wilson, London, contains the texts of many of the early pre-Hague national acts and 
their amendments, including the U.S., Canada, and Australia.
150 Comité Maritime International, The Travaux Preparatoires of the International Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading of 25 August 1924, The Hague Rules, and of 
the Protocols of 23 February 1968 and 21 December 1979, The Hague-Visby Rules (1997) CMI 
Headquarters Pub., Antwerpen, Belgium, at p. 23; Karan, ibid; Sturley, ibid, at p. 17-18. 
151 The Dominion Acts, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, were not uniform in their provisions, thus 
giving rise to difficulties. (Maclachlan, D. Treatise on the Law of Merchant Shipping, 7th Ed. (1932) Sweet 
& Maxwell, London, at p. 364). 
152 Australia’s Act was more generous to cargo interests in several respects: it removed the due diligence 
qualification to the seaworthiness obligation, in essence rendering it “absolute” and it prohibited choice of 
law clauses that avoided the application of Australian law for shipments outbound shipments from 
Australia (Sturley, M. “History of COGSA and the Hague Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 1,at p. 15). New 
Zealand, followed Australia’s example, essentially copying the Australian Act directly (Ibid). 
153 Water Carriage of Goods Act, 9&10 Edw. VII , ch. 61 (1910).
154  Ibid, section 5: “…any stipulation or agreement purporting to oust or lessen the jurisdiction of any 
Court having jurisdiction at the port of loading in Canada in respect of the bill of lading or document, shall 
be illegal, null, and void, and of no effect.”  
155 Ibid, section 8: “The ship, the owner, charterer, master or agent shall not be liable for loss or damage to 
or in connection with goods for a greater amount than one hundred dollars per package…” See also Karan, 
H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, and 
Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 21.  
156 Water Carriage of Goods Act, ibid, section 6 and 7. The list now included: latent defects, fire, any 
reasonable deviation, strikes, and losses arising without the carrier’s actual fault or privity or without the 
fault or neglect of his agents, servants or employees. 
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Water Carriage of Goods Act,157 the carrier’s exemptions, including nautical fault, were 
essentially taken verbatim.158
  
157 For example, time for suit was expanded, the package limitation was increased, and the notice of claim 
provisions were altered. See Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: 
The Hague, Hague-Visby, and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 24; 
Sturley, M. “History of COGSA and the Hague Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 1, at p. 23-24. 
158 Sturley, ibid. 
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Chapter 2
Incorporation Into Uniform Law
After the First World War it became apparent that uniformity in bills of lading 
terms, and in the legal regimes governing them, was desirable in order to facilitate 
international trade. Moreover, an international regime was also considered desirable and 
advantageous by the shipping industry,159 as at the time, there existed a general 
divergence in the treatment of exemption clauses. Certain nations permitted shipowners 
to exempt themselves from liability by contract, notably, England, France, Sweden, and 
Norway.160 While other nations, such as the United States and those nations who had 
implemented legislation based on the Harter Act, prohibited exemption clauses.161 A 
desire for legal uniformity, however, was not the only impetus driving the push for 
uniform law. The question of responsibility for the goods had become an urgent problem 
due to the phenomenal increase in pilferage following the First World War. “One of the 
greatest difficulties which after the war troubled business men was how to check the 
enormous increase in theft and pilferage fr m goods in transit. Shipowners estimated that 
the evil was twenty times as great as before the war.”162 Underwriters would only cover 
three-quarters of the value of the lost goods, with the aim of making shippers more 
diligent with respect to packing, and forcing shipowners to properly supervise their 
employees.163 Exemption clauses in bills of lading limiting the shipowner’s liability 
therefore became a key issue to be resolved.  
  
159 Treitel, G., & Reynolds, F. Carver on Bills of Lading (2001) Sweet & Maxwell, London, at p. 448. 
160 Cole, S. The Hague Rules Explained: Being the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924 (1925) Effingham 
Wilson, London, at p. 16. 
161 Aside from nations that had implemented Harter Act based legislation, certain other nations also 
prohibited or curtailed the ability of carriers to lessen their liability.  For example, at the time the Japanese 
Commercial Code, Article 592, provided that: “Even by express agreement a shipowner cannot exempt 
himself from his liability for damage caused by his fault, or by the serious fault of a seaman or of any other 
person employed, or by the unseaworthiness of the ship..” (Cole, ibid, at p. 18).  
162 Cole, ibid, at p. 20. Cole explains that “the root of the evil was widespread individual dishonesty: one of 
the results of war.”
163 Ibid.
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In the end, the impetus for an international regime came from the United 
Kingdom. The overseas dominions, in particular Canada, Australia and New Zealand, 
where cargo interests and importers were politically powerful,164 were pressuring the 
Imperial Government to create a uniform regime throughout the entire British Empire.165
In 1921, the Imperial Shipping Committee, appointed by the Imperial Government, 
issued a report concluding that “there should be uniform legislation throughout the 
Empire on the lines of the existing Acts dealing with shipowners’ liability, but based 
more precisely on the Canadian Water Carriage of Goods Act, 1910…and not the Harter 
Act which it closely resembles…because it embodies the latest experience.”166 England, 
however, had become concerned that domestic legislation might result in its shipowners 
being placed at a disadvantage with regard to international competition.167 As well the 
shipowners agreed and preferred to have uniform regulation rather than differing 
regulations for different ports.168 An appeal was therefore made to the International Law 
Association (ILA) to tackle the issue through an international conference.169 In 1921, a 
draft based on the Canadian Water Carriage of Goods Act was prepared by the Maritime 
Law Committee of the ILA, and was adopted at the ILA’s Conference at The Hague later 
that year.170 This draft, entitled the “Hague Rules of 1921” was subsequently amended by 
the Comité Maritime International (CMI), and then again during the Diplomatic 
  
164 Sturley, M. “History of COGSA and the Hague Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 1, at p. 18. 
165 Treitel, G., & Reynolds, F. Carver on Bills of Lading (2001) Sweet & Maxwell, London, at p. 448; 
Sturley, ibid; Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, 
Hague-Visby, and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 22; Maclachlan, D. 
Treatise on the Law of Merchant Shipping, 7th Ed. (1932) Sweet & Maxwell, London, at p. 364.  
166 Imperial Shipping Committee, “Report of the Imperial Shipping Committee on the Limitation of 
Shipowners’ Liability by Clauses in Bills of Lading and on Certain Other Matters Relating to Bills of 
Lading,” Report issued February 25th, 1921, sections of which are reproduced in Comité Maritime 
International, The Travaux Preparatoires of the International Convention for the Unification of Certain 
Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading of 25 August 1924, The Hague Rules, and of the Protocols of 23 
February 1968 and 21 December 1979, The Hague-Visby Rules (1997) CMI Headquarters Pub., 
Antwerpen, Belgium, at p. 18-21. 
167 Diamond, A. “The Hague-Visby Rules” [1978] LMLCQ 225. 
168 Sturley, M. “History of COGSA and the Hague Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 1, at p. 19. 
169 Knauth, A. The American Law of Ocean Bills of Lading, 4th Ed. (1953) AMC, Baltimore, at p. 125; 
Sturley, ibid; Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, 
Hague-Visby, and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 22. 
170 Knauth, ibid, at p. 125-126; Treitel, G., & Reynolds, F. Carver on Bills of Lading (2001) Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, at p. 448; Karan, ibid, at p. 23. 
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Conferences held at Brussels in 1922, 1923 and 1924.171 The resulting document became 
the Hague Rules of August 25th, 1924. 
2.1. NEGOTIATION AND DRAFTING OF THE HAGUE RULES
Several aspects concerning the negotiation and drafting of the Hague Rules prove 
to be of particular interest with regard to establishing a context for the examination of the 
nautical fault exemption. 
2.1.1. The Balance of Power
During the end of the 19th century, the shipowners were in a superior bargaining 
position in relation to the cargo interests, however, thirty years later the power balance 
had shifted such that a compromise was possible.  By the time of the Hague Rules 
Diplomatic Conferences, the wartime destruction from submarines had left British 
carriers in a weakened financial state.172 As well, “the collapse of the international coal 
export trade after the First World War had disastrous consequences for British 
shipowners.”173 Moreover, “[b]y 1924, the industry was suffering from depression, labour 
troubles, and reckless competition, and therefore desperately needed protection.”174 It 
was these changed circumstances, paired with a glut in cargo-carrying capacity from 
reckless over-expansion in shipbuilding,175 that in the end prompted carriers to accept the 
shippers’ bill of lading proposals in the initial draft. This situation was described by Sir 
Norman Hill, the representative of the Liverpool Steamship Owners Association, at the 
Hague Diplomatic Conferences: “…the all-powerful shipowners are at their wits end to 
  
171 Treitel, G., & Reynolds, F. Carver on Bills of Lading (2001) Sweet & Maxwell, London, at p. 448.
172 Sweeney. J “The Prism of COGSA” (1999) 30 JMLC 543, at p. 558; Frederick, D. “Political 
Participation and Legal Reform in the International Maritime Rulemaking Process: From Hague Rules to 
the Hamburg Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 81, at p. 86.  
173 Palmer, S. “The British Shipping Industry, 1850-1914” in Change and Adaptation in Maritime History: 
The North Atlantic Fleets in the Nineteenth Century (1985) Fischer, L. & Panting, G. (Eds), Memorial 
University of Newfoundland, St. Johns, at p. 107, noted that the coal cargo’s impact in developing and 
sustaining the shipping industry of Britain was significant, and thus the collapse of the industry was 
disastrous. 
174 Sweeney. J “The Prism of COGSA” (1999) 30 JMLC 543, at p. 558.
175 Jamieson, A. Ebb Tide in the British Maritime Industries: Change and Adaptation, 1918-1990 (2003) 
University of Exeter Press, Exeter, at p. 13, notes that” [t]oo many ships chasing too little cargo led to ever 
lower freight rates and this was the crippling reality for world shipping in the 1920s and 1930s.” Sweeney, 
ibid; Frederick, D. “Political Participation and Legal Reform in the International Maritime Rulemaking 
Process: From Hague Rules to the Hamburg Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 81, at p. 86. 
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secure freights to cover their working expenses. Voyage after voyage is being made at a 
dead loss. Vessels by the hundreds are lying idle in port. At the moment any cargo owner 
could secure any conditions of carriage he required provided he would only offer a 
freight that could square the yards.”176
As a result of this change in the balance of power, the initial draft of the text 
based on the Canadian Water Carriage of Goods Act was therefore altered in favour of 
cargo interests. The cargo interests succeeded in: i) increasing the carrier’s limitation of 
liability, ii) extending the time for suit from sixty days to one year, iii) including a 
provision that prohibits the carrier from lessening his liability except as provided for in 
the rules, and iv) ensuring that taking delivery of the goods, without submitting written 
notice of loss prior to removing them from the custody of the carrier, would no longer 
deprive cargo interests of the right to sue.177 The carriers, however, were able to extend 
the list of exemptions to cover certain events that were unavoidable.178 With regard to the 
list of exemptions, it was noted at the time by Lord Justice Scrutton that a general 
provision might very well have the same effect.179 Sir Norman Hill later commented that 
“[i]t would have been absolutely impossible to secure agreement to the Rules without an 
Article setting out in detail the exceptions to which the shipowners and cargo owners are 
accustomed. They would never have acted on an assurance that the Law Courts would 
construe any form of general words as covering those, and only those, exceptions.”180  
The reaction to the Hague Rules of 1921 among cargo interests was not entirely 
favourable, primarily due to the fact that the Rules were drafted for voluntary 
  
176 Sir Norman Hill, who in essence represented shipowning interests, in the Hague Conference Report, at 
38, quotation reprinted in Frederick, D. “Political Participation and Legal Reform in the International 
Maritime Rulemaking Process: From Hague Rules to the Hamburg Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 81, at p. 86.
177 See Sturley, M. “History of COGSA and the Hague Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 1, at p. 23-24; Karan, H. 
The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, and 
Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 24. With respect to taking delivery 
without submitting written notice of loss, it had previously been that notice-of-claim provisions in bills of 
lading which barred all claims for loss or damage if written notice was not given to the carrier prior to 
removing the cargo from his custody were considered valid (Sturley, M. “History of COGSA and the 
Hague Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 1, at p. 24. See The Westminster (1904) 127 F. 680, and The Persiana 
(1911) 185 F. 396). 
178 Acts of war, quarantine restrictions, riots and civil commotions, insufficiency or inadequacy of marks, 
and latent defects not discoverable by due diligence. See Sturley, ibid, at p. 24-25; See Karan, ibid.
179 Cole, S. The Hague Rules Explained: Being the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924 (1925) Effingham 
Wilson, London, at p. 90. 
180 Sir Norman Hill as quoted by Cole, ibid.. 
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incorporation, and thus were not binding on the parties.181 As a result of cargo opposition 
to the voluntary principle, during the Brussels Diplomatic Conferences, the draft was 
amended in favour of cargo. Not only did the Hague Rules become mandatory, but a 
distinction between apparent and non-apparent damage to the goods was also added.182
Arguably, the superior bargaining power that the carriers possessed thirty years earlier 
had ceased to exist, replaced instead by a balance tipped slightly in favour of cargo 
interests.  
2.1.2. Commercial Men
It is important to note that the drafts of the Hague Rules were negotiated not by 
politicians or diplomats, but rather by commercial men who represented economic and 
industry interests. As addressed infra, this differs markedly when compared with both the 
Hamburg Rules and the recent UNCITRAL Draft Convention. Among the 44 delegates at 
the ILA Conference at the Hague, only four were affiliated with political or diplomatic 
interests, while the remainder were from the private commercial sector.183 These 
individuals included a coal merchant, shipowners, barristers, lawyers, an underwriter, the 
chairman of Lloyd’s, the managing director of Produce Brokers, an adjuster, shippers, 
  
181 Knauth notes that “the voluntary principle of the 1921 Hague Rules was promptly and vigorously 
assailed by groups of shippers, under the leadership of the Corn Trade.” (Knauth, A. The American Law of 
Ocean Bills of Lading, 4th Ed. (1953) AMC, Baltimore, at p. 126); See also Colinvaux, R. The Carriage of 
Goods by Sea Act, 1924 (1954) Steven & Sons, London, at p. 7-8; Cole, S. The Hague Rules Explained: 
Being the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924 (1925) Effingham Wilson, London, at p. 5, noting that after 
the drafting of the 1921 Hague Rules, an atmosphere of doubt and suspicion had begun to form, with 
certain shipowners wondering whether too many concessions had been given.  
182 When the damage was apparent, notice of loss or damage must be given before removing the goods 
otherwise there would be a presumption of proper delivery, but where the damage was not apparent the 
consignee was granted extra time to submit his notice (Sturley, M. “History of COGSA and the Hague 
Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 1, at p. 30). As a trade off for gaining the added notification time, cargo interests 
had to sacrifice a potential two year time bar that had been proposed as part of compromise legislation 
drafted by Sir Norman Hill, a leading spokesman for carriers in Britain, and Andrew Jackson, a leading 
representative of cargo interests in Britain. Many of the suggestions made by Hill and Jackson, were 
incorporated into the draft Rules at the CMI meeting in 1922 (Sturley, M. “History of COGSA and the 
Hague Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 1, at p. 26-27). 
183 Comité Maritime International, The Travaux Preparatoires of the International Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading of 25 August 1924, The Hague Rules, and of 
the Protocols of 23 February 1968 and 21 December 1979, The Hague-Visby Rules (1997) CMI 
Headquarters Pub., Antwerpen, Belgium, at p. 168-74; Frederick, D. “Political Participation and Legal 
Reform in the International Maritime Rulemaking Process: From Hague Rules to the Hamburg Rules” 
(1991) 22 JMLC 81, at p. 88, f.n. 23. 
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bankers, and professors.184 This avoided political infighting,185 as well as protracted 
negotiations, and eventually produced results that were accepted by groups on all sides of 
the shipping industry. The initial draft, for example, was completed after only a month,186
and adopted at the Hague Conference after only a few amendments.187  
2.1.3. Discussion With Respect to Nautical Fault
Surprisingly, during the drafting conferences from 1921 to 1924, there was 
comparatively little discussion surrounding either the presence or the substance of the 
nautical fault exemption. The wording of the provision in text submitted to the ILA 1921 
Hague Conference was “4(2). Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss 
or damage arising or resulting from (a) faults or errors in the navigation or in the 
management of the ship.”188 The text of Article IV(2)(a) was derived verbatim from the 
Canadian Water Carriage of Goods Act,189 which was practically identical to the Harter 
Act.190 On the second day of proceedings, 31st of August 1921, Sir Norman Hill proposed 
what would be the only change to the wording of the provision: “This clause, Article 4, is 
the shipowners’ clause. Now, Sir, I would venture to remind the Committee that we have 
dealt with the cargo interests clause in Article 3, and we have agreed and accepted the 
actual words that the cargo interests have put forward imposing the obligations on the 
ship with regard to seaworthiness, and, what is more important, we have accepted Article 
3(2)…We have not sought to weaken or qualify those in any way. When we come to 
Article 4(2) our big point is the navigation point, and what we have asked is that we 
  
184 Comité Maritime International, ibid.
185 Frederick, D. “Political Participation and Legal Reform in the International Maritime Rulemaking 
Process: From Hague Rules to the Hamburg Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 81, at p. 88
186 Sturley, M. “The History of COGSA and the Hague Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 1, at p. 20. A month after 
the draft was completed it was well received by the International Chamber of Commerce, and in the two 
months that followed, over three thousand copies were circulated in Great Britain, the Dominions, 
Continental Europe, and the United States (Knauth, A. The American Law of Ocean Bills of Lading, 4th Ed. 
(1953) AMC, Baltimore, at p. 125). 
187 Sturley, ibid, at p. 23. 
188 Comité Maritime International, The Travaux Preparatoires of the International Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading of 25 August 1924, The Hague Rules, and of 
the Protocols of 23 February 1968 and 21 December 1979, The Hague-Visby Rules (1997) CMI 
Headquarters Pub., Antwerpen, Belgium, at p. 391. 
189 Water Carriage of Goods Act, 9&10 Edw. VII, ch. 61 (1910), section 6: “…faults or errors in navigation 
or in the management of the ship…”. 
190 Harter Act, 46 U.S.C. ss 190-192 (1893), section 3: “…faults or errors in navigation, or in the 
management of the said vessel…”
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
36
should have the words which from time immemorial have certainly appeared in all 
British bills of lading. “Faults or errors” have not appeared. They have been added. Our 
old words were: “Act, neglect or default of the master, mariner, pilot, or the servants of 
the carrier in the navigation or in the management of the ship”, and we would ask, Sir, in 
our clause to have our old words; leave out “faults or errors”, and put in our old words 
instead.”191
Cargo interests accepted the change in wording with no objection.192 The only 
concern with regard to the wording of the provision in the opinion of cargo was the fact 
that it stipulated “in the navigation or in the management” as opposed to “or in the 
navigation and management” and courts may therefore interpret “management” widely so 
as to include stowage.193 Cargo interests were reassured that the w rding would in no 
way go back on the obligations the carriers had accepted in respect of stowage in Article 
3, and therefore the wording remained unchanged.194
The only other issue with the provision that arose during the three years of 
diplomatic conferences was the difficulty surrounding the use of the term “management” 
because it did not translate readily into French. The issue was discussed during the Hague 
Conference in 1921, and during the Diplomatic Conferences of October 1922 and 
October 1923.195 The issue arose because when “management” was translated into 
French, the closest term was “administration”, however its meaning was wider and it 
could conceivably include all handling of the cargo.196 This was a point of contention as 
it was felt by some attendees that the focus was on British cargo and carriers, and thus 
English wording, negating the fact that the wording could not be translated into French 
  
191 Comité Maritime International, The Travaux Preparatoires of the International Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading of 25 August 1924, The Hague Rules, and of 
the Protocols of 23 February 1968 and 21 December 1979, The Hague-Visby Rules (1997) CMI 
Headquarters Pub., Antwerpen, Belgium, at p. 391.
192 Ibid, Mr. McConechy: “On behalf of the interests I am here to represent, I am quite willing to accept 
what is printed here as amended by Sir Normal Hill.” 
193 Ibid, at p. 391-392. 
194 Ibid, at p. 391-393. 
195 Ibid, at p. 393-397. 
196 Ibid, at p. 393. 
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without seriously impacting the French interests.197 Mr. Dor was fairly expressive with 
regard to his discontent on this point: “I am afraid that British interests are so largely and 
so ably represented in this meeting that the meeting may lose sight of the fact that you are 
not laying down rules for the British Empire, but for the world, and that it is no good your 
rules being accepted by the British owners only. Sir Norman Hill was saying for instance, 
“Well, the British cargo owners are content to have that long enumeration”, but you do 
not know if all the Continental cargo owners will be content. In the same way, in the 
matter of “management” we cannot possibly put in French the English word 
“management”; therefore you have to find out some way of expressing that in something 
which is legal French, and I leave it to Sir Norman Hill.”198 In the 1922 Diplomatic 
Conference, the issue arose again, with attendees noting that despite searching no better 
term has been found, and by the 1923 Diplomatic Conferences it was admitted that 
despite the fact that many would have preferred another expression for the word 
“management”, it would be too difficult to alter the provision now.199 The English 
wording for the provision thus remained unaltered after Sir Norman Hill’s amendment at 
the 1921 Hague Conference, and the final French version read: “4(2) Ni le transporteur 
ni le navire ne seront responsables pour perte ou dommage resultant ou provenant: (a) 
des actes, negligence ou defaut du capitaine, marin, pilote ou des preposes du 
transporteur dans la navigation ou dans l’administration du navire.”200
2.2. THE HAGUE RULES
The Hague Rules came into force on June 2nd, 1931. The Rules were a success, 
and the desired uniformity of the law of carriage of goods had arguably been achieved. 
By the time of the 1968 Visby Protocol,201 there were 73 states who were parties to the 
  
197 Ibid: 
198 Ibid.
199 Ibid, at p. 395-397. Some other terms were suggested such as “technical management of the ship” which 
would translate into “administration technique” which was more precise. The term “manoeuvre” was 
suggested by Swedish and Scandinavian interests, but it was realized to be substantively quite different 
from “management” and thus rejected. As a translation for “management”, the term “exploitation” was 
suggested but again its meaning was wider than what the term “management” covered in English. (Ibid). 
200 Ibid, at p. 393.
201 Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to 
Bills of Lading, Brussels, 23 February 1968. The Visby Protocol was aimed at addressing certain problems 
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Hague Rules, including most of the major maritime nations of world.202 Of the nations 
that did not ratify the Hague Rules, many of them adopted or implemented the Hague 
Rules into national statutes, for example Carriage of Goods by Sea Acts,203 or 
incorporated them into commercial codes that were already in force.204 The popularity of 
the Hague Rules has continued to grow as evidenced by the most recent CMI Yearbook
listing 93 state parties to the Convention.205 Of the major trading nations, the vast 
majority operate under the Hague and Hague-Visby system, for example in 2004, 46.27% 
of Canada’s waterborne trade was conducted with Hague-Visby Rules countries, 19.87% 
with Hague Rules countries, and 2.65% with Hamburg Rules nations.206 Depending on 
     
with the Hague Rules, in particular the limitations of liability and the notion of a package in a containerized 
industry. The Visby Protocol was initially drafted by the CMI, and amended during debates at the 
Stockholm Conference in 1963. The draft was presented at the Diplomatic Conference in Brussels, 1967, 
and during a adjourned session in February 1968, the protocol was signed, amending the Hague Rules 
(Yancy, B. “The Carriage of Goods: Hague, COGSA, Visby and Hamburg” (1983) 57 Tul. L. Rev. 1238, at 
p. 1248). The Visby Protocol addressed certain problems. Notably, by virtue of Art. 3, it provided that all 
the carriers servants and agents are entitled to the carriers’ defences and limits of liability. Moreover, the 
monetary limits of liability were raised, and the ‘package’ issue was addressed. It should be noted however, 
that the Visby Protocol did not amend or alter the defences available to the carrier, including nautical fault.  
202 Comité Maritime International, “Uniformity of the Law of Carriage of Goods by Sea” in CMI Yearbook 
1995, Scandinavian University Press, Stockholm, at p. 107.  
203 Canada, for example, had domestically implemented the Hague Rules in the Carriage of Goods by 
Water Act 1936, but had never actually ratified the Hague Convention. Moreover, Australia, New Zealand, 
and the Union of South Africa also domestically implemented the Hague Rules (Knauth, A. The American 
Law of Ocean Bills of Lading, 4th Ed. (1953) AMC, Baltimore, at pl. 457). Carriage of Goods by Sea Acts 
were also enacted in Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Spain, Portugal, Japan, although these nations 
did formally adhere to the convention, while Yugoslavia, Liberia, Tunis and the Republic of Ireland, never 
formally adhered to the convention but passed acts based on it  (See Yiannopolous, A. Negligence Clauses 
in Ocean Bills of Lading (1962) Louisiana State University Press, Louisiana, at p. 56-57 for further 
information on the domestic statutes of these nations). 
204 Indonesia and Greece, although not adhering to the Convention, inserted the Hague Rules into their 
codes in substance and in form, while Soviet Russia, Syria, and Lebanon, also inserted provisions echoing 
the principles of the Hague Rules. Conversely, Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Turkey gave 
force of law to the Hague Rules by inserting them into their commercial codes. See Yiannopolous, A. 
Negligence Clauses in Ocean Bills of Lading (1962) Louisiana State University Press, Louisiana, at p. 58-
59 detailing the amendments to the codes of the above nations. 
205 Comité Maritime International, CMI Yearbook 2005-2006, CMI Headquarters Pub., Antwerp, Belgium, 
at p. 411-413, giving the status of parties to the Hague Rules. Note that this number includes nations that 
have since denounced the Hague Rules in favour of Hague-Visby, or Hamburg. 
206 Transport Canada, “Marine Liability Act, Part 5: Liability for the Carriage of Goods by Water” (2004) 
Consultation paper dated September 2004, Transport Canada, Government of Canada, Doc. TP 14307E, at 
p. 8. Available online from the Canadian Maritime Law Association website at: 
www.cmla.org/papers/2004/TransportReport-Oct.4,%202004.pdf. See also Thornton, S. “An Optimal 
Model for Reforming COGSA in the United States: Australia’s COGSA Compromise” (2001) 29 Transp. 
L.J. 43, at p. 53, noting that the vast majority of Australia’s trading partners fall under the Hague-Visby 
regime. Ping-fat, S. Carrier’s Liability under the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules (2002) Kluwer 
Law International, The Hague, at p. 210 notes that none of Australia’s major trading partners have adopted 
the Hamburg Rules.   
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the source, it has been estimated that today 75% to 85% of the world’s trade is conducted 
under the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules.207 It has been argued that the Hague Rules have 
“acquired the status of international customary shipping law – lex maritima, thereby also 
becoming part of the international customary trade law – lex mercatoria.”208 Despite the 
fact that uniformity is currently breaking down, one cannot help but think that the 
uniformity achieved and the impact made by the Hague Rules has far exceeded the 
intentions of its drafters.209
  
207 Tetley, W. “Reform of Carriage of Goods – The UNCITRAL Draft and Senate COGSA ’99.” (2003) 28 
Tul. Mar. L.J. 1, at p. 9, providing the figure of 75%. Hare, J. “The Pendulum of Liability: Harter, Hague, 
Hamburg to UNCITRAL Draft”, Lecture at University of Cape Town, South Africa (August 10, 2005), 
providing the figure of 85%.  
208 Lejnieks, M. “Diverging Solutions in the Harmonisation of Carriage of Goods by Sea: Which Approach 
to Choose?” (2003) 8 Unif. L. Rev. 303, at p. 304.
209 Especially given the fact that, according to Yiannopolous, A. Negligence Clauses in Ocean Bills of 
Lading (1962) Louisiana State University Press, Louisiana, at p. 6, “the Brussels Convention was not 
conceived as a comprehensive and self-sufficient code regulating the carriage of goods by sea.”
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Chapter 3
Rationale for the Nautical Fault Exemption
Many explanations have been put forward to justify the nautical fault exemption, 
some given at the time when it was being incorporated into statute or uniform law, and 
others given ex post facto. Certain justifications for the existence of the exemption in 
uniform law have come under attack as the nature of shipping has evolved over the years, 
while others, particularly those concerned with risk allocation and the balance of 
interests, remain relevant despite technological developments in shipping. 
3.1. THE HISTORICAL RATIONALE 
The historical rationale behind the exemption resides in the inherent nature of 
merchant shipping prior to the advent of the 20th century shipping industry. That period in 
the history of shipping has been characterized as “days of wooden ships and iron men” 
when “cargo was carried in wooden sailing ships whose course was subject to the winds, 
reliable charts were few, navigational aids could not yet cope with cloudy weather and 
uncharted shoals, and shipowners could not communicate with ships at sea.”210 In the late 
19th century, the expansive nature of the justification had narrowed slightly and centred 
more on the lack of communication, given that shipping had for the most part evolved 
from wooden ships to steam and steel. During the drafting of the Harter Act, it was 
considered that “since communications were often difficult or impossible, and because 
[the shipowners] could not control their ships after departure, [they] were not held liable 
for the negligence or fault of the captain and crew in their navigation and management of 
the vessel after it had left port.”211 In The Lady Gwendolyn, Sellers, LJ implied that it 
would be unjust to render the shipowner liable for navigation given the fact that it is “so 
  
210 Honnold, J. “Ocean Carriers and Cargo; Clarity and Fairness – Hague or Hamburg?” (1993) 24 JMLC 
75, at p. 104. 
211 Mandelbaum, S. “Creating Uniform Worldwide Liability Standards for Sea Carriage of Goods Under 
the Hague, COGSA, Visby and Hamburg Conventions” (1996) 23 Transp. L.J. 471, at p. 476; Karan, H. 
The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, and 
Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 88 states, “Once the ship started her 
voyage, she cut all her links with the land, and was left alone against maritime hazards for days and 
months…the carrier lost all control over the ship, cargo and, more importantly, his servants and agents.”
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much in control of the master, officers and crew and so much out of the control of the 
owners…”212 It is this justification that has been, above all others, subject to criticism.213
When descriptors such as “out-moded”, “out-dated” and “anachronistic” are used, in 
many instances it is with regard to this historical justification of the exemption.214 No one 
could possibly deny that communication and shipping technologies have greatly evolved; 
“Steel-built engine vessels which are more durable and safer at sea have replaced 
wooden-hulled sailing ships. Thanks to an increase in their speeds the period when ships 
are at sea has been reduced. The invention of radar and other similar equipment, and the 
preparation of modern charts have minimized the possibility of shipwreck and iceberg 
collisions, and groundings. Carriers can now keep in contact with their vessels wherever 
they are, through computerized radios and satellite control and instruct their servants and 
agents.”215 This causes certain authors to question the logic behind the exemption’s 
continued existence; “With improved technology in navigation, the ‘nautical fault’ 
  
212 The Lady Gwendolyn [1965] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 335 (C.A.), at p. 337-338.
213 Thornton, S. “An Optimal Model for Reforming COGSA in the United States: Australia’s COGSA 
Compromise” (2001) 29 Transp. L.J. 43, at p. 46 notes “Many oppose the continuance of this defence, as it 
is felt to no longer be a realistic ground for the exoneration of liability. It is argued that advances in 
communication technology, vessel navigation and safety, and employee education and training provide the 
carrier with a higher degree of control of the vessel and cargo than was available when the defence was 
adopted.”; Mandelbaum, S. “Creating Uniform Worldwide Liability Standards for Sea Carriage of Goods 
Under the Hague, COGSA, Visby and Hamburg Conventions” (1996) 23 Transp. L.J. 471, at p. 500, argues 
“the world has changed a great deal since the Hague Rules were adopted in 1924. Wooden ships have given 
way to highly automated steel ships. Marconi’s wireless has been replaced with satellite communications. 
Gangs of longshoremen lifting loads of breakbulk cargo have yielded to lines of intermodal containers 
hoisted aboard ships by cranes. Formerly isolated national economics now complete fiercely in global 
commerce...The nautical fault defence might be revised, as its historic rationale has been virtually 
eliminated.”; Weitz, L. “International Maritime Law: The Nautical Fault Debate” (1998) 22 Tul. Mar. L.J. 
581, at p. 587, referring to the exemption as “an anachronism”.
214 Wilson, J.F. Carriage of Goods by Sea, 3rd Ed. (1998) Pitman, London, at p. 256, noting its antiquity 
and that that defence is considered now “anachronistic” in many circles. Hill notes that with regard to the 
P&I Clubs who support the defence, even they acknowledge it is out dated: “But it is acknowledged over 
coffee in Club management board or conference rooms that the negligent navigation and management 
defence was an anomaly and a historical survivor which should have been buried in history years ago.” 
(Hill, C. “The Clubs Reaction to the Coming into Effect of the Hamburg Rules” in The Hamburg Rules: A 
Choice for the EEC? (1994) European Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, Maklu, Antwerpen, at p. 
196); Bauer, G. “Conflicting Liability Regimes: Hague-Visby v. Hamburg Rules – A Cases by Case 
Analysis” (1993) 24 JMLC 53, at p. 54, has wryly commented that nautical fault “certainly must have
originated in the days of sail when the owner lost control over his ship as soon as it vanished over the 
horizon.”
215 Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, 
and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 89. 
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defence becomes more difficult to justify.” 216 Certainly, the days of ‘iron men and 
wooden ships’ have long since ended, nevertheless despite the advances in shipping 
technology carriers remain exposed to dangers characteristic of sea carriage unparalleled 
in other forms of transport. This is exemplified by the fact that this justification remains 
present in modern jurisprudence. A Canadian court noted that “[i]n maritime matters the 
safety of the ship and the expeditious and efficient pursuit of the voyage are recognized 
as taking precedence over the cargo, because it is recognized sea traffic involves a 
constant struggle with incalculable and unusual possibilities of peril.”217 A similar 
sentiment was recently echoed by the Tribunal de Commerce de Marseille, in denying the 
claim of cargo interests whose container was lost overboard during a typhoon; “un aspect 
de faute nautique exonératoire de responsabilité pour le capitaine, ce qui se comprend 
aisément, l’activité nautique restant à hautes risques et perils et, dans leur lutte contre 
les elements déchainés comme un typhoon, les marins, si expérimentés soient-ils, ne sont 
jamais certains de sortir vainqueurs, quand bien même des progress considérables on été 
accomplish dans la conduite des navires et qu’en l’espèce, il ne saurait y avoir faute, le 
commandant Figuières démontrant que le captaine a tout fait pour manoeuvrer au mieux 
son navire et defender la sécurité de l’equipage et de cargaison.”218
3.2. PROTECTIONISM
Providing protection for shipowners in order to prevent ruinous liability is a 
concept that has stretched back for centuries. Boucher v. Lawson, decided in 1734, 
concerned shipowners who were held personally liable for the master’s theft of a cargo of 
  
216 Ping-fat, S. Carrier’s Liability under the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules (2002) Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, at p. 207. 
217 Seaway Distributors v. Newfoundland Container Lines (1982) 52 N.S.R. (2d) 566 (N.S. Dist. 1), at p. 
573.
218 Tribunal de Commerce de Marseille, 12 décembre 2003, (Ville de Tanya), DMF 2004, 630, at p. 633. 
[Author’s translation: One aspect of the nautical fault exemption as it applies to the captain that must be 
understood, is that maritime activities remain perilous and involve high risk, and as they grapple with the 
myriad of elements such as typhoons, the sailors, regardless of how experienced they are, are never certain 
to emerge victorious, even though considerable progress has been made with respect to vessel operations, 
as such there is no fault, as Commander Figuières has demonstrated that the captain did everything in his 
power to properly navigate his vessel, and protect the safety of the crew and the cargo.]
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
43
silver and gold.219 It was this case that resulted in statutory relief from the British 
Parliament, ensuring that the shipowners’ liability was limited, with the purpose of 
protecting the industry and encouraging investment.220 Similarly, the United States 
Limitation of Liability Act,221 in the words of the Supreme Court, “was designed to 
promote the building of ships, and to encourage persons engaged in the business of 
navigation, and to place that of this country upon a footing with England and on the 
continent of Europe.”222 The notion that the shipowner needed protection in the form of 
limited liability in order to prevent ruin in the event of an incident and to stimulate 
investment in merchant shipping was among the original arguments put forward to justify 
the nautical fault exemption.223 The investment in sea transport was proportionally 
greater when compared both to other forms of transport and the overall value of the 
goods carried in the vessel.224 When a disaster occurred, the carrier generally suffered the 
greatest loss, his vessel, as opposed to the losses suffered by cargo interests, and if that 
loss had been expanded to include responsibility for nautical fault, then the carrier would 
have likely suffered economic ruin.225 Historically, this was even more so the case given 
that until the later half of the 19th century, the shipowners frequently had a portion of
direct investment in the cargo itself.226 In today’s shipping industry, arguably the risk in 
respect of investment and ruin has increased. Carriers continue to have large investments 
in their vessels, as well, bulk carriers and tankers with their increased cargo capacity have 
even expanded the potential liability, with the effect that liability for nautical fault may 
  
219 Sweeney, J. “Limitation Shipowner Liability: Its American Roots and Some Problems Particular to 
Collision” (2001) 32 JMLC 241, at p. 243. 
220 Ibid, at p. 243-244; Griggs, P. et al. Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims 4th Ed. (2005) LLP, 
London, at p. 5, note that the United Kingdom Responsibility of Shipowners Act 1733, allowed a 
shipowner to limit his liability for theft by the master or crew, up to the value of the ship and the freight. 
Griggs, further comments that “this was an early example of legislation designed to promote the 
development of the merchant fleet.” (Griggs, ibid). 
221 Limitation of Liability Act, Act of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 43, 9 Stat. 635 (1851). 
222 Moore v. The American Transportation Co., 65 U.S. 1 (1861), at p. 39. 
223 Note that this argument was also the corner stone of the policy to grant shipowners the ability to limit 
their liability. For a discussion on the limitation of liability by the tonnage of the vessel see Hill, C. 
Maritime Law 5th Ed. (1998) LLP, London, at p. 375. 
224 Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, 
and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 88. 
225 Ibid.
226 Williams, B.K. “The Consequences of the Hamburg Rules on Insurance” in The Hamburg Rules on the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea (1978) S. Mankabady, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 
Chameleon Press, London, at p. 251. 
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still cause economic ruin.227 The distinction in today’s industry however is the 
widespread use of Hull and Machinery insurance and P&I Clubs that enable the carrier to 
protect their maritime assets and reduce their exposure to ruinous risk.228 Nevertheless, 
the argument that the shipowner is need of protection is still being utilized.229 This line of 
reasoning has not only been employed in the context of individual shipowners, but with 
regard to the industry as a whole. When the shipping industry was in its developing 
stages, there was the belief that the fledgling industry needed protection for it to survive. 
This same sentiment has more recently been expressed in the context of the fleets of 
developing nations. During the Hamburg Conferences, it was advocated that the “fleets of 
emerging maritime nations, particularly those of the developing countries, would thereby 
be better protected or ‘nursed’ through their ‘infant-industry’ stage” if the nautical fault 
exemption was retained.”230
3.3. INCENTIVE AND RISK ALLOCATION
It has been argued that the carrier’s existing responsibilities under the Hague 
Rules are sufficient such that care will be taken, given that those on board the vessel will 
not wish to “unnecessarily endanger the vessel and thereby themselves.”231 In other 
words, it would be futile to impose liability for cargo damage caused by negligent 
navigation, as the crew’s interest in their safety provides ample incentive for careful 
navigation.232 Another incentive is provided by the fact that collision would not only 
  
227 Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, 
and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 89.
228 Ibid.
229 Rosaeg, E. “The applicability of Conventions for the carriage of goods and for multimodal transport.” 
[2002] LMCLQ 316, at p. 318: “Arguably, carriers have more to lose than shippers by not having 
mandatory rules. Shipper can obtain protection by other means if needed. Carrier’s on the other hand, need 
mandatory legislation to legitimate that the risk distribution is fair. This is probably why attempts to 
circumvent the Hague-Visby Rules are rare – they are the best the carriers can hope for.”
230 Shah, M. “The Revision of the Hague Rules on Bills of Lading Within the UN System – Key Issues” in 
The Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (1978) S. Mankabady (Ed.), British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law, Chameleon Press, London, at p. 20. 
231Japikse, R.E. “Deck Cargo Exclusion, Nautical Fault Exemption, Fire Exception” in The Hamburg 
Rules: A Choice for the EEC? (1994) European Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, Maklu, 
Antwerpen, at p. 186.  
232 Kimball, J. “Shipowner’s Liability and the Proposed Revision of the Hague Rules” (1975) 7 JMLC 217, 
at p. 251. 
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affect the records of the crew, but possibly have criminal consequences as well.233
Essentially, the same argument applies to shipowners. It has been argued that “adequate 
incentives are provided by [the shipowner’s] interest in protecting the investment in the 
ship,” such that the aids and equipment for safe navigation will be provided.234 It has 
been noted that the foundation for the above argument is a theory that postulates the 
following: the carrier must “bear enough of the risk to have an incentive to exercise due 
care, but once that threshold level is achieved the remaining risks should be left to the 
cargo owner.” 235 This theory on the optimum division of risk is aptly described by 
Diamond: “[I]t simply doesn’t matter what level of liability is imposed on shipowners –
whether it be high or low – so long as there is some level of liability which can be 
enforced so as to chastise the wayward shipowner and so as to encourage the recalcitrant 
or slothful shipowner to forsake indolence and to prefer the exercise of due diligence.”236
There has been criticism with respect to the application of this theory to nautical fault, in 
that from an economic theory perspective carriers do not simply face a choice between 
negligent and careful navigation.237 Rather, carriers will undertake a cost-benefit analysis, 
essentially assessing the magnitude of any potential loss as against the costs of possible 
precautions.238 If the carrier’s only economic incentive is the value of his vessel, given 
that his liability to cargo is exempted, precautions may be inadequate in instances where 
  
233 Berlingieri, F. “The Period of Responsibility and the Basis of Liability of the Carrier” in The Hamburg 
Rules: A Choice for the EEC? (1994) European Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, Maklu, 
Antwerpen, at p. 99. 
234 Honnold, J. “Ocean Carriers and Cargo; Clarity and Fairness – Hague or Hamburg?” (1993) 24 JMLC 
75, at p. 107. There is, however, a weakness to this assertion according to Honnold. The vested interest in 
providing radar and navigational aids and charts to avoid collisions and groundings, arguably does not 
extend to “maximum care to prevent seepage or bleeding of sea-water into cargo holds, care in stowage 
adequate to prevent shifting of cargo in heavy weather or adequate securing of on deck containers.” (Ibid).  
In response to Honnold, one may argue that the above problems listed would evidently fall under a breach 
of the Art. 3 Hague Rules duty to carefully load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for, and discharge the cargo 
carried. In essence, the Art. 3 obligation already renders the carrier liable for deficiencies in the areas listed 
by Honnold, and therefore the author is unsure how eliminating the nautical fault exemption would have 
any bearing on improving the practice of carriers in those instances. 
235 Sturley, M. “Changing Liability Rules and Marine Insurance” (1993) 24 JMLC 119, at p. 127-128; See 
also Williams, B.K. “The Consequences of the Hamburg Rules on Insurance” in The Hamburg Rules on the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea (1978) S. Mankabady, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 
Chameleon Press, London, at p. 255
236 Diamond, A. “A Legal Analysis of the Hamburg Rules” (1978) in The Hamburg Rules (Lloyd’s of 
London Seminar, Sept. 28, 1978) as quoted by Sturley, ibid, at p. 128. 
237 Sturley, ibid.
238 Ibid.
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the value of the cargo is significant.239 The criticism of the above justification is 
therefore, from an economic perspective, that the shipowner’s vested interest in his vessel 
alone is not sufficient exposure to loss to ensure adequate precautions and care in certain 
instances. Arguably, the notion of the value of the cargo significantly influencing the 
shipowners’ precautions in practice is flawed. If the nautical fault exemption is 
eliminated, the carrier is still only exposed to loss up to the value of the package or 
weight limitation, rather than the true value of the cargo. Finally, economic theory does 
not necessarily undermine the existence of the nautical fault exemption, given that it has 
also been utilized in support of limited carrier liability.240  
3.4. HINDSIGHT AND DISCRETION
A justification for nautical fault has been put forward that can perhaps be 
characterized as an ‘agony of the moment’ style argument. “[I]t was thought unfair if, 
after the event, through an investigation by experts a ship’s command could be criticized 
with hindsight in far quieter circumstances, with resultant liabilities; such a perspective 
could negatively burden the decision-making at sea when immediate or quick action is 
  
239 Ibid. Sturley notes that the most serious risks have been taken in instances where the cargo carried is 
worth considerably more than the ship. The argument is therefore “imposing liability for the cargo on the 
carrier provides the incentive necessary for the carrier to take greater care of the vessel and the cargo – an 
incentive that the carrier’s interest in the vessel alone [is] inadequate to provide.” (Ibid). 
240 Lord Diplock notes that “goods in transit inevitably run the risk of being lost or stolen, damaged or 
destroyed. The risk can be reduced but not eliminated, by physical precautions taken by those persons 
having custody of the goods during transit.” (Diplock, L. “Conventions and Morals – Limitations Clauses 
in International Maritime Conventions” (1970) 1 JMLC 525, at p. 525). His Lordship goes on to argue that 
the costs involved in precautions will be passed on through freight, eventually increasing the cost of the 
goods at destination. Such expenditures are unproductive where they exceed the cost of any loss or 
diminution in the value of the goods which would have occurred had the precautions not been taken. 
(Diplock, ibid). His Lordship finds therefore that “the economic aim of any law relating to the contract of 
carriage should be to encourage custodians of goods in transit to take those precautions, and no more, 
which on this basis are economically productive.” (Diplock, ibid, at p. 526). See also Williams, B.K. “The 
Consequences of the Hamburg Rules on Insurance” in The Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by 
Sea (1978) S. Mankabady, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Chameleon Press, 
London, at p. 255, arguing that the carrier’s basis for liability is based not on an ‘indemnity’ function for 
loss but rather to simply penalize him if he fails in his duties under the Rules. Cargo will still need cargo 
insurance to cover the entire journey and potential areas where the carrier is not responsible, therefore, it is 
suggested that any more liability than needed to produce the incentive to take care of the cargo would be 
unproductive. (Williams, ibid).   
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required.”241 This notion has been recognized by the judiciary. In The Marilyn L, the 
shipowner was held to be protected by the exemption where the master and crew made 
erroneous navigational and ballasting decisions, with the court commenting that 
“mariners acknowledge that the master is obliged to make navigational decisions which 
may result in the selection of a course which, after the voyage has ended, may prove to 
have been the unwise course.”242 Nevertheless the court found that despite the fact that 
less adverse conditions would have been experienced on another route, it was the 
master’s privilege to select the route that he thought best and his error in judgment does 
not expose the owner to liability.243 Similarly, in The Naples Maru, the vessel 
encountered stormy weather on the journey, and the claimant argued that the damage 
resulted from moisture and sweat caused by the failure to sufficiently ventilate the 
cargo.244 The Court commented that “it is not for the court to say when it was safe to 
open the hatches and the ventilators. This is solely in the discretion of the master. This 
court can only reverse his judgment where there appears to be a clear abuse of discretion 
on his part.”245
3.5. COMMERCIAL COMPROMISE
The nautical fault exemption has been referred to extensively as part of a 
“compromise” between shipowning and cargo interests. Lord Sumner has noted “the 
intention of this legislation in dealing with the ability of a shipowner as a carrier of goods 
by sea undoubtedly was to replace a conventional contract, in which it was constantly 
attempted, often with much success, to relieve the carrier from every kind of liability, by 
a legislative bargain, under which he should be permitted to limit his obligation to take 
good care of the cargo by an exception, among others, relating to navigation and 
management of the ship.”246 This compromise has been characterized as weighing in 
  
241 Japikse, R.E. “Deck Cargo Exclusion, Nautical Fault Exemption, Fire Exception” in The Hamburg 
Rules: A Choice for the EEC? (1994) European Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, Maklu, 
Antwerpen, at p. 186.
242 Georgia-Pacific Co. v. M/S Marilyn L., 1971 AMC 2157 (E.D. Vir. 1971), at p. 2165. 
243 Ibid, at p. 2166. 
244 Philippine Sugar Centrals Agency v. S.S. Naples Maru, 1937 AMC 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
245 Ibid, at p. 1244. 
246 Gross Millerd v. Canadian Government Merchant Marine [1929] A.C. 223 (H.L.), at p. 236.
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favour of the shipowners, or as favouring cargo interests, depending on the commentator. 
The compromise has also been regarded as fair and even, being the result of negotiation 
by individuals within the shipping industry: “…the exemption’s principle is often seen 
…to justly match the carrier’s liability for commercial faults (such as due care for the 
cargo), which liability was and is hailed to constitute the cornerstone of the Rules.”247
What is significant is that the compromise was a result of negotiation between 
commercial parties involved in shipping. It has been argued that at their core, liability 
regimes are simply commercial compromises that allocate the risks between carriers and 
cargo interests.248 The risk allocation between cargo interests and carriers has been 
referred to as the “famous compromise”, both in the context of the Harter Act and in the 
Hague Rules. It was this commercial meeting of the minds, that enabled carrier interests 
to gain the nautical fault exemption, in exchange for liability for failing to care for the 
cargo and exercise due diligence to render the vessel seaworthy. 
3.6. CONCLUSION
The variations in the above justifications are symptomatic of the controversial and 
multifaceted nature of the nautical fault exemption. Those who oppose the exemption 
often use certain older justifications, particularly the historical ones, as straw-man 
arguments. While those interested in maintaining the exemption, assert its continued 
relevance today. Throughout this study of nautical fault, it becomes clear that neither side 
is without merit, however, the respective positions become difficult to evaluate given the 
multitude of arguments and justifications. The problematic question that nevertheless has 
yet to be answered is whether the existence of the nautical fault exemption in modern 
carriage law remains justified. 
  
247 Japikse, R.E. “Deck Cargo Exclusion, Nautical Fault Exemption, Fire Exception” in The Hamburg 
Rules: A Choice for the EEC? (1994) European Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, Maklu, 
Antwerpen, at p. 186.
248 Sturley, M. “Carriage of Goods by Sea” (2000) 31 JMLC 241, at p. 250.
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Chapter 4
The Meaning and Scope of Article IV(2)(a) of The Hague Rules
The central element involved in defining the nautical fault exemption, is the task 
of distinguishing it from the carrier’s obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel and his 
duty to care for the cargo. To illustrate: A bulk cargo arrives partially damaged because 
an electrical lamp in the cargo hold was left on, scorching a portion of the cargo. There 
are three possibilities. First, if the lamp had been on during loading and a crewman had 
forgotten to turn it off, the vessel is unseaworthy. Secondly, if the lamp in the cargo hold 
had been erroneously turned on during the voyage by a crewman intendi g to turn on the
deck light, this is a fault in the management of the ship. Thirdly, if the lamp was turned 
on to inspect the cargo and never turned off, then it is an error in the management of the 
cargo.249 The exemption is therefore highly contextual and the question of its meaning 
and scope is not one that can be addressed briefly. 
Article IV(2) provides: “Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for 
loss or damage arising or resulting from: (a) Act, neglect, or default of the master, 
mariner, pilot, or the servants of the carrier in the navigation or in the management of the 
ship.” Although the wording of Art. IV(2)(a) determines its scope to a certain extent, the 
boundaries of the nautical fault exemption have been delineated through its application in 
practice, as it effects are often dependent on the facts of the situation at hand. For 
example, the act of opening the wrong valve when ballasting the ship causing the 
flooding of the cargo hold, on one hand has been held to fall within the exemption,250
while on the other hand the carrier has been denied the protection of Art. IV(2)(a).251 This 
  
249 This example can be found, although in a slightly different format, in Falkanger, T. et al. Scandinavian 
Maritime Law: the Norwegian Perspective (2004) Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, at p. 273, where it is based 
loosely on a decision of the Norwegian Supreme Court. 
250 Firestone Synthetic Fibers Co v. M.S. Black Heron, 324 F.2d 835 (2 Cir. 1963), where the 2nd Circuit 
held that the carrier was immune from liability to cargo interests as the aim of the engineer was to ballast 
the ship, which is an act of management, rather than attempting to care for the cargo. 
251 Hydaburg Cooperative Assoc. v. Alaska Steamship Co. (The Coastal Rambler), 1969 AMC 363 (9 Cir. 
1968), where the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that due to the fact that there were indistinct markings 
on the pipe outlets, this rendered the vessel unseaworthy and thus the carrier was denied the benefit of 
article IV(2)(a). 
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distinction in judicial reasoning resulted from a slight variation in the facts of those two 
incidents.252 Gilmore & Black have noted that “[t]he distinction between a loss due to 
improper stowage or unseaworthiness on the one hand and a loss resulting from faults or 
errors in the navigation or management of the vessel on the other hand requires in many 
instances a close and discriminating attention to the specific facts of the case.”253
Nevertheless, the meaning and general scope of the exemption can be determined through 
a thorough examination of the wealth of jurisprudence and doctrinal commentary 
generated over the past century therefore distinguishing the factual situations that fall 
under the exemption from those that do not. 
4.1. DEFINITION OF ARTICLE IV(2)(A)
The meaning of the wording of Article IV(2)(a) has been interpreted both 
judicially and through doctrinal commentary. One may consider that there are in effect
four central issues to be addressed: firstly, the notion of action and inaction; secondly, 
which individuals fall within the scheme of the exemption; and thirdly, the nature of the 
action; and fourthly, whether the vessel or means of transport constitutes a “ship”. 
4.1.1. “Act, Neglect or Default”
It has been argued that the wording “act, neglect or default” is somewhat broader 
than that of the original exemption found in the Harter Act of “faults or errors”.254 In 
practice, this is of no consequence, given that American courts have held that the 
exemption has the same meaning regardless of whether the contract of carriage was 
governed by the Harter Act and U.S. COGSA.255 With regard to jurisprudence from 
  
252 Despite the fact that the erroneous actions taken by the seamen in ballasting the vessels were essentially 
the same, the distinction arose due to the fact that in The Coastal Rambler, ibid, the Court criticized the 
markings on the pipe outlets, finding them inadequate, thus rendering the vessel unseaworthy, while in The 
Black Heron,, the carrier was able to benefit from Art. IV(2)(a) as the ballast system was considered to be 
in order (Firestone Synthetic Fibers Co v. M.S. Black Heron, 324 F.2d 835 (2 Cir. 1963)). 
253 Gilmore, G. & Black, C. The Law of Admiralty, at p. 134, as quoted by Justice Rives in Heinrich C. 
Horn v. CIA De Navegacion (The Heinz Horn) [1970] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 191 (5 Cir. 1969), at p. 202.
254 Poor, W. American Law of Charter Parties and Ocean Bills of Lading, 5th Ed. (1968) Matthew Bender, 
New York, at p. 174. 
255 Spencer Kellogg v. Great Lakes Transport Co. (The Fred W. Sargent), 1940 AMC 670 (E.D. Mich. 
1940) at p. 675, holding that “the words ‘in the navigation or in the management of the ship’ have been 
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jurisdictions other than the United States, the difference in wording appears to also have 
no effect given that Harter Act jurisprudence was and is routinely relied on when 
considering the nautical fault exemption.256
Nautical fault is not restricted to errors and improper actions. The wording of the 
exemption also includes the failure to act and the non-performance of duties.257 In The 
Olivebank, where the court of first instance found the cargo was damaged but that “the 
decision not to close the skylight or vent covers was a management decision,” the 
claimants argued on appeal that the decision could not have been a management decision 
because it was not an act but rather an omission.258 The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that the claimants “have misconstrued the district court’s use of the phrase ‘management 
decision’. Neglect by management also relieves liability under COGSA.”259
Along with failures to act, the wording of the nautical fault exemption 
encompasses actions that go beyond simple faults. The words ‘Act, neglect or default’ 
have been found to encompass gross fault, or une négligence grossière.260 In addition, it 
has been noted by commentators that the protection afforded by the exemption also 
     
held by the British courts to have the same meaning in the British Act as in our Harter Act…I hold that the 
Congress intended these words as used in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1936, to have the same 
meaning as those assigned to them in the long line of decisions construing these words as used in the Harter 
Act.”; Robertson, D. et al. Admiralty and Maritime Law in the United States (2001) Carolina Academic 
Press, Durham, at p. 320 have noted that “because COGSA and the Harter Act are very similar, it often 
makes no difference which statute applies, and it remains common for courts to cite Harter Act decisions 
when construing comparable provisions in COGSA.” The defence as found in marine insurance law has 
also been held to have the same meaning as that of COGSA. See Tetley, W. Marine Cargo Claims, 4th Ed., 
Ch. 16, at p. 5 (Available online only at: http://tetley.law.mcgill.ca/maritime), referencing Larsen v. 
Insurance Co. of N. America 362 F.2d 261 (9 Cir. 1966 ). 
256 For example, the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal, who relied on both The Ferro [1893] P. 38 (P.D.) 
and The Glenochil [1896] P 10 (P.D.) (Div Ct) when considering whether an error that resulted in the loss 
of cargo overboard was an error in management or one in relation to the cargo (Carling O’Keefe Breweries 
v. CN Marine [1990] ETL 654 (Fed. C.A.), at p. 666). In denying the time charterer the benefit of the 
nautical fault exemption, the Court of Appeal opined “in the present case, there was at the very least, to 
adopt the words of Sir Francis Jeune in the Glenochil, at page 16, a ‘want of care of the cargo’ rather than a 
‘want of care of the vessel indirectly affecting the cargo’.” (Carling, ibid).  
257 In The Sanfield, 92 F. 663 (1898), the failure for twenty days to open a sluice gate which would have 
emptied the bilges was held to be an error in management of the vessel. 
258 Folger Coffee Co. v. Olivebank, 2000 AMC 844 (5 Cir. 2000), at p. 849. 
259 Ibid, at p. 849. 
260 Rodière, R. “Faute nautique et faute commerciale devant la Jurisprudence francaise” DMF 1961, 449, at 
p. 453. Although where the fault is too great or is incompetence of an exceptional nature, it can be viewed 
as a failure on the part of the shipowner to exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy. This is 
considered infra. 
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includes wilful fault and wilful misconduct by the master.261 Furthermore, one author has 
commented that intentional acts are within the scope of nautical fault, thus covering 
malicious acts, barratry, and felonious acts.262 The Federal Supreme Court of Germany 
has interpreted the exemption for error in navigation or management of the vessel to 
include not only negligent conduct, but intentional acts as well.263 Justice MacKinnon, of 
the English Commercial Court, in considering loss arising from the abandonment of a 
vessel, opined that “even if it had been the grossest and deliberate and wilful desertion of 
the ship in calm weather, I think that would still be an act, neglect or default of the master 
[in the navigation or management of the ship] for which, under these words, the owners 
would be relieved. With regard to that, I must bear in mind that it has been held that even 
culpable recklessness on the part of the captain or crew is, vis-à-vis the owner, an act, 
neglect or default for which under such a clause he is relieved of responsibility.”264
4.1.2. Error of the “Master, Mariner, Pilot or Servant of the Carrier”
The error or fault must be one committed either by the master, mariner, pilot or a 
servant of the shipowner. For the exemption to apply therefore, the error or the fault must 
not be one that is attributed to the shipowner personally.265 If the resulting damages are 
the consequences of the shipowner’s own negligence, such as instructing the vessel to 
  
261 Herber, R. “The Hamburg Rules: Origin and Need for the New Liability System” in The Hamburg 
Rules: A Choice for the EEC? (1994) European Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, Maklu, 
Antwerpen, at p. 39. Note that this statement would only relate to the protection of the carrier, due to the 
fact that if cargo interests take action against the master or the crewman, their ability to rely on the 
exemption for protection is limited by the wording of art. IV bis 4 of Hague-Visby, “Nevertheless, a 
servant or agent of the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this article, if it is 
proved that the damage resulted from an act or omission of the servant or agent done with intent to cause 
damage or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably result.”
262 Chaiban, C. Causes Legales D’Exoneration du Transporteur Maritime dans le Transport de 
Merchandises (1965) Pichon & Durand-Auzias, Paris, at pp. 94-96. 
263 Cargo Interests on Board MV Cita v. Time-charterers of MV Cita (2006) I ZR 20/04 (Federal Supreme 
Court), available at: www.onlinedmc.co.uk. In this instance, the Federal Supreme Court held that where the 
watch officer set a new course, failed to turn on the watch-keeping alarm, was alone on the bridge, and then 
fell asleep resulting in the ship grounding, the time-charterer was not liable to cargo interests by virtue of 
the nautical fault exemption as incorporated into s. 607 of the German Commercial Code (HGB). 
264 Bulgaris v. Bunge (The Theodoros Bulgaris) [1933] 45 Ll. L. Rep. 74 (K.B.), at p. 81. 
265 Falkanger, T. et al. Scandinavian Maritime Law: the Norwegian Perspective (2004) Universitetsforlaget, 
Oslo, at p. 271; Tetley, W. Marine Cargo Claims, 4th Ed., Ch. 16, at p. 16 (Available online only at: 
http://tetley.law.mcgill.ca/maritime); Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime 
Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at 
p. 285. 
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forgo the use of a pilot, then the exemption offers no protection.266 For smaller shipping 
operations, or non-corporate owners, it is possible that the shipowner may also be the 
master of the vessel. In such instances, where the shipowner in essence wears two hats, 
there have been different approaches depending on the jurisdiction. Under English law, 
where “the master is himself owner or part owner and is sued as such, the 
exception…will protect him as to his negligence as master, though not as to his 
negligence as owner.”267 Conversely, the nautical fault exemption as incorporated into 
the German Commercial Code (HGB), at provision 607, has been interpreted by the 
German courts such that “si le transporteur est lui-même capitaine de son navire, il n’est 
pas libéré de la responsabilité pour fautes nautiques commises par lui- même en sa 
qualité de capitaine.”268
The wording of Art. IV(2)(a) does not expressly stipulate that the shipowner’s 
own actions or knowledge do not fall within the exemption. Certain national codes have 
therefore amended the wording of the original nautical fault exemption in order to clarify 
when the shipowner may become liable. The German nautical fault exemption, found in 
s.607 of the Commercial Code (HGB), stipulates: “If the loss is due to any conduct in the 
navigation or management of the ship or to fire, the carrier shall only be liable if there is 
actual fault or privity on his part.”269 Similarly, in the Greek Code of Private Maritime 
Law, Article 138 stipulates “[i]f loss or damage arises from an act or omission in the 
  
266 Boyd, S. Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading, 20th Ed. (1996) Sweet & Maxwell, London, at 
p. 238, gives the examples of a shipowner negligently appointing a drunken captain or negligently giving 
orders that no pilot should be employed. For an example where the personal negligence of the shipowner 
was demonstrated see City of Lincoln v. Smith [1904] A.C. 250 (P.C.). 
267 Boyd, ibid; See also Cooke, J., et al, Voyage Charters (1993) LLP, London, at p. 754. See also Westport 
Coal v. McPhail [1898] 2 Q.B. 130. Conversely, a Norwegian Arbitration tribunal, ND 1974.315 NA Sotra, 
decided that where the master is also the shipowner, he is not protected. The Judicial Committee criticized 
the decision: “It must be right that the carrier can invoke an exemption from liability in such situations to 
the same extent as if he had not been master or crew.” (Falkanger, T. et al. Scandinavian Maritime Law: the 
Norwegian Perspective (2004) Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, at p. 272). It has been noted that since the 
introduction of the Norwegian Maritime Code, the result will likely follow the view of the Judicial 
Committee (Falkanger, ibid). 
268 Markianos, D. “Le Transport Maritime Sous Connaissement En Droit Allemand” in Le Transport 
Maritime Sous Connaissement A L’Heure Du Marche Commun (1966) M. De Juglart & P. De La Pradelle 
(Eds.), Pichon & Durand-Auzias, Paris, at p. 40. [Author’s translation: if the shipowner is himself acting as 
master of his vessel, he is not exonerated from liability for fautes nautiques committed by himself when 
acting in his capacity as master.] 
269 Handelsgesetzbuch, (HGB) Commercial Code of Germany, Chapter 5, s. 607.2. 
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navigation or handling of the ship, the carrier shall not be liable except for faults of his 
own…”270 The expression, ‘actual fault or privity’, as used in the HGB, is frequently 
used to describe when the liability of the shipowner is engaged based on what is 
considered to be his personal fault. The expression ‘actual fault or privity’ has been 
described as “a term of art in English law borrowed from the fire and tonnage limitation 
rules of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894.”271 The Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 of 
the United States contained a similar expression: “privity or knowledge”.272
Subsequently, the expression ‘actual fault or privity’ has been used in a number of 
conventions and statutes in order to describe under what conditions the shipowner may be 
relieved from all or a portion of liability where the fault is not his own. As such, 
jurisprudence under other conventions with respect to this issue is frequently used when 
determining whether the nautical fault is one that may be attributed to the shipowner 
personally. In particular, it has been suggested that when considering the nautical fault 
exemption, inspiration may be drawn from the jurisprudence arising under the Limitation 
of Shipowner’s Liability Convention, and the Limitation Convention, both of which 
expressly stipulate that the shipowner must be personally free from fault in order to limit 
his liability.273 Moreover, jurisprudential analysis under both Art. IV(2)(b) and Art. 
IV(2)(q) of the Hague Rules, proves instructive in determining when the fault is such that 
it is attributable or imputed to the shipowner, as the expression “actual fault or privity of 
the carrier” is used.274
  
270 Karatzas, T. & Ready, N. The Greek Code of Private Maritime Law (1982) Martius Nijhoff Pub, The 
Hague, at p. 39. 
271 Gaskell, N. et al. Bills of Lading: Law and Contracts (2000) LLP, London, at p. 344; See also Treitel, 
G., & Reynolds, F. Carver on Bills of Lading (2001) Sweet & Maxwell, London, at p. 503 for a discussion 
on the origin of the expression. 
272 Chen, X. Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims: A Study of U.S Law, Chinese Law and 
International Conventions (2001) Kluwer, The Hague, at p. 60. Chen, at p. 61, further notes that the 
American definition of ‘privity or knowledge’ is in essence viewed as carrying the same meaning as ‘actual 
fault or privity’.
273 Tetley, W. Marine Cargo Claims, 4th Ed., Ch. 16, at p. 16 (Available online only at: 
http://tetley.law.mcgill.ca/maritime). The wording “actual fault or privity” of the owner is found in the 
Limitation of Shipowner’s Liability Convention, Brussels October 10, 1957, Art. 1, while “acts or faults” 
of the owner was used in the Limitation Convention, Brussels August 25, 1925. For an excellent article on 
the limitation of liability under the two aforementioned conventions, see Heeney, P. “Limitation of 
Maritime Claims” (1994) 10 MLAANZ 1. 
274 Ping-fat, S. Carrier’s Liability under the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules (2002) Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, at p. 82-84, suggests using Art. IV(2)(q) in order to elucidate when the shipowner 
is personally liable under Art. IV(2)(a). 
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The meaning of the expression ‘actual fault or privity’ has been described as 
follows: “Actual fault or privity implies some culpability on the part of the owner. It may 
consist in being privy to the neglect, unskilfulness or improper act or omission of a 
servant or agent. It may be the neglect or the imprudent or wrongful act of the shipowner 
himself. But the shipowner must in some way be to blame…A failure to make himself 
aware of what he ought to know is or may be an actual fault.”275 Where the vessel is 
personally owned, the act, fault or knowledge, must be that of the owner himself.276 In 
modern shipping, however, ships are almost exclusively owned by corporate bodies. “In 
law, a personality is attributed to a corporation by a fiction. Since a corporation is not a 
living person with mind and hands to carry out its intention, the attribution of liability to 
a corporation was originally solved by the development of a concept known as the ‘alter 
ego’.”277 The concept of the ‘alter ego’, and the notion of ‘actual fault or privity’, arose in 
the House of Lords decision of Lennard Carrying Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co.278 The 
House of Lords considered the instance where cargo was destroyed as a result of the 
stranding of the vessel, which subsequently caught fire. Both the shipowners and the 
managing owners were limited liability corporations. One individual, Lennard, was a 
director of both companies and took an active part in the management of the vessel. The 
shipowners argued that the loss occurred without their fault or privity, and as such the 
House of Lords considered whether the fault of Lennard, in knowing or having means to 
know of the defective boilers, was the fault of the company itself. Viscount Haldane, in 
his seminal speech, opined as follows: “[A corporation] has no mind of its own any more 
than it has a body of its own; its active and directing will must consequently be sought in 
the person of somebody who for some purposes may be called an agent, but who really is 
the directing mind and will of the corporation, the very ego and center of the personality 
of the corporation. That person may be under the direction of the shareholders in a 
general meeting; that person may be the board of directors itself, or it may be, and in 
  
275 James Patrick & Co Pty Ltd v. Union SS Co of New Zealand (1938) 60 CLR 650 (Aust. H.C.), at p. 670; 
It has been noted that actual knowledge is not required, rather constructive knowledge is sufficient (Chen, 
X. Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims: A Study of U.S Law, Chinese Law and International 
Conventions (2001) Kluwer, The Hague, at p. 62).
276 Gaskell, N. et al. Bills of Lading: Law and Contracts (2000) LLP, London, at p. 344.
277 Mandaraka-Sheppard, A. Modern Admiralty Law (2001) Cavendish Publishing, London, at p. 919. 
278 Lennard Carrying Co v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. [1915] A.C. 705 (H.L.)
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some companies it is so, that that person has an authority co-ordinate with the board of 
directors given to him under the articles of association, and is appointed by the general 
meeting of the company, and can only be removed by the general meeting of the 
company…It must be upon a true construction of [s. 502 of the Merchant Shipping Act 
1894] in such a case as the present one that the fault or privity is the fault or privity of 
somebody who is not merely a servant or agent for whom the company is liable upon the 
footing respondeat superior, but somebody for whom the company is liable because his 
action is the very action of the company itself.”279 Accordingly, the shipowners were 
unable to limit their liability. Lennard Carrying Co. is the seminal judgment on the alter 
ego of the shipowner, and as such has been followed extensively.280  
It has been suggested that actions by the board of directors of a corporation would 
be considered to be the actual fault or privity of the corporation, while actions by junior 
and middle management would not,281 however this proposition is debatable. Exactly 
what level of position in a corporate structure is the alter ego of the shipowner is difficult 
to pinpoint precisely. The Privy Council in Lennard’s Carrying Co. opined about 
individuals in relation to the board of directors of a corporation, however, subsequently, 
the notion of the alter ego has been extended to include management personnel. In The 
Lady Gwendolen, the English Court of Appeal found that the marine superintendent, 
along with the manager of the traffic department, had failed to detect the master’s 
repeated occurrences of excessive speed and dangerous navigation that eventually led to a 
collision.282 The Court of Appeal reasoned that “where, as in the present case, a company 
has a separate traffic department, which assumes responsibility for running the 
  
279 Ibid, at pp. 713-714. 
280 See Societe Anonyme Des Minerais v. Grant Trading Inc. (The Ert Stefanie) [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 349 
(C.A.) where the owners of the vessel were denied limitation for losses resulting from the errors of the 
management company; The Garden City [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 382 (Q.B.) where Justice Staughton held 
that the fault of the chief navigator was not imputed to the shipowner, as he was not the directing mind, but 
the fault of director of the technical and investment department would have been the fault of the shipowner 
had his fault been causative; Meredith Jones v. Vangemar Shipping (The Apostolis) [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 
241 (C.A.), the Court of Appeal held, at p. 258, that the claimants had failed to prove that the welding, 
which had allegedly cause the fire aboard ship, was an incident persistent enough over time such that the 
general manager of the firm of ship managers appointed by the shipowner, should have been aware of it.
281 Gaskell, N. et al. Bills of Lading: Law and Contracts (2000) LLP, London, at p. 344.
282 The Lady Gwendolen [1965] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 335 (C.A.). In this instance, the shipowner was Arthur 
Guinness Son & Co., known commonly as the Guinness Brewery. 
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company’s ships, I see no good reason why the head of that department, even though not 
himself a director, should not be regarded as someone whose action is the very action of 
the company itself, so far as it concerns anything to do with the company’s ships.”283 As 
such, the shipowners were not entitled to limit their liability. 
When considering jurisprudence on the notion of whose action is the action of the 
company itself, caution must be exercised when referring to United States jurisprudence. 
“In the United States, courts have long obtained a reputation for their dislike for the 
Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 and the term ‘privity or knowledge’ has been used as 
a convenient point of attack by U.S. courts to deny the right to limitation.”284
Accordingly, one may find ‘privity or knowledge’ much lower down in the corporate 
hierarchy, than one would when relying on the notion of ‘actual fault or privity’ as found 
in Commonwealth jurisprudence. A 5th Circuit Court of Appeals decision imputed the 
privity and knowledge of the master of the vessel to the corporation on the basis that he 
had significant autonomy in managing the vessel, such as recruiting the crew and 
arranging the charters.285 Moreover, United States district courts and courts of appeal 
have held that the privity or knowledge of the corporation is that of his employees with 
supervisory or discretionary powers.286 A particularly striking example is In re Hercules 
Carriers Inc, where the 11th Circuit Court of Appeal considered the instance of an allision 
with a bridge in Florida causing both the loss of property and lives while the vessel was 
under the command of a pilot.287 It was determined that the cause of the allision was the 
vessel’s excessive speed in poor visibility, and the Court of Appeals faulted the vessel’s 
crew for their failure to countermand the negligence of the pilot.288 Nevertheless, the 
Court of Appeals found that the shipowner was privy to the negligence of the crew, on
  
283 Ibid, at p. 345. 
284 Chen, X. Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims: A Study of U.S Law, Chinese Law and 
International Conventions (2001) Kluwer, The Hague, at p. 60. 
285 Continental Oil Company v. Bonaza Corporation, 706 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1983).
286 Chen, X. Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims: A Study of U.S Law, Chinese Law and 
International Conventions (2001) Kluwer, The Hague, at p. 64; See also Spencer Kellogg & Sons Inc. v. 
Hicks (The Linseed King), 285 U.S. 502, holding that the knowledge of the manager of the linseed oil 
factory in New Jersey, who was instructed to inform the master of the motor launch that it was not to be 
used during the winter, was imputed to the executive officers of the Spencer Kellogg’s company, when the 
launch sank after collision with ice while carrying plant workers. 
287 In re Hercules Carriers Inc., 768 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1985)
288 Ibid, at pp. 1566-1567. 
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the basis that the shipowner had permitted the practice of allowing navigational decisions 
to be made by the pilots when onboard.289 When considering actual fault or privity of the 
shipowner with respect to the nautical fault exemption, the use of commonwealth 
jurisprudence on limitation is therefore preferred. 
It the context of the nautical fault exemption, it has been argued that the owner’s 
fault or privity would be satisfied by the fault of senior management personnel: “errors of 
senior employees are covered…[thus] if the technical inspector acquires equipment 
which he should have realized was inadequate, or the personnel manager hires an officer 
he should have realized was incompetent, then these actions will be deemed to have been 
carried out by the owner.”290 Whose actions can be imputed to the shipowner has been 
considered in several instances involving a nautical fault. When there is a simple 
navigational error by the master or the crew, often that will be difficult to impute to the 
owners of the vessel. For example, the Privy Council opined that negligent navigation on 
the part of the captain, officers and crew in colliding with a lighthouse was not an act that 
could be characterized as the actual fault or privity of the shipowners.291 Where the 
analysis becomes more complex, is often where there is an incident and a representative 
or a superintendent of the shipowner is contacted. The Supreme Court of Canada 
considered the issue of whose fault is attributable to the shipowner in the instance where 
a vessel had rubbed the bank of a canal resulting in the wetting of cargo.292 The assistant 
marine superintendent stationed at the head office had received the Captain’s call 
reporting the incident. The Captain was instructed to proceed to Montreal based on the 
fact that there was no change in the list or draft of the vessel, nevertheless, on arrival the 
cargo was wetted. The claimant contended that the owners had intervened and taken 
control of the vessel, and thus were not protected from liability under the nautical fault 
exemption. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the assistant marine supervisor was 
not the “alter ago” of the shipowner as described by the House of Lords in Lennard 
  
289 Ibid, at pp. 1571-1572. 
290 Falkanger, T. et al. Scandinavian Maritime Law: the Norwegian Perspective (2004) Universitetsforlaget, 
Oslo, at p. 271-272.
291 Robin Hood Mills v. Paterson Steamships (The Thordoc) [1937] 3 D.L.R. 1 (P.C.), in this instance, the 
Privy Council was considering an action for limitation. 
292 Leval & Co. v. Colonial Steamships [1961] S.C.R. 221. 
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Carrying Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co.293 Conversely, in The Isis, the United States 
Supreme Court considered the instance where a vessel’s rudder became damaged through 
stranding in a river prior to her first port of discharge.294 Once the vessel reached the port 
of discharge, the owner’s managing representative instructed that the rudder should be 
repaired at the home port, thus the bent rudder was subsequently lashed into position for 
the remainder of the voyage. The Supreme Court held that when the vessel grounded for 
the second time, the carrier was responsible as the owner had taken control of the vessel, 
and thus the exemption was unavailable. The Supreme Court opined that “here is a case 
where master and crew have surrendered their management and have made their appeal 
to the owner to resume control himself…An owner intervening in such circumstances 
must be diligent in inspection or forfeit his immunity. Negligence at such a time is not the 
fault of servants employed to take the owner’s place for the period of the voyage. It is the 
fault of the owner personally, exercising his judgment to determine whether the voyage 
shall go on.”295 Similarly, in Campbell Soup Co. v. Federal Motorship Co., where the 
owner of a vessel sent a wreck master to supervise repairs at a port of refuge, the cargo 
was entitled to recover for damage suffered after the vessel had left the port of refuge.296
In the West Cajoot, the vessel grounded during her voyage from Manila to Los Angeles, 
and pulled into Kobe for repairs.297 The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals found that “at Kobe, 
the vessel was boarded by the agent of her operators…by the port superintendent and 
other officials of the United States Shipping Board. These officials, who unquestionably 
can be regarded as the responsible representatives of the shipowner, [discussed ways to 
handle the ship and cargo]…under such circumstances, if the West Cajoot sailed from 
Kobe in an unseaworthy condition, the fault is attributable to the shipowner, and cannot 
be regarded as a fault of navigation or management.”298
Finally, the error must be one by master, mariner, pilot or servant of the carrier, as 
opposed to, for example, an agent. If the negligence concerning the management or 
  
293 Ibid, at p. 227, relying on the test found in Lennard Carrying Co v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. [1915] A.C. 
705 (H.L.). 
294 May v. Hamburg-Amerikanische (The Isis), 1933 AMC 1565 (S.C.).
295 Ibid, at pp. 1571-1572. 
296 Campbell Soup Co. v. Federal Motorship Co., 1935 AMC 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
297 United States of America v. Los Angeles Soap Co. (The West Cajoot), 1936 AMC 850 (9 Cir. 1936).
298 Ibid, at p. 859.
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navigation of the vessel is committed by an individual not falling within one of the four 
specified categories of individuals, then the carrier is liable.299 As well, in the instance of 
multiple tortfeasors, all must fall within the specified categories. It has been stated that “if 
the damage was caused partly by the chief officer’s negligence and partly by the 
negligence of the repairer’s men, that would not give the shipowners the protection they 
seek.”300
4.1.3. “In the Navigation or in the Management”
Neither the Harter Act, the Hague or Hague Visby Rules define the meaning or 
the effect of the words “navigation” or “management”. One commentator has described 
“navigation” as covering steering and manoeuvring the vessel, while “management” 
relates to the ship’s condition, the manning and the equipment.301
The term “navigation” means manoeuvring and other seafaring matters rather than 
the commercial operation of the vessel.302 A classic example would be, for instance, 
steering the wrong course.303 The House of Lords has recently defined navigation as 
embracing matters of seamanship and including “choices as to the speed or steering of the 
vessel are matters of navigation, as will be the exercise of laying off a course on a 
chart.”304 The term “navigation” is not restricted to when the vessel is “steaming 
forward” but covers the situation where the vessel is propelled simply by the current.305
  
299 Cooke, J., et al, Voyage Charters (1993) LLP, London, at p. 754. 
300 Minister of Food v. Reardon Smith Line (Fresno City) [1951] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 265 (K.B.), at p. 270. 
Justice McNair relies on the Accomac (1890) 15 P.D., noting that the Court of Appeal in that instance “took 
the view that a finding of joint negligence by two persons, one being within the exception and the other 
without, would disentitle the shipowner to rely upon the exception. In The Fresno City however, that point 
was not at issue, “but it seems to me quite plain that this is not a point which it was the umpire’s intention 
should be open for argument before me”, therefore Justice McNair’s comment is obiter. 
301 Falkanger, T. et al. Scandinavian Maritime Law: the Norwegian Perspective (2004) Universitetsforlaget, 
Oslo, at p. 271-272
302 Poland, S. & Rooth, T. Gard Handbook on P&I Insurance (1996) Gard, Arendal, Norway, at p. 275. 
303 The Satya Kailash [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 465 (K.B.); [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 588 (C.A.). 
304 Whistler International Ltd. v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (The Hill Harmony) [2001] 1 All ER 403 (H.L.), at 
p. 422. 
305 General Cocoa Co. v. S.S. Lindenbank, 1979 AMC 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), where a vessel ran aground 
after drifting for a period of time. The claimants argued that the carrier could not benefit from the error in 
navigation defence as the vessel was not navigated at the time, citing Black’s Law Dictionary defining 
navigation as the act of ‘traversing the sea’ implying that a ship should be steaming forward. The court 
responded that such a description would be too narrow, and that a full bridge watch was maintained at the 
time thus the vessel was being navigated when she went aground. 
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The term “management” has been described by Lord Atkins as referring to the 
handling of “the ship as a ship”, although it may also affect the safety of the cargo.306 It 
has been noted that “the word ‘management’ is not a term of art.”307 Lord Sumner has 
explained that “[management] has no precise legal meaning and its application depends 
on the facts, as appreciated by persons experienced in dealing with steamers.”308 Sir 
Francis Jeune notes “the word “management” goes somewhat beyond – perhaps not much 
beyond – navigation, but far enough to take in this very class of acts which do not affect 
the sailing or movement of the vessel, but do affect the vessel herself...[and] I see no 
reason for limiting the word “management” to the period of the vessel being actually at 
sea.”309
An error, which is one in the navigation and the management of the vessel, has 
been defined as “an erroneous act or omission, the original purpose of which was 
primarily directed towards the ship, her safety and well-being, and towards the common 
venture generally.”310 It has been noted, however, in The Rodney, that “[t]he acts need not 
be done merely for the safety of the vessel or for her maintenance in a seaworthy 
condition. If you extend them to keeping the vessel in her proper condition, then the act 
in this case is an act done in the management of the vessel.”311 There are however limits 
to what the phrase ‘navigation or in the management’ will cover. In The Santa Ana, the 
vessel struck a concealed underwater obstruction in the defendant’s dry docking facility,
causing water entry and damaging the cargo.312 The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 
  
306 Hourani v T&J Harrison (1927) 28 Ll. L.R. 120 (C.A.), at p. 125. 
307 The Dagny Skou [1980-1981] 1 S.L.R. 2000 (C.A.), at p. 202; Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing 
(Australia) v. The Ship Novoaltaisk [1972] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 476, at p. 481, as Macfarlan J. noted “the word 
‘management’ is not a term of art.”
308 Suzuki & Co Ltd. v. Beynon & Co. Ltd. (1926) 42 T.L.R. 269 (H.L.), at p. 274. 
309 The Glenochil [1896] P 10, at p. 16, where an engineer negligently failed to check a sounding pipe 
before ballasting the vessel. In this instance the accident occurred in port during the discharge of the cargo. 
310 Tetley, W. Marine Cargo Claims, 4th Ed., Ch. 16, at p. 3 (Available online only at: 
http://tetley.law.mcgill.ca/maritime), based on Kalamazoo Paper Co. v. C.P.R. (The Nootka) [1950] SCR 
356. See also Seaway Distributors v. Newfoundland Container Lines (1982) 52 N.S.R. (2d) 566 (N.S. Dist. 
1), at p. 573.
311 The Rodney [1900] P 112, at p. 117, where a boatswain used a metal poker to clear a pipe that carries off 
water and had cause flooding in his quarters, but negligently poked a hole in it causing water to enter the 
forehold and damage a portion of the cargo. 
312 Grace Line v. Todd Shipyards (The Santa Ana) [1975] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 276 (C.A.)  
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commented that with regard to the negligent maintenance of a dry dock falling under the 
exemption, “a reading of the many cases giving context to the words “navigation” and 
“management” makes it evident [the defendant] was doing something else.”313 Similarly, 
the Eastern District Court of Virginia has also placed a limit on what the exemption will 
cover. In the limitation proceedings of The Mimi, an able-bodied seaman named Gun Gun
Supardi “went bezerk without warning”, murdered the four officers on board, ordered the 
remaining four men into the lifeboats at knife point and scuttled the vessel by opening the 
sea valves.314 The District Court held “we do not find sec. 1304(2)(a), which refers to loss 
due to an act of the master or crew in navigating or managing the vessel, to be applicable. 
Certainly Supardi’s acts in murdering and scuttling could not be deemed acts of 
navigation or management.”315 Finally, it has been held that theft by stevedores does not 
constitute an error in management. The English Commercial Court held, “I am not 
satisfied that the act of the stevedores…in stealing the cargo while they ought to be 
discharging it, can be held to be an act in the management of the ship; and therefore I 
have come to the conclusion that the defendants fail to bring themselves within the 
protection of Clause (a) [of Rule 2 of Art. IV].”316
4.1.4. “The Ship”
With contracts for the carriage by sea being frequently combined with inland 
portions of the journey, an increasing numbers of cargo claims for loss or damage to 
cargo are occurring during an inland leg of the journey. Multimodal carriage has often 
proven complex and problematic with regard to carrier liability.317 This led the Supreme 
  
313 Ibid, at p. 286. Note that the Court of Appeals finding with regard to the dry dock owner being shielded 
by the exemption are obiter, as it had already been held that the Himalaya clause could not be extended to 
cover non-carriers such as dry dock owners. 
314 Mimi Lim. Proc., 1977 AMC 1841 (E.D. Vir. 1977), at p. 1847.
315 Ibid, at p. 1848. The court, however, did find that the carrier was protected by 1304(2)(q) as his fault did 
not contribute to the loss complained of. Evidently ‘murdering’ would not fit within the exemption, 
however the act of opening the sea valve thus causing the loss of the ship and cargo is an act that has been 
held to be an act of management. 
316 Brown & Co. v. Harrison [1927] 27 Ll. L. Rep. 415 (K.B.), at p. 418; See also Leesh River Tea Co. v. 
British India Steam Navigation Co. (The Chyebassa) [1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 193 (C.A.) where the English 
Court of Appeal held that a felonious act of stevedores was not an act done in the management of the vessel 
with Art. IV(2)(a). 
317 See Crowley, M. “The Limited Scope of the Cargo Liability Regime Covering Carriage of Goods by 
Sea: The Multimodal Problem” (2005) 79 Tul. L. Rev. 1461, in particular pp. 1478-1485; See also Waid, 
R. “Piloting in Post-Kirby Waters: Navigating the Circuit Split Over Whether the Carmack Amendment 
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Court of the United States to recently clarify the issue somewhat by holding that maritime 
law governed the limitation of liability of an inland rail carrier for cargo damage, by 
virtue of the reasoning that where the contract involves a substantial ocean leg, the entire 
contract is a maritime contract.318 In light of recent decisions such as Kirby, and with the 
standard industry practice of contractually extending the limitations of liability in the bill 
of lading to cover agents, intermediaries and independent contractors entrusted with the 
goods,319 it becomes easy to lose sight of the fact that the nautical fault exemption applies 
to errors in navigation or management of the ship. The protection of the nautical fault 
exemption therefore may only extend to the ship, as illustrated in The Sealand Express.320
In this instance, the truck and the driver who received the cargo directly from the vessel 
to deliver it to the consignee erroneously took a route under an overpass highway that 
was too low for the load with the result that the cargo was damaged. The 5th Circuit Court 
of Appeals held that the error in navigation exemption could not extend to protect the 
truck as “the truck used to transport the varnishing machine from Houston to Nuevo 
Laredo was not a “ship” as defined by COGSA.”321 The definition of “ship” can also be 
quite restrictive. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals has found that where cargo was 
transferred to lighters, and subsequently damaged, “COGSA saves the carrier harmless 
only for errors of management with respect to the “ship,” and “ship” as used in the Act, 
has been judicially defined to exclude lighters.”322 Conversely, the Exchequer Court of 
Canada, held that where the goods were loaded onto lighters to take them ashore, but fell 
off and sank, the Hague Rules applied, as the lighter was a “ship” within the meaning of 
the Rules.323 As such, despite the fact that Himalaya Clauses are frequently employed to 
     
Applies to the to the Land Leg of an Intermodal Carriage of Goods on a Through Bill of Lading” (2007) 34 
Transp. L.J. 113. 
318 Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. James N. Kirby Pty, Ltd., 2004 AMC 2705 (U.S. 2004). At p. 2707, 
Justice O’Connor aptly began the judgment with the statement that “This is a maritime case about a train 
wreck”. 
319 See for example the discussion in Kirby, ibid, at p. 2717-2720, concerning the Himalaya Clause in the 
bill of lading and its application to independent contractors, such as Norfolk Southern, whose services have 
been retained to perform the contract.
320 Vistar S.A. v M/V Sealand Express, 1986 AMC 392 (5 Cir. 1985). 
321 Ibid, at p. 395
322 Isthmian Steamship Co. v. California Spray-Chemical Co., 1961 AMC 2476 (9 Cir. 1961), at p. 2484. 
323 Falconbridge Nickel Mines v. Chimo Shipping [1969] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 277 (Exch. C. Can.), at p. 291-
292. Note that the Exchequer Court was the Admiralty Court of Canada, and the predecessor to the current 
Federal Court of Canada.
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extend the limitations under the bill of lading to parties other than the shipowner, only 
navigational and management errors relating to a ship are exempted from liability. 
4.2. SCOPE IN RELATION TO THE CARRIER’S OBLIGATIONS UNDER 
THE HAGUE RULES
Where the scope of the exemption often proves problematic is the intersection 
between faults that are excusable under the nautical fault exemption, and those that 
trigger carrier liability for failing to fulfil obligations with respect to the cargo or the 
seaworthiness of the vessel. 
4.2.1. Article III(2): Care of the Cargo
Arguably, the element of the defence that has fostered confusion and spawned 
considerable litigation over the past century is the distinction between fault in the 
management of the vessel and fault with respect to the carrier’s duty to take proper care 
of the cargo.324 One commentator has characterized distinguishing between these two 
faults as “probably one of the most, if not the most, difficult features of the Rules.”325
Gilmore & Black have noted that “Few clear-cut concepts have appeared for dealing with 
the problem; the feel of it can only be acquired by reading the cases.”326 The distinction 
between improper management of the ship and improper handling of the cargo is still 
regarded, over a century after it was first considered by the courts, as a “hot bone of 
contention”.327 This is clearly distinguished from the errors in navigation aspect of the 
  
324 Wilson, J.F. Carriage of Goods by Sea, 3rd Ed. (1998) Pitman, London, at p. 257; Tetley, W. Marine 
Cargo Claims, 4th Ed., Ch. 16, at p. 3 (Available online only at: http://tetley.law.mcgill.ca/maritime).  For a 
discussion by the Cour d’Appel de Montpellier on the distinction between nautical fault and fault in respect 
of the cargo as found in the Hague Rules from a French perspective see Cour d’Appel de Montpellier, 19 
mars 1969, (Regina Pacis), DMF 1969, 727. For doctrinal commentary on the distinction between fautes 
nautiques and fautes commerciales, see Fraikin, G. Traité de la Responsabilité du Transporteur Maritime
(1957) Pichon et Durand-Auzias, Paris, at pp. 201-203. 
325 Astle, W. Shipowners’ Cargo Liabilities and Immunities (1967) H.F. & G. Witherby Ltd. London
326 As quoted by Parks, A. & Cattell, E. The Law of Tug, Tow and Pilotage (1994) Cornell Maritime Press, 
Maryland, at p. 59.
327 Japikse, R.E. “Deck Cargo Exclusion, Nautical Fault Exemption, Fire Exception” in The Hamburg 
Rules: A Choice for the EEC? (1994) European Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, Maklu, 
Antwerpen, at p. 185.
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exemption, where courts have little difficulty distinguishing between it, and a failure to 
care for the cargo.328
The carrier’s duty to care for the cargo is expressed in Article III(2) of the Hague 
Rules, which provides: “Subject to the provisions of Article IV, the carrier shall properly 
and carefully load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for, and discharge the goods carried.” 
In France, the obligation to care for the cargo is characterized as “de fournir à la 
marchandise les soins diligents d’un professionnel competent,” and should he fail in that 
obligation, his failure is faute commerciale for which he is held liable.329 The distinction 
between the obligation to care for the cargo and error in management is best expressed in 
the words of Lord Justice Greer: “If the cause of the damage is solely, or even primarily, 
a neglect to take reasonable care of the cargo, the ship is liable, but if the cause of the 
damage is a neglect to take reasonable care of the ship, or some part of it, as distinct from 
the cargo, the ship is relieved from liability; for if the negligence is not negligence 
towards the ship, but only negligent failure to use the apparatus of the ship for the 
protection of the cargo, the ship is not so relieved.”330 Lord Justice Greer’s judgment is 
considered the leading opinion on this matter, and has been relied on extensively in 
subsequent judgments and cited in many doctrinal works.331 Recently, the English 
  
328 Healy, N. & Sharpe, D. Cases and Materials on Admiralty, 4th Edition (2006) West Pub. Co., St. Paul, 
Minnesota, at p. 341.
329 Seriaux, A. La faute du transporteur (1984) Economica, Paris, at p. 145. [Author’s translation: to treat 
the merchandise with the same care as a diligent and competent professional would.] An example is found 
where the Cour d’Appel de Paris denied the carrier the benefit of the nautical fault exemption for the 
disappearance of the cargo where it was determined that the carrier failed to properly supervise the cargo in 
the Ghanan port (Cour d’Appel de Paris, 14 mars 1985, DMF 1987, 364).
330 Gosse Millerd v. Canadian Government Merchant Marine (1927) 29 Ll. L.R. 190, at p. 200. Lord 
Justice Greer further clarifies the distinction by commenting that “In my judgment, the reasonable 
interpretation to put on the Articles is there is a paramount duty imposed to safely carry and take care of the 
cargo, and that performance of this duty is only excused if the damage to the cargo is the indirect result of 
an act, or neglect, which can be described as either (1) negligence in caring for the safety of the ship; (2) 
failure to take care to prevent damage to the ship, or some part of the ship; or (3) failure in the management 
of some operation connected with the movement or stability of the ship, or otherwise for ship’s purposes.” 
Lord Justice Greer’s judgment in the Court of Appeal was the dissenting judgment, however, the House of 
Lords subsequently upheld Greer’s judgment and allowed the appeal in Gosse Millerd v. Canadian 
Government Merchant Marine (1928) 32 Ll. L. Rep. 91. 
331 See International Packers v. Ocean Steam Ship Co. [1955] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 218 (Q.B.), at p. 234; 
Kalamazoo Paper Co. v. C.P.R. [1950] S.C.R. 356, at p. 365; Tetley, W. Marine Cargo Claims, 4th Ed., Ch. 
16, at p. 5 (Available online only at: http://tetley.law.mcgill.ca/maritime); Wilson, J.F. Carriage of Goods 
by Sea, 3rd Ed. (1998) Pitman, London, at p. 257; Marais, G. Les Transports de Marchandises Par Mer et 
Jurisprudence: Loi du 2 Avril 1936 (1948) Pichon & Durand-Auzias, Paris, at p. 39; Ping-fat, S. Carrier’s 
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Commercial Court relied on Lord Justice Greer’s characterization of the distinction when 
considering the excessive heating of the bunker oil that was believed to have led to an 
explosion.332 Justice Morison held that the shipowner could rely on Art. IV(2)(a)  on the 
basis that “[t]he heating of the bunker tank was to facilitate the transfer of oil from it to 
the engines. It was a single act which did not relate in any way to the care of the cargo; 
albeit it may have indirectly adversely affected the cargo.”333
In Hourani v. T&J Harrison, Lord Justice Banks draws the distinction between 
“damage resulting from some act relating to the ship herself and only incidentally 
damaging the cargo” and an act dealing “solely with the goods and not directly or 
indirectly with the ship herself,”334 and thus it was held that although the act of stowing 
and discharging the cargo does affect both the ship and the cargo, they couldn’t be 
regarded as matters concerning the management of the ship.335 In The Ferro, Justice 
Barnes is adamant with respect to stowage, “[i]t seems to me a perversion of terms to say 
that the management of a ship has anything to do with the stowage of the cargo.”336
The actual act of stowing or discharging cargo can generally be clearly 
distinguished from an act in relation to the management of the vessel,337 nevertheless in 
     
Liability under the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules (2002) Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 
at p. 91-92.
332 Compania Sud American Vapores v. MS ER Hamburg Schiffahrtsgesellschaft [2006] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 66 
(Q.B.)
333 Ibid, at p. 82.
334 Hourani v T&J Harrison (1927) 28 Ll. L.R. 120 (C.A.), at p. 123. 
335 Ibid, at p. 124. In this instance, the stevedores pillaged the cargo, and Banks L.J. holding for the Court 
of Appeal, found that on the basis of English and American authorities that these acts could not come 
within the expression of acts done in the management of the ship. 
336 The Ferro [1893] P. 38, at p. 46. In this instance a cargo of oranges were damaged due to the manner in 
which they were stowed, with the result that the carrier was held responsible. 
337 In MacNamara v. The Hatteras [1930] 38 Ll. L. Rep. 232 (Irish Free State, Adm. Div.), at p. 235, it was 
found that an error in stowage, with respect to a cargo of tobacco, could not be a fault or error in the 
management of the ship. In Carling O’Keefe Breweries v. CN Marine [1990] ETL 654 (F.C.A.), over 4000 
cases of beer in 3 containers were lost overboard as a result of being stowed on deck and secured with wire 
rope lashings instead of superior fittings, and thus the Federal Court of Appeal held that this was not an 
error in management, rather there was a want of care of the cargo.  In General Chemical Company v. Barge 
Joseph J. Hock, 1934 AMC 507 (2 Cir. 1934), it was held that the discharge of cargo causing damage is 
negligence in relation to care of the cargo and not an error in management. In the Cour de Cassation, 26 
fevrier 1991, (Aude), DMF 1991, 358, the French Cour de Cassation held that where a vessel was 
discharging and developed a list, due to an error in the discharging process, causing damage to cargo, the 
error was a faute commerciale. Although an error in stowage, has been held by the Cour de Cassation to be 
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certain factual situations the distinction between acts in relation to the care of the cargo 
and the management of the vessel can prove difficult to draw. There are actions that are 
clearly connected with the vessel, such as engines and steering gear, and actions clearly 
connected with the cargo, such as refrigeration or stowage. There are actions, however, 
that may be connected with both; “There are some parts of the ship which for this 
purpose are regarded as ancipitis usus; for instance, the hatches may in one aspect be 
regarded as part of the outer skin of the vessel as when decks are actually or potentially 
swept by seas, so that the proper battening down of the hatches with tarpaulins and cleats 
is as much a part of the management of the ship as closing the portholes. Under other 
circumstances, as in dock or in calm waters, the hatches belong to the management of the 
cargo, either because they have to be removed for ventilation or kept tight to keep wet 
from perishable cargo.”338 Where an action could be connected to both the cargo and the 
management of the vessel, the courts of various jurisdictions have not responded in a 
consistent fashion. Justice Rand, of the Supreme Court of Canada, has found that if the 
act or omission is one which is both care of the cargo and error in management, then the 
carrier will benefit from the exemption.339 Similarly, the Cour de Cassation of France has 
found that where one error was both faute nautique and faute commerciale, the carrier is 
     
a faute nautique where it affected the stability and security of the whole vessel, however this judgment is 
older and perhaps may be decided differently today (Cour de  Cassation, 4 juillet 1972, (Hildegard 
Doerenkamp), DMF 1972, 717). 
338 Forman & Ellams v. Federal Steam Navigation [1928] 30 Ll. L. Rep. 52 (K.B.), at p. 60. 
339 In Kalamazoo Paper Co. v. C.P.R. [1950] S.C.R. 356, The Supreme Court of Canada held that an error 
to utilize pumping facilities was an error in management, yet at p. 366, Rand J. found that the omission was 
also in respect of the cargo, but stated: “the further question is whether an act or omission in management is 
within the exception when at the same time and within the same mode it is an act or omission in relation to 
care of the cargo. It may be that duty to the ship as a whole takes precedence over duty to a portion of the 
cargo; but, without examining the question, the necessary effect of the language of Article III(ii) “subject to 
the provisions of Article IV” seems to me to be that once it is shown that the omission is in the course of 
management, the exception applies, notwithstanding that it may be also an omission in relation to the cargo. 
To construe it otherwise would be to add to the language of paragraph (a) the words “and not being a 
neglect in the care of the goods.” Rand’s statement, if read carefully would most certainly interpret it as 
stating that if the act or omission is one which is both care of the cargo and error in management, then the 
carrier is not responsible. Tetley has stated “[i]f both ship and cargo have been affected by the same error, 
then the carrier is usually exculpated, because the whole venture is implicated.” (Tetley, W. Marine Cargo 
Claims, 4th Ed., Ch. 16, at p. 5 (Available online only at: http://tetley.law.mcgill.ca/maritime)). On the other 
hand, Wilson interprets Rand’s judgment as taking “the view that the negligent conduct in question was 
directly primarily to ensure the safety of the vessel.” (Wilson, J.F. Carriage of Goods by Sea, 3rd Ed. 
(1998) Pitman, London, at p. 258, f.n. 94). There is a distinction there as Tetley’s argument, and 
presumably Rand’s judgement, are meant irrespective of entering into a primary purpose analysis, and if 
the act affects both, the carrier is exonerated. Wilson, on the other hand seems to imply that the carrier is 
only exonerated if the primary purpose of the act is with regard to management. 
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exonerated.340 Yet this position is contentious.341 More recently, Rodière has noted that as 
the carrier must actually establish that the fault is nautique in order to exempt himself 
from liability, then the two categories of fault, nautique and commerciale, are not on an 
equal plane and there is a presumption that the fault committed is commerciale.342 Under 
British law, it has been noted that “[i]f both the ship and cargo are affected by the same 
error, the carrier can usually avoid responsibility, as the whole venture is involved, but 
each case will be decided on the individual facts of the case. Where two errors occur, one 
being management of the ship and the other care of the cargo, the carrier must distinguish 
between the damage caused by each or be responsible for all.”343 The Italian position is 
such that where there is an act that has elements of both nautical fault and error in respect 
of the cargo the carrier is liable. The Corte Di Cassazione considered the instance where 
two containers had been lost during the voyage where the route had been selected with 
knowledge of, and despite, adverse weather condition.344 The Corte De Cassazione held 
that for the carrier to be relieved of liability by virtue of nautical fault, the carrier must 
prove that there was no other cause of the loss, which in this instance would be to 
demonstrate that there were no errors with respect to stowage.345
In the United States, it has been noted that “the United States Supreme Court had 
addressed the distinction between error in management and error in care of the cargo but 
has not articulated a clear test. The Ninth Circuit, noting that no precise definitions exist, 
advocates a case-by-case determination using the following test: If the act in question has 
the primary purpose of affecting the ship, it is ‘in navigation or in management’; but if 
  
340 Cour de Cassation, 6 juillet, 1954, DMF 1954, 714. See also Pontavice, E. Droit et Pratique des 
Transports Maritimes et Affrètements (1970) Delmas et Cie., France, at p. 17, stating that a fault whose 
nature affects both the safety of the vessel and the safety of the cargo falls within the nautical fault 
exemption. 
341Chaiban, C. Causes Legales D’Exoneration du Transporteur Maritime dans le Transport de 
Merchandises (1965) Pichon & Durand-Auzias, Paris, at pp. 93-94; See also Fraikin, G. Traité de la 
Responsabilité du Transporteur Maritime (1957) Pichon et Durand-Auzias, Paris, at p. 203 who notes that 
where two faults, one commercial and one nautical, cause the damage the carrier can only be exonerated 
where he can prove that the nautical fault caused the damage exclusively. 
342 Rodière, R. & du Pontavice, E., Droit Maritime, 12th Ed. (1997) Dalloz, Paris, at p. 346. 
343 Lloyd’s of London Press. A Guide to the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules: An LLP Special Report (1985) 
LLP, London, at p. 29.
344 Corte di Cassazione, May 18, 1995, Agenzia Marittima Aldo Spadoni v. Insurance Co. of North 
America, (1996) 1 Unif. L. Rev. 378, at p. 378.
345 Ibid.
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the primary purpose is to affect the cargo, it is not ‘in navigation or management’.”346
The act of distinguishing between care of the cargo and errors in management has been 
termed by some authors as the “primary purpose test”.347 It should be noted that although 
this line of reasoning and manner of characterization is an American legal construct, it is 
not restricted solely to the United States, and has been utilized by certain European 
commentators.348 In The Germanic, the United States Supreme Court opined on the 
primary purpose test where the vessel arrived at port covered with heavy coat of ice, and 
during the simultaneous loading and discharge, the vessel listed and sank.349 Justice 
Holmes, speaking for the United States Supreme Court, opined, “[i]f the primary purpose 
is to affect the ballast of the ship, the change is management of the vessel, but if, as in 
view of the findings we must take to have been the case here, the primary purpose is to 
get the cargo ashore, the fact that it also affects the trim of the vessel does not make it the 
less a fault of the class which the first section [of the Harter Act] removes from the 
operation of the third. We think it plain that a case may occur which, in different aspects, 
falls within both sections, and if this be true, the question which section is to govern must 
be determined by the primary nature and the object of the acts which cause the loss.”350
  
346 Shaver Transportation Co. v. The Travelers Indemnity Co., 1980 AMC 393 (D.C. Ore. 1979), at p. 399, 
referencing for the test, Grace Lines v. Todd Shipyards, 1974 AMC 1136, at p. 1153 (9 Cir. 1974). In this 
instance the shipowner’s failure to provide uncontaminated load lines was viewed as an error in the care 
and custody of the cargo. 
347 Tetley, W. Marine Cargo Claims, 4th Ed., Ch. 16, at p. 4 (Available online only at: 
http://tetley.law.mcgill.ca/maritime), “In the United States, the “primary purpose” test is employed to 
differentiate between whether the impugned operation was conducted principally in the interests of the ship 
or of the cargo.”;  Hare, J. Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, (1999) Juta & Co, 
Cape Town, at p. 631, “There are times when the actions of the crew affect both vessel and cargo. The 
United States has solved this dilemma by applying the ‘primary purpose’ test to ascertain whether the 
operation was conducted in the interests of the vessel or the cargo.”
348 For example, one European commentator notes the distinction between care of the cargo and error in 
management as “There is a case of improper care of the goods when equipment of the ship is misused or 
neglected which exclusively or primarily serve the purpose of proper care of the goods, or when the use 
actually made of it was so directed at such care (e.g. an omission to start up or adequately adjust a 
refrigerator for the preservation of a fruit cargo…); conversely, there is a case of erroneous management of 
the ship when equipment of the vessel was misused or neglected which is exclusively or primarily meant to 
serve ship’s purposes or when the use actually made of it was so directed at such purpose (e.g…negligent 
filling of tanks…).” (Japikse, R.E. “Deck Cargo Exclusion, Nautical Fault Exemption, Fire Exception” in 
The Hamburg Rules: A Choice for the EEC? (1994) European Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, 
Maklu, Antwerpen, at p. 185). 
349 Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Aitken (The Germanic), 196 U.S. 589 (1904). 
350 The Germanic, ibid, at p. 597. For a discussion and application of Justice Holmes’ holding by the 
Supreme Court of Canada see Kalamazoo Paper Co. v. C.P.R. [1950] S.C.R. 356, at p. 370; See also 
Greenwood, E. “Problems of Negligence in Loading, Stowage, Custody, Care, and Delivery of Cargo” 
(1971) 45 Tul. L. Rev. 790, at pp. 801-802. For U.S. cases applying the primary purpose test see Leon 
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Acts that have their primary purpose as one in relation to cargo are therefore not 
considered management of the vessel. Examples are: failing to ventilate,351 failing to 
close ventilation lids,352 stowing cargo in a position where other cargo may damage it,353
failing to heat cargo,354 and failing to cool cargo,355 among others.356 With regard to what 
     
Bernstein Co. v. Wilhelm Wilhelmsen (M.S. Titania), 1956 AMC, 754; 232 F.2d 771(5 Cir. 1956) and 
General Cocoa Co. v. S.S. Lindenbank, 1979 AMC 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), at p. 294.
351 In Schnell v. The Vallescura 293 U.S. 296 (1934), the Supreme Court held that although during certain 
parts of the voyage heavy weather prevented ventilation, the evidence showed that ventilation during other 
portions of the voyage could have been accomplished and therefore the carrier was liable to the cargo 
owner for damage to a cargo of fresh onions as a result of his negligence in the care of the cargo. The Court 
opined “the failure to ventilate the cargo was not a ‘fault or error in navigation or management’ of the 
vessel from the consequences of which it may be relieved by s. 3 of the Harter Act…The management was 
of the cargo…” (The Vallescura, ibid, at p. 303). For further discussion on The Vallescura, and other U.S. 
Supreme Court judgments that have considered the exemption for error in management, see Baer, H. 
Admiralty Law of the Supreme Court, 3rd Ed. (1979) Michie Co, Charlottesville, Virginia, at pp. 507-512. 
There has been extensive litigation with regard to ventilation, as certain cargos need extra ventilation, for 
example potatoes and rice. See Canada Rice Mills v Union Marine & General Ins. (The Segundo) [1941] 
67 Ll.L. Rep. 549 (P.C.), at p. 533 for the Privy Council’s consideration of a damaged shipment of rice. In 
Brown & Williamson v. S.S. Anghyra, 1958 AMC 472 (E.D. Vir. 1957), the master shut down the dynamo 
for the purpose of ensuring that the crew complied with blackout regulations, however the court found the 
resulting damage to the tobacco from a failure to ventilate it was an error in caring for the cargo: “while the 
primary purpose of the dynamo may have been associated with the operation of the ship in normal 
circumstances, it may be that the primary purpose changed when the vessel was at anchorage under 
blackout orders.” (S.S. Anghyra, ibid, at p. 487).  
352 Lockett & Co. v. Cunard (The Samaria) 1927 AMC 1057 (E.D.N.Y. 1927), where a ventilator lid was 
negligently left open while crewmen were using a hose to press up a ballast tank, when the hose burst, the 
cargo was wetted through the open lid, the court considered this to be an error in the care of the cargo. 
353 In Knott v. Botany Worsted Mills, 179 U.S. 69 (1900), the cargo, bales of wool, were stowed forward of 
a bulkhead that was not watertight, while sugar was stored aft of the bulkhead. The ship was trimmed by 
the stern, so that sugar drainage would run aft, but cargo aft was subsequently discharged, and the vessel 
became trimmed by the bow, therefore causing the run off from the sugar to damage the wool. The 
Supreme Court held that the loss was primarily caused by the stowage of the wool forward without 
ensuring that no changes in stowage would bring the vessel down by the head.  The Court opined: “The 
primary cause of the damage was negligence and inattention in the loading in the loading or stowage of the 
cargo, either regarded as a whole, or as respects the juxtaposition of wet sugar and wool bales placed far 
forward. The wool should not have been stowed forward of the wet sugar, unless care was taken in the 
other loading, and in all subsequent changes in the loading to see that the ship should not get down by the 
head.” (Knott, ibid, at p. 73). In The Exmoor 1939 AMC 1095 (2 Cir. 1939), the carrier was held liable 
when tobacco was damaged from heat and decay that was caused by valonia (acorn cups) being stowed in 
the same compartment.  One the other hand, in Warner Moore v. S.S. Milwaukee Bridge, 1928 AMC 1063 
(2nd Cir.), drums of acid carried as deck cargo began to leak during the voyage, the crew then jettisoned 
certain drums and hosed the deck down, nevertheless a cargo of flour stored under deck suffered acid and 
water damage. The 2nd Cir. Court of Appeals found this related primarily to the management of the vessel 
and not to care and custody of the cargo. 
354 The Massasoit 1928 AMC 1458 (D.N.J. 1928), failing to heat creosote. 
355 The New York 1929 AMC 53 (2 Cir. 1928), where the Second Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with a 
failure to keep pears cool. As well see Barr v. International Mercantile Marine Co., 29 F.2d 26 (2Cir. 
1928), where a failure to care for the refrigeration equipment, thus failing to keep the cargo cool, was an 
error primarily in respect of cargo. 
356 For further case law and examples see Healy, N. & Sharpe, D. Cases and Materials on Admiralty (1974) 
West Pub Co., St Paul, Minnesota, at pp. 483-486; Sturley, M. Benedict on Admiralty, 6th Ed., Volume 2A 
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activities have their primary purpose in relation to cargo, Benedict notes that “if the 
negligence complained of is in the performance or non-performance of an act which is an 
ordinary incident of storage on land, as for instance, negligence in ventilating, cooling or 
heating the goods, then management of the ship is not involved.”357 In the United States, 
if the error is one of failure to care for the cargo, concurrent with an error in management, 
the burden rests on the carrier to prove what damage resulted from the exception, as 
failing to distinguish between the two kinds of damage results in the carrier’s liability.358
Courts in jurisdictions other than the United States have also utilized the language 
of ‘primary purpose’. In The Iron Gippsland, the Supreme Court of New South Wales 
considered the situation where a cargo of automotive diesel oil was contaminated via the 
inert gas system in the vessel.359 The Court found that “[i]t is true that inert gas systems 
were installed on tankers fundamentally for the protection of the vessel. However, the 
purpose of the inert gas system is primarily to manage the cargo, not only for the 
protection of the cargo but for the ultimate protection of the vessel from adverse 
consequences associated with that cargo. Thus, essentially the inert gas system is 
concerned with the management of the cargo and, in my view, damage occasioned to the 
cargo by mismanagement of the inert gas system cannot be categorized as neglect or fault 
in the management of the ship.”360 In another Australian case, The Tenos, a cargo of wool 
was damaged as a result of water escaping through the negligence of the crewmen testing 
for leaks in tanks used for the carriage of vegetable oil.361 It was held that “these 
activities…did not have anything to do with the management of the ship and the primary 
purpose was to undertake activities which were in relation to a part of the ship which was 
     
(1990) Matthew Bender & Co, New York, at pp. 13-12 to 13-18; Schoenbaum, T. Admiralty and Maritime 
Law, 3rd Ed. Volume 2. (2001) West Group, St. Paul, Minnesota, at p. 131; Note, a particularly 
comprehensive list is found in Song, S. A Comparative Study on Maritime Cargo Carrier’s Liability in 
Anglo-American and French Laws (1970) PhD Thesis, Cornell University, Ann Arbor, Michigan, at pp. 54-
56. 
357 Sturley, M. Benedict on Admiralty, 6th Ed., Volume 2A (1990) Matthew Bender & Co, New York, at p. 
13-20. 
358 Bunge Co. v. Alcoa Steamship Co. (S.S. General Artigas), 1955 AMC 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), concerning 
a cargo of damaged wheat where the cause could have been rain coming down the ventilators, or 
smothering steam erroneously turned on during the voyage. 
359 Caltex Refining v. BHP Transport (The Iron Gippsland) [1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 335 (S.C. N.S.W.).
360 Ibid, at p. 358. The Court, at p. 359, went on to hold the carrier liable for a failure to properly and 
carefully carry, keep and care for the goods pursuant to art. III, r. 2 of the Rules.
361 Chubu Asahi Cotton Spinning Co. v. The Ship Tenos [1968] 12 F.L.R. 291. 
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solely used for the purpose of carrying cargo.”362 Similarly, the Swedish Supreme Court 
found in relation to a failure to close two bilge valves that “[t]he closing of the valves 
primarily benefits the vessel, because the failure to close the valve may endanger the 
safety of the vessel.”363
In France, the criteria for distinguishing between faute nautique and faute 
commerciale is to look to “l’objet de l’opération litigieuse.”364 Indeed, it has been noted 
that this is the key criterion to distinguishing between management of the vessel and care 
of the cargo.365 To illustrate, where there is an error with regard to plugging in a power 
cord, if it is to aid the function of the vessel, then it is a nautical fault, yet the fault is 
commercial where it powers the refrigeration system for the cargo.366 The Cour de 
Cassation has held that where an error was committed during ballasting, the fault with be 
nautical fault where the act of ballasting was intended for the equilibrium and safety of 
the vessel.367 This has been the traditional French view with regard to distinguishing 
between the two characterizations. Although this remains in theory the manner in which 
nautical fault is distinguished from commercial fault, as recent doctrinal texts have 
attested to,368 in practice this has been altered to a certain extent. The French tribunals 
have become increasingly hostile towards allowing carriers to benefit from the nautical 
  
362 Ibid, at p. 301. 
363 ND 1961.282  SCC Malevik (Summarized by Falkanger, T. et al. Scandinavian Maritime Law: the 
Norwegian Perspective (2004) Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, at p. 272-273). See also ND 1957.30 NSC 
Trinidad, where the Norwegian Supreme Court found that where a light had been left on scorching some of 
the cargo of grain, the fact of turning on the wrong switch in this instance constituted fault in the 
management of the cargo. 
364 Remond-Gouilloud, M. Droit Maritime, 2nd Ed. (1993) Ed. A. Perdone, Paris, at p. 376. [Author’s 
translation: the intention of the act that is the source of the litigation.] 
365 Bonassies, P. & Scapel, C. Droit Maritime (2006) Librairie générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, Paris, 
at p. 703-704: “Pour identifier la faute dans l’administration du navire et la distinquer de fautes voisines, 
que l’on a parfois qualifiées de fautes dans l’administration de la cargaison, un critère a été d’abord 
privilégié, celui de la destination de l’acte fautif: cet acte intéressait-il la navire – impliquant alors une 
faute nautique – ou, au contraire, la cargaison – impliquant alors une faute commerciale?” [Author’s 
translation: To identify faults in the management of the vessel, and distinguish it from other faults, such as 
those that have often been qualified as faults in the management of the cargo, one criteria above all is 
privileged, that of the intent of the faulty act: is this act aimed at the vessel – therefore implicating nautical 
fault – or to the contrary, the cargo – thereby implicating commercial fault.]
366 Ibid, at p. 376. 
367 Cour de Cassation, 17 juilliet 1980, DMF 1981, 209, although the Cour de Cassation expressly noted 
that errors in ballasting do not necessarily constitute nautical fault. 
368 Bonassies, P. & Scapel, C. Droit Maritime (2006) Librairie générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, Paris, 
at p. 703-704; Remond-Gouilloud, M. Droit Maritime, 2nd Ed. (1993) Ed. A. Perdone, Paris, at p. 376. 
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fault exemption. As such, the French judiciary taken to approaching the manner in which 
one distinguishes between commercial and nautical faults in a particularly narrow 
fashion. The Cour d’Appel de Versailles and the Cour de Cassation have recently held 
that although the ballasting act in question was aimed at the stability of the vessel, the 
carrier was liable for commercial fault as he could not prove that the error had in fact 
affected the stability and the security of the vessel.369 This restrictive approach by the 
French judiciary is not restricted to the distinction between commercial and nautical fault, 
rather the Tribunals are using all means at their disposal to effectively neutralize the 
nautical fault exemption.370
Distinguishing between an act which would constitute an error in management, 
and one for which the carrier is liable for failing to properly and carefully care for the 
goods, despite nuances in the jurisprudence, has been viewed as not terribly problematic 
by certain commentators. One author has commented that “[t]rue, there still exist 
differing nuances with a potentially different outcome and there will still be borderline 
cases, but doctrine and jurisprudence have anyway created a visible path in developing 
general criteria helpful enough to have demarcation issues largely resolved and to have 
the bulk of cases so decided.”371 Other commentators, however, adopt the opposing view. 
Gaskell has argued that “the distinction is nearly always a difficult, and somewhat 
artificial, one and the [Iron Gippsland] case shows the reluctance of the courts to allow 
the defence, even where the ‘management’ relates to both the cargo and the ship.”372
With regard to the distinction between the two concepts, one French commentator has 
complained, “l’interprétation de ces formules a donné lieu à d’innombrables 
difficultés.”373 Certain legislators have therefore chosen to amend the wording of Art. 
  
369 Cour d’Appel de Versailles, 20 decembre 2001 (Fort Fleur d’Epee), DMF 2002, 251; Cour de Cassation, 
3 décembre 2003, (Fort Fleur d’Epée), DMF 2004, 626. 
370 Bonassies, P. & Scapel, C. Droit Maritime (2006) Librairie générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, Paris, 
at p. 702. For further discussion on the restrictive approach to the nautical fault exemption by the French 
courts, see Chapter 7: Restricting the Availability of the Nautical Fault Exemption.
371 Japikse, R.E. “Deck Cargo Exclusion, Nautical Fault Exemption, Fire Exception” in The Hamburg 
Rules: A Choice for the EEC? (1994) European Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, Maklu, 
Antwerpen, at p. 185. 
372 Gaskell, N. et al. Bills of Lading: Law and Contracts (2000) LLP, London, at p. 279. 
373 Remond-Gouilloud, M. Droit Maritime, 2nd Ed. (1993) Ed. A. Perdone, Paris, at p. 376. [Author’s 
translation: the interpretation of these formulas has given rise to innumerable difficulties].
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IV(2)(a) in light of slightly differing interpretations in various jurisdictions. The 
distinction drawn in jurisprudence has been codified in Turkish law in order to give 
clarity to the provision. In the Turkish Commercial Code of 1956, which incorporates the 
Hague Rules, article 1062(II) stipulates: “If the loss was caused by the act (of the 
carrier’s servants or of the ship’s company) in the navigation or in the management of the 
ship, or by fire, the carrier is liable only for his own fault. Measures which are taken 
mainly in the interest of the cargo do not pertain to the management of the ship. In the 
case of doubt, loss is presumed not to have arisen from the management of the ship.”374
German legislators have also seen fit to amend the text of the exemption in the interests 
of clarity. The German Commercial Code (HGB), provision 607, incorporates the 
nautical fault exemption but then expressly stipulates that “The management of the ship 
does not include such conduct that is primarily directed towards the care of the cargo.”375
This added stipulation in provision 607 of the HBG therefore expressly indicates that it is 
the aim or the object of the act that is determinative.376 Finally, the Greek Code of Private 
Maritime Law, in article 138, provides “…If loss or damage arises from an act or 
omission in the navigation or handling of the ship, the carrier shall not be liable except 
for faults of his own. Navigation or handling of the ship shall not include measures taken 
principally in the interest of the cargo.”377
4.2.2. Article III(1): Due Diligence to Make the Ship Seaworthy
Similar to acts in relation to cargo, difficulties have often existed when 
distinguishing an error in management or navigation from one which is an omission to 
exercise due diligence to render the vessel seaworthy. Article III(1) provides: “The 
carrier shall be bound before and at the beginning of the voyage to exercise due diligence 
to (a) Make the ship seaworthy. (b) Properly man equip and supply the ship. (c) Make the 
holds, refrigerating and cool chambers, and all other parts of the ship in which goods are 
  
374 Karan, H. “The Carrier’s Liability for Breach of The Contract of Carriage of Goods by Sea Under 
Turkish Law” (2002) 33 JMLC 91, at p. 102. 
375 German Commercial Code, HGB s. 607.2. 
376 Markianos, D. “Le Transport Maritime Sous Connaissement En Droit Allemand” in Le Transport 
Maritime Sous Connaissement A L’Heure Du Marche Commun (1966) M. De Juglart & P. De La Pradelle 
(Eds.), Pichon & Durand-Auzias, Paris, at p. 39. 
377 Karatzas, T. & Ready, N. The Greek Code of Private Maritime Law (1982) Martius Nijhoff Pub., The 
Hague, at p. 39. 
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carried, fit and safe for their reception, carriage and preservation.” In this instance, as 
with the section above, errors in management generally pose much more difficulty with 
regard to the demarcation of the nautical fault exemption than do errors in navigation.378
Under the Harter Act, the exercise of due diligence was a condition precedent to 
benefit from the exemption of error in navigation and management.379 Essentially, any 
exoneration of carrier liability was conditional on due diligence having been exercised to 
render the ship seaworthy,380 and any failure to do so, regardless of whether it is causally 
linked to the loss or not, pre-empts the carrier from relying on the exemption.381 Under 
the Hague Rules, the nautical fault exemption has been characterized as “unconditional 
and absolute.”382 Arguably, this is not entirely the case as the obligation to exercise due 
diligence to render the vessel seaworthy has been interpreted to be an “overriding 
obligation”383 and therefore the nautical fault exemption is subject to Art. III(1).384
Moreover, even where there has been a want of due diligence on the part of the carrier, 
the exemption remains available provided the want of due diligence was not causative of 
  
378 Ping-fat, S. Carrier’s Liability under the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules (2002) Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, at p. 94, after an discussion on error in management of the vessel involving 
several pages, simply notes “the other limb of the exception, relating to errors in navigation, appear to have 
posed fewer problems.”
379 May v. Hamburg-Amerikanische (The Isis), 1933 AMC 1565 (S.C. 1933). See also Poor, W. American 
Law of Charter Parties and Ocean Bills of Lading, 5th Ed. (1968) Matthew Bender, New York, at p. 169. 
380 Schoenbaum, T. Admiralty and Maritime Law, 3rd Ed. Volume 2. (2001) West Group, St. Paul, 
Minnesota, at p. 130, f.n.1. 
381 Hendrikse, M. & Margetson, N. “A Comparative Law Study of the Relationship between the 
Obligations of Sea Carriers and the Exceptions” [2005] ETL 161, at p. 167.
382 Schoenbaum, T. Admiralty and Maritime Law, 3rd Ed. Volume 2. (2001) West Group, St. Paul, 
Minnesota, at p. 130, f.n.1.
383 The expression ‘overriding obligation’ was coined by the Privy Council in Maxine Footwear Co v. 
Canadian Government Merchant Marine [1959] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 105 (P.C.), at p. 113, where was 
determined that the duty to exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel is an overriding obligation, 
and therefore where the carrier is in breach of this overriding obligation and that breach is causative of the 
loss or the damage, Art. IV(2) may not be relied upon. The Dutch Supreme Court, in Quo Vadis, held that 
the obligation to exercise due diligence to ensure seaworthiness is an overriding obligation (Hendrikse, M. 
& Margetson, N. “A Comparative Law Study of the Relationship between the Obligations of Sea Carriers 
and the Exceptions” [2005] ETL 161, at p. 166).
384 Lord Somervell of Harrow, in considering the nature of the obligation to exercise due diligence to make 
the vessel seaworthy, opined as follows: “Article III, rule 1 is an overriding obligation. If it is not fulfilled 
and the non-fulfilment causes the damage, the immunities of Art. IV cannot be relied on. This is the natural 
construction apart from the opening words of Art. III, rule 2. The fact that the rule is made subject to the 
provision of Art. IV and Rule 1 is not so conditioned makes the point clear beyond argument.” (Maxine 
Footwear Co v. Canadian Government Merchant Marine [1959] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 105 (P.C.), at p. 118).
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the loss and damage.385 Where there are several contributing causes, one of them being a 
failure to exercise due diligence, then the carrier is liable for the loss or damage. In The 
Fred W. Sargent, it was determined that where “unseaworthiness of the vessel, caused by 
failure of the carrier to exercise due diligence, and negligence in the management of the 
ship concur in causing the loss, the carrier is liable for the loss.”386 This is further 
illustrated by The Coastal Rambler, where a seaman put a hose and its stream of water 
into the wrong sounding pipe damaging the cargo.387 The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 
found the carrier liable as a result of indistinct markings on the pipe, commenting that “in 
our view, there may have been error in the management of the ship, but in a series of 
events one may find unseaworthiness and negligence in “management of the ship” 
causing damage. The presence of the latter does not vitiate the former.”388 In The 
Theodegmon, a vessel grounded in the Orinoco River; consequently the cargo claimant 
asserted a steering gear breakdown while the carrier claimed error of the pilot.389 It was 
held by the English Commercial Court that as the carrier could not demonstrate due 
diligence with respect to the steering gear, it was liable to cargo interests.390 In The Irish 
Spruce, imprudent navigation and unseaworthiness in the form of the absence of the 
Admiralty List of Radio Signals on board the vessel both contributed to the loss of the 
plaintiff’s cargo; thus the Southern District Court of New York found the carrier liable.391
In Maxine Footwear, thawing pipes with a torch was considered both an error in 
management and a failure to exercise due diligence, therefore the Privy Council held the 
carrier liable for the loss.392 Finally, the English Commercial Court in The Tolmidis, 
where the vessel was flooded, partially by a hole in the vessel caused by a failure to 
  
385 Cooke, J., et al, Voyage Charters (1993) LLP, London, at p. 752. 
386 Spencer Kellogg v. Great Lakes Transport Co. (The Fred W. Sargent), 1940 AMC 670 (E.D. Mich. 
1940), at p. 678. 
387 Hydaburg Cooperative Assoc. v. Alaska Steamship Co. (The Coastal Rambler), 1969 AMC 363 (9 Cir. 
1968. 
388 Ibid, at p. 366-367. 
389 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cabaneli Naviera (The Theodegmon) [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 52 (Q.B.). 
390 Ibid, at p. 77. 
391 American Smelting v. S.S. Irish Spruce [1976] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). This judgment 
illustrates the difficult nature of the distinction. Although the Southern District Court of New York would 
have been right to hold the carrier liable where both navigational error and unseaworthiness caused the 
grounding, on appeal to the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals, in American Smelting v. S.S. Irish Spruce, 548 
F.2d 56 (2 Cir. 1977), the Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts holding on the basis that it disagreed 
that unseaworthiness, in this instance the absence of the list of radio signals, was in fact a cause of the 
stranding.
392 Maxine Footwear Co. v. Canadian Government Merchant Marine [1959] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 105 (P.C.). 
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exercise due diligence and partially by errors made in the management of the vessel, 
found the carrier liable as the vessel was unseaworthy.393 It is considered therefore well 
settled law that where two concurrent actions cause the loss, with one being a failure to 
exercise due diligence, the carrier is liable.394
When the damage is the result of concurrent actions, the analysis is generally not 
terribly problematic, however, the difficulty arises when one must decide whether to 
characterize a single action either as a failure to exercise due diligence or as an error in 
management or navigation. In The Farrandoc, a second engineer turned the wrong valve 
when attempting to ballast and damaged the cargo.395 The act of turning the wrong valve 
was not considered an error in management, rather the crewman had not been given 
instruction as to the piping and thus the carrier was liable for unseaworthiness on the 
basis of the crewman’s lack of knowledge.396 In order for a vessel to be considered 
seaworthy with respect to manning she must “be provided with a crew, adequate in 
number and competent for the voyage with reference to its length and other particulars, 
and have a competent and skilled master of sound judgment and discretion.”397 Where 
crewmen are untrained for the particular vessel, or are incompetent, generally the carrier 
will not benefit from the exemption and the vessel will be characterized as 
unseaworthy.398
  
393 Metals and Ores v. Compania De Vapores (The Tolmidis) [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 530 (Q.B.). The crew 
had left the high sea suction value partially closed, the low sea suction valve fully open, and the pump 
discharge valve partly open, see p. 538. 
394 In Carl I. Dingfelder v. S.S. Carnia, 1933 ANC 1397 (E.D.N.Y. 1933), where onions were damaged as a 
result of negligence and unseaworthiness, the carrier is liable.; In Smith, Hogg & Co v. Black Sea and 
Baltic General Insurance (The Lilburn) (1940) 67 Ll. L. Rep. 253 (H.L.), the Lords found that where the 
ship was so carelessly loaded that she was unseaworthy and developed a list, paired with an error in 
management when taking on bunkers so that the list worsened sinking the vessel, the shipowner was held 
liable. 
395 Robin Hood Flour Mills v. N.M. Patterson (The Farrandoc) [1968] 1 Ex. C.R. 175; [1967] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 276 (Exch. C. Can). 
396 Ibid. 
397 The Framlington Court, 1934 AMC 272, at p. 277 (5 Cir. 1934).
398 Justice Solomon in Hong Kong Fir Shipping v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha [1961] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 159 
(Q.B.), at p. 168 sets out the test as to whether the incompetence of a crew member has rendered the vessel 
unseaworthy: “Would a reasonably prudent owner, knowing the relevant facts, have allowed this vessel to 
put to sea with this master and crew, with their state of knowledge, training and instruction?” In M/V 
Wishing Star Lim. Proc., 1994 AMC 170 (Dist. Puerto Rico 1991), two vessels collided port to port caused 
by the abrupt turn of the Wishing Star across the bow of the other. The court held it was not an error in 
navigation, rather having an unlicensed helmsman alone on the bridge keeping an inadequate look out, who 
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The nature of the act or error committed by the crewmember may aid in its 
characterization. If the nature of the act is such that it may be viewed simply as an error 
then the carrier will likely benefit from the exemption. Rather if the nature of the act was 
so egregious that it is considered evidence of manifest incompetence, then this may call 
into question whether the shipowner exercised due diligence to properly man the vessel. 
In The Patraikos 2 where a vessel ran aground, the Singapore High Court found that “I 
cannot overlook the fact that even at the eleventh hour, had [the second officer] 
slowed/stopped the engines and/or steered the vessel hard to starboard instead of port, he 
would have still avoided the rocks…I regard such action not as indicative of causal 
negligence but of sheer incompetence.”399 The Court went on to hold that the carrier was 
unable to benefit from Art. IV(2)(a) and was liable for failing to exercise due diligence in 
appointing a competent second officer.400 Similarly, in The Eurybates, the Eastern 
District Court of Louisiana considered that the actions of the crew demonstrated 
incompetence; “The errors of the crew of the Eurybates can be described only as 
extremely gross fault. To mistake the lights of a naval fleet for those of fishing vessels, to 
fail to monitor these vessels for approximately thirteen minutes while proceeding on a 
course which would take the Eurybates in close proximity to the vessels, and finally to 
order a hard port turn which placed the Eurybates directly in the path of the naval vessels, 
contrary to the rules of navigation, is more than just error. This level of performance 
raises a presumption that the collision was not caused merely by an error in navigation by 
an otherwise competent crew; these actions must be presumed to be those of a crew that 
was incompetent. Clearly not all errors in navigation constitute incompetence, but errors 
of a sufficiently aggravated nature, such as errors of the master and the crew of the 
Eurybates, transcend ordinary fault and constitute proof of incompetence, in the absence 
     
was never asked whether he was licensed or knew how to use a radar and was allowed to take the mid-
watch after two hours sleep, was unseaworthiness. In Standard Oil v. Clan Line (The Clan Gordon) (1923) 
17 Ll. L. Rep. 120 (H.L.), the master of the vessel had extensive experience, but did not have knowledge of 
the particular vessel including her design and stability. The master ordered to ballast tanks to be emptied 
causing the ship to capsize, and losing the cargo. Lord Atkinson rejected the error defence and found that 
the lack of familiarity with the vessel on the part of the master constituted unseaworthiness. 
399 The Patraikos 2 [2002] 4 S.L.R. 232, at p. 274.
400 Ibid, at p. 277. 
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of contrary proof.”401 The District Court therefore found that the carrier did not discharge 
his burden to exercise due diligence in employing his crew.402 In a similar instance, 
considered by the District Court of Puerto Rico, a small vessel suddenly, inexplicably and 
without warning turned into the path of an oncoming vessel one hundred and six times 
the size of the smaller one.403 The District Court held that the turn to port was not a 
nautical fault rather it was evidence of incompetence, and as such the shipowner was 
liable on the basis that the vessel was unseaworthy.404 A French arbitral award has 
distinguished between a simple faute nautique where a crewman did not take note of a 
reef, and one where “la faute procède d’une incapacité foncière du capitaine, impliquant 
un comportement fautif du transporteur lui-même, susceptible de metre en cause 
l’obligation général de diligence qui pèse sur lui.”405 The English Court of Appeal in 
The Star Sea has cautioned however, “we do not accept (as the [trial] Justice in his 
judgment recognized) that one mistake or more than one mistake renders a crew member 
incompetent. Anyone can make a mistake without the conclusion being drawn that he had 
either a “disabling want of skill” or “disabling lack of knowledge”.”406 Nevertheless, The 
Court of Appeal did go on to hold that the master had “a disabling lack of knowledge” 
due to the fact that the master had no formal training in fire fighting and was unaware of 
the need to use the CO2 system on board or the method by which it needed to be used.407
The Norwegian Supreme Court has proven to be quite strict in this regard. In the Faste 
Jarl, the vessel ran around because the chief mate was drunk and feel asleep while on 
  
401 Eurybates Lim. Proc., 1981 AMC 2350 (E.D. La. 1981). 
402 Eurybates Lim. Proc., ibid. See also Bangladesh Shipping Corp. v. OMI Corp., 1990 AMC 798 
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), at p. 819, where the court finds the vessel unseaworthy as a result of the crewman’s 
actions “in the close quarters situation [which] were woefully wanting in competent seamanship and 
common sense.”
403 In re Complaint of G&G Shipping Co. Ltd. of Anguilla, 767 F. Supp. 398 (D. P.R. 1991).
404 Ibid, at p. 412. 
405 Award of 10 June 1986, Chambre arbitral maritime de Paris, summarized by Rodière, R. & du 
Pontavice, E., Droit Maritime, 12th Ed. (1997) Dalloz, Paris, at p. 346. [Author’s translation: the fault 
results from a deep incompetence of the master that implies a fault on the part of the carrier himself, such 
that one must question whether he exercised his general obligation of due diligence].
406 Manifest Shipping v. Uni-Polaris Insurance (The Star Sea) [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 360 (C.A.), at p. 374. 
407 Ibid.
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duty.408 The Norwegian Supreme Court held that the vessel was unseaworthy due to the 
chief mate’s intoxication.409
Conversely, the Hanseatic Court of Appeal in Hamburg has adopted a more 
lenient approach in holding that, where the vessel stranded due to the fact that the first 
officer who was keeping watch on his own,410 had switched off the watch keeping 
alarm411 and fallen asleep, it could not be assumed that he was incompetent simply 
because he was tired when the vessel sailed and had insufficient knowledge of the 
applicable regulations on watch-keeping.412 The Hanseatic Court of Appeal overturned 
the Regional Court’s holding that the vessel was unseaworthy, and granted the carrier the 
benefit of the nautical fault exemption found in s. 607.2.1. of the German Commercial 
Code (HGB).413 The Federal Supreme Court of Germany subsequently affirmed the 
decision of the Hanseatic Court of Appeal.414 Similarly, in The Captayannis S, the 
master’s decision to cross the Columbia River Bar during stormy weather and without a 
pilot was described by the Oregon District Court as “an exceedingly gross error in 
navigation and a decision of sheer lunacy,” but nevertheless the carrier benefited from the 
exemption.415 In several other instances, egregious errors have been considered to be 
within the bounds of the exemption rather than evidence of incompetence.416
  
408 ND 1992.163 NSC Faste Jarl (Norwegian Supreme Court), summarized in English in Falkanger, T. et al. 
Scandinavian Maritime Law: the Norwegian Perspective (2004) Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, at p. 469.  
409 Ibid. 
410 As opposed to with a second watch keeper as required by the STCW 1978. 
411 The purpose of which is to ensure that the watch-keeper does not fall asleep. 
412 Cargo Interests on Board MV Cita v. Time-charterers of MV Cita (2003) 6 U 220/00 (Hanseatic Court 
of Appeal Hamburg) available at: www.onlinedmc.co.uk. 
413 Ibid. 
414 Cargo Interests on Board MV Cita v. Time-charterers of MV Cita (2006) I ZR 20/04 (Federal Supreme 
Court), available at: www.onlinedmc.co.uk
415 Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. M/V Captayannis, 1969 AMC 2484 (D.C. Ore. 1969), at p. 2488. 
416 For example in Director General of India Supply Mission v. S.S. Janet Quinn, 1972 AMC 1227 
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), where collision was caused by master misinterpreting a prolonged blast as a short-blast 
whistle signal, but the court found that this was not incompetence given the master was fully qualified. In 
the President of India v. West Coast Steamship Co. (The Portland Trader) [1963] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 278 (D.C. 
Ore. 1962), at p. 285, the master was zigzagging through an area with shallow reefs during the night time 
with poor visibility without radar or loran, rather than waiting a few hours until daylight. Justice Kilkenny, 
of the District Court of Oregon, at p. 285, commented that the master’s behaviour was “foolhardy” and 
“hazardous” and displayed “exceptionally poor judgment” but nevertheless held that the carrier benefited 
from the exemption. Affirmed President of India v. West Coast Steamship Co. (The Portland Trader), 327 
F.2d 638 (9 Cir. 1964). 
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This distinction between unseaworthiness and nautical fault has also been 
described in relation to defects that can or cannot be rectified during the ship’s voyage. 
Benedict on Admiralty makes this distinction as follows: “Unseaworthiness is to be 
distinguished from neglect or default in management in that even if on sailing, the ship is 
not in a safe condition to complete the voyage, she is not unseaworthy if, in the course of 
the voyage, the defect will be remedied. For instance, on sailing, a porthole may be left 
open which might normally be closed in the course of the voyage. In such a case, a 
failure to close the port-hole is an error is management.”417 For example, in The Silvia, 
the failure to close a porthole that was open in an obvious place and the crewman was 
aware that it was open, was characterized by the United States Supreme Court as a 
careless failure that constituted an error in management.418 Conversely, the United States 
Supreme Court has held that where there was a failure to close a p rt hold and those in 
command of the vessel were unaware of this, then due diligence to make the vessel 
seaworthy had not been exercised.419 In certain instances this can be difficult to 
distinguish, as various defects can be rectified after sailing, yet the carrier fails to benefit 
from the exemption. For example, the House of Lords considered the instance where a 
vessel had struck a reef off Jamaica and sunk. The Lords however dismissed the 
shipowner’s assertion of the nautical fault defence as the vessel was considered 
unseaworthy having left Vancouver for St. Thomas without an extra safety margin of coal 
  
417 Sturley, M. Benedict on Admiralty, 6th Ed., Volume 2A (1990) Matthew Bender & Co, New York, at p. 
13-20; See also Poor, W. American Law of Charter Parties and Ocean Bills of Lading, 5th Ed. (1968) 
Matthew Bender, New York, at p. 177, who echoes the same sentiment: “unseaworthiness is to be 
distinguished from neglect or default in management in the even if on sailing, the ship is not in a safe 
condition to complete the voyage, she is not unseaworthy if, in the course of the voyage, the defect will be 
remedied. For instance, on sailing a port-hole may be left open which might normally be closed in the 
course of the voyage. In such a case, a failure to close the port-hole is an error in management.” Note that 
although Benedict’s quote refers to error in management prior to the commencement of the voyage there 
has been a divergence of opinion on whether an act committed before the voyage commences can fall under 
the exemption. In Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The 
Hague, Hague-Visby, and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 293, it is stated 
that “the carrier cannot benefit from the exemption of fault in management of the ship if the fault has been 
committed before the voyage begins.” 
418 The Silvia, 171 U.S. 462 (1898). See also S.S. Steel Navigator v. Catz-American Co., 1928 AMC 388 (2 
Cir. 1928), where a vessel sailed having left the manhole cover open, expecting to take on a cargo in that 
tank at the next stop, the cargo was cancelled, the tank was filled with ballast water, which therefore spilled 
over damaging cargo in another hold. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the district court, 
finding that this pertained to management of the vessel. 
419 International Navigation Co. v. Farr & Bailey, 181 U.S. 218 (1901), where there was a failure to close a 
port hole near the waterline and the officers were unaware of this, the Supreme Court found that the vessel 
was unseaworthy. 
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thus necessitating the stop in Jamaica.420 It is considered therefore that even if one can 
technically rectify the defect of insufficient coal or bunkers by stopping to refuel, the 
vessel was still considered unseaworthy.421 An example of a defect that cannot be 
remedied is stowage. In Paterson Steamships v. Canadian Co-operative Wheat 
Producers, the shipowners had loaded a cargo of grain in bulk without precautions to 
keep it from shifting.422 The vessel subsequently encountered a gale and tried to shelter 
near an island for fear of the cargo shifting rather than maintaining her course, at which 
point she grounded.423 The Privy Council held that the grounding was not error in 
navigation or management but rather the vessel was unseaworthy.424
The distinction between an issue of seaworthiness and one of nautical fault in any 
particular instance is also dependent on the nature of the voyage. The seaworthiness of a 
vessel is a relative concept to be evaluated in relation to the particular voyage. 
“Seaworthiness is a relative term depending for its application upon the type of vessel 
and the character of the voyage. The general rule is that the ship must be staunch and 
strong and well equipped for the intended voyage.”425 In The Wychwood, the vessel stuck 
a reef off Bermuda, and the plaintiff alleged that the failure to provide a large-scale chart 
of the waters immediately adjacent to Bermuda rendered the vessel unseaworthy.426 The
Exchequer Court of Canada found that the shipowner benefited from the Art.IV(2)(a), as 
it was not the intention of the master to approach Bermuda, rather it was “due to 
  
420 Northumbrian Shipping Co. v. Timm & Son [1939] 2 All ER 648 (H.L.), at p. 656 and 660. Interestingly 
enough, the vessel had technically enough coal on the basis of calculations, just not a contingency supply if 
the voyage took longer. As well, the Lords did not characterize the error as one of deviation, as one might 
expect, rather it was considered unseaworthiness. 
421 Sturley, M. Benedict on Admiralty, 6th Ed., Volume 2A (1990) Matthew Bender & Co, New York, at p. 
7-15, has noted that “to be seaworthy a vessel must be adequately supplied with bunkers for the voyage 
undertaken. It has been held that to be adequate the bunkers should be 20 percent to 25 percent greater than 
the tonnage of bunkers which is estimated will be consumed on the contemplated voyage, under normal 
circumstances. 
422 In Paterson Steamships v. Canadian Co-operative Wheat Producers [1934] All ER 480 (P.C.).
423 Ibid.
424 Ibid, at p. 488. A defect in securing the cargo was also held to render the vessel unseaworthy in 
Falconbridge Nickel Mines v. Chimo Shipping [1969] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 277 (Exch. C. Can.), where a tractor 
and generating set lashed to barges to lighten the vessel for discharging fell overboard. The Exchequer 
Court of Canada held that the loss was not a result of an error in management or navigation, rather due 
diligence was not exercised to adequately secure the equipment.
425 The Framlington Court, 1934 AMC 272, at p. 277 (5 Cir. 1934).
426 Apex (Trinidad) Oilfields v. Lunham & Moore Shipping (The Wynchwood) [1962] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 203 
(Exch. C. Can). 
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misjudgement and to an error in navigation that the vessel found herself in those 
waters.”427
Finally, the distinction between an act relating to the seaworthiness of the vessel 
and one for which the shipowner is exempt under Art. IV(2)(a), may also involve whether 
the act was prior to the commencement of the voyage. Although, this is not always the 
case, as demonstrated by Benedict’s statement supra. A simple example is found in The 
Lady Serena, wherein the cargo of phosphate was damaged as a result of a valve in the 
hold suction line being jammed open and the London Court held that as the defect in the 
valve occurred before the beginning of the voyage, the vessel was unseaworthy.428 In The 
John Weyerhaeuser, the carrier was denied the benefit of the error in management 
exemption as he knew prior to the voyage that increased water had been found in the 
bilges and failed to make an adequate inspection to locate the defect in the overboard 
discharge valve.429 The difficulty of determining when the voyage commences is 
illustrated by Maxine Footwear, where several pipes were blocked by ice and one of the 
vessel’s officers in thawing them with an acetylene torch inadvertently caused the ship to 
catch fire prior to the vessel leaving port. 430 The Exchequer Court of Canada, upheld by 
the Supreme Court of Canada, held that the crewman’s negligence was in the 
management of the ship and the carrier was protected by Art. IV(2)(a). The Privy Council 
disagreed and allowed the appeal. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the plaintiff’s 
goods were loaded prior to the commencement of the fire, however the Privy Council 
opined as follows; “In their Lordships opinion “before and at the beginning of the 
voyage” means the period from at least the beginning of the loading until the vessel starts 
on her voyage…On that view the obligation to exercise due diligence to make the vessel 
seaworthy continued over the whole of the period from the beginning of loading until the 
ship sank.”431 The issue of the availability of the nautical fault exemption prior to the 
  
427 Ibid, at p. 208. Note that the finding with regard to Art. IV(2)(a) is obiter, as the claimant had taken suit 
against the time charterer and the court found that the time charterer was not “the carrier”, but had the 
owner been sued he would have been protected. 
428 Fisons Fertilizers v. Thomas Watson (The Lady Serena) [1971] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 141 (M&C London).
429 Iligan International Corp. v. S.S. John Weyerhaeuser, 1974 AMC 1718 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
430 Maxine Footwear Co. v. Canadian Government Merchant Marine [1959] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 105 (P.C.).  
431 Ibid, at p. 113. 
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commencement of the voyage is contentious and can differ between jurisdictions. This 
subject is therefore discussed in further detail in the section that follows. 
4.3. OTHER FACTORS IMPACTING THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE IV(2)(a)
There are several other factors that bear mention as in certain factual situations 
they impact the scope of the nautical fault exemption. Chief among those factors, and 
certainly the most contentious, is whether the nautical fault exemption may protect the 
shipowner from liability resulting from faults committed prior to the commencement of 
the voyage. 
4.3.1. Commencement of the Voyage
There has been debate, uncertainty and divergence of opinion as to whether a fault 
committed before the commencement of the voyage may be characterized as an act, 
neglect, or default for which the carrier is exempt from liability by virtue of the nautical 
fault exemption. Commencement of the voyage is the defining characteristic of 
seaworthiness, as by virtue of Art. III(1) of the Hague Rules, the “carrier shall be bound 
before and at the beginning of the voyage to exercise due diligence” to make the vessel 
seaworthy. It has been observed that “assuming both error in management or negligent 
navigation and facts otherwise indicative of failure to exercise due diligence to make the 
vessel seaworthy, the shipowner escapes liability for damage to cargo only if the error in 
management or negligent navigation occurred following the “commencement” of the 
voyage.”432 Similarly, it has been confidently stated by one author that “the carrier cannot 
benefit from the exemption of fault in management of the ship if the fault has been 
committed before the voyage begins.”433 Whereas on the other hand, another comments 
that “[e]rror in the navigation or management of the ship may occur before the 
commencement of the voyage, as well as afterwards.”434 This has been characterized as a 
jurisdictional difference by the English Commercial Court in The Aquacharm: “It seems 
  
432 Greenwood, E. “Problems of Negligence in Loading, Stowage, Custody, Care, and Delivery of Cargo” 
(1971) 45 Tul. L. Rev. 790, at p. 803. 
433 Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, 
and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 293. 
434 Tetley, W. Marine Cargo Claims, 4th Ed., Ch. 16, at p. 5 (Available online only at: 
http://tetley.law.mcgill.ca/maritime). 
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that in the United States management of the vessel does not, or may not, include acts 
done by the master in preparation of the voyage…There is no such limitation in English 
law. The word “management” applies equally whether the vessel is in the harbour or on 
the high seas.”435 English law, however, is unsettled in this matter as commencement of 
the voyage can play an important role in when an act can be characterized as either a 
failure to exercise due diligence or an error in management. This is demonstrated by the 
reasoning of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Maxine Footwear, in finding 
that because an error in thawing the pipes of the vessel, which otherwise would have been 
an error in management, occurred prior to the beginning of the voyage, the vessel was 
therefore unseaworthy.436
There is a considerable volume of jurisprudence, predominantly American, 
holding that the nautical fault exemption is unavailable to the carrier where the voyage 
had not yet commenced. The United States Supreme Court in 1901 stated that “the word 
‘management’ is not used without limitation, and is not, therefore, applicable in the 
general sense as well before as after sailing.”437 This has necessitated in-depth 
examination by the courts to determine at which point the voyage actually commenced. 
In The Newport, the captain ordered a steam valve opened to aid the ship in getting 
underway, however a crewman erroneously opened the wrong valve flooding the cargo 
hold with steam thus damaging the plaintiff’s cargo.438 The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 
found that the voyage had not yet commenced, and therefore the defence of error in 
management was unavailable to the carrier.439 In The Del Sud, the vessel had cast off all 
her lines except two and was in the process of being pivoted by a tug when she stuck the 
dock, after which the master failed to inspect for damage with the result that seawater 
subsequently entered the hold, damaging the cargo.440 The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals 
overturned the trial judge’s decision that the voyage had not commenced and thus the 
vessel was unseaworthy, instead holding that the voyage had in fact commenced and thus 
  
435 Actis Co. v. The Sanko Steamship Co. (The Aquacharm) [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 237 (Q.B.).
436 Maxine Footwear Co. v. Canadian Government Merchant Marine [1959] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 105 (P.C.). 
437 International Navigation Co. v. Farr & Bailey (1901) 181 U.S. 218.
438 G. Amsinck & Co. v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co. (The Newport), 7 F.2d 452 (9 Cir. 1925). 
439 Ibid. 
440 Mississippi Shipping Co. v. Zander and Co. (S.S. Del Sud), 1959 AMC, 2143 (5 Cir. 1959).
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the exemption of error in management is available to the carrier.441 Where there was an 
error in ballasting in The Canada Mail, the court found that “even though the failure to 
stop the flow of water upon reaching the top of the tank is found to be an error in 
management for which the shipowner would not be responsible had it occurred after the 
commencement of the voyage, the same error may be a lack of due diligence on the part 
of the shipowner to make the vessel seaworthy when such conduct occurs before the 
beginning of the voyage.442 In Louis Dreyfus, while loading, the vessel’s engine room 
flooded due to an open valve in the seawater cooling process, however the 5th Circuit 
held that the carrier could not argue error in management on the basis of the engineer’s 
error because the voyage had not yet commenced.443 There have however been instances 
where the commencement of the voyage has been viewed as immaterial by the American 
courts. In The John Miller, cargo damage was caused by an error in navigation when the 
vessel grounded as she was moving to a temporary anchorage, and the cargo interests 
argued that the defence did not apply as the voyage had not yet commenced.444 The 
Southern District Court of New York rejected that argument holding that “[t]he exception 
of the carrier and the ship for loss or damage arising from negligence or default of the 
master, mariner, pilot or servant of the carrier in the navigation or management of the 
ship is unconditional…”.445
Recently, in The Jalavihar, the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals has called the 
previous jurisprudence into question in some respects.446 In this instance a vessel 
grounded while moving to her next anchorage due to an error in navigation. The cargo 
  
441 Ibid. The 5th Circuit opines at p. 2148, “in a very real sense the voyage had begun. The ship had no 
further purpose at the dock. She was made ready for sea. She was being turned around for the purpose of 
leaving…the ship was literally and figuratively in the sole command of the master on the bridge.” 
Interestingly enough, the court opined in obiter that “had the Santos coffee been immediately damaged by 
the inrush of water, the Section 4 defence would have been absolute whether the ship was deemed to be on 
her voyage, making ready for her voyage, or simply undocking preparatory to commencing her voyage.” 
442 American Mail Line v. United States of America (The Canada Mail), 1974 AMC 1536 (W.D. Wash. 
1974).
443 Louis Dreyfus Co. v. 27,946 Long Tons of Corn, 1988 AMC 1053 (5 Cir. 1987). 
444 Isbrandtsen Co. v. Federal Insurance Co. (The John Miller), 1952 AMC 1945 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), affd. 
205 F.2d 679 (2d Cir. 1953).
445 Ibid,, at p. 1946. 
446 Usinas Siderugicas De Minas Geras v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. (The Jalavihar), 1997 AMC 2762 
(5 Cir. 1997). For synopsis and commentary see Koehl, E. “Fifth Circuit Symposium: Fifth Circuit –
Admiralty” (1998) 44 Loyola L. Rev. 481, at p. 505-506, and Tabrisky, J. “Recent Developments in the 
Carriage of Cargo” (1998) 22 Tul. Mar. L.J. 535, at p. 539-541. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
87
interests claimed, on the basis of Louis Dreyfus, that because the error was committed 
before the commencement of the voyage the exemption couldn’t apply. The 5th Circuit 
Court of Appeals noted that “we interpret Louis Dreyfus to stand for the proposition that 
a failure of a shipowner and its employees to detect a manufacturing flaw, if it occurs 
before the commencement of the voyage, is best viewed as a failure to exercise due 
diligence, and not an error in management.”447 The 5th Circuit also noted The Del Sud, 
highlighting the fact that, firstly, the case concerned an error in management, and 
secondly in obiter it was stated that had the facts been different the defence would have 
been absolute.448 The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals determined that “we see no reason to 
restrict the navigational error exception to errors occurring after the commencement of a 
voyage…[therefore] navigational error that occurs prior to the commencement of a 
voyage is excepted under 46 U.S.C. app s.1304(2)(a).”449 Moreover, the Court also 
opined that; “COGSA’s exception for navigational or managemental error, however, is 
not restricted to navigational errors occurring after the commencement of a voyage.”450
This decision has generated positive commentary. It has been noted that the effect of the 
holding that “errors in navigation and management could be made prior to the 
commencement of the voyage, [is that it] greatly reduced the significance of voyage 
commencement as a singular, dispositive factor in distinguishing such errors from the 
failure to exercise due diligence in making the vessel seaworthy.”451 The decision has 
been viewed as simplifying the analysis, as it is argued to be much simpler to determine 
the nature of the fault as opposed to when the voyage has actually commenced.452
Moreover, “deciding the precise point at which a voyage commences is problematic and 
would continue to result in a great deal of litigation on the issue,” had the 5th Circuit 
Court of Appeals not settled the question.453 From a policy perspective, the decision has 
been considered to be an improvement in the law: “Requiring that all damages, latent or 
  
447 The Jalavihar, ibid, at p. 2767. 
448 Ibid, at p. 2768. 
449 Ibid, at p. 2769-2770. 
450 Ibid, at p. 2769. 
451 Brown, C. “The Fifth Circuit Alters the Analysis for Determining General Average Events” (1998) 22 
Tul. Mar. L.J. 659, at p. 662. 
452 Ibid, at p. 672. 
453 Brewer, R. “The Fifth Circuit Holds that COGSA Defenses Are Absolute” (1998) 72 Tul. L. Rev. 1421, 
at p. 1429
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immediate, occurring before the commencement of the voyage be deemed a failure to 
exercise due diligence is unnecessarily restrictive and imposes an enormous burden on 
the carrier.”454
In Germany, the 5th Book of the Commercial Code “Handelsgesetzbuch” (HGB), 
ss. 476 seq., governs maritime matters.  Section 607, para 2, of the HGB stipulates that 
the carrier and its servants are exempted from liability where they have acted in the 
management or navigation of the vessel. While section 559 of the HGB provides that the 
carrier is liable for damage caused by lack of seaworthiness or cargoworthiness of the 
ship. The German tribunals have found the “navigation” portion of the exemption fairly 
clear,455 however the distinction between management of the vessel and activities 
directed at the seaworthiness of the vessel have proved more opaque. In practice the 
distinction is made as follows: “If an act rendering the ship unseaworthy took effect only 
after the beginning of the voyage, ss. 607 para 2 HGB applies; if the act took effect at an 
earlier stage, even if undiscoverable, then ss. 559 HGB applies, and ss. 607 para 2 is 
inapplicable.”456 In essence, the German tribunals have interpreted the exemption to be 
only applicable after the commencement of the voyage. 
4.3.2. Deviation
The doctrine of deviation has been present in maritime law long before sailing 
vessels evolved into steamships. The doctrine is rooted in marine insurance,457 where a 
“marine underwriter was deemed to have contracted only for the risks inherent to the 
expeditious prosecution of the voyage by the agreed or customary route.”458 As such, 
where there was an unauthorized geographic deviation, the insurance contract became 
invalid, and cargo interests lost their protection.459 As a result, the carrier was therefore 
  
454 Ibid. 
455 Herber, R. “German Law on the Carriage of Goods by Sea” in New Carriage of Goods by Sea. (1997) 
H. Honka (Ed.) Institute of Maritime and Commercial Law, Abo, at p. 353. 
456 Ibid. 
457 Bauer, G. “Conflicting Liability Regimes: Hague-Visby v. Hamburg Rules – A Cases by Case Analysis” 
(1993) 24 JMLC 53, at p. 56.
458 Nikaki, T. “The Quasi-Deviation Doctrine” (2004) 35 JMLC 45, at p. 45. 
459 Tetley, W. Marine Cargo Claims, 3rd Ed. (1988) Blais, Montreal, Canada, at p. 100. 
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deemed to have become an insurer of the cargo for any loss or damage that resulted.460
By virtue of Art. IV(4), the Hague Rules have moderated the somewhat harsh effects of 
the doctrine, by permitting the carrier to be exonerated where the deviation is 
‘reasonable’.461 The United States COGSA, s. 1304(4), adds the following proviso to the 
Hague Rules text; “provided, however, that if the deviation is for the purpose of loading 
or unloading cargo or passengers it shall, prima facie, be regarded as unreasonable.” The 
added proviso therefore underscores the notion that if the carrier were to call at an 
unscheduled port to increase its own revenues, this amounts to a prima facie unreasonable 
deviation resulting in potentially increased liability for the carrier.462 Determining 
whether a deviation is reasonable has been characterized as “a question of fact in the light 
of the interests of all the parties to the common venture as contracted for.”463 In other 
words, where the benefit of the deviation rests with the carrier, it is an indicator that the 
deviation was unreasonable. Lord Justice Greer has opined that a reasonable deviation is 
one either “in the interests of the ship or the cargo-owner or both, which no reasonably 
minded cargo-owner would raise any objection to.”464
In the context of the nautical fault exemption, where the shipowner unreasonably 
deviates, the shipowner loses the benefit of the exemption. The seminal case with regard 
to unreasonable deviations is Stag Line v. Foscolo Mango. 465 The House of Lords 
considered the instance where due to the drunkenness of the crew, a test of the super 
heater aboard the vessel had to be delayed, and thus the engineers aboard to do the test 
could not leave the vessel with the pilot. The vessel, therefore, had to detour later to drop 
the engineers off at another port, where upon leaving the port she struck a rock. The 
carrier pleaded nautical fault, however, the House of Lords held that where there is an 
unreasonable or unauthorized deviation, Art. IV(2)(a) does not operate to protect the 
  
460 Nikaki, T. “The Quasi-Deviation Doctrine” (2004) 35 JMLC 45, at p. 45; Tetley, ibid, at p. 100. 
461 Article IV(4) of the Hague Rules provides: “Any deviation in saving or attempting to save life or 
property at sea or any reasonable deviation shall not be deemed to be an infringement or breach of this 
Convention or of the contract of carriage, and the carrier shall not be liable for any loss or damage resulting 
therefrom.”
462 Nikaki, T. “The Quasi-Deviation Doctrine” (2004) 35 JMLC 45, at p. 46-47. 
463 Tetley, W. Marine Cargo Claims, 3rd Ed. (1988) Blais, Montreal, Canada, at p. 730. 
464 Stag Line v. Foscolo Mango (1931) 39 Ll. L. Rep. 101 (C.A.), at p. 111. 
465 Stag Line v. Foscolo Mango (1931) 41 Ll. L. Rep. 165 (H.L.).
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
90
shipowner. Similarly, in The Cepheus, where a chartered tanker deviated 12 hours to 
bunker for the following voyage then stranded 8 days later while trying to berth in 
adverse weather conditions, the tribunal denied the shipowner the availability of the error 
in navigation defence and he was precluded from recovering general average.466
Not all deviations are unacceptable or unreasonable.467 In The Belleville, the 
vessel detoured 15 miles off the regular route to drop off a pilot and subsequently 
grounded.468 The Southern District Court of New York held that the deviation was not 
unreasonable and thus the carrier was protected by the error in navigation exemption. 
Similarly, in The Al Taha, the vessel was supposed to bunker at Boston’s outer anchorage 
but rather moved to the inner anchorage for bunkering as well as the replacement of a 
repaired boon.469 When leaving the inner anchorage the pilot negligently grounded the 
vessel, and cargo interests argued that the vessel deviated and was thus deprived of the 
exemption. Justice Phillips rejected the argument, holding that the Art. IV(2)(a) 
exemption persists during a lawful deviation.470 The Eastern District Court of Virginia 
has found that where the master changes course in order to avoid severe weather 
conditions, but erroneously selects a less advantageous course, this is not a deviation.471
Indeed, erroneous decisions concerning which course is preferable has been argued to 
constitute errors in the navigation or management of the vessel.472
  
466 Transportes Del Este v. Afran Transport (The Cepheus), 1990 AMC 1058 (Arb. NY 1990). The majority 
found that the carrier was liable as he was unable to prove that the deviation was not a factor in the berthing 
error which occurred during icy and foggy conditions. There was a strong dissent on the part of Nicolas 
Healy who found that there was no evidence that if the vessel had arrived earlier the result would have been 
different and that the deviation was reasonable. Healy would have allowed the carrier’s general average 
claim and split the damages resulting from the grounding between the carrier and cargo interests. 
467 Leon Bernstein Co. v. Wilhelm Wilhelmsen (M.S. Titania), 1956 AMC 754, 232 F.2d 771 (5 Cir. 1956), 
where the vessel was requisitioned by England for the Falkland Islands war, necessitating the transhipment 
of the cargo. The cargo was finally delivered short, but the carrier was not liable as the deviation of 
transhipping was a reasonable deviation because of the requisition.
468 American Metal Co. v. M/V Belleville, 1970 AMC 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
469 Lyric Shipping Inc. v Intermetals Ltd. (The Al Taha) [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 117 (Q.B.). 
470 The shipowners had conceded that their vessel had deviated, otherwise Phillips J. hinted that the 
doctrine of deviation must be subject to the de minimus principle and such a case may have fallen within 
this principle. 
471 Georgia-Pacific Co. v. M/S Marilyn L., 1971 AMC 2157 (E.D. Vir. 1971), at p. 2166.
472 Tetley, W. Marine Cargo Claims, 3rd Ed. (1988) Blais, Montreal, Canada, at p. 730.
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4.3.3. Servants and Agents of the Carrier
Article IV(2) reads “Neither the carrier not the ship shall be responsible for loss or 
damage arising from (a) Act, neglect, or default of the master…”. The exemption 
therefore protects the shipowner from the actions of the master, yet the master himself, 
along with other servants and agents of the carrier, are not protected under the nautical 
fault exemption. In The Perseus, cargo was damaged when a vessel came into contact 
with a lock as a result the master misjudging the distance.473 The claimants filled suit 
against the owners and the master, and the owners were found to be protected under 
U.S.COGSA. The Eastern District Court of Michigan examined the issue and found that 
under the common law, including the Laws of Oleron, the master and crew were liable 
for acts of negligence in the operation of the vessel. It was then considered that the Harter 
Act, “as it originally passed the House of Representatives in December 1892, exempted 
the vessel, the owner, the agent and master from liability [for errors in 
navigation]…however, the House Bill was amended in the Senate …and as enacted into 
law, it exempted the vessel owner, agent and charterers, but specifically deleted the 
master as one who was not liable.”474 The Court concluded that with regard to 
U.S.COGSA, “it was not the intention of Congress to give immunity to a master for his 
negligent acts committed during the navigation of a vessel.”475 By operation of the Hague 
Rules alone, therefore, only the carrier is exempted from liability for nautical fault. In 
practice however, provided that the bill of lading contains a Himalaya clause,476 the 
  
473 International Milling Co. v. S.S. Perseus [1958] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 272  (E.D. Mich. 1957). 
474 Ibid, at p. 273. 
475 Ibid, at p. 275. 
476 The purpose of the Himalaya clause is essentially to extend the defences and limitations that are 
available to the carrier, to his servants and agents. The Himalaya clause derives it name from the English 
Court of Appeal case of Adler v. Dickson (The Himalaya) [1957] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 267 (C.A.) where an 
injured passenger was able to take suit against the employees of the carrier on the basis that the terms of the 
passenger ticket did not expressly or by implication benefit the servants of the vessel. As a result of Adler v. 
Dickson, carriers began inserting such clauses into their bills of lading. The two seminal cases that tested 
the validity of such clauses were in relation to cargo damage resulting from the activities of stevedores. In 
Scruttons v. Midland Silicons [1962] A.C. 446, (H.L.) at p. 474 where Lord Reid laid out the four 
conditions by which a stevedore would benefit under the contract, adopting an approach based on agency: 
“I can see a possibility of success of the agency argument if (first) the bill of lading makes it clear that the 
stevedore is intended to be protected by the provisions in it which limit liability, (secondly) the bill of 
lading makes it clear that the carrier in addition to contracting for these provisions on his own behalf, is 
also contracting as an agent for the stevedore that these provisions should apply to the stevedore, (thirdly) 
the carrier has authority from the stevedore to do that, or perhaps later ratification by the stevedore would 
suffice, and (fourthly) that any difficulties about consideration moving from the stevedore were overcome.” 
Subsequently, in New Zealand Shipping v. A.M. Satterthwaite (Eurymedon) [1975] A.C. 154 (P.C.), the 
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servants and agents of the carrier will benefit from the exemption.477 Note however, that 
this issue only arises under the Hague Rules, where no party other than the “carrier” may 
benefit from the nautical fault exemption, along with the other limits of liability provided 
for. The Hague-Visby Rules, by virtue of Art. IV bis(2), provides that if “an action is 
brought against a servant or agent of the carrier (such servant or agent not being an 
independent contractor), such servant or agent shall be entitled to avail himself of the 
defences and limits of liability which the carrier is entitled to invoke under these Rules.” 
The protection provided under Art. IV bis(2), is however qualified by Art. IV bis(4), that 
denies a servants or agent the benefit of the defences and limits of liability where the 
damages are proved to have resulted from their act or omission done with “intent to cause 
damage or recklessly and with knowledge that the damage would probably result.”  
     
Privy Council approved Lord Reid’s conditions and applied them to allow the stevedores to benefit from 
the clause. The seminal judgment on Himalaya Clauses in the United States is Robert C. Herd & Co. v. 
Krawill Mach. Co., 1959 AMC 879 (S.C. 1959), where the United States Supreme Court rejected the 
notion that the carrier’s defences apply by force of law to the agents and servants of the carrier, however 
the Court hinted that by a properly expressed contract, the defences could be extended to stevedores and 
others. Himalaya Clauses have now received general acceptance by the courts and are regularly enforced 
by the courts of most jurisdictions. The Supreme Court of anada in International Terminal Operators v. 
Miida Electronics (Buenos Aires Maru) [1986] 1 S.C.R. 752 (S.C.C.) upheld the Himalaya clause, although 
mostly on bailment inspired reasoning (ibid, at p. 782-794). For an in-depth analysis of the Himalaya clause 
in Canadian law see Tetley, W. “The Himalaya Clause – Revisited” (2003) 10 JIML 40, at pp. 50-52. 
Previously, Australia had used a bailment reasoning to protect stevedores where actions in tort were
brought, as found in Gilbert Stokes v. Dalgety [1948] 81 Ll. L. Rep. 337 (Sup. Ct. N.S.W.). But the clauses 
have since been upheld in Carrington Slipways Pty. v. Patrick Operations Pty. (The Cape Comorin) (1991) 
24 N.S.W.L.R. 745 (C.A. N.S.W.) and Godina v. Patrick Operations Party [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 333 
(N.S.W. C.A.). For discussion on the Himalaya clause in Australian law see Grime, R. “Bills of Lading” in 
Australian Maritime Law (1991) M. White (Ed.) Federation Press, Sydney, at p. 86-89.
An example of a Himalaya clause is provided in New Zealand Shipping v. A.M. Satterthwaite (Eurymedon)
[1975] A.C. 154 (P.C.) at p. 165, where the bill of lading stipulated: “It is hereby expressly agreed that no 
servant or agent of the carrier (including every independent contractor from time to time employed by the 
carrier) shall in any circumstances whatsoever be under any liability whatsoever to the shipper, consignee 
or owner of the goods or to any holder of this Bill of Lading for any loss, damage or delay of whatsoever 
kind arising or resulting directly or indirectly from any act, neglect or default on his part while acting in the 
course of or in connection with his employment and, without prejudice to the generality of the forgoing 
provisions of this clause, every exemption, limitation, conditions and liberty herein contained and every 
right, exemption from liability, defence and immunity of whatsoever nature applicable to the carrier or to 
which the carrier is entitled hereunder shall also be available and shall extend to protect every servant or 
agent of the carrier acting as aforesaid and for the purpose of all the forgoing provisions of this clause the 
carrier is or shall be deemed to be acting as agent or trustee on behalf of and for the benefit of all persons 
who are or might be his servants or agents from time to time (including independent contractors as 
aforesaid) and all such persons shall to this extent be or be deemed to be parties to the contract in or 
evidenced by this Bill of Lading.” For a large number of Himalaya clauses drawn from multiple bills of 
lading see Gaskell, N. et al. Bills of Lading: Law and Contracts (2000) LLP, London, at p. 383 and ff.
477 Is has been noted by Griggs, P. et al. Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims 4th Ed. (2005) LLP, 
London, at p. 156 that “the common use of Himalaya clauses in bills of lading may reduce the instances in 
which a servant or agent can be held liable to a claimant.”
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4.3.4. Barges and LASH Barges
Incidents involving barges and lash barges478 have been regarded as problematic 
and have often, although not always, fallen outside the scope of the error in navigation 
exemption. In The Atlantic Forest, where cargo was damaged due to the negligent 
navigation of a three-barge tow, the Eastern District Court of Louisiana, finding that the 
exemption must be construed narrowly, held that the defence of error in navigation is 
unavailable where the tow is not the ship designated under the bill of lading to be laden 
with cargo.479 In The Acadia Forest, the towline running from a tug to a lash barge 
snapped, and the barge collided with a lock damaging the cargo.480 The Eastern District 
Court of Louisiana found that the defence was unavailable to the defendants as the lash 
barge was not a “ship” within the meaning of the Act.481 The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals 
however allowed the appeal, holding that the defendant would be protected by the 
exemption through the legal gymnastics of characterizing the entire lash flotilla as the 
offending ship.482
  
478 LASH stands for Lighter Aboard Ship, and for a detailed explanation of the lash system see Wirth 
Limited v. S/S Acadia Forest, 1976 AMC 2178 (5 Cir. 1976), at p. 2180.
479 Agrico Chemical Co. v. SS Atlantic Forest, 1979 AMC, 801 (E.D. La. 1978), at pp. 809-810, the Court 
held that “in construing the exemptions under COGSA, this Court must construe them narrowly, since the 
purpose of the COGSA defences was to give the carrier a narrowly defined protection…it is all too obvious 
that Congress was referring to the same ship in the error in navigation clause as that ship which it required 
the carrier to exercise due diligence to make seaworthy, equip and supply, and make the holds fit and safe 
for the carriage of goods. The carrier had to perform these duties on the ship designated in the bill of lading 
as the vessel to be laden with the cargo. Obviously it would not have been for the specific benefit and 
protection of the cargo owner if Congress required that any random ship owned by the carrier be made 
seaworthy. Congress never intended to let any vessel, as long as owned by the carrier and causing the 
damage to the cargo, take advantage of the error in navigation clause.” This case has attracted commentary, 
see Hoskins, D. “Lash Carriage under COGSA – Defining the Maritime Kangaroo” (1979) 53 Tul. L. Rev. 
1500.  The title derives from rather interesting reasoning, “The kangaroo metaphor was used by Chief 
Judge R. Brown [in The Acadia Forest, 1976 AMC 2178, at p. 2187] to place in its proper perspective the 
question whether LASH barges are ships within the meaning of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 
(COGSA): Is a kangaroo any the less a kangaroo because during part of its existence it is carried in a 
specially adapted berth aboard another kangaroo? Our answer is no. And upon the same rationale…a 
LASH barge is no less a COGSA “ship”…simply because it is designed to carried during part of the 
voyage by the mother ship.” (Hoskins, ibid, at footnote 2).
480 Wirth Limited v. S/S Acadia Forest [1974] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 563 (E.D. La. 1974).
481 Ibid, at p. 566-567. 
482 Wirth Limited v. S/S Acadia Forest, 1976 AMC 2178 (5 Cir. 1976). 
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In Canada, barges and lighters have been found to qualify as a ‘ship’ within the 
Hague Rules.483 The exact opposite has been found by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 
where cargo was transferred to lighters,484 and subsequently damaged; “COGSA saves 
the carrier harmless only for errors of management with respect to the “ship,” and “ship” 
as used in the Act, has been judicially defined to exclude lighters.”485
In Barge DXE-78, the owner of a tank barge was allowed to benefit from the 
nautical fault exemption, where the barge grounded, necessitating the equalizing of the 
tanks to bring the barge to an even keel, causing damage to the cargo.486 The Eastern 
District Court of Louisiana, subsequently upheld by the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, held 
that the acts were errors in navigation and management, and that given that the tug and 
the tank barge were under common ownership, they were considered to be one vessel and 
thus able to invoke the exception.487 In The Alice, the Eastern District Court of New York 
found that where cargo was damaged when a barge stranded due to a fouled towline, the 
owner was exempt from liability for the error in management and navigation.488 There is 
thus a line of jurisprudence extending the benefit to barges,489 however caution must be 
exercised, as the issue is contentious and replete with conflicting authorities.  
  
483 Falconbridge Nickel Mines v. Chimo Shipping [1969] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 277 (Exch. C. Can.), at p. 291-
292.
484 Lighters are an uncovered form of barge. 
485 Isthmian Steamship Co. v. California Spray-Chemical Co., 1961 AMC 2476 (9 Cir. 1961), at p. 2484. 
486 Commerce Oil Co. v. Barge DXE-78, 1957 AMC 2473 (E.D. La. 1957), holding at p. 2476 that the 
manipulation of the cargo valves “were done reasonably and in an attempt to correct the trim of the barge.” 
487 Ibid. This was upheld by the 5th Circuit Court of Appeal in Commerce Oil Co. v. Barge DXE-78, 1958 
AMC 815 (5 Cir. 1958). 
488 The Alice, 1932 AMC 256 (E.D.N.Y.). 
489 In Insurance Co. of North America v. Southern Transportation Co. (The Bathgate), 1928 AMC 487 (3
Cir. 1928) where a both tug and tow are owned by the same company, the two vessels as a unit comprise 
the carrier and thus may benefit from the exemption in the situation where they grounded during a heavy 
fog; In Royal Insurance Co. v. S.S. Robert E. Lee, 1991 AMC 1750 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), it would appear that 
the court would have extended the benefit of the error in navigation defence to a barge, however in this 
instance the barge’s owner was found to have breached its carrier’s duty to properly keep and care for the 
cargo. In M/V Frank Phipps Lim. Proc., 1983 AMC 1288 (E.D. La. 1982), the court allowed a tug and tow 
of lash barges to benefit from the error in navigation exemption by characterizing them as “a ship” under 
COGSA; In Sacramento Navigation Co. v Salz, 273 U.S. 326 (1927) a collision with an anchored vessel 
that damaged the cargo on the board was held to be an error of navigation for which the owner was exempt 
from liability. 
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Chapter 5
Application of The Nautical Fault Exemption in Specific Instances
Certain common errors have been judicially considered repeatedly over the years. 
Despite the fact that each decision will turn on the facts at hand, there are nevertheless 
certain errors that have come to be treated fairly consistently by the judiciary, such as 
groundings and collisions. Whereas errors with respect to storms, hatches and tarpaulins 
have been known to be contentious, with judicial reasoning and decisions varying greatly.  
Finally, both the shipping industry and judicial attitudes have evolved over time with the 
result that certain errors, such as ones concerning refrigeration equipment, have become 
less likely to be excused.  
5.1. REFRIGERATION
Just over a century ago, Justice Kennedy in Rowson v. Atlantic Transport
considered a case of cargo loss which resulted from the negligence of the crew with 
respect to the refrigeration machinery.490 It was held that the cargo of butter was damaged 
during the voyage by the negligence of those in charge of the refrigeration system, and 
thus the carrier was exempt as such negligence was considered “within the meaning of 
the Harter Act, negligence in the management of the ship of which that machinery is a 
part.”491 On appeal, the Court of Appeal noted the fact that the refrigeration system was 
installed partly to preserve the cargo and partly to preserve the food used by the crew, 
and therefore held that the apparatus was part of the ship, and therefore mismanagement 
of it was mismanagement of the ship and therefore the carrier was allowed to benefit 
from the exemption.492 In Forman & Ellams v. Federal S.N. Co, the cargo of meat was 
  
490 Rowson v. Atlantic Transport Co. [1903] 1 K.B. 114 (K.B.). 
491 Ibid, at p. 116. 
492 Rowson v. Atlantic Transport Co. [1903] 2 K.B. 666 (C.A.). Note that the House of Lords in Gosse 
Millerd v. Canadian Government Merchant Marine [1928] 32 Ll. L. Rep. 91 (H.L.) expressed doubts 
concerning the correctness of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Rowson, but declined to actually overrule 
it; “My Lords, I do not think it necessary or desirable to discuss whether the Court of Appeal was right in 
their application of the principle in that particular case…” (at p. 94).  It remains therefore valid law, 
although one may very easily marginalize it by distinguishing it on the facts from any instance that may 
arise. Cooke, J., et al, Voyage Charters (1993) LLP, London, at p. 756 has noted that “on the facts of the 
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damaged following the mismanagement of the refrigeration system used to cool the 
cargo, and the English Commercial Court held that the damage did not occur in the 
management of the vessel.493 Justice Wright opined that “many modern steamships like 
the Rimutaka have holds which are insulated and which can be cooled by elaborate 
refrigeration machinery and apparatus. All this constitutes parts of the ship and of its 
equipment, but these are solely provided for the care of the special cargo. The ship can, 
as a sea going vessel, be safely and efficiently navigated and managed even though the 
refrigerating equipment is in disorder and the cargo is perishing.”494 Justice Wright noted 
Justice Kenedy’s finding in Rowson, commenting that where “the same refrigeration 
machinery is used for the crew’s food and the cargo, these facts ought not to affect the 
conclusion that, quoad the refrigeration of the cargo holds, it is the management of the 
cargo and not the ship which is involved.”495
Subsequent cases, in various jurisdictions, have tended to hold fairly consistently 
that errors relating to refrigeration systems are not errors in management of the vessel.496
A Belgian court, in The M.S. Wladyslaw, held unequivocally that supervising and 
controlling the normal functioning of the refrigeration unit of a series of refrigerated 
containers during the voyage constitutes “management of the cargo”.497 Similarly, in The 
Heinz Horn, where the negligent operation of the refrigeration system caused damage to a 
cargo of bananas, the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals found that “since the operation of the 
refrigeration system herein so directly affected the condition of the cargo, we conclude 
that the damages related thereto fall within the liability created by sect.1303(2) [of 
     
Rowson case, a very large part of the equipment was devoted to the ship’s provisions and the result might 
have been different if the preservation of the ship’s provisions had been merely incidental to the main 
function of preserving the cargo.” 
493 Forman & Ellams v. Federal S.N. Co [1928] 30 Ll. L. Rep. 52 (K.B.). 
494 Ibid, at p. 60. 
495 Ibid, at p. 62. 
496 For example see The Samland, 7 F.2d 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1925), the carrier was held liable for failing to 
observe the condition of the thermometers in the refrigeration compartments; Barr v. International 
Mercantile Marine Co., 29 F.2d 26 (2Cir. 1928), where a failure to care for the refrigeration equipment, 
thus failing to keep the cargo cool, was an error primarily in respect of cargo; Gosse Millerd v. Canadian 
Government Merchant Marine [1928] 32 Ll. L. Rep. 91 (H.L.) where the House of Lords expressed doubts 
concerning the correctness of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Rowson.
497 Hof van Beroep te Antwerpen, October 27, 1992 (The M.S. Wladyslaw) [1993] ETL 727, at p. 727. 
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COGSA].”498 The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals did however leave open the possibility 
that it may not always be so, “for there may be circumstances where the operation of a 
refrigeration system has more to do with the management or navigation of a vessel than 
with the care of the cargo.”499
5.2. GROUNDING
Grounding, along with collision with channels or locks, for the most part has 
tended to be one of the clearest examples of what one would envision as an error in 
navigation of the ship. Where the use of the exemption with respect to grounding has 
been denied by the courts is often on the basis of the subsequent actions of the carrier. If 
the master ignores the potential damage and continues on the voyage, this has been 
regarded as falling within the nautical fault exemption. On the other hand, if there is 
intervention, either in the form of removal of the cargo, or a temporary port for repairs, 
courts have in certain instances characterized this action in such a way as to deprive the 
carrier of the benefit of the exemption. Where reliance on the exemption has also been 
denied is where the competence of the master or crewman who has made the error is 
called into question. 
A classic example of the operation of the nautical fault exemption is found where 
the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals held that despite the allegations by the claimant of 
unseaworthiness, defective steering mechanism and incompetent crew, the carrier was 
exempt from liability as the pilot misjudged a turn and gave the wrong commands 
causing the vessel to run aground.500 There is extensive jurisprudence holding where the 
grounding was the result of faults, errors or negligence on the part of the pilot, the 
shipowner is exempt for liability under the nautical fault exemption.501 In The Santa 
  
498 Heinrich C. Horn v. CIA De Navegacion (The Heinz Horn) [1970] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 191, at p. 202 (5 Cir. 
1969). 
499 Ibid, at p. 202. 
500 Grace Line Lim Procs (The Santa Leonor) 517 F.2d 404 (2 Cir. 1975), at p. 406 and 409. 
501 Bunge North American Grain Co. v. Steamer Skarp [1932] Ex. C.R. 212, where the vessel stranded 
twice in areas well known to be dangerous, the Exchequer Court of Canada held that the carrier was exempt 
from liability of the errors in navigation of the pilot under the Harter Act; See Shell Petroleum Co. v. 
Dominion Tankers [1940] 3 D.L.R. 646, where the Supreme Court of Canada held that where the vessel 
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Leonor, where the vessel ran aground in Patagonian Channels of Chile due to momentary 
error of the pilot, the Southern District Court of New York stated “this is exactly the kind 
of situation in which Congress intended to exempt the shipowner from liability.”502 The 
operation of the exemption is the same where straight forward acts, errors or negligence 
on the part of the qualified master or crewman result in grounding.503 Grounding has even 
fallen under the exemption where the master has displayed “exceptionally poor 
judgment,” 504 or his decision was characterized as one “of sheer lunacy.”505
Failure to utilize charts or updated notices that are available on board when the 
vessel grounds, fall under the exemption, while failure to provide up to date charts, do 
not. This distinction is clarified when examining “stranding cases, when stranding has 
been found due to the use of a chart not containing the current correction. If notices to 
mariners are on board from which the chart might be corrected, the failure to make use of 
them is a neglect or default in the navigation or management, for which the ship owner is 
not liable. On the other hand, if, on sailing, the ship is not supplied with the necessary 
navigational data, then a condition of unseaworthiness may exist.” 506 In The Iristo, the 
2nd Circuit Court of Appeals found that although the outdated chart did not indicate a 
wreck on the outer reef of the coast to where the vessel was sailing and on which it 
subsequently grounded after having mistaken the wreck for an approaching steamer, the 
“Notices to Mariners” did disclose its existence and therefore the vessel was seaworthy 
     
stranded as a result of the pilot dozing for a few moments, the carrier was exempt from liability for nautical 
fault; See also American Independent Oil Co. v. M.S. Alkaid, 1968 AMC 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
502 Grace Line Lim Proc (The Santa Leonor) (1973) 397 F.Supp. 1258 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), at p. 1277.
503 Harold W. Holocombe v. Joseph R. Ferlita (The Doromar), 1950 AMC 756 (5 Cir. 1969), where the 
grounding of the vessel off Cuba at night on a Cay where there is no light was held to be an error in 
navigation. 
504 President of India v. West Coast Steamship Co. (The Portland Trader) [1963] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 278 (D.C. 
Ore. 1962), at p. 285. In this instance, the master was zigzagging through an area with shallow reefs during 
the night time with poor visibility, rather than waiting a few hours until daylight. Justice Kilkenny, of the 
District Court of Oregon, at p. 285, commented that the master’s behaviour was “foolhardy” and 
“hazardous”. Contrast this with The Patraikos 2 [2002] 4 S.L.R. 232, where the second officer’s failure to 
take action in preventing the ship from running aground was characterized as “incompetent” and thus 
falling outside the exemption. 
505 Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. M/V Captayannis, 1969 AMC 2484 (D.C. Ore. 1969), at p. 2488, referring to the 
master’s decision to cross the Columbia River Bar in stormy weather without a pilot. 
506 Poor, W. American Law of Charter Parties and Ocean Bills of Lading, 5th Ed. (1968) Matthew Bender, 
New York, at p. 177-178.
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and may benefit from the exemption.507 Where the task of securing the charts or other 
navigational data is delegated to the officers of the ship, their failure to secure them is not 
an error for which the carrier is excused.508 Note, that even where the ship is not supplied 
with updated charts, if the master did not rely on the chart and simply made a 
navigational error then the carrier is not responsible, as there must be a causal link.509
Actions affecting the cargo as a result of the grounding have been held to be 
errors in management of the vessel. The Supreme Court of Canada considered an appeal 
with regard to the grounding of a vessel, which had later been beached to prevent 
sinking.510 Cargo interests alleged that there was an error with respect to the cargo as 
once the vessel was beached, all available pumping facilities were not used, and thus the 
cargo was damaged.511 The Supreme Court held that the failure to utilize pumping 
facilities was an error in management on the part of the master.512 Similarly, in a 
judgment of the Southern District Court of New York, it was held that the failure to pump 
water out of a hold after an accident is an error in management.513 In Leval & Co. v. 
Colonial Steamships, the vessel struck the side of a canal and upon reaching port it was 
  
507 Middleton & Co. v. Ocean Dominion Steamship Co. (The Iristo), 1943 AMC 1043 (2 Cir. 1943), where 
at p. 1048, the court opined: “we hold that the Iristo was properly found seaworthy because of the notices 
on board which disclosed the existence and location of the wreck and that the failure to bring the chart 
down to date, or other wise to use the information available, when navigating in the vicinity of Bermuda, 
was a fault ‘in navigation or management’.” See also United States Steel Products v. American & Foreign 
Ins. Co. (The Steel Scientist) 1936 AMC 387 (2 Cir. 1936), where it was held that the vessel was seaworthy 
even though her charts were outdated, because there existed records on board from which her charts could 
be up dated. 
508 Gianni Gladioli v. Standard Export Lumber (The Maria), 1937 AMC 934 (4 Cir. 1937), holding that the 
duty of seaworthiness is non-delegable, and therefore where the ship was defectively equipped by the 
ship’s officers, this is not bad seamanship but rather unseaworthiness. 
509 See Director General of India Supply Mission v. S.S. Maru, 1972 AMC 1695 (2 Cir. 1972), where 
despite the fact that the up to date charts were not on board, it was established that the stranding of the 
vessel was solely caused by the master’s error; See also Director General of India Supply Mission v. S.S. 
Janet Quinn, 1972 AMC 1227 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), where collision was caused solely by bad seamanship, not 
related to the outdated Suez Canal chart on board; See also Charles I. Waterman v. The Aakre, 1941 AMC 
1263 (2 Cir. 1941), where the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals found that the use of an old chart is not 
unseaworthiness where the master knows the error in the old chart, rather the stranding of the vessel off 
Nova Scotia was an error in navigation.
510 Kalamazoo Paper Co. v. C.P.R. [1950] S.C.R. 356.
511 Ibid. 
512 Ibid. 
513 Campbell Soup Co. v. Federal Motorship Co., 1935 AMC 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1935). Conversely, in Atlantic 
Transport Co. of West Virginia v. Rosenberg Bros. (The Manchuria), 1929 AMC 1539 (9 Cir. 1929), it was 
held that where the vessel’s chain locker is not watertight, this is unseaworthiness, and damage to the cargo 
cannot be attributed to the negligence of the crew is not removing the water with a bilge pump. 
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discovered that the hull had been holed and water was entering the bilge.514 The crew 
failed to take steps to prevent further water entering the vessel resulting in damage to the 
cargo, however the Supreme Court of Canada held that that “the failure to take these 
steps was negligence in the management of the ship on the part of the master and, 
accordingly, the case falls within the exception in Art. IV, para. 2(a).”515  In The Isla 
Fernandina, the vessel ran aground and had to be lightened to get off the bank.516 Justice 
Langley, of the English Commercial Court, held that with regard to the cartons of 
bananas lost in the attempts to refloat the vessel, the carrier was protected by Art. 
IV(2)(a).517 Similarly, where a cargo of lubricating oil was contaminated with seawater, 
by the stranding of the vessel which holed one of her tanks, and the subsequent opening 
of the valves to bring the vessel to an even keel by equalizing the cargo, it was held that 
both events fell within the exemption and were not in connection with the care and 
custody of the cargo.518
The carrier is exempt from responsibility for damage resulting from grounding 
when it is characterized as an error in navigation, nevertheless the carrier must exercise 
reasonable care to protect the cargo from further damage. In The West Cajoot, the 9th
Circuit Court of Appeals held that although the carrier was excused from the damage 
caused by the grounding of the vessel, the carrier was responsible for failing to remove a 
cargo of coconut oil from the deep tanks while in dry dock so they could be examined for 
leaks.519 In The Naftoporos, the error of the master caused the grounding and the 
shipowner asserted that the vessel was a constructive total loss.520 The court found the 
carrier liable to cargo interests for negligence with regard to the cargo in the form of 
  
514 Leval & Co. v. Colonial Steamships [1961] S.C.R. 221.
515 Ibid, at p. 229. 
516 Rey Banano Del Pacifico v. Transportes Navieros Ecuatorianos (The Isla Fernandina) [2000] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 15 (Q.B.). 
517 Ibid, at p. 34. However, one of the carrier’s three generators for the refrigeration of the cargo of bananas 
failed while the vessel was on the bank, with the result that the remaining two had insufficient power to 
preserve the cargo. Langley J. held that the carrier was responsible for damage arising from the failure of 
the generator, despite arguments that it was an error in management, as it was determined that the failure 
was in respect of care of the cargo in that the vessel should have had sufficient power capacity in the event 
of a generator failure (Ibid, at p. 34-35). 
518 Commerce Oil Co. v. Barge DXE-78, 1957 AMC 2473 (E.D. La. 1957). 
519 United States of America v. Los Angeles Soap Co. (The West Cajoot), 1936 AMC 850 (9 Cir. 1936).
520 Office of Supply Government of the Republic of Korea v. M.V. Naftoporos, 1987 AMC 697 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985). 
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failing to pursue the possibility of salvaging the coal cargo.521 The United States Supreme 
Court considered the instance where a vessel stranded and crewmembers left behind the 
vessel along with three crewmembers; the mate returned months later to salvage the 
cargo.522 The United States Supreme Court held that negligent navigation and the 
grounding were not the source of liability, rather the master was grossly negligent in 
leaving the cargo on board without attempting to refloat the vessel or remove and store 
the cargo.523 A Belgian court has opined that even where the shipowner properly 
abandons the voyage due to shipwreck, he must nevertheless provide the best possible 
care of the cargo based on the duty to properly manage the cargo.524 In The Ville 
d’Aurore, the Cour d’Appel d’Aix-en-Province held that the carrier was exonerated for 
wet cargo as a result of the faute nautique of grounding on a wreck clearly indicated on 
the charts.525 The carrier was not however exonerated from the faute commerciale of 
failing to prevent further cargo damage by discharging the wet containers and taking 
action to preserve the as yet undamaged portion of the cargo in the affected containers.526
Conversely, the Chambre Arbitrale Maritime de Paris considered the instance where the 
master veered off his route and struck a coral reef, which necessitated having the vessel 
re-floated and towed to port.527 A portion of the cargo of barley was destroyed and the 
remainder was discharged, however, it sat for five months fermenting in the heat. The 
Chambre Arbitrale Maritime de Paris found that the carrier had promptly contacted cargo 
interests but failed to receive instructions with respect to a new destination. As such the 
carrier was not liable for either the cargo destroyed during the grounding, or for the cargo 
destroyed after discharge, by virtue of the nautical fault exemption.528 Similarly, in a 
Hong Kong Court of Appeal decision, the vessel grounded on rocks on the coast of the 
  
521 Ibid, the Southern District Court of New York also found the carrier responsible for prematurely 
declaring the vessel and the cargo as a constructive total loss, as it was more economically advantageous to 
the shipowner, and then simply selling the stranded vessel and the coal to a Panamanian corporation for 1$. 
522 The Propeller Niagra v. Cordes, 62 U.S. 7 (1858). Given the age of the case on can thus understand why 
the delay before the master returned was five months on a stranding between Buffalo and Chicago. 
523 Ibid. 
524 Hof van Beroep te Antwerpen, September 17, 1980 (The M.S. Fortuna) [1981] ETL 378.
525 Cour d’Appel d’Aix-en-Provence, 23 septembre 1999, (Ville d’Aurore), DMF 2001, 598, at p. 599.
526 Ibid, at p. 601-602.
527 Sentence 626 du 10 juin 1986, Chambre Arbitral Maritime de Paris, DMF 1987, 173.
528 Ibid, at p. 174. 
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People’s Republic of China and the crew abandoned the vessel. 529 The Court of Appeal 
held that the shipowner was not responsible for the looting of all the cargo aboard during 
a four day period, due to the fact that there was a typhoon warning in force and the local 
authorities were unable to contain the looting.530
A failure to inspect the vessel or cargo after an allision could be considered an 
error in management. In The Del Sud, the ship struck the dock, such that it was felt 
throughout the ship, but the master ignored the reports and continued the voyage without 
inspecting the ship for damage.531 The cargo was damaged when seawater entered the 
hold, however, the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the failure to inspect was an 
error in management of the vessel.532 Upon examination of precedents such as The Del 
Sud, one cannot help but question what standard of behaviour or seamanship the courts 
are promoting. If the master or crew ignores potential hull damage that may cause 
damage to the cargo as well, the shipowner is protected, however, if the shipowner’s 
agents intervene, or if the problem is addressed, then the shipowner becomes exposed to 
liability. It would, in essence, appear to be a promotion of wilful blindness. Evidently, the 
policy behind such decisions has not been well thought out, if at all. 
5.3. COLLISION
Almost without exception, collisions are considered to be a result of negligent 
navigation as opposed to a failure to exercise due diligence to render the vessel 
seaworthy. Schoenbaum comments, “the defence of error in navigation normally poses 
little difficulty, especially when it results in a collision or a stranding.”533 There is 
extensive jurisprudence on this point.534 It should also be noted that collisions with 
  
529 Taitexma Enterprise Corporation v. Tillemont Shipping Corporation S.A., HCA 1994 CL – 70 (H.K. 
C.A.)
530 Ibid.
531 Mississippi Shipping Co. v. Zander and Co. (S.S. Del Sud), 1959 AMC 2143 (5 Cir. 1959).
532 Ibid. 
533 Schoenbaum, T. Admiralty and Maritime Law, 3rd Ed. Volume 2. (2001) West Group, St. Paul, 
Minnesota, at p. 130. 
534 Cour d’Appel d’Aix-en-Provence, 23 septembre 1999, (Ville d’Aurore), DMF 2001, 598, where 
collision with a wreck that was clearly indicated on the charts was considered faute nautique; See also 
Director General of India Supply Mission v. S.S. Janet Quinn, 1972 AMC 1227 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), where 
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structures, or allisions, appear to pose little difficulty; as such an allision with a wharf is 
considered an act in the navigation or management of the ship.535 Similarly, damage to 
cargo resulting from the ingress of water originating in the ballast tank due to allision 
with the wall of a lock is also exempted under the Art. IV(2)(a).536
There are however instances where collisions are considered to be the result of a 
failure to exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy. An example of an instance 
where a collision would be an issue of unseaworthiness would be when there is an error 
in connecting the steering apparatus such that on sailing, the vessel turns the wrong 
way.537 A further example of where a collision may be an issue of seaworthiness is where 
the training or certifications of the crewmember responsible for the collision are 
inadequate. To illustrate, where the 3rd mate at the wheel was making his first voyage 
when the vessel collided and the master was not present standing watch, the 2nd Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that the carrier did not exercise due diligence in selecting the 
crew.538
If there is a collision and both vessels are to blame, “as a consequence of the 
principle of divided liability adopted by Article 4 of the 1910 Collision Convention and 
of the exoneration from liability for nautical fault, the owners of the goods carried on 
each vessel may only claim damages from the owners of the non-carrying vessel in 
proportion to its fault.”539 A vessel therefore benefits from the nautical fault exemption in 
relation to any damage to cargo carried on board that vessel. This is not the case in the 
United States, however, as it never became a party to the Collision Convention.540 The 
law of the United States allows cargo claimants to “recover the full extent of [their] 
     
collision caused solely by bad seamanship fell under the exemption; See also Daisy Philippine Underwear 
Co. v. United States Steel Products, 82 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1936), the failure to use the charts resulting in a 
collision is an error in navigation; See also The Spartan, 1931 AMC 1 (2 Cir. 1930); 
535 The Seaway [2004] SGCA 57 (C.A. Singapore) available at: www.onlinedmc.co.uk. 
536 Insurance Co. of North America v. S.S. Georgis A Georgilis, 1983 AMC 1916 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
537 Knauth, A. The American Law of Ocean Bills of Lading, 4th Ed. (1953) AMC, Baltimore, at p. 203. 
538 Protomac Transport v Ogden Marinew Inc. 909 F.2d 42 (2 Cir. 1990). 
539 Berlingieri, F. “The Period of Responsibility and the Basis of Liability of the Carrier” in The Hamburg 
Rules: A Choice for the EEC? (1994) European Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, Maklu, 
Antwerpen, at p. 95. 
540 Tetley, W. International Maritime and Admiralty Law (2002) Yvon Blais, Cowansville, Quebec, at p. 
235. 
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damages from the non-carrying vessel, including physical loss or damage, loss of value 
due to delay, cargo contribution to general average and lost pre-paid freight.”541 The non-
carrying ship then seeks contribution from the carrying ship, thus rendering the nautical 
fault defence de facto inapplicable in such situations. This results in odd situations where 
the carrier ship will pay one half of the loss of its own cargo if both vessels are to blame, 
however, the carrying ship pays none of the loss of its own cargo if it is the only ship is to 
blame. It has been noted that “this curious anomaly in American jurisprudence that the 
carrier pays more if its navigators are half at fault than if they are solely at fault, has long 
been a source of friction. Both American and foreign interests complain of it.”542 To 
rectify the situation, in the United States a clause must be incorporated into the bill of 
lading should carriers wish to benefit from the exemption with respect to the cargo on 
board in a collision situation. This clause is referred to as the Both-to-Blame Collision 
Clause, which provides that where there is a collision resulting from the nautical fault of 
the carrier, the cargo owners will indemnify the carrier for all liability paid to the non-
carrying ship, insofar as such liability represents claims by the cargo owner against the 
non-carrying ship that the non-carrying ship can recover against the carrier.543 In essence, 
the Both-to-Blame Collision Clause entitles the carrier to recover any cargo liability that 
the carrier incurs for which he would otherwise be exempt by virtue of Art. IV(2)(a). 
  
541 Hare, J. Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, (1999) Juta & Co, Cape Town, at p. 
642; See also Strathy, G. & Moore, G. The Law and Practice of Marine Insurance in Canada (2003) 
Butterworths, Toronto, at p. 243-244. 
542 Knauth, A. The American Law of Ocean Bills of Lading, 4th Ed. (1953) AMC, Baltimore, at p. 211.
543 Both-to-Blame Collision Clause: “If the ship comes into collision with another ship as a result of the 
negligence of the other ship and any act, neglect or default of the master, mariner, pilot or the servants of 
the carrier in the navigation or in the management of the ship, the owners of the goods carried hereunder 
will indemnify the carrier against all loss or liability to the other or non-carrying ship or her owners insofar 
as such loss or liability represents loss of, or damage to, or any claim whatsoever of the owners of said 
goods, paid or payable by the other or non-carrying ship or her owners to the owners of said goods and set 
off, recouped or recovered by the other or non-carrying ship or her owners as part of their claim against the 
carrying ship or carrier. The foregoing provisions shall also apply where the owners, operators or those in 
charge of any ships or objects other than, or in addition to, the colliding ships or objects are at fault in 
respect to a collision or contact.” (Drawn from Clause 31(b) of NYPE 93); A practically identical clause is 
found in BIMCO’s Gentime, Appendix A – Protective Clauses, Clause F “Both –to-Blame Collision 
Clause, which can be found in Glass, D et al., Standard Form Contracts for the Carriage of Goods (2000) 
LLP, London, at pp. 59 and ff, along with many other standard form contracts; For further examples of 
Both-to-Blame Clauses, Gaskell, N. et al. Bills of Lading: Law and Contracts (2000) LLP, London, at p. 
345 and ff, provides six different examples drawn from multiple standard form bills of lading.
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5.4. STORMS
In general, when a seaworthy vessel sails in disregard of a storm warning or bad 
weather reports, it has been found to an error in navigation.544 The same is true where the 
vessel sails through a storm despite the fact that there was another route available.545 In 
The Mars, a cargo of bagged cocoa beans was damaged through a lack of ventilation 
resulting from the master sailing right through the centre of a storm.546 The claimant 
argued that the damage could have been avoided had the master sailed around the storm, 
however, the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals held that the vessel was exonerated as it was an 
error in navigation.547 Similarly, the Southern District Court of New York has found that 
where the master decided to head back into the pacific storm, which caused the twisting 
of the hatch cover resulting in cargo damage, the carrier is exonerated under the error in 
navigation defence.548 Nevertheless, the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals has found that the 
carrier may only benefit from the exemption if the vessel is seaworthy for the voyage or 
for the expected bad weather or storm.549
The Federal Court of Canada, in The Washington, has taken a rather strict view of 
the nautical fault exemption where master stayed on course despite the fact that it 
converged with the storm’s course.550 Justice Heald denied the shipowner the protection 
of the nautical fault exemption, concluding “ that the master’s negligence referred to in 
maintaining his course and speed on Nov. 18 and 19 in view of the weather reports he 
was receiving was an error constituting a negligent failure to use the apparatus of the ship 
for the protection of the cargo...”551
In France, there has been some inconsistency with respect to storms. In a Cour 
d’Appel de Paris decision, The Aubrac, it was found that where the master decided to sail 
  
544 The Iowa 1938 AMC 615 (D.C. Ore. 1938); Hanson v. Haywood Bros. 152 F. 401 (7 Cir. 1907). 
545 Yawata Iron & Steel v. Anthony Shipping, 1975 AMC 1602 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
546 Hershey Chocolate Co. v. S.S. Mars, 1961 AMC 1727 (3 Cir. 1960). 
547 Ibid. Although the carrier was held liable for damage to cargo that was a result of the use of hooks and 
contact with exposed structural portions of the ship. 
548 Yawata Iron & Steel v. Anthony Shipping, 1975 AMC 1602 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
549 Texas & Gulf S.S. v. Parker, 263 F. 864 (5 Cir. 1920). 
550 The Washington [1976] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 453 (Fed. Crt. T.D.)
551 Ibid, at p. 460. Justice Heald opined that as the ship came through the weather undamaged, this weighed 
in favour of a failure to care for the cargo.
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regardless of the weather reports, he was not protected under the exemption peril of the 
sea as he was aware of the risks and the incoming weather.552 In doctrinal commentary 
however, the decision to hold the carrier liable has been criticized, as it is agreed that this 
error should have been characterized as faute nautique on the part of the master, thus 
exempting the carrier.553 On appeal at the Cour de Cassation, the carrier pleaded faute 
nautique, but the Cour held that as faute nautique was not pleaded before the Cour 
d’Appel, the carrier was therefore precluded from pleading it for the first time in 
cassation.554 In general, French courts are less forgiving in instances of sailing into 
storms, and the masters are granted less deference with regard to their navigational 
decisions. In a decision by the Cour de Paris, the weather services were announcing a 
typhoon, and thus the master altered course to try to avoid it.555 Nevertheless a day later 
the course of the typhoon had altered, the ship encountered heavy weather and lost 
containers. The Cour de Paris found that the master could have taken a different route 
giving even more latitude to the typhoon and thus the carrier was liable. In The Ras 
Mohamed, the Cour d’Appel d’Aix-en-Provence rejected the carrier’s defence that sailing 
into heavy weather as a result of a route choice was a faute nautique, rather the action 
was viewed as a failure in relation to the cargo.556 Interestingly, four years later the Cour 
d’Appel d’Aix-en-Province, in the Al Hoceima, exonerated a carrier of all responsibility 
on the basis of faute nautique where despite adverse weather, the Captain nevertheless 
left the safety of the port to continue the voyage.557 The claimants argued that the fault 
was in reality one in relation to the cargo, as the master ran the risk through the storm in 
order for the cargo to arrive in port early.558 The Cour d’Appel rejected the argument 
holding that “…le capitaine, en reprenant son voyage malgré des conditions 
  
552 Cour d’Appel de Paris, 12 janvier 1984, (Aubrac), DMF 1984, 413. For a comparison of this judgment 
with a later judgment of the Cour d’Appel D’Aix-en-Provence, 19 mars 1994, also holding that sailing into 
a storm was not an error in navigation as such weather was expected, see Bonassies, P. “Le droit positif 
francais en 1993 (fin)” DMF 1994, 163, at p. 167-168. 
553 Poupard, “Note” following the Cour d’Appel de Paris judgment at p. 425-426. 
554 Cour de Cassation, 22 juillet 1986, (Aubrac), DMF 1988, 119, at p. 119.
555 Cour de Paris, 24 April 1992, summarized by Bonassies, P. “Le droit positif francais en 1992 (III)” 
DMF 1993, 139, at p. 142.
556 Cour d’Appel d’Aix-en-Provence, 19 janvier 2001, (Ras Mohamed), DMF 2001, 820. The Cour d’Appel 
reasoned that the fault must have been faute commerciale as it did not compromise the safety of the entire 
maritime voyage.
557 Cour d’Appel d’Aix-en-Provence, 14 mai 2004, (Al Hoceima), DMF 2005, 322, at pp. 325-326. 
558 Ibid, at p. 331. 
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météorologiques très mauvais, a commis une faute purement nautique, relative à la 
sécurité du navire, et qui a entrainé sa perte, cette faute ne pouvant dès lors être qualifiée 
de commerciale.559 As well, the decision to sail in bad weather can be characterized as 
faute nautique,560 provided the cargo is adequately stowed for the anticipated weather.561
In a recent decision by the Chambre Arbitral Maritime de Paris, the arbitral tribunal 
excused the shipowner and charterer for a certain percentage of the liability to cargo 
interests on the basis of the nautical fault of the captain, but the carriers were liable for 
the remaining percentage on the basis that the cargo had not been adequately stowed and 
lashed for the storm encountered. 562
5.5. BALLASTING
“Negligence in the handling of ballast is in legal contemplation a “classic case” of 
excusable negligence in the navigation or management of the ship.”563 There is a long 
line of jurisprudence concerning simple errors in ballasting. In The Glenochil, it was held 
that the owner was exempt from liability for the negligent manner in which ballasting 
was carried out at the port of discharge.564 In another instance, a failure to harden down a 
ballast tank lid, causing water damage to cargo, was characterized as an error exempt 
under Art. IV(2)(a).565 Similarly, the act of overfilling the ballast tank, allowing it to 
overflow through an open manhole and damage cargo, has been viewed as a fault in the 
  
559 Ibid, at p. 325-326. [Author’s translation: the captain, in resuming his voyage despite the very bad 
weather, committed a fault of a purely nautical nature, relative to the safety of the vessel, and that caused 
the loss complained off, thus this fault cannot be characterized as commercial fault.]
560 Bonassies, P. “Le droit positif francais en 1995” DMF 1996, 243, at p. 254.
561 In la Cour d’Appel d’Aix-en-province, 31 mai 1994, it was held that where the cargo was stowed on 
deck, thus failing to appreciate the weather’s effect on the cargo, the nature of the error is commerciale
(Bonassies, ibid). 
562 Sentence 1105 du 14 janvier 2005, Chambre Arbitral Maritime de Paris, DMF 2005, 562. The faute 
nautique of the captain was the fact that he had sailed at excessive speeds, in heavy weather, made 
hazardous route alterations, and sailed perpendicular to both the wind and the swell. 
563 General Foods Co. v. S.S. Mormacsurf, 1959 AMC 1842 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), at p. 1847. 
564 The Glenochil [1896] P 10, during the discharge of the cargo, the second engineer had run water into a 
ballast tank but negligently omitted to check the condition of the sounding-pipe and casing after having 
encountered heavy weather during the voyage, thus the cargo was wetted. 
565 Minister of Food v. Reardon Smith Line (Fresno City) [1951] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 265 (K.B.). In this instance 
the chief engineer was negligent as after having instructed a crewmember to harden down the tank lids, he 
simply pumped up the tanks without ensuring that they had actually been made watertight. 
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management of the vessel.566 In The Titania, the master decided to fill the deep tanks 
with ballast to give the vessel better trim, and the mate forgot to replace a manhole, 
through which water escaped damaging the cargo.567 The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that it was an error in management, “as a last link in the chain of causation, the 
damage here came about because the manhole cover was off. But sea water would not 
have been in the deep tank had it not been determined that the ship should be ballasted to 
trim her for expected heavy weather. That was the real and underlying cause of the 
damage. And without a doubt, that act of ballasting to trim had as its main and principle 
aim to general care and safety of the whole vessel to protect ship, crew, cargo and freight 
as she ploughed ahead into the area of typhoons.”568 In The Mormacsurf, after cargo 
stored in a deep tank had been discharged, on the way to the next port, the deep tank was 
run up for ballast but was overpumped causing damage to cargo.569 The 2nd Circuit Court 
of Appeals, held that as the ballasting was required for the safety of the vessel as a whole, 
this constituted error in the management of the vessel: “the choice between improper care 
and management is often difficult. However, looking to the primary purpose of the 
ballasting operation, it was clearly for the welfare of the entire ship without regard to care 
of any particular cargo or even cargo as a whole. The negligent pumping in trimming the 
ship was management intimately connected with her navigation.”570 The Supreme Court 
of Norway considered the instance where in heavy seas the master ordered water to be 
pumped into two non-cargo tanks for stability but by mistake the water was directed to 
the cargo tank.571 It was held that the measures taken were for the safety of the ship, thus 
the carrier was able to benefit from the exemption of errors in management.572 The 
French courts, in contrast, have been known to be strict with regard to errors in 
  
566 Orient Insurance Co. v. M.S. Argentina, 1961 AMC 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Leon Bernstein Co. v. 
Wilhelm Wilhelmsen (M.S. Titania), 1956 AMC 754 (5 Cir. 1956).
567 Leon Bernstein Co. v. Wilhelm Wilhelmsen (M.S. Titania), 1956 AMC 754 (5 Cir. 1956). 
568 Ibid, at p. 756. 
569 General Foods Co. v. S.S. Mormacsurf, 1960 AMC 1103 (2 Cir. 1960).
570 Ibid, at p. 1104. 
571 NMCases 1979.108 (Gevostar) Supreme Court Norway, as summarized in Honka, H. “New Carriage of 
Goods by Sea – The Nordic Approach,” in New Carriage of Goods by Sea. (1997) H. Honka (Ed.) Institute 
of Maritime and Commercial Law, Abo, at p. 47. 
572 Ibid. 
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ballasting,573 nevertheless the Cour d’Appel de Rouen has found; “que l’erreur ou la 
negligence commises au cours de la fin des opérations par un remplisage excessif des 
ballasts se situent dans un domaine proprement nautique.”574 Other European courts have 
also been unforgiving of ballasting errors. A Belgian court in The Arnold Maursk, 
acknowledged the necessity of refilling ballast for the safety of the vessel, but found that 
this necessity does not negate the carrier’s obligation to protect the cargo by preventing 
the escape of ballast water into the holds.575 As such, the Belgian court held that the 
escape of ballast water is a mismanagement of the cargo, thus rendering the carrier 
liable.576 The Belgian Court of Cassation, the Hof Van Cassatie, upheld the lower court 
decision finding that in certain instances the failure to prevent the infiltration of ballast 
water into the cargo holds does not constitute an error in navigation or management of 
the vessel, rather it constitutes a lack of diligence with respect to the cargo.577 Similarly, 
another Belgian court has also held that improperly closing a manhole cover in a ballast 
tank such that it is not watertight, constitutes mismanagement of the cargo on the basis 
that a carrier is required to prevent the penetration of ballast water into the holds in order 
to prevent cargo damage.578
Often, distinguishing between nautical fault and care of the cargo or 
unseaworthiness in instances of ballasting is contentious when it involves the 
certifications of the crewmembers, the training they have received with regard to the 
particular vessel, or the condition of the ballasting system. In The Farrandoc, the fact that 
the second engineer who made the ballasting error had not been instructed on the piping 
system in the vessel, had not received training, and was hired only at the beginning of 
that voyage, caused the Exchequer Court of Canada to determine that the issue was one 
  
573 In Cour de Cassation, 17 juillet 1980, (Kenosha), DMF 1981, 209, several bales of material were wetted 
as a result of water entry due to a ballasting error. The Cour held that as the intent of the ballasting 
operation was not directed at the safety or stability of the vessel, then the carrier was unable to benefit from 
the exemption and was liable. 
574 Cour d’Appel de Rouen, 9 fevrier 1982, (Kenosha), DMF 1982, 669, at p. 674. [Author’s translation: the 
error or the negligence committed during the ballasting operations in overfilling the ballast tanks falls 
within the proper domain of nautical fault.] 
575 Hof van Beroep te Antwerpen, December 12, 1990 (The Arnold Maersk) [1992] ETL 388.
576 Ibid.
577 Hof van Cassatie van Belgie, September 25, 1992 (The Arnold Maersk) [1993] ETL 213.
578 Hof van Beroep te Antwerpen, June 29, 1983 [1984] ETL 84.
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
110
of unseaworthiness, and not error in management.579 While in Instituto Cubano v. Star 
Line, when molasses were damaged as a result of a ballasting mistake, it was held that the 
unsealed cargo valve, the ultimate cause of the loss, “was an error in care and custody of 
the cargo outweighing error in management in improper ballasting.”580
5.6. HATCH COVERS AND TARPAULINS
Attempting to generally distinguish between acts involving hatches that fall into 
the nautical fault exemption and those which do not has often proved difficult in the past, 
given that a myriad of decisions exist on both sides of the issue. Justice Wright describes 
hatches as a quintessential example of a part of the vessel that may be related to either 
care of the cargo or error in the management of the vessel: “…the hatches may in one 
aspect be regarded as part of the outer skin of the vessel as when decks are actually or 
potentially swept by seas, so that the proper battening down of the hatches with tarpaulins
and cleats is as much a part of the management of the ship as closing the portholes. Under 
other circumstances, as in dock or in calm waters, the hatches belong to the management 
of the cargo, either because they have to be removed for ventilation or kept tight to keep 
wet from perishable cargo.” 581
There are many instances where errors with respect to hatches have been found to 
relate to the care of the cargo. The 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals has found that the act of 
opening hatches to ventilate the cargo and failing to close them during heavy weather 
does not fall within the exemption.582 Where a hatch, which was inadequately secured, 
was forcibly opened and thrown back in a gale, the Queen’s Bench Admiralty Court held 
that the carrier was liable for the resulting damage to the cargo of cement on the basis of 
the breach of the obligation to carefully carry the cargo.583 The House of Lords, in Gosse 
Millerd, determined that where tarpaulins covering the hatches were removed to 
  
579 Robin Hood Flour Mills v. N.M. Patterson (The Farrandoc) [1968] 1 Ex. C.R. 175; [1967] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 276 (Exch. C. Can).  
580 Instituto Cubano v. Star Line, 1958 AMC 166 (Arb. N.Y. 1957). 
581 Forman & Ellams v. Federal Steam Navigation [1928] 30 Ll. L. Rep. 52 (K.B.), at p. 60. 
582 Andean Trading Company v. Pacific Steam Navigation, 263 F. 559 (2 Cir. 1920). 
583 The Bulkness [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 39 (Q.B.). 
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effectuate repairs to the vessel, and the cargo was damaged by rainwater, “such 
negligence was not negligence in the management of the ship” but rather in management 
of the cargo.584 Similarly in the Singapore case of The Santiago del Estoro, cargo arrived 
damaged due to lack of ventilation in the hold, and the court held the carrier liable for 
failing to care for the cargo by omitting to use mechanical ventilation where the hatches 
could not be opened due to weather and failing to open them when the weather 
permitted.585 The Supreme Court of Canada considered the instance where cargo of nails 
was damaged as a result of the loosening of the tarpaulins that covered the hatches.586
The majority excused the carrier on the basis of the peril of the sea exemption found in 
Art. IV(2)(c) of the Hague Rules yet the dissent found that it would have been an error in 
the care of the cargo following the House of Lords decision in Gosse Millerd.587
Conversely, in other instances the carrier has been protected by the nautical fault 
exemption. When tarpaulins have been stripped from hatch covers in heavy weather 
allowing seawater into the hold damaging cargo, it has been held that the failure of the 
ship’s officers to fit locking bars or to lash the hatches fell within the Art. IV(2)(a) 
exemption.588 The Eidsivating Court of Appeal, Norway, considered an instance where 
the hatches were not properly closed, the wedges holding the tarpaulin came lose, and the 
cargo became contaminated by water.589 There were heavy seas and the tarpaulin cover 
had been strengthened, but it nevertheless gave way.590 The Court of Appeal found that 
“in view of the time of year and the nature of the voyage, covering the hatches was 
  
584 Gosse Millerd v. Canadian Government Merchant Marine [1928] 32 Ll. L. Rep. 91 (H.L.), at p. 95. 
585 The Santiago del Estoro (1984) Unrep. Suit No. 671 and 672 of 1984, Singapore. (Summarized in 
Meng, T. The Law in Singapore on Carriage of Goods by Sea 2nd Ed. (1994) Butterworths Asia, 
Singapore, at p. 361-362). 
586 Keystone Transports v. Dominion Steel & Coal Co. [1942] S.C.R. 495
587 Ibid, at p. 508. 
588 International Packers v. Ocean Steam Ship Co. [1955] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 218 (Q.B.), however, Justice 
McNair at p. 238, held that where the cargo was further damaged at port by the failure to discharge the 
cargo in the wetted hold, the carrier was responsible as it was an error that related to the care of the cargo. 
589 ND 1987.229 NCA Ulla Dorte (Summarized in Falkanger, T. et al. Scandinavian Maritime Law: the 
Norwegian Perspective (2004) Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, at p. 273). 
590 Ulla Dorte, ibid, as described in Honka, H. “New Carriage of Goods by Sea – The Nordic Approach,” in 
New Carriage of Goods by Sea. (1997) H. Honka (Ed.) Institute of Maritime and Commercial Law, Abo, at 
p. 47. 
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essential for the safety of the ship,” and therefore the carrier benefited from the 
exemption for errors in management of the vessel.591
Hatches and tarpaulins have proven to be a contentious area of law with regard to 
the nautical fault exemption. In this respect, these acts provide an example of the often 
fact specific nature of the defence. One would be wise to take note of Lord Sumner’s 
caution in Gosse Millerd, when considering this area of the law; “it is never wise to try to 
decide case B because part of the ship mishandled is “like” the part mishandled in case 
A.”592
5.7. OTHER EXAMPLES RELATING TO ERROR IN MANAGEMENT
Damage resulting from leaking drainage pipes has been considered by various 
courts on several occasions. In several instances, sailors’ negligently clearing drainage 
pipes leading from their quarters or washrooms has been held to be an error in 
management.593 In The Touraine,594 a crewman negligently forced an iron rod into a pipe 
that carried wastewater from the crew quarters in order to clear it, while in The 
Rodney,595 a boatswain negligently used a metal poker to clear a pipe that carried off 
water and had caused flooding in his quarters. In both instances, the damage caused to the 
pipes had resulted in cargo being wetted, and in both instances the acts were held to be an 
error in the management of the vessel.596 Similarly, where a crewman clearing a toilet 
with an iron rod punched a hole in the pipe, causing water damage to the cargo in a hold 
below, the court held that the damage was due to error in management.597 Failing to 
replace the caps to pipes has also been found to be within the exemption.598 On the other 
  
591 Ulla Dorte, ibid, as summarized by Falkanger, T. et al. Scandinavian Maritime Law: the Norwegian 
Perspective (2004) Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, at p. 273.
592 Gosse Millerd v. v. Canadian Government Merchant Marine [1928] 32 Ll. L. Rep. 91 (H.L.), at p. 97. 
593 The J.L. Luckenbach 1933 AMC 980 (2 Cir. 1933), where negligently poking a hole in a blocked drain 
pipe causing water to enter the cargo hold is an error in management of the vessel. 
594 The Touraine [1927] All ER 372 (Adm. Div.). 
595 The Rodney, [1900] P 112 (Div Ct). 
596 The Touraine [1927] All ER 372 (Adm. Div.). The Rodney, [1900] P 112 (Div Ct). 
597 Kalbfleisch Co. v. United States of America (The Culberson), 1931 AMC 1987 (D.C. Mass. 1931).
598 In Gold Dust Co v. Munson Steamship Lines (The Munindies), 1931 AMC 245 (E.D.N.Y. 1930), it was 
held that where a 2nd asst. engineer in filling a double bottom tank negligently allowed the water to 
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hand a failure to drain the fresh water sanitary system after it had been shut off in below 
freezing temperatures was found to have caused a pipe to part, and this was held “not to 
constitute an error in management; rather, it concerns the care and custody of the cargo, 
i.e., to prevent water damage to the cargo.”599
It has been noted that “sounding bilges and pumping bilges are regarded as 
essential acts of daily management of any ship, whether laden or in ballast; hence errors 
and negligence in sounding and pumping out bilges are deemed errors in management 
and are excused.”600 Also where the cap has been left off the sounding pipe during a 
storm such that seawater entered the bilges and a hold, causing damage to the cargo of 
sugar, this has fallen within the exemption.601 It has been noted however, that if the 
scuppers are clogged or dirty permitting sweat to damage the carg , the carrier is unable 
to benefit from the exemption.602 Conversely, it has also been held that a failure to keep 
the scuppers clear is an error in management.603 These examples serve to underscore the 
often subjective or fact specific nature of the jurisprudence. 
Errors involving valves have in certain instances been held to be errors in 
management. The Supreme Court of Canada considered a situation in which a crewman 
was instructed to pump up the boilers, close the sea-cock valve off, and take certain 
covers off the air-pump. He instead removed the cover off the sea-cock causing an 
ingress of water and damage to the cargo, and this was considered to be an error in 
management.604 In a Norwegian judgment, two bilges valves were not properly closed 
after drainage causing cargo damage.605 The Norwegian Court exempted the carrier from 
     
overflow through the sounding pipes, the caps of which had been removed, into the shaft alley, then 
through another sounding pipe into the cofferdam, then into the cargo bilges, and then into the cargo 
causing damage, that it was an error in management
599 International Produce Inc. v. S.S. Frances Salman [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
600 Knauth, A. The American Law of Ocean Bills of Lading, 4th Ed. (1953) AMC, Baltimore, at p. 201. See 
also The British King, 89 F. 872 (S.D.N.Y. 1898); See also The Ontario, 106 F. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1900).
601 Spreckels Sugar Co. v. S.S. Point Chico, 1941 AMC 1468 (5 Cir. 1941).
602 Knauth, A. The American Law of Ocean Bills of Lading, 4th Ed. (1953) AMC, Baltimore, at p. 201. See 
The Cornelia 1926 AMC 1337 (S.D.N.Y. 1926). 
603 The Hudson, 172 F. 1005 (1909). 
604 Richardson & Sons v. SS. Burlington [1931] S.C.R. 76. 
605 “The Malevik” ND 1961.282 (Summarized by Falkanger, T. et al. Scandinavian Maritime Law: the 
Norwegian Perspective (2004) Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, at p. 272-273). 
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liability, holding: “The valves must be considered to be for the benefit of both the cargo 
and ship. The former is benefited in that the opening of the valves allows the release of 
water collected in the cargo holds. The closing of the valves primarily benefits the vessel, 
because the failure to close the valves may endanger the safety of the vessel…In the 
instance case, where damage was clearly caused by the failure to close the valves 
properly, the emphasis must be placed on the function the valves play with respect to the 
safety of the vessel. Hence the actual omission is best considered a fault in the 
management of the ship.”606 Conversely, the failure to tighten a storm valve, wetting the 
cargo, has been found by a Canadian Court to be an error with regard to due diligence 
preventing the carrier from relying on the Art. IV(2)(a) exemption.607 In The Lady 
Serena, the cargo of phosphate was damaged as a result of a valve in the hold suction line 
being jammed open, and the London Court held that as the defect in the valve occurred 
before the beginning of the voyage, the vessel was unseaworthy.608 In another instance, it 
was held by the Southern District Court of New York that the error in management 
defence was unavailable due to a failure to adequately inspect the overboard discharge 
valve which had caused the excessive water in the bilges.609 Importantly, it has been 
found that where the carrier cannot prove why or by whom a sea valve was opened 
causing damage to oil cargo, he may not benefit from the error in management defence as 
such as act might have related to the care of the cargo.610 Finally, when the loss was due 
to a non-return valve stuck in the open position, it has been held that this cannot qualify 
as an error in management, the issue rather being one of seaworthiness.611
Finally, activities such as weight distribution, cleaning, pumping, and ventilating 
have been found to be in relation to the management of the vessel. In The Marilyn L, a 
  
606 Ibid.
607 Australian Newsprint Mills Ltd. v. Canadian Union Line Ltd. [1952] 1 D.L.R. 850 (B.C.S.C.). 
608 Fisons Fertilizers v. Thomas Watson (The Lady Serena) [1971] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 141 (M&C London).
609 Iligan International Corp. v. S.S. John Weyerhaeuser, 1974 AMC 1718 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
610 Standard Shipping Co. v. Luckenbach Steamship Co. (The Mary Luckenback), 1940 AMC 1582 (Arb. 
NY 1940). There was a dissenting arbitrator however, who found at p. 1588 that the sea valve had no 
legitimate use in connection with the discharge of the cargo and its purpose is wholly related to 
management of the vessel, therefore the carrier should benefit from the exemption. 
611 Brazil Oiticica Inc. v. S.S. Bill, 1942 AMC 1607 (D.C. Ma 1942), this was the case even though the fact 
that the possibility of non-return valve getting stuck in the open position due to the sticky quality of the oil 
carried, would not have been anticipated by the crew and had never been seen before by the surveyors. 
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cargo of plywood had arrived damaged, and it was argued that the metacentric height of 
the vessel was such that the weight distribution should have been increased by additional 
ballasting by the defendant.612 It was held that a failure to adjust the metacentric height 
was a default in the navigation or management of the vessel under Art. IV(2)(a).613 In The 
Dagny Skou, the Court of Appeal of Singapore considered the instance in which the crew 
was cleaning two deep tanks by the rock and roll method, however the tanks were 
overfilled and flooded a cargo hold. The Court of Appeal held that as the tanks were 
constructed for a dual purpose, one for carrying cargo and the other for fuel oil, the 
cleaning was done for the purposes of the ship and thus was an error in the management 
of the vessel.614 The Norwegian Supreme Court had found that where a crew member 
erroneously pumped fresh water into the inspection pipe for a cargo hold rather than 
replenishing the ship’s fresh water, the fault was in the management of the vessel.615  
Finally, inadequate ventilation has been found in certain instances to constitute an error in 
management,616 while in others it falls to be viewed as a failure to care for the cargo.617
5.8. OTHER EXAMPLES RELATING TO ERROR IN NAVIGATION
The length of this section stands in stark contrast to the proceeding section, thus 
demonstrating the fairly straightforward nature of the error in navigation aspect of the 
nautical fault exemption. The aforementioned examples illustrate that the main issue 
regarding the navigation aspect of the defence is in distinguishing between error and the 
incompetence of the master or crewmembers. Nevertheless, there are two further 
examples of error in navigation worth mentioning. First, where a vessel declines towage 
assistance following a casualty, as per the Iceland Supreme Court, this is an error in 
  
612 Georgia-Pacific Co. v. M/S Marilyn L., [1972] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 418, 1971 AMC 2157 (E.D. Vir. 1971)
613 Ibid, at p. 429 and 2166. 
614 Dagny Skou, [1980-1981] 1 S.L.R. 2000 (C.A. Singapore), at p. 203. 
615 ND 1975.85 NSC Sunny Lady (Summarized by Falkanger, T. et al. Scandinavian Maritime Law: the 
Norwegian Perspective (2004) Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, at p. 273). 
616 The Devanha [1927] 27 Ll. L. Rep. 281 (M&C London), Justice Cooper found that where ventilators 
were improperly used damaging a cargo of sheepskins, it was a fault in the management of the ship and the 
carrier is protected under Art. IV(2)(a).
617 The Erik Boye [1929] 34 Ll. L. Rep. 442 (Adm. Div.), Justice Hill holding that failing to have proper 
ventilation for a cargo of flour was a defect for which the carrier is liable. 
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navigation.618 Second, the failure to keep the vessel anchored head-on into Force 6 winds 
causing the rolling of the vessel, which strained and broke the lashings of the generator 
stored on deck, constituted an error in navigation.619
  
618 ND 2000.91 ISC Vikartindure (Summarized in Falkanger, T. et al. Scandinavian Maritime Law: the 
Norwegian Perspective (2004) Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, at p. 272).  
619 General Electric v. M/V Lady Sophie, 1979 AMC 2554 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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Chapter 6
Expanding the Boundaries and Application of Nautical Fault
In the classic cargo claims scenario, Art. IV(2)(a) of the Hague-Visby Rules, if 
applicable, would be invoked by the carrier as a defence to a claim for cargo damage, 
generally by the holder of the bill of lading. The application of the nautical fault 
exemption has subsequently been expanded, as a result of developments in two notable 
areas. Firstly, it has become common practice in many charterparty agreements to 
incorporate the Hague or Hague-Visby Rules, thus expanding the application of the 
nautical fault exemption to situations which would not ordinarily arise in the context of 
disputes under bills of lading. Secondly, due to the development of the notion of 
actionable fault in general average, the carrier may rely on the nautical fault exemption in 
certain instances to claim general average contribution, even where the peril results from 
the negligence of his own employees. In this Chapter, therefore we examine the 
application of the nautical fault exemption in the context of general average and 
charterparties. 
6.1. INCORPORATION OF THE NAUTICAL FAULT EXEMPTION INTO 
CHARTERPARTIES
In relation to the traditional carrier and cargo claimant dispute, Art. IV(2)(a) 
would be utilized to defend against a claim concerning cargo damage. The scope of Art. 
IV(2)(a) in those instances would therefore be with regard to the obligations found in Art. 
III(2), concerning the loading, handling, stowage, carriage, custody, care and discharge of 
the cargo. With regard to charterparties, the substance of the relationship between the 
shipowner and the charterer extends far beyond the obligations found in Art. III(2) of the 
Hague Rules. Loss or damage suffered by the parties may very well be unrelated to the 
aforementioned cargo obligations, and therefore the protection afforded by Art. IV(2)(a) 
may very well be expanded by virtue of its incorporation into a charterparty. The scope of 
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Art. IV(2)(a) with respect to disputes under a charterparty is contentious.620 There is a 
divergence of opinion as to whether Art. IV(2), once incorporated into a charterparty, 
must be given the same scope and interpretation as in a bill of lading, or whether its scope 
is thereby extended to cover acts, faults, loss or damage that would not have arisen in a 
traditional carrier-shipper bill of lading relationship.
6.1.1. Clause Paramount
The Hague or Hague-Visby Rules, by their own terms, do not apply to 
charterparties. As such a ‘Clause Paramount’, which has the effect of incorporating the 
provisions of Hague, Hague-Visby or U.S.COGSA into a charterparty, has become a 
common feature of most charterparties.621 The wording varies depending on which 
standard form contract is used, nevertheless, the effect is in essence similar.622 It has been 
  
620 Wilford, M et al. Time Charters, 5th Ed. (2003) LLP, London, at p. 579 and ff., noting that with respect 
to the United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, when incorporated into a time charterparty, the extent to 
which the Act is restricted by the fact that section 2 relates only to cargo has been a matter of debate.
621 Astle, W. International Cargo Carriers’ Liabilities (1983) Fairplay Publications, London, at p. 39; 
Bauer, G. “The Measure of Liability for Cargo Damage Under Charter Parties: A Second Look” (1990) 21 
JMLC 397, at p. 402 notes that “in both voyage charters and time charters it is usual to include a clause 
intended to regulate the liabilities between owner and charterer regarding the carriage of cargo. This clause 
may take the form of a ‘general exceptions’ clause, listing those categories of damage or loss for which the 
owner is not liable, such as act of God, perils of the seas, etc., or the charter party may simply annex or 
include a Clause Paramount.” Despite being a common practice, it has been noted by a Norwegian arbitral 
tribunal that the reason for the practice may be somewhat misunderstood: “the reason why the Clause 
[Paramount] was attached to the C/P appears to be that shipowning and shipbrokering circles hold a certain 
vague and somewhat erroneous belief that the Paramount Clause may be useful to the shipowner. The 
representatives of the shipping industry who have given evidence before this Tribunal this characterized the 
Clause as one of ‘the usual protectives’, but admitted that they did not have a clear idea of its legal 
implications.” (Rederi A/B/ Walltank v. M/S/ Granvill, Oslo, Arbitration, as quoted by Bauer, ibid, at p. 
404).  With respect to bareboat charters, both Barecon 89 and Barecon 2001 provide that all documents 
issued by the charterers shall contain a clause paramount (Davis, M. Bareboat Charters 2nd Ed. (2005) 
LLP, London, at p. 123). Regardless, unlike voyage and time charters, the bills of lading bind the bareboat 
charterers and not the owners, meaning that the bareboat charterer is the “carrier” under the Hague and 
Hague-Visby Rules (Davis, ibid). 
622 The New York Produce Exchange Form, September 14, 1993 (NYPE 93), issued by the Association of 
Ship Brokers and Agents (U.S.A.) contains in Clause 31(a), entitled Clause Paramount, the statement “This 
bill of lading shall have effect subject to the provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of the United 
States, the Hague Rules, or the Hague-Visby Rules, as applicable, or such other similar national legislation 
as may mandatorily apply by virtue of origin or destination of the bills of lading, which shall be deemed to 
be incorporated herein and nothing herein contained  shall be deemed a surrender by the carrier of any of its 
rights or immunities or an increase of any of its responsibilities or liabilities under said applicable Act. If 
any term of this bill of lading be repugnant to said applicable Act to any extent, such term shall be void to 
that extent but no farther.” While the New York Produce Exchange Form, October 3, 1946 (NYPE 1946), 
contains in Clause 24, the statement “U.S.A. Clause Paramount: The bill of lading shall have effect subject 
to the provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of the United States, approved April 16, 1936, which 
shall be deemed to be incorporated herein, and nothing herein contained shall be deemed a surrender by the 
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noted that “as spot trading of commodities has grown – particularly oil trading, which 
was virtually unheard of before the 1970’s – more and more charter party cargo losses 
have been subject to the Hague Rules.”623 In the context of time charters in particular, it 
is almost standard procedure these days to incorporate the Hague or Hague-Visby 
Rules.624 The courts have given full effect to the clause paramount.625 In The Saxon Star, 
the House of Lords held that it was plainly the intent of the parties to incorporate the 
Hague Rules and thus such intention should be given effect, despite the fact that the 
Hague Rules expressly stipulate that they are not to apply to charterparties.626 Once the 
Hague or Hague-Visby Rules have been included in a paramount clause, they become 
part of the charterparty contract between the parties, as if each word of the Rules had 
     
carrier of any of its rights or immunities or an increase of any of its responsibilities or liabilities under said 
Act. If any term of this bill of lading is repugnant to said Act to any extent, such term shall be void to that 
extent, but no further.” BIMCO’s 1999 Gentime, which is an undated version of the Baltime, contains a 
clause paramount in Clause B of Appendix A – Protective Clauses: “Clause Paramount: The International 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating to the Bills of Lading signed at Brussels on 
24 August 1924 (“the Hague Rules”) as amended by the Protocol signed at Brussels on 23 February 1968 
(“the Hague-Visby Rules”) as enacted in the country of shipment shall apply to the Contract. When the 
Hague-Visby Rules are not enacted in the country of shipment, the corresponding legislation in the country 
of destination shall apply, irrespective of whether such legislation may only regulate outbound shipments. 
When there is no enactment of the Hague-Visby Rules in either the country of shipment or in the country of 
destination, the Hague-Visby Rules shall apply to this Contract, save where the Hague Rules as enacted in 
the country of shipment or if no such enactment is in place the Hague Rules as enacted in the country of 
destination apply compulsorily to this Contract. The Protocol signed at Brussels on 21 decembre 1979 (“the 
SDR Protocol 1979”) shall apply where the Hague Visby Rules apply whether mandatorily or by this 
Contract. The Carrier shall in no case be responsible for loss of or damage to cargo arising prior to loading, 
after discharging, or while the cargo is in the charge of another carrier, or which respect to deck cargo and 
live animals.” (Glass, D et al., Standard Form Contracts for the Carriage of Goods (2000) LLP, London, at 
p. 65). 
623 Chandler, G. “After Reaching a Century of the Harter Act: Where Should We Go From Here?” (1993) 
24 JMLC 43, at p. 45.
624 Davis, D. “Rights to Routes: The Hill Harmony” [1999] LMLCQ 461, at p. 463; Pritchett, R. “The New 
York Produce Exchange Charterparty: The Clause Paramount and Responsibility for Cargo Operations and 
Seaworthiness” (1983) 14 JMLC 69, at p. 87 notes that “it has long been a common  practice in the time 
chartering of vessels for parties to seek to incorporate the terms of the Hague Rules into their agreement.”
625 See Nissho-Iwai Co. v. M/T Stolt Lion, 1980 AMC 867 (2d Cir 1980), holding that where charterers and 
vessel owners incorporate United States COGSA, either expressly or impliedly into the charterparty, it will 
be given effect.
626 Adamastos Shipping v. Anglo-Saxon Petroleum (The Saxon Star) [1958] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 73 (H.L.). The 
House of Lord’s decision has been cited and followed with respect to the Clause Paramount in the New 
York Produce Form 1946, Clause 24. See Aliakmon Maritime Co. v. Trans Ocean Continental (The 
Aliakmon Progress) [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 499 (C.A.); Actis Co. v. The Sanko Steamship Co. (The 
Aquacharm) [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 7 (Q.B.); Seven Seas Transportation v Pacifico Union Marina (The 
Satya Kailash) [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 465 (Q.B.), and Seven Seas Transportation v. Pacific Union Marina 
(The Satya Kailash) [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 588 (C.A.).
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been written into the charterparty.627 There is divergence, however, in the treatment of the 
provisions of the Hague or Hague-Visby Rules once they have become part of the 
charterparty. This divergence is with respect to whether the provisions of the Rules 
become paramount over other charterparty terms. Certain authors have argued that under 
English law, the Hague or Hague-Visby Rules are given primacy over other terms of the 
charterparty.628 Lord Denning and Lord Justice Goff in The Aegios Lazaros, considered 
that where a Gencon charterparty incorporated the Hague Rules by virtue of the phrase 
“…Paramount clause deemed to be incorporated in this Charter Party,” then the Hague 
Rules provisions superseded all inconsistent charterparty terms.629 Although, this is not 
always the case. In Marifortuna Naviera S.A. v. Government of Ceylon, Justice Mocatta 
opined that “it would be wrong to place too much weight on the word “Paramount”…I 
see no reason…for thereby giving the provisions of this clause greater weight than the 
provisions of clause 21.”630 Justice Mocatta went on to hold that a specific charterparty 
clause, inconsistent with the nautical fault exemption, prevailed over the rights and 
immunities in the Hague Rules.631 The American law is also inconsistent. Certain 
American courts have considered that when COGSA is incorporated, it is no more than 
any other general contract term, while other courts have considered that COGSA 
provisions are intended to prevail.632 Nevertheless, one must recall that in essence it is an 
issue of contract interpretation, and as such, will vary depending on the wording of the 
clause paramount and the facts of the case. 
Hague, Hague-Visby and COGSA are generally incorporated by reference, 
however one may also decide to only incorporate certain provisions.  When the 
  
627 In Pohang Iron & Steel Ltd. v. Norbulk Cargo Services Ltd. [1996] 4 HKC 701 (H.K. H.C.), the Hong 
Kong court held that the Hague-Visby time period, incorporated by virtue of a paramount clause, became in 
reality part of the contract between the parties, thus all liability was extinguished after the passage of one 
year; Davies, M. & Dickey, A. Shipping Law 3rd Ed (2004) Lawbook Co, Pyrmont, Australia, at p. 356 
states: “The effect of the Clause Paramount is that the rules are read as if they had been written into the 
charterparty, and meaningless and superfluous words relating to bills of lading are reinterpreted or 
ignored.”
628 Pritchett, R. “The New York Produce Exchange Charterparty: The Clause Paramount and Responsibility 
for Cargo Operations and Seaworthiness” (1983) 14 JMLC 69, at p. 91-92.
629 The Aegios Lazaros [1976] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 47 (C.A.), at p. 50 & 53. 
630 Marifortuna Naviera S.A. v. Government of Ceylon [1970] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 247 (Q.B.), at p. 255-256. 
631 Ibid, at p. 257.
632 Pritchett, R. “The New York Produce Exchange Charterparty: The Clause Paramount and Responsibility 
for Cargo Operations and Seaworthiness” (1983) 14 JMLC 69, at p. 94-95.
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incorporation is by reference, parties are then subject to the entire statute. The French 
Cour de Cassation has found that once parties have incorporated the Hague Rules by 
reference into their charterparty, they cannot then derogate from those provisions which 
they could not have derogated from had the Hague Rules been applicable by law.633 In 
the United States, the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that where the charterparty 
has incorporated United States COGSA, “[t]he parties must have presumed to have 
intended to incorporate all the effects of that statute.”634 Despite this, shipowners 
occasionally challenge the application of the due diligence standards in cargo damage 
cases where the charterparty contains a clause paramount.635 Nevertheless, it has been 
argued that “…COGSA is incorporated in charter parties within the Clause Paramount, to 
the benefit of both owners and charterers. As the measure of liability between them, it 
provides substantial benefits to both, so that any attempt to read out one or more of 
COGSA’s provisions must be carefully scrutinized, lest all of its benefits be lost.”636
6.1.2 “Loss or Damage”
One of the difficulties that arises with respect to the incorporation of the nautical 
fault exemption is interpreting the wording  “loss or damage”. Justice Devlin, in The 
Saxon Star, commented that “loss or damage” should be restricted to such loss or damage 
that was in relation to or had connection with the operations listed in s. 2 of U.S. 
COGSA.637 The House of Lords, however disagreed and held that “loss or damage” in 
Art. IV(2) was not restricted to the physical loss or damage of goods, and as such that the 
  
633 Cour de Cassation, 4 février 1992, (Hilaire Maurel), [1992] ETL 783. 
634 Heinrich C. Horn v. CIA De Navegacion (The Heinz Horn) [1970] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 191 (5 Cir. 1969).
635 Chandler, G. “The Measure of Liability for Cargo Damage Under Charter Parties” (1989) 20 JMLC 395, 
at p. 395. 
636 Ibid, at p. 402.
637 Adamastos Shipping v. Anglo-Saxon Petroleum (The Saxon Star)[1957] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 79 (Q.B.), at p. 
87, “The last question asks whether the words ‘loss or damage’ in section 4(1) and (2) of the Act relate only 
to physical loss of or damage to the goods. The words themselves are not qualified or limited by anything 
in the section. The Act is dealing with responsibilities and liabilities under contracts of carriage of goods by 
sea, and clearly such contractual liabilities are not limited to physical damage. A carrier may be liable for 
loss caused by the shipper by delay or misdelivery, even though the goods themselves are intact. I can see 
no reason why the general words “loss or damage” should be limited to physical loss or damage. The only 
limitation…[is] the loss or damage must, in my opinion, arise in relation to the “loading, handling, stowage, 
carriage, custody, care and discharge of such goods.”…I should give the same meaning to ‘in relation to’ as 
to in connexion with”.” Devlin J. was asked to express a view as to whether the loss of voyages would fall 
under s.4, and he commented that he viewed it as unlikely. The House of Lords did deal with the question, 
and found that the wording allowed for recovery for losses resulting from fewer voyages than intended. 
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wording could be interpreted to cover the loss to the charterers resulting from the 
reduction in the number of voyages under the charter due to negligence.638 Lord Keith of 
Avonholm, opined, “it does not follow that loss or damage is limited to physical loss of, 
or damage to, goods…[O]n the view that the subject-matter of the contract here was 
voyages, the loss of voyages naturally falls under the words ‘loss or damage’.”639
Arriving at the same holding by slightly different reasoning, Lord Somervell of Harrow 
opined, “I agree with the learned Judge that ‘loss or damage’ in the Act is not limited to 
physical damage to the goods. I also agree that the loss or damage must arise in relation 
to the ‘loading, handling, stowage, carriage, custody, care and discharge of such 
goods.’…The claim is, in my opinion, in relation to loading and carriage of goods…”640
More recently, the English Court of Appeal in the Ot Sonja, also adopted an expansive 
view of the wording ‘loss or damage’ in the context of a voyage charter, holding that a 
“wide construction” was the correct approach.641
Reasoning similar to Lord Somervell of Harrow’s is found in Australian Oil 
Refining v. R.W. Miller & Co., where the vessel collided with the charterer’s wharf prior 
to loading, causing damage.642 The charterparty contained Clause 15, which repeated 
verbatim the text of Art.IV(2)(a), as well as Clause 33, which incorporated the Hague 
Rules. The High Court of Australia held that Art. IV(2)(a) as incorporated by Clause 33 
is “limited to loss or damage in relation to the loading, handling, stowage, carriage, 
custody, care and discharge of the goods the subject of the contract of carriage contained 
in the charterparty.”643 With regard to Clause 15, however, it was held that the expression 
“loss or damage” did in fact cover the damage to the charterer’s wharf, as one must 
examine the relationship between the parties and not attribute meaning to the expression 
  
638 Adamastos Shipping v. Anglo-Saxon Petroleum (The Saxon Star) [1958] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 73 (H.L.), Note 
in the footnote ibid, that Devlin J. did not formally deal with the particular point of recovery for lost 
voyages. 
639 Ibid, at p. 97. 
640 Ibid, at p. 100. 
641 Cargill International S.A. v. CPN Tankers (The Ot Sonja) [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 435 (C.A.), at p. 443-
444. In this instance, financial losses were incurred by the charterer pumping cargo into a non-
contaminated tank and carrying out contamination testing, and the Court of Appeal held that this was ‘loss 
or damage’ that arose in relation to the goods. 
642 Australian Oil Refining v. R.W. Miller & Co.[1968] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 448 (H.C. Aust.). 
643 Ibid, at p. 456, per Justice Owen. 
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that normally is used in more limited relationships with more limited contractual 
obligations.644 A slightly more expansive view of Art. IV(2)(a) has been taken in The 
Satya Kailash, where claimants, owners of the primary carrying vessel, had chartered the 
defendants vessel for the purpose of lightening in order to enter a port.645 The defendant’s 
vessel caused damage to the plaintiff’s vessel during lightening operations due to the 
defendant’s crew’s negligent navigation. The charter provided an exemption for “errors 
of navigation” in Clause 16, and in Clause 24 incorporated the Hague Rules. Justice 
Staughton concluded “that the loss or damage in this case was within art. IV(2)(a). It was, 
on a broad construction, in relation to the loading of the vessel. It all occurred while the 
loading was in process, or very nearly so, when the vessel was either arriving to load, or 
departing from loading.”646 Conversely, Justice Staughton found that Clause 16 was not 
broad enough to cover negligent navigation.647 The Court of Appeal in The Satya 
Kailash, upheld the ruling yet gave Art. IV(2)(a) an even more expansive scope.648 The 
Court of Appeal addressed the reality that in an ordinary bill of lading dispute the claim 
will be of the kind relating to the cargo, but in a charterparty situation there are more 
obligations involved,649 and found for the defendant, holding that “we can see no reason 
why, in principle, the benefit of immunities contained in s.4 of the United States Act 
should not be available to the respondents in respect of damage caused to the appellants 
in performance of this activity, even though such damage did not fall within any of the 
range of activities specified in s. 2.”650 The Court of Appeal therefore, in adopting such 
  
644 Ibid, at p. 452, per Chief Justice Barwick. There was a strong dissent by Justice Windeyer arguing at p.
455 that Clause 15 should be read contra proferentem and given that it covered the same loss or damage as 
art. IV(2)(a), it should be restricted to the cargo and thus damage to the  charterer’s wharf was outside the 
exemption. Justice McTiernan, at p. 542, also dissented for similar reasons.
645 Seven Seas Transportation v. Pacific Union Marina (The Satya Kailash) [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 465 
(Q.B.).
646 Ibid, at p. 473. 
647 Ibid, at p. 474-475. 
648 Seven Seas Transportation v. Pacific Union Marina (The Satya Kailash) [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 588 
(C.A.). 
649 Ibid, at p. 594: “Of course when the United States Act is incorporated into an ordinary bill of lading 
contract, it is unlikely that problems of this kind will arise; for in such a case a claim by the bill of lading
holder will naturally arise in relation to one of the matters specified in s.2…But where, as here, the act is 
incorporated into a charter-party, difficulties arise because of the more extended range of obligations 
imposed on the shipowner under what is after all a contract of services. These will generally include an 
obligation to proceed to a place specified in the charter or as ordered to load cargo. In the present case, 
however, the cargo was not to be loaded at a specified place, but from a mother ship.”
650 Ibid, at p. 596. It was determined that the general wording “loss or damage” was not restricted to matters 
specified under s.2, but included other contractual activities performed under the charter. At p. 595, The 
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an expansive view of the scope of the nautical fault exemption, has effectively divorced 
Art. IV(2)(a) from the obligations found in Art. III(2), with regard to the notion of loss or 
damage. 
6.1.3. “Navigation or Management”
With respect to the incorporation of nautical fault into charterparties, the issue has 
arisen as to the scope of a fault “in the navigation or management” of the vessel. The 
House of Lords in The Hill Harmony, recently considered the scope of Art. IV(2)(a) with 
respect to its incorporation into a NYPE charterparty.651 The owners of the vessel 
remained responsible for “navigation” under the charterparty, and benefited from Art. 
IV(2)(a) by virtue of the Hague-Visby Rules being incorporated into the charterparty. 
The charterers in this instance had ordered the master on two voyages between Japan and 
Vancouver to take the shortest route, the northern great circle route, as recommended by 
Ocean Routes. Instead, the master disregarded the orders and took a southerly rhumb line 
course, with the result that both voyages took a total of 296 hours longer. The charterers 
subsequently deducted 90,000$ from hire for bunkers consumed and time taken. The 
owner’s claim for hire was dismissed at arbitration on the basis that the master failed to 
prosecute the voyage with utmost dispatch and to follow the charterer’s orders with 
respect to the employment of the vessel. In the High Court, Justice Clark allowed the 
owners claim on the basis that the master’s decision as to his route was a decision with 
regard to navigation, not employment, and therefore even if the master had not 
prosecuted the voyage with the utmost dispatch the breach was one for which the owner 
is protected under Art. IV(2)(a).652 The Court of Appeal upheld the decision holding that 
     
Lord Justices justified this conclusion relying on the speeches of Lord Keith and Viscount Simons in 
Adamastos Shipping v. Anglo-Saxon Petroleum (The Saxon Star) [1958] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 73 (H.L.), as 
having held that unlike Devlin J. where the wording was restricted to s.2, the two Lords simply held that 
“loss or damage” covered the subject matter of the contract which was voyages. 
651 Whistler International Ltd. v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (The Hill Harmony) [2001] 1 All ER 403 (H.L.). It 
should be noted however that NYPE also contains an exemption for “errors in navigation” in clause 16. 
This differs from the nautical fault exemption, in that is has been interpreted so as to be confined to non-
negligent acts or omissions. See Koh, P. “Errors of Navigation in NYPE Form: Reflections on the 
Emmanuel C” [1983] LMCLQ 597, in particular pp. 598-600. 
652 Whistler International Ltd. v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (The Hill Harmony)[1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 367 
(Q.B.), at p. 372, Clark J. stating “in my judgment an order as to where the vessel was to go, as for example 
to port A or B to load or discharge or to port B via port C to bunker would be an order as to employment 
which the master would be bound to follow, subject of course (as all parties agreed) to his overriding 
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a routing instruction was an order with regard to navigation rather than employment, and 
that the master’s decision had been made in the interests of safety of the vessel and was 
bona fide.653 These two decisions were heavily criticized.654 One commentator argued 
“[q]uestions of navigation must be connected with the safety of the vessel, her crew and 
cargo and are normally taken once the voyage has started.”655 Another author, concerned 
about the implications of the holding, commented “[t]his surely cannot be right, 
particularly when the incorporation of the Hague or the Hague-Visby Rules into time 
charterparties (almost standard procedure in this day and age) has such a devastating 
effect in respect of routing and the obligation to prosecute a voyage with the utmost 
dispatch, because of the Art. IV, r. 2 exception “negligence in the navigation of the 
ship”.”656 In the House of Lords, the appeal was allowed. Lord Hobhouse opined as 
follows: “The meaning of any language is affected by its context. This is true of the 
words ‘employment’ in a time charter and of the exception for negligence in the 
‘navigation’ of the ship in a charterparty of contract of carriage. They reflect different 
aspects of the operation of the vessel. ‘Employment’ embraces the economic aspect – the 
exploitation of the earning potential of the vessel. “Navigation’ embraces matters of 
seamanship…What is clear is that to use the word ‘navigation’ in this context as if it 
includes everything which involves the vessel proceeding through the water is both 
mistaken and unhelpful…where seamanship is in question, choices as to the speed or 
     
responsibility for the safety of his ship. An order as to how to get from where the ship was to port A,B or C 
would not, however, be an order as to employment but an order as to navigation…In my judgment these 
considerations lead to the conclusion that a decision whether to proceed across the Pacific by taking the 
great circle route of the rhumb route or course would also be a decision in and about navigation of the 
vessel and not in and about her employment.” Clark J. did acknowledge however the implications of the 
holding, “it is true…that one decision or the other would be likely to have important financial consequences 
for the charterers, (and perhaps the owners), but that is true of many decisions which masters take.”
653 Whistler International Ltd. v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (The Hill Harmony)[2000] Q.B. 241 (C.A.). The 
Court of Appeal, at pp. 261-262, held that the matter was one of navigation, and as long as the master’s 
decision was made bona fide, whether the decision was reasonable or not was irrelevant as the owners were 
protected… “so far as the application of art IV, r 2(a) is concerned, I consider that the judge was right in 
construing the term ‘navigation’ as therein appearing as extending to a decision taken, in the course of 
voyage planning, to steer a particular course or courses having regard to the weather to be anticipated.”
654 Gaskell, N. et al. Bills of Lading: Law and Contracts (2000) LLP, London, at p. 278, notes with 
disapproval the fact that the implication of the Court of Appeal decision is such that “a decision as to 
navigation could be made while a vessel was still in port and the carrier would not be liable even if the 
master’s decision was unreasonable.”
655 Davenport, B. “Rhumb Line or Great Circle? That is a Question of Navigation” [1998] LMLCQ 502, at 
p. 504. 
656 Davis, D. “Rights to Routes: The Hill Harmony” [1999] LMLCQ 461, at p. 463. 
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steering of the vessel are matters of navigation, as will be the exercise of laying off a 
course on a chart. But it is erroneous to reason…that all questions of what route to follow 
are questions of navigation.”657 The House of Lords held that the owners breached the 
contract by failing to prosecute the voyage with utmost dispatch and failing to comply 
with the charterer’s orders regarding employment, noting “the [nautical fault] exemption 
did not provide a defence…any error which the master made in this connection was not 
an error in the navigation or management of the vessel; it did not concern any matter of 
seamanship.” 658 One commentator has noted that “the consequence of these findings as 
to the proper definition of “navigation” was that…[it] had to relate to seamanship and 
[could not] cover a refusal by the master to obey the charterer’s orders in a situation 
where the safety of the vessel was not at issue. The practical significance of the decision 
is that the economic interests of time charterers will not longer be put in jeopardy as a 
result of an unjustifiable excess of caution on the part of the master.”659  
“Management” can also take on new meaning in the context of a charterparty 
agreement. In The Aquacharm, where the vessel had been refused entry to the Panama 
Canal on the basis that she exceeded the permitted draught, it was found that the master 
had failed to use reasonable care to comply with the time charterer’s orders as to 
loading.660 Justice Lloyd, of the English Commercial Court, held that the Hague Rules 
Art. IV(2)(a) operated to exempt the shipowner from the master’s error in management of 
  
657Whistler International Ltd. v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (The Hill Harmony) [2001] 1 All ER 403 (H.L.), at 
pp. 421-422. Lord Hobhouse at p. 417 noted, “the vessel was fit to sail by the shorter northern route and the 
master did not have any good reason for preferring the longer southern route. It was not a good reason that 
he preferred to sail through clam waters or that he wanted to avoid heavy weather. Vessels are designed and 
built to be able to sail safely in heavy weather. The classification society rules require, as does clause 1 of 
the NYPE form, the maintenance of these safety standards. It is no excuse for the owners to say that the 
shortest route would (even if it be the case) take the vessel through the heavy weather which she is 
designed to be able to encounter.”
658 Ibid, at p. 422. The Lords relied on, among other decisions, Lord (owners) v. Newsum [1920] 2 Ll. L. 
Rep. 276 (K.B.). In Lord, it was held at p. 849, 279, that the masters choice to proceed by a route close to 
the coast, as opposed to the route farther from the coast as recommended by the British Admiralty, resulting 
in an inability to complete the voyage due to German submarines, was not a decision in the navigation or 
management of the vessel, rather it was a breach of the utmost dispatch clause: “[I]t cannot be said to be 
navigation of the steamer when the Master is in port deliberating, not how he shall proceed and how the 
steamer shall run or anything of that kind, but by which of two routes he shall proceed to his destination.” 
659 Baughen, S. “Navigation or Employment? The Hill Harmony” [2001] LMLCQ 177, at p. 179. 
660 Actis Co. v. The Sanko Steamship Co. (The Aquacharm) [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 237 (Q.B.).
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failing to comply with the charterer’s orders.661 Arguably, this is a rather expansive view 
of the notion of error in management. 
6.1.4. Period of Application
An issue has also arisen as to the period of application of the nautical fault 
exemption, as under a bill of lading situation the period of application would be restricted 
to ‘tackle-to-tackle’ as the Hague-Visby Rules apply “from the time when the goods are 
loaded on to the time when they are discharged from the ship.”662 In The Obelix, where 
cargo interests under a voyage charter suffered damages as a result of delay, due to a 
collision involving the vessel prior to loading, the charterparty contained a clause 
incorporating U.S. COGSA’s mutual exceptions from liability.663 Cargo interests argued 
that the exemptions should not apply until the cargo was loaded, h wever 5th Circuit 
Court of Appeals held the carrier to be exonerated under 1304(2)(a), responding that 
“were COGSA applicable by law this argument would be persuasive. However, the 
parties are free to contract as they wish, and in this instance they chose to apply the 
COGSA exceptions to the entire term of the charter.”664 This was also the case in The 
Marilena, where the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals held that when U.S. COGSA 1304(1) 
through (3) are incorporated into a charterparty, these provisions extend for the entire 
term of the charter and not simply from loading and unloading.665 In Louis Dreyfus, 
however, where the charterparty had simply incorporated U.S. COGSA, the claimant 
suffered delay damages where the engine room was flooded during loading, due to an 
error by an engineer.666 The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals held that “because the critical 
error of the engineer in this case occurred before the commencement of the voyage, [the 
  
661 Ibid, at p. 241. 
662 Article 1(e) of the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules. This rule has traditionally been referred to as ‘tackle-
to-tackle’ application. 
663 Arth H. Mathiesen v. M/V Obelix, 1987 AMC 2183 (5 Cir. 1987). The Clause stipulated “Owners shall 
be bound before and at the beginning of the voyage to exercise due diligence to make the ship seaworthy 
and to have her properly manned, equipped and supplied and neither the vessel not the Master or Owners 
shall be or shall be held liable for any loss or damage or delay to the cargo for causes excepted by the U.S. 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1936 or the Canadian Water Carriage of Goods Act, 1936.”
664 Ibid, at p. 2189. Note that the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals did find that if the parties had incorporated 
the entire COGSA, then 1301(e) would apply and the decision would be more difficult, however, the court 
did not speculate as to what the solution would have been as it was not the case in this instance. 
665 United States v. M/V Marilena, 1969 AMC 1155 (4 Cir. 1969). 
666 Louis Dreyfus Co. v. 27,946 Long Tons of Corn, 1988 AMC 1053 (5 Cir. 1987).
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carrier] is not shielded from liability by sec. 1304(2)(a).”667 A similar approach with 
regard to application was taken in another 5th Circuit Court of Appeals decision, The An 
Ning Jiang.668 In that instance, it was held that the Hague-Visby Rules applied by virtue 
of the clause Paramount, but only tackle-to-tackle, while the law of the United States, 
including COGSA, applied by virtue of a United States governing law clause, to any 
damage that occurred outside the tackle-to-tackle period.669
6.1.5. Delay and Payment of Hire
The fact that the exemption is incorporated into charterparties also has an effect 
with regard to hire during instances of delay. Generally, “the financial risk for delay of 
the vessel due to bad weather, strikes of pilots or stevedores, etc., during the charter 
period normally rest on the charterers.”670 As such, often where the vessel is detained by 
virtue of nautical fault, the charterer is unable to go off-hire. In The Aquacharm, the 
vessel when loaded exceeded the permitted draught for the Panama Canal, contrary to the 
charterer’s instructions, and as a result was not permitted to go through the Canal.671 The 
off-hire clause provided that “…in the event of the loss of time from deficiency of men or 
stores, fire breakdown or damage to hull machinery or equipment or by any other cause 
preventing the full working of the vessel the payment of hire shall cease for the time 
thereby lost.” The charterer contended that the vessel was off-hire during the nine-day 
delay, yet Justice Lloyd held that the owners were protected by Art. IV(2)(a) from the 
consequences of the master’s error in management of failing to comply with orders, with 
the result that the shipowners were entitled to hire.672 In the Aliakmon Progress, the 
vessel struck a quay, due to crew negligence, and damaged her stem plating necessitating 
temporary repairs, and then permanent repairs.673 The owners claimed for hire while the 
charterers cross-claimed for delays and the consequential loss of losing anticipated cargo 
  
667 Ibid, at p. 1062. 
668 Foster Wheeler Energy Corp. v. An Jiang MV and Industrial Maritime Carriers, 2004 AMC 2409 (5 
Cir. 2004)
669 Ibid.
670 Gorton, L. et al. Shipbrokering and Chartering Practice, 6th Ed. (2004) LLP, London, at p. 277. 
671 Actis Co. v. The Sanko Steamship Co. (The Aquacharm) [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 237 (Q.B.).
672 Ibid, at p. 241. 
673 Aliakmon Maritime Co. v. Trans Ocean Continental (The Aliakmon Progress) [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 
499 (C.A.). 
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due to the delays. The Court of Appeal held that the owners were not responsible for acts 
falling under Art. IV(2)(a) and therefore were entitled to hire, while the charterer’s claim 
failed as it arose out of the negligence of the master and thus was excluded by virtue of 
Art. IV(2)(a).674 Frequently, however, the issue of nautical fault in the context of the 
charterparty, where there is a grounding, collision with a quay or vessel when entering, 
leaving or manoeuvring in a port, is muddied with the issue of nominating a safe port.675
A final point to note is that attention must be paid to the off-hire clause in the 
charterparty as it may impact the reasoning of the court. Should for example, nautical 
fault be expressly provided for as an off-hire event, it stands to reason that a court may 
view this as superseding any immunity provided by virtue of Art. IV(2)(a) of the Hague-
Visby Rules. 
6.1.6. Demurrage
Although the exemption for nautical fault has been interpreted so as to shield the 
shipowner from charterers’ claims for delay or to prevent charterers from suspending 
hire, the exemption is not necessarily beneficial for the owner with respect to 
demurrage.676 It has been noted that “while in the common law systems it is hardly 
conceivable that the shipowner should be free to claim demurrage for delays caused by 
the defective condition of his ship or the poor quality of his employees, there is very little 
case law to indicate these limitations.”677 Nevertheless, the English Commercial Court 
has considered this very issue. In The Union Amsterdam, laytime had expired and 
demurrage had begun to accrue, when the vessel grounded on her way to berth due to 
negligent navigation.678 The owners contended that demurrage continued to accrue and 
  
674 Ibid. 
675 Cassegrain, J. “Responsibilities and Liabilities of the Time-Charterer” in Time Charters: Why the 
Confusion? (1977) LLP, London, at pp. 5-7; Slebent Shipping v. Associated Transport (The Star B), SMA 
(Arb. at N.Y., November 2003), where the vessel grounded both as a result of negligent navigation of the 
master and the pilot, and an unsafe condition of the port; 
676 Demurrage is a certain rate to which the owners are entitled to once the time allotted under the 
charterparty for loading or discharge has expired. In essence, the demurrage rate is a form of liquidated 
damages, and as such the owners do not have to prove their loss (Gorton, L. et al. Shipbrokering and 
Chartering Practice, 6th Ed. (2004) LLP, London, at p. 243). 
677 Tiberg, H. The Law of Demurrage 4th Ed. (1995) Sweet & Maxwell, London, at p. 54. Tiberg further 
notes that “the usual formula is that the charterer is liable for delay unless it arises through the fault of the 
shipowner or those for whom he is responsible.” (Ibid). 
678 Blue Anchor Line v. Alfred C. Toepfer (The Union Amsterdam) [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 432 (Q.B.).
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drew attention to the fact that they were exempted under Art. IV(2)(a) for errors in 
navigation. Justice Parker held that the owners cannot avail themselves of the exemption 
in this instance and thus the charterers are excused from their obligation to pay 
demurrage. It was reasoned that the exemption would have protected the owners as a 
defence to a claim in damages for delay by the charterers, but in this instance the “owners 
have, by negligent navigation or management, so prevented her [from being available] 
and…it does not lie in their mouths to say that the vessel was being detained by the 
charterers during the period when by their negligence she was grounded.”679 Similarly, in 
Marifortuna Naviera S.A. v. Government of Ceylon, the English Commercial Court 
considered the instance in which the vessel had given notice that she would be ready to 
load the next day; however en route to the port, due to negligent navigation, she collided 
with another vessel.680 She arrived in port on time, however due to the need for surveys 
and repairs, loading did not begin until 13 days later. The shipowners claimed demurrage, 
and argued that Art. IV(2)(a) protected them from any damages suffered by the 
charterers. The Court dismissed the shipowner’s claim, on the basis of contractual 
interpretation. The Court’s reasoning was that Clause 21 of the Gencon charterparty, 
which provided that where the vessel is not ready to load in accordance with definite 
notice owners would be responsible for expenses incurred including demurrage, prevailed 
over the clause paramount.681 As such, the owners were not entitled to demurrage. This is 
an interesting case, as Justice Mocatta’s opinion, despite having discussed Art. IV(2)(a), 
did not outright reject the notion that it could be used to recover demurrage. However, 
from statements in obiter noting the possibility “that as a matter of construction art. 4, r. 2 
of the Hague Rules only protects against claims for damages,” it would appear that Art. 
IV(2)(a) may not be a vehicle through which a shipowner can recover demurrage arising 
out of nautical fault.682
  
679 Ibid, at p. 436. 
680 Marifortuna Naviera S.A. v. Government of Ceylon [1970] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 247 (Q.B.)
681 Ibid, at p. 257. 
682 Ibid, at p. 254. 
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6.1.7. Conclusion
The operation of the nautical fault exemption when Harter, Hague or Hague-
Visby is incorporated into charterparties, or even where the wording of Art. IV(2)(a) is 
incorporated, demonstrates that the scope of the provision in these instances is much 
more expansive than its general operation in a simple bill of lading situation.683 One may 
surmise that the scope of Art. IV(2)(a), and the wording therein, remains to a certain 
extent a contentious issue when incorporated into a charterparty, as demonstrated by the 
fact that the issue was litigated up to the House of Lords only a few years ago. 
Nevertheless, the trend in this instance generally is for courts to take an expansive 
approach with regard to the interpretation of the provision. 
6.2. GENERAL AVERAGE
The nautical fault exemption has proved to be exceptionally beneficial to carriers 
with respect to seeking contribution for general average events. As previously discussed, 
the nautical fault exemption is generally employed to shield the carrier with respect to 
cargo claims and certain claims by charterers. In this instance however, the nautical fault 
exemption enables carriers to take suit for general average contribution where they would 
otherwise be unable. In the context of general average, therefore the nautical fault 
exemption has proven to be particularly expansive. 
6.2.1. The Origin and Development of General Average
The concept of general average has existed in relation to carriage of goods by sea 
almost from its inception. Rhodian Law is credited with being the originator of the 
concept, dating from as early as 1000 BC to 800 BC.684 One of the earliest definitions of 
general average is found in Roman Law in the Digest of Justinian: “The Rhodian law 
  
683 For example see Luria Brothers v. Eastern Transportation Co. (The R.W. McDonald), 1937 AMC 778 
(2 Cir. 1937), where the carrier was held not liable for the negligent selection of an anchorage or ineffective 
distress signals, which were considered to be errors in management.
684 The dates vary depending on the source. In Tetley, W. International Maritime and Admiralty Law
(2002) Yvon Blais, Cowansville, Quebec, at p. 369, the Rhodian Law is dated at 800 BC, while Rose, F. 
General Average: Law and Practice 2nd ed. (2005) LLP, London, at p. 1, footnote 3, states that it is at least 
as old as 1000BC, and finally Dockray, M. Cases & Materials on the Carriage of Goods by Sea 3rd Ed 
(2004) Cavendish, London, at p. 355, dates the concept to 900BC. 
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decrees that if in order to lighten a ship merchandise is thrown overboard, that which has 
been given for all shall be replaced by the contribution of all.”685 Originally, the concept 
of general average was restricted to cases of jettison,686 however, by the end of the 18th
century the concept had expanded to encompass all losses provided they were incurred in 
accordance with the principles of general average.687 It was also during this time that the 
term “general average” began to be used to describe this concept. Although the term 
“average” first appeared in this context around the 16th century,688 the term “general 
average” first appeared in reported English and American jurisprudence by the end of the 
18th century.689 By the beginning of the 19th century, what has been described as “the 
classic definition of general average given by an English Judge,”690 was enunciated by 
Justice Lawrence in Birkley v. Presgrave: “All loss which arises in consequence of 
extraordinary sacrifices made or expenses incurred for the preservation of the ship and 
cargo come within general average and must be born proportionately by all those who are 
interested.”691  
The need for a uniform practice or regime in relation to general average became 
clear in the 19th century. The York-Antwerp Rules were initially drafted in 1864, but 
have since been amended several times, in 1877, 1890, 1924, 1950, 1974, 1994, and 
2004.692 The York-Antwerp Rules, defines general average as follows: “There is a 
general average act when, and only when, any extraordinary sacrifice or expenditure is 
  
685 Digest of Justinian, Book XIV, Title 2, Fr. 1, as quoted in English in Tetley, W. International Maritime 
and Admiralty Law (2002) Yvon Blais, Cowansville, Quebec, at p. 365, footnote 9; Rose, F. General 
Average: Law and Practice 2nd ed. (2005) LLP, London, at p. 1. For Latin and English transcriptions of the 
Digest and Institutes of Justinian pertaining to general average see Lowndes & Rudolf, The Law of General 
Average and the York-Antwerp Rules 12th Ed. (1997) Ed. by Wilson, D. & Cooke J., Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, Appendix 1at p. 749 and ff. 
686 Tetley, ibid, at p. 365, footnote 8. 
687 The Coppenhagen (1799) 165 E.R. 180, at p. 182, where Lord Stowell stipulates that in order for a loss 
to be general average, it must be incurred “for the general benefit and preservation of the whole”.
688 Davies, M. & Dickey, A. Shipping Law 3rd Ed (2004) Lawbook Co, Pyrmont, Australia, at p. 537. 
689 Tetley, W. International Maritime and Admiralty Law (2002) Yvon Blais, Cowansville, Quebec, at p. 
366. See The Coppenhagen (1799) 165 E.R. 180, at p. 182, for the first use of the term in English 
jurisprudence. For the first reported American jurisprudence containing the term see Campbell v. The 
Alknomac 4 Fed. Cas. 1155 at p. 1156 (No. 2,350) (D. S.C. 1798) (Tetley, ibid). 
690 Rose, F. General Average: Law and Practice 2nd ed. (2005) LLP, London, at p. 1.
691 Birkley v. Presgrave (1801) 1 East 220, at p. 228, as quoted by Rose, ibid.
692 Davies, M. & Dickey, A. Shipping Law 3rd Ed (2004) Lawbook Co, Pyrmont, Australia, at p. 538; 
Dockray, M. Cases & Materials on the Carriage of Goods by Sea 3rd Ed (2004) Cavendish, London, at p. 
355.
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intentionally and reasonably made or incurred for the common safety for the purposes of 
preserving from peril the property involved in a common maritime adventure.”693 The 
York-Antwerp Rules are not a convention, rather they are given force of application by 
virtue of incorporation into the contract. For example, the P & O Nedlloyd Bill provides 
at clause 22(2): “Any general average on a vessel operated by the Carrier shall be 
adjusted according to the York/Antwerp Rules of 1994 or any subsequent amendment 
thereto authorized by the CMI…”694 Even though they are not imposed on parties by 
force of law, “general average is almost universally agreed and adjusted according to the 
York-Antwerp Rules, as produced by the CMI.”695 Nevertheless, it should be noted that 
claims for general average independently of the York-Antwerp Rules have been 
allowed.696  
6.2.2. Conduct Barring Recovery of General Average Contributions
In general, a carrier may not request general average contributions where the 
general average event has resulted from his own negligence.697 Nevertheless, despite the 
possibility of faulty conduct on the part of the shipowner or the cargo owner giving rise 
to the general average act, Rule D of the York-Antwerp Rules mandates that a general 
average adjustment must take place. Rules D does however provide for the instance 
where one of the parties to the common venture is at fault by stipulating the following: 
  
693 This passage is unchanged from the last three incarnations of the York-Antwerp Rules. It is found in 
Rule A of the 1974 York-Antwerp Rules, Rule A of the 1994 York-Antwerp Rules, and Rule A(1) of the 
York-Antwerp Rules 2004. Another modern definition of general average is found in the Maritime Code of 
the People’s Republic of China, article 193: “General average refers to a special sacrifice resulting from an 
intentional and reasonable measure adopted or special expenses incurred for the common safety of the 
vessel, cargo or other property which encounter a common danger during the same voyage at sea.” (An 
English translation of the Maritime Code is found as an appendix at p. 429 and ff. of Mo, J. Shipping Law 
in China (1999) Sweet & Maxwell Asia, Hong Kong.)
694 Gaskell, N. et al. Bills of Lading: Law and Contracts (2000) LLP, London, at pp. 348-354 provides 
general average clauses from 10 different bills of lading. 
695 Ibid, at p. 355. 
696 Dockray, M. Cases & Materials on the Carriage of Goods by Sea 3rd Ed (2004) Cavendish, London, at 
p. 355. 
697 Gilmore, G. & Black, C. The Law of Admiralty 2nd Ed. (1975) Foundation, Minneola, N.Y., at p. 266 
state “A vessel owner at fault is not able to collect general average contribution from the cargo owner.” 
This principle is not by any means restricted to the shipowner or carrier, as in McKay Massey Harris v. 
Imperial Chemical Industries of Australia & New Zealand (The Mahia No. 2) [1959] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 433 
(S.C. Vic), it was found by Justice Lowe of the Supreme Court of Victoria, at p. 451, that where the 
damage resulted from the negligence of the stevedores, the cargo interests were entitled to recover from the 
stevedores the amount paid as general average contribution to the carrier under the bill of lading. 
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“Rights of contribution in general average shall not be affected, though the event which 
gave rise to the sacrifice or expenditure may have been due to the fault of one of the 
parties to the adventure; but this shall not prejudice any remedies or defences which may 
be open against or to that party in respect of such fault.”698 Essentially, each party’s 
general average contribution is calculated without considering fault, however, the 
existence of fault may later affect a party’s obligation to make the calculated 
contribution.699 In practice, this means that where the party claiming general average 
contribution was at fault, and such fault gave rise to the general average event, the other 
party may refuse to pay. Moreover, where a party not at fault has already contributed, for 
example where the salvage award has been paid or by the sacrifice of their goods, they 
may claim an indemnity from the party at fault. 
In 1889, Lord Watson opined that the shipowner cannot “be permitted to claim 
recompense for services rendered, or indemnity for losses sustained by him, in the 
endeavour to rescue property which was imperilled by his own tortious act, and which it 
was his duty to save.”700 More recently, in the Faste Jarl, the Norwegian Supreme Court 
determined that the vessel was unseaworthy due to the chief mate’s intoxication, which 
resulted in the vessel running aground.701 As a result of a general average adjustment, the 
expenses incurred to refloat the vessel were distributed between the vessel and the 
cargo.702 The Norwegian Supreme Court held that due to the unseaworthiness of the 
vessel, the cargo owners were entitled to claim against the vessel owner for 
indemnification of the general average contribution.703 Similarly, in The Hasselt, the 
Supreme Court of Canada, held that where the shipowner had failed to exercise due 
diligence to properly train his crew to fight fire at sea, with the result that they 
  
698 The Chinese Maritime Code, Article 197, has enacted this principle as follows: “The possibility that the 
accident resulting in the occurrence of the special sacrifice or special expenses might have been caused by 
the fault of one party does not affect the party’s right to demand sharing of the general average concerned. 
However, the innocent party and the party in fault may make a claim against the fault in question or raise 
defences for the fault respectively.” (English translation of the Chinese Maritime Code is found as an 
appendix at p. 429 and ff. of Mo, J. Shipping Law in China (1999) Sweet & Maxwell Asia, Hong Kong). 
699 Davies, M. & Dickey, A. Shipping Law 3rd Ed (2004) Lawbook Co, Pyrmont, Australia, at p. 543. 
700 Strang, Steel & Co. v. A. Scott & Co. (1889) 14 App Cas 601, at p. 608. 
701 ND 1992.163 NSC Faste Jarl (Norwegian Supreme Court), summarized in English in Falkanger, T. et al. 
Scandinavian Maritime Law: the Norwegian Perspective (2004) Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, at p. 469. 
702 Ibid. 
703 Ibid. 
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exacerbated the fire and caused general average damage with the water, the shipowner 
was precluded from recovering the cargo interests’ share of general average.704 Failure to 
exercise due diligence to ensure that the vessel was seaworthy is the fault that is perhaps 
the most commonly relied on by cargo interests to preclude the carrier from recovering 
general average contribution,705 although, the argument is often unsuccessful.706  
6.2.3. Actionable Fault
In general, a carrier may not request general average contributions where the 
general average event has resulted from his own negligence.707 More specifically, “at 
common law a carrier is not entitled to obtain contribution in general average from cargo, 
if the peril which necessitates the extraordinary sacrifice or expenditure arises as a result 
if his actionable fault or negligence in law or that of his employees.”708 Most 
jurisdictions, therefore, will allow a carrier at fault but protected by contractual 
  
704 Century Insurance Co. of Canada v. N.V. Bocimar S.A. (The Hasselt) (1987) 39 D.L.R. (4th) 465 
(S.C.C.).
705 Guinomar of Conakry v. Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co. Ltd. (The Kamsar Voyager) [2002] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 57 (Q.B.), where the shipowner declared general average after a wrongly fitted spare piston 
damaged the engine. Justice Dean held that the vessel was unseaworthy on the basis of the cracked piston, 
and as such the fault was actionable and therefore the carrier was unable to recover the cargo interests’ 
general average contribution; Goulandris Brothers v. B. Goldman & Sons (The Granhill) [1957] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 207 (Q.B.), where at p. 219 and ff, Justice Pearson considered Rule D in relation to allegations of 
unseaworthiness; Ever Lucky Shipping v. Sunlight Mercantile (The Pep Nautic) [2004] 1 S.L.R. 171 (C.A.), 
where the Singapore Court of Appeal held that despite exemption clauses in the bills of lading excluding all 
liability for deck cargo, the shipowner was not absolved of actionable fault on the basis that the vessel was 
unseaworthy, and as such, he was denied recovery in general average.  
706 For a recent instance of where the shipowner was able to demonstrate due diligence to render the vessel 
seaworthy and successfully claim general average contribution, see Demand Shipping v. Ministry of Food 
Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh (The Lendoudis Evangelos II) [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 
304 (Q.B.), where Justice Cresswell, at p. 312, held that a grossly irresponsible act of one crewmember did 
not render the vessel unseaworthy; See also Christian Anderson v. Attorney General of New Zealand (The 
Danica Brown) [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 264 (Q.B.) where the vessel broke down while sailing off Canada, 
due to the failure of a thrust roller bearing. Justice Waller nevertheless held that the shipowner had 
exercised due diligence and was entitled to succeed in this claim for general average contribution; See also 
Jugoslavenska Oceanska Plovidba v. American Smelting and Refining (The Admiral Zmajevic) [1983] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 86 (Q.B.), where Justice Lloyd, at p. 90, held that where there was an engine breakdown, the 
owners had exercised due diligence through periodic inspections and could therefore succeed in their claim 
for contribution; Consolidated Mining and Smelting Co. of Canada v. Straits Towing [1972] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 
497 (Fed. Crt.), where cargo-laden barges had sunk at their moorings after being left unattended. The 
plaintiff alleged unseaworthiness, but Justice Cattanach held that the defendants benefited from the peril of 
the sea defence and as such were entitled to general average contribution. 
707 Gilmore, G. & Black, C. The Law of Admiralty 2nd Ed. (1975) Foundation, Minneola, N.Y., at p. 266 
state “A vessel owner at fault is not able to collect general average contribution from the cargo owner.” 
708 Tetley, W. International Maritime and Admiralty Law (2002) Yvon Blais, Cowansville, Quebec, at p. 
369 [Emphasis Added]. 
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exemptions to claim contribution from cargo interests who contracted on those terms.709
In essence, the notion of ‘fault’ with respect to liability for general average contributions 
means ‘actionable fault’, so a shipowner can thus rely on an exemption clause in the 
contract of carriage to recover a general average contribution where the event which gave 
rise to the general average act arose from an excepted peril.710 Carver has stated that the 
test for an actionable wrong is as follows: “whether, had the general average sacrifice or 
expenditure not been made, the person making it would have been liable in damages, to 
the person against whom he is claiming contribution, for the loss or damage to that 
person’s interest in the adventure which the sacrifice or expenditure was intended to 
avert.”711 With the result therefore that where the carrier’s fault is not actionable under 
the Hague or Hague-Visby Rules, such as by virtue of Art. IV(2)(a), the carrier is entitled 
to claim general average.712 This is the law in the vast majority of jurisdictions, including 
the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth countries.713
American law, however, approaches general average differently. “[T]he mere fact 
that the negligent carrier is immunized from liability for the loss or damage sustained by 
cargo by one or more provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) does not 
permit him to claim a general average contribution from cargo.”714 In The Irrawaddy, the 
United States Supreme Court held that although the carrier was protected under the 
Harter Act from liability for damage to cargo, the carrier could not claim general average 
contribution where the master had been negligent.715 The Supreme Court reasoned that 
the Harter Act did not confer affirmative rights for use by the shipowner in cases of 
general average stemming from his servant’s negligence.716 In essence, the Supreme 
  
709 Hare, J. Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, (1999) Juta & Co, Cape Town, at p. 
777. 
710 Hudson, N. “General Average – Defences and “Due Diligence” Disputes: A New Approach Needed” 
[1976] LMCLQ 416, at p. 416. 
711 Carver as quoted by Rose, F. General Average: Law and Practice 2nd Ed. (2005) LLP. London, at p. 81. 
712 Hare, J. Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, (1999) Juta & Co, Cape Town, at p. 
777; Tetley, W. International Maritime and Admiralty Law (2002) Yvon Blais, Cowansville, Quebec, at p.
371. 
713 Davies, M. & Dickey, A. Shipping Law 3rd Ed (2004) Lawbook Co, Pyrmont, Australia, at p. 543; 
Tetley, ibid. 
714 Tetley, ibid. 
715 Flint v. Christall (The Irrawaddy), 171 U.S. 187 (1898)
716 Ibid. 
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Court viewed the exemptions in the Harter Act as operating only as a shield to defend 
against a cargo claim. As a result of The Irrawaddy, carriers began to insert clauses into 
the bills of lading providing for cargo contribution in general average where the cause of 
the peril is one for which the carrier is not responsible for under statute. The United 
States Supreme Court in The Jason addressed the validity of such clauses, where a 
seaworthy vessel stranded off Cuba through the negligence of her navigators.717 The bill 
of lading contained a clause essentially stipulating that cargo interests shall not be exempt 
from general average payments in instances where the cause of the disaster is one for 
which the carrier is excused under the Harter Act. The United States Supreme Court held 
“in our opinion, so far as the Harter Act has relieved the shipowner from responsibility 
for the negligence of his master and crew, it is no longer against the policy of the law for 
him to contract with the cargo-owners for a participation in general average contribution 
growing out of such negligence…the provision in question is valid, and entitled him to 
contribution under the circumstances stated.”718 As a result of The Jason, such a clause 
inserted into a bill of lading was titled a Jason Clause. After the United States Carriage of 
Goods by Sea Act, 1936, came into force, the scope of the Jason Clause was expanded 
becoming the modern New Jason Clause.719 When a New Jason Clause is incorporated in 
bills of lading, it allows a carrier to claim general average from cargo regardless if the 
general average event resulted from negligence in the navigation or management of the 
vessel. The clause is now commonplace and recovery for general average expenses when 
nautical fault has caused the incident is unquestioned.720 Recently, the 5th Circuit Court of 
  
717 The Jason, 225 U.S. 32, 2004 AMC 2387, in reprint (1912).
718 Ibid, at p. 55. 
719 Davies, M. & Dickey, A. Shipping Law 3rd Ed (2004) Lawbook Co, Pyrmont, Australia, at p. 543; The 
New Jason Clause reads: “In the event of an accident, danger, damage or disaster before or after the 
commencement of the voyage resulting from any cause whatsoever, whether due to negligence or not, for 
which, or for the consequences of which, the carrier is not responsible, by statute, contract, or otherwise, 
the goods, shippers, consignees, or owners of the goods shall contribute with the carrier in general average 
to the payment of any sacrifices, losses or expenses of a general average nature that may be made or 
incurred, and shall pay salvage and special charges incurred in respect of the goods.” (Clause 31(c) of the 
New York Produce Exchange Form, 1993). The BIMCO Gentime contains an identical clause, however, it 
contains an added stipulation absent from the above NYPE clause, that provides: “The foregoing provisions 
shall also apply where the owners, operators or those in charge of any vessels or objects other than, or in 
addition to, the colliding vessels or objects are at fault in respect to a collision or contract.” (Clause F, 
Appendix A, Gentime 1999, re-printed in Glass, D et al., Standard Form Contracts for the Carriage of 
Goods (2000) LLP, London, at p. 65). 
720 Folger Coffee Co. v. Olivebank, 2000 AMC 844 (5 Cir. 2000), where water entered the vessel through 
an error in management of not closing the skylight or vent covers, causing the vessel to lose electrical 
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Appeals considered the instance in which water entered the vessel through an error in 
management of not closing the skylight or vent covers, causing the vessel to lose 
electrical power, and necessitating salvage in rough weather.721 As the bill of lading 
contained a New Jason Clause, it was found that “once the vessel establishes that a 
general average act occurred, the cargo owner may only avoid liability by establishing the 
vessel was unseaworthy at the start of the voyage and that the unseaworthiness was the 
proximate cause of the general average event. If the cargo owner proves unseaworthiness, 
the vessel may still prevail by proving that it exercised due diligence to make the vessel 
seaworthy prior to the voyage.”722 The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals therefore held that 
cargo was not relieved of its obligation to contribute to general average. 
It has been argued that the New Jason Clause is probably superfluous in English 
law and certain other jurisdictions, however it is wise to include it nevertheless.723
Certainly, it is the practice in all Canadian bills of lading, charterparties and contracts of 
affreightment to include the New Jason Clause, just in case general average were to be 
adjusted under American law.724 This practice has been both noted and approved by 
Canadian courts.725 Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada, in The Orient Trader, allowed 
a shipowner to claim general average contribution on the basis of the broad scope of a 
New Jason Clause in the bill of lading, even where there had been an unreasonable 
deviation.726
     
power, necessitating salvage in rough weather, nevertheless cargo was not relieved of its obligation to 
contribute to general average; United States Steel Products v. American & Foreign Ins. Co. (The Steel 
Scientist) 1936 AMC 387 (2 Cir.1936), where the grounding was a result of negligent navigation, the court 
ordered that the general average contribution be paid to the vessel owner. 
721 Folger Coffee Co. v. Olivebank, 2000 AMC 844 (5 Cir. 2000).
722 Ibid, at p. 847. 
723 Hare, J. Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, (1999) Juta & Co, Cape Town, at p. 
777. 
724 Strathy, G. & Moore, G. The Law and Practice of Marine Insurance in Canada (2003) Butterworths, 
Toronto, at p. 330. 
725 Ibid, citing several jurisprudential examples. 
726 Drew Brown Ltd. v. The Orient Trader and Owners (The Orient Trader) [1973] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 174 
(S.C.C.), see in particular, Justice Laskin’s judgment at p. 182-185.
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6.2.4. Nautical Fault and General Average Events
It has been noted that “the operation of the actionable fault bar is considerably 
reduced in practice by the Hague(-Visby) Rules exemption of negligence in navigation 
and management.”727 Indeed, were it not for the nautical fault exemption, general average 
expenditures or sacrifices made in the context of groundings, allisions, collisions, for 
example, would likely not be recoverable. The use of the nautical fault exemption to 
enable a shipowner to claim general average contribution, provided the vessel is 
seaworthy,728 is a common practice in both bill of lading and charterparty situations. A 
New Jason Clause, when inserted into a charterparty, and combined with a Clause 
Paramount, enables the shipowner to claim general average contributions from charterers 
in instances of negligence navigation or management of the vessel. To use an old 
common law maxim, in this instance, the nautical fault exemption is operating as both a 
sword and a shield. 
The exemption for nautical fault has proven to be particularly valuable to 
shipowners in the context of groundings.729 In The Isla Fernandina, the Gencon 
charterparty incorporated a New Jason Clause and Paramount Clause by virtue of clause 
38, with the effect that Art. IV(2)(a) of the Hague Rules was applicable.730 The vessel 
was grounded as a result of negligent navigation and cargo loss ensued, in part through 
  
727 Rose, F. General Average: Law and Practice 2nd Ed. (2005) LLP. London, at p. 87.
728 The Hellenic Glory [1979] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 424 (S.D.N.Y.), where Justice Broderick held that although 
the owner was protected from liability arising from crew negligence in the management of the vessel by 
virtue of COGSA 1304(2)(a), the failure to replace an engine pin actually rendered the vessel unseaworthy 
and as such the shipowners were not entitled to general average contributions; Smith, Hogg & Co v. Black 
Sea and Baltic General Insurance (The Lilburn) (1940) 67 Ll. L. Rep. 253 (H.L.), where the vessel was 
beached to prevent sinking, and the House of Lords held that the shipowner was unable to recover general 
average contribution from the cargo insurers on the basis that the vessel was unseaworthy. The House of 
Lords agreed with the Court of Appeal’s finding that the nautical fault exemption did not operate to allow 
the shipowner to claim general average where the dominant cause of the loss was unseaworthiness. 
729 In The Torepo [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 535 (Q.B.), the pilot, through negligent navigation, grounded the 
vessel, and therefore on the basis of the nautical fault exemption, the claimant charterer failed in his claim 
to recover what was paid to salvors as salvage remuneration and the return of the general average security 
they had posted; United States Steel Products v. American & Foreign Ins. Co. (The Steel Scientist) 1936 
AMC 387 (2 Cir.1936), where the grounding was a result of negligent navigation, the court ordered that the 
general average contribution be paid to the vessel owner.
730 Rey Banano Del Pacifico v. Transportes Navieros Ecuatorianos (The Isla Fernandina) [2000] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 15 (Q.B.).
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unloading in order to lighten the vessel to get her off the bank.731 Justice Langley of the 
English Commercial Court determined that the vessel was seaworthy, denied the cargo 
claim for the loss of cartons caused by the attempts to refloat the vessel and held that 
shipowner was entitled to recover general average expenses from the charterer.732
Similarly, in The Jalavihar, the charterparty incorporated a New Jason Clause and thus 
when the vessel ran aground the owners declared general average.733 The 5th Circuit 
Court of Appeals considered that navigational and managemental error, an excepted 
cause under U.S. COGSA, gave rise to the general average event. The Court of Appeal 
therefore held that the owners could recover in general average pursuant to the New 
Jason Clause.734
In the context of a collision, Lord Merriman, considered the question of whether 
cargo owners could recover their contribution to general average by way of damages 
against a wrongdoing vessel, which had carried their cargo.735 Lord Merriman noted that 
both Art. IV(2)(a) of the U.K. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, and Rule D of the York-
Antwerp Rules were applicable, before opining that “notwithstanding the majority of 
blame attributed to the Greystoke Castle, she was entitled to obtain the general average 
contribution from the cargo, a result which is in accordance with the general commercial 
practice throughout the world.”736 Abandonment was considered in Bulgaris v. Bunge, 
where the vessel developed a list, the steering gear broke down, and a fresh gale was 
coming, as such the master and crew abandoned ship onto a passing steamer.737 The 
vessel was subsequently salvaged, and the shipowner claimed against cargo for general 
average. Justice MacKinnon allowed the shipowner to recover general average 
contribution, noting that had the vessel been improperly abandoned this fault would not 
  
731 Ibid. Subsequent cargo damage was also at issue in this instance, having occurred later in the voyage as 
a result of the failure of the ship’s generators. 
732 Ibid, at p. 34. 
733 Usinas Siderugicas De Minas Geras v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. (The Jalavihar), 1997 AMC 2762 
(5 Cir. 1997).
734 Ibid. 
735 Owners of Cargo in M.V. Greystoke castle v. Owners of S.S. Cheldale (1944) 77 Ll. L. R. 395 (Adm. 
Div.), at p. 400. 
736 Ibid, at p. 401. 
737 Bulgaris v. Bunge (The Theodoros Bulgaris) [1933] 45 Ll. L. Rep. 74 (K.B.), at p. 75. 
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be actionable as it would constitute an error in the navigation or management of the 
ship.738
Finally, a decision that bears mention is The Oak Hill, where different qualities of 
pig iron were separated by holds and shipped under a voyage charter from Quebec to 
Italy.739 The charterparty contained a nautical fault exemption and incorporated the York-
Antwerp Rules. The vessel ran aground in the St. Lawrence River, but was re-floated by 
discharging the cargo, received repairs, re-loaded and continued the voyage. At Genoa it 
was discovered that the different types of pig iron were intermixed when they were re-
loaded, and the cargo owners brought suit. The shipowner pleaded nautical fault and 
general average, specifically Rule XII, 740 with regard to the cargo loss. The Supreme 
Court of Canada found that the grounding was caused by the error in navigation of the 
pilot, for which the shipowner was absolved, and that the unloading, repairs and 
reloading properly constituted a general average act.741 The Supreme Court however, 
found that that there was nothing in the York-Antwerp Rules that relieved the master of 
his responsibility to see that the cargo is properly handled and cared for during the 
carrying out the general average procedure.742 The shipowner was therefore held liable 
for cargo damage on the basis of the following reasoning: “[T]he expenses incurred in 
handling the cargo at Levis were a direct consequence of the general average act, but the 
combined negligence of the master and of the surveyors and stevedores who were acting 
as his servants which occasioned the damage, was not attributable to the general average 
act; it constituted a separate and independent cause…[the shipowners] have not shown 
that the damage complained of was ‘the direct consequence of the general average 
  
738 Ibid, at p. 81. Despite opining that improperly and unnecessarily abandoning the vessel would have been 
an error in navigation or management of the vessel entitling the shipowner to recover general average, 
Justice MacKinnon held that based on the facts at hand, the vessel was not improperly abandoned. 
739 Federal Commerce v. Eisenerz (The Oak Hill) [1975] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 105 (S.C.C.)
740 Rule XII provides: “Damage to or loss of cargo, fuel or stores caused in the act of handling, discharging, 
storing, reloading and stowing shall be made good as general average, when and only when the costs of 
those measures respectively is admitted as general average.”
741 Federal Commerce v. Eisenerz (The Oak Hill) [1975] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 105 (S.C.C.), at p. 110.
742 Ibid.
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act’.”743 Accordingly, it is therefore important to note that despite the wording of Rule 
XII and the existence of nautical fault, a failure to care for the cargo during the general 
average procedure may result in liability for cargo loss or damage. 
6.2.5. Artificial General Average
One particular aspect of general average that has developed over the past century 
is the notion of ‘artificial general average’.744 When the York-Antwerp Rules first came 
into being, general average expenditures and sacrifices were only made against imminent 
perils. Over the intervening years, the requirement of the existence of a peril was negated 
in certain instances where expenditures were made for the ‘safe prosecution of the 
voyage’.745 By virtue of Rules X and XI, where a vessel enters a port or place of refuge as 
a result of an accident or sacrifice for repairs necessary for the safe prosecution of the 
voyage, the port expenses, the costs of discharging cargo, fuel or stores, wages and 
maintenance of the master, officer and crew, reasonably incurred along with fuels and 
stores consumed shall be allowed as general average expenses.746 It has been noted that 
“because there is no ‘peril’ requirement in Rules X(b) and XI(b), claims may be made for 
general average expenses at the port of discharge, even when there is no peril.”747 This 
has been considered to be quite extraordinary, and has attracted criticism. In particular 
cargo insurers are hostile to the notion and consider that “allowances in general average 
should be restricted to those incurred while the vessel is actually ‘in grip of a peril’. This 
would entail excluding port of refuge expenses, temporary repairs and costs of 
transhipment of cargo to the destination.”748 In light of artificial general average, Art. 
IV(2)(a) is particularly important for the shipowner. When there is a grounding, as 
  
743 Ibid, at p. 114. Justice Ritchie also quoted with approval the holding of the trial judge: “These acts of 
neglect, even if committed during the general average procedure cannot, in my view, be held as those of the 
plaintiff so as to prevent the latter from successfully recovering the damages to its cargo.”
744 Tetley, W. International Maritime and Admiralty Law (2002) Yvon Blais, Cowansville, Quebec, at p. 
381.
745 Ibid, at p. 381. 
746 Rule X(a) and (b), Rule XI(a) and (b), of the York-Antwerp Rules, 1994 and the York-Antwerp Rules, 
2004. The main distinction between the two versions of Rules X and XI is the 1994 version uses the phrase 
“admitted as general average” while the 2004 version uses the phrase “allowed as general average”. The 
principles nevertheless remain unchanged.  
747 Tetley, W. International Maritime and Admiralty Law (2002) Yvon Blais, Cowansville, Quebec, at p. 
383; The York-Antwerp Rules 2004, Rules X(b) and XI(c) also do not require a “peril”. 
748 Dockray, M. Cases & Materials on the Carriage of Goods by Sea 3rd Ed (2004) Cavendish, London, at 
p. 356. 
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exemplified by a number of the aforementioned cases,749 the shipowner then becomes 
entitled to recover a portion of all the associated port and maintenance costs, along with 
the costs of temporary or permanent repairs. Were it not for the nautical fault exemption, 
the shipowner would not only be liable for any ensuing cargo damage, but also, for 
example, repairs to the vessel, salvage costs, and port and maintenance expenses. 
6.2.6. Conclusion
The foregoing demonstrates that nautical fault has not only expanded its 
application through the notion of actionable fault, but also has become a key element in 
determining the recovery of general average expenditures. Moreover, it is truly in the 
context of artificial general average that the impact of the exemption is felt. All the 
expenditures for the safe prosecution of the voyage, now accepted as general average 
under the York-Antwerp Rules, are generally recoverable by virtue of nautical fault when 
the vessel has grounded or collided. Regardless of assertions that the exemption is being 
restricted and marginalized in practice, it would be difficult to imagine an article in the 
Hague Rules that could prove to be more beneficial to the carrier than nautical fault.
  
749 Rey Banano Del Pacifico v. Transportes Navieros Ecuatorianos (The Isla Fernandina) [2000] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 15 (Q.B.); The Torepo [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 535 (Q.B.). 
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Chapter 7
Restricting The Availability of the Nautical Fault Exemption
Despite the expansive application of the nautical fault exemption in certain areas 
of carriage, recent developments in other areas may serve to curtail reliance on the 
exemption. Firstly, certain recent uniform laws, notably the STCW Convention, the ISM 
Code, and the ISPS Code, potentially impact the use of the exemption, although to what 
extent is as of yet uncertain given the very few cases to date. Secondly, certain 
commentators have argued that the courts are becoming increasingly hostile towards the 
nautical fault exemption. Despite the assertions of certain commentators, in most 
jurisdictions it is premature to pronounce on a clear judicial trend of restricting the 
application of the nautical fault exemption. The exception however is France, where in 
the last few years the courts have blatantly and unabashedly interpreted nautical fault so 
strictly that there is concern that it’s effectiveness as an exemption will be completely 
neutralized. 
7.1. THE IMPACT OF RECENT UNIFORM LAW
The ability of the carrier to rely on the nautical fault exemption is becoming 
increasingly restricted as a result of recent uniform law. In the past two decades several 
conventions and codes in particular have come into force that have increasingly regulated 
the manning and safety aspects of the shipping industry. Although these instruments do 
not deal with nautical fault per se, the obligations contained therein have the potential 
effect of restricting the availability of the exemption by imposing further obligations on 
the shipowner that must be fulfilled in order to have exercised due diligence to make the 
vessel seaworthy.  
7.1.1. STCW Convention
Given that human error is a significant factor contributing to accidents and 
incidents, it was felt by the international community that crew training required 
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attention.750 The 1978 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification 
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) has been updated by amendments adopted by 
IMO in July 1995, and entered into force on February 1, 1997.751 The 1978 Convention, 
despite its aims of creating standards to ensure seafarers are qualified for their duties, has 
been described as weak,752 and virtually worthless.753 The 1995 reforms aimed to right 
the past failures, and thus produced a series of new articles which were paired with 
several carried over from the old regime, with the aim, again, to ensure that “seafarers on 
board ships are qualified and fit for duties.”754 The amendments included new standards 
of competence extended to cover more categories of crewmen, criteria for the evaluation 
of candidates for certification, obligations on the shipowner to demonstrate competent 
and qualified personnel, and mandatory minimum rest periods.755 The STCW may impact 
the availability of the nautical fault exemption by virtue of the fact that it defines “in 
considerable detail what are to be considered competent masters, officers, and 
seaman,”756 thus making it more difficult to demonstrate due diligence to properly man 
the vessel. Where a shipowner, therefore, fails to exercise due diligence to ensure the 
ship’s crewmembers have proper certificates, are familiarized with the characteristics of 
the ship, and are provided with the documentation required by the STCW, the ship will 
be unseaworthy on the basis that it was improperly manned. Previously, shipowners had 
the obligation to ensure that their crews were competent, held the proper certifications 
and were trained for the vessel,757 however the STCW in essence raises the bar by 
  
750 Power, V. “European Union Shipping Law” in Shipping Law Faces Europe: European Policy, 
Competition and Environment (1995) Kegels, T. (Ed.) Maklu, Antwerpen, at p. 70.
751 1978 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 
opened for signature July 7, 1978, and amended July 7, 1995. 
752 Power, V. “European Union Shipping Law” in Shipping Law Faces Europe: European Policy, 
Competition and Environment (1995) Kegels, T. (Ed.) Maklu, Antwerpen, at p. 70.
753 Sperling, G. “The New Convention on Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping: What, if 
Anything, Does it Mean?” (1998) 22 Tul. Mar. L.J. 595, at p. 597; 
754 Ibid, at p. 599. 
755 Pamborides, G. International Shipping Law: Legislation and Enforcement (1999) Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, at p. 168. 
756 Sperling, G. “The New Convention on Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping: What, if 
Anything, Does it Mean?” (1998) 22 Tul. Mar. L.J. 595, at p. 614-615. 
757 See The Garden City [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 382 (Q.B.), where Justice Staughton commented that the 
shipowners “would have been foolish to entrust the safety of one of their ships to an officer who produced 
only certificates of competence and opinions such as are in evidence in this case. A responsible shipowner 
should and would make further enquiries.” (Ibid, 395-396); See also The Makedonia [1962] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 
316 (Adm. Div.) where Justice Hewson faulted the shipowner for hiring a both a chief engineer and a 
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ensuring precise standards of competence are met, and detailed records are kept, thus 
enabling claimants and authorities to more easily identify any failures on the part of the 
shipowners. The ISM Code is discussed below, however it is worth noting that the new 
regulations in the STCW, “particularly those concerning certification, familiarization, and 
communication are closely related to [obligations] contained in the ISM Code.”758
As the transitional period provided for in the STCW 1995 has only lapsed fairly 
recently,759 there are as of yet no key judgments that serve to exemplify the operation of 
the convention in practice. Nevertheless, two decisions under the old STCW serve to 
illustrate the potential impacts of the new regime. In The Torepo, a vessel ran aground, 
and cargo was required to contribute to salvage and general average.760 The claimants 
sought to recover those contributions while the carrier sought to defend itself under error 
in navigation.761 The claimants made several allegations with respect to the vessel being 
unseaworthy focusing on bridge team management and defects in personnel and 
experience, which included contending that “there ought to have been a system which 
complied with the relevant international regulations such as IMO STCW Convention 
1978…the system was either non-existent or not proper…[and] there ought to have been 
on board the bridge at the material time…a dedicated look-out who was properly 
qualified to act as such in accordance with the STCW Regulations 11/4 and A-11/4.”762
Justice Steel however determined that based on the evidence neither the master nor the 
owners had any reason to believe that the lookout was not competent to fulfil his 
     
second engineer without taking the time to ensure that they were properly qualified, and accordingly held 
him liable for a failure to exercise due diligence. 
758 Weitz, L. “International Maritime Law: The Nautical Fault Debate” (1998) 22 Tul. Mar. L.J. 581, at p. 
593. 
759 Although the STCW 1995 entered into force February 1, 1997, the Convention provided for a 
transitional period until February 1, 2002, wherein the parties to the Convention may continue to issue, 
recognize and endorse certificates conforming to previous regulations to seafarers who began training 
before August 1, 1998. (Pamborides, G. International Shipping Law: Legislation and Enforcement (1999) 
Kluwer Law International, The Hague, at p. 169).
760 The Torepo [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 535 (Q.B.). 
761 The Hague-Visby Rules did not govern, as the carriage was under a series of overlapping charterparties, 
nevertheless, the Shell Time form contained a clause, 27(a), which exonerated the carrier in the same 
manner that Art. IV(2)(a) of Hague-Visby does. The vessel was subsequently voyage chartered but 
pursuant to the terms of the time charter, thus the nautical fault exemption applied in respect of cargo 
interests. 
762 The Torepo [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 535, at p. 540-541. 
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function.763 Despite the fact that the claimants failed to prove that the casualty resulted 
from causative unseaworthiness, as the cause was found to be pilot error for which the 
carrier was exempt, the case demonstrates the potential effects that the Convention may 
have on manning requirements and seaworthiness. The Cour d’Appel de Bordeaux 
recently considered a somewhat similar instance, in which the vessel Heidberg, collided 
with port installations while a pilot was on the bridge.764 The captain had left the bridge 
of the vessel in order to stop ballasting operations, leaving a junior member of the crew 
and the pilot on the bridge. The carrier pleaded faute nautique, however the Cour d’Appel 
denied the carrier the benefit of the exemption, finding that the carrier had not ensured 
the proper cohesiveness and functioning of the crew.765 In particular, the Cour d’Appel 
found that given the master left the bridge without being replaced, the lookout was 
engaged in another task, and there was a lack of information exchange between the 
master and the pilot, these actions constituted breaches of Rule 2-1 of STCW 78.766
The key impact of the STCW 1995, with respect to carrier liability, is that it 
provides the claimants, the courts, and the authorities with a clear benchmark against 
which the actions and the practices of shipowners can be judged. Given that the 
convention is aimed at addressing human error, which provides the basis of the error in 
navigation or management exemption, the shipowner may have a higher burden to meet 
in order to demonstrate that appropriate measures were taken to prevent and guard 
against the occurrence of such errors. 
7.1.2. ISM Code
The importance of properly implemented safety and management procedures 
cannot be underestimated, as statistical studies have demonstrated that upwards of 80% 
of all shipping accidents are cause by human error.767 Indeed, in a span of 18 years, 
  
763 Ibid, at p. 547. 
764 Cour d’Appel de Bordeaux, 31 mai 2005, (Heidberg), DMF 2005, 839, at p. 847.
765 Ibid, at p. 844. 
766 Ibid, at p. 843. The Cour d’Appel does note however that the carrier did not breach the fundamental 
principles of STCW 78. 
767 Huybrechts, M. “The International Safety Management Code: From Human Failure to Achievement” 
[1999] ETL 17, at p. 18, who further argues that acts or omissions of humans contribute to every accident, 
including structural or equipment malfunctions. 
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between 1980 and 1997, 167 bulk carriers and 1,352 lives were lost at sea.768
Accordingly, efforts were made to address the human factor and minimize the number of 
human errors both on board and ashore that led to shipping casualties.769 The result, the 
International Safety Management Code (ISM Code),770 therefore has the objective of 
providing an international standard for the safe management and operation of ships.771
The aim of the ISM Code is summarized by Lord Donaldson as follows: “In the short and 
medium term, it is designed to discover and eliminate sub-standard ships, together with 
substandard owners and managers, not to mention many others who contribute to their 
survival and, in some cases, prosperity. In the longer term its destination is to discover 
new and improved methods of ship operation, management and regulation which will 
produce a safety record more akin to that of the aviation industry.”772 The ISM Code was 
enacted by virtue of incorporation into the SOLAS Convention,773 as Chapter IX on May 
19, 1994, and provided for the following compliance times: 1) Ro-ro passenger ferries 
operating between ports in the EU by July 1, 1996, 2) Passenger ships no later than July 
1, 1998, 3) Oil tankers, chemical tankers, gas carriers, bulk carriers and cargo high speed 
craft of 500 gross tonnage and upwards by July 1, 1998, and 4) Other cargo ships and 
mobile offshore drilling units of 500 gross tons and upwards, not later than July 1, 
2002.774 As the ISM Code was enacted as a chapter in SOLAS, it became force of law in 
  
768 Lord Donaldson of Lymington. “The ISM Code: The Road to Discovery?” [1998] LMCLQ 526, at p. 
531. 
769 Pamborides, G. International Shipping Law: Legislation and Enforcement (1999) Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, at p. 153. 
770 International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention, rendered 
mandatory under Ch. IX, SOLAS Convention, 1974. The ISM Code is also published: IMO. International 
Safety Management (ISM) Code 2002 (2002) IMO, London. 
771 ISM Code, Preamble. The objectives of the Code are set out in greater detail in article 1.2 of the Code 
entitled Objectives. They include safety at sea, prevention of human injury or loss of life, and damage to 
the environment. They also enumerate a list of safety management objectives for companies as well as
dictating that the safety management system should ensure 1) compliance with mandatory rules and 
regulations, and 2) that applicable Codes, guidelines and standards recommended by the organization, 
Administration, classification societies and maritime industry organizations are taken into account. 
772 Lord Donaldson of Lymington. “The ISM Code: The Road to Discovery?” [1998] LMCLQ 526, at p. 
527. 
773 Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) 1974, adopted November 1, 1974, in force May 25, 1980. 
774 Rodriguez, A. & Hubbard, M. “The International Safety Management (ISM) Code: A New Level of 
Uniformity” (1999) 73 Tul. L. Rev. 1585, at p. 1593-1594; Anderson, P. ISM Code: A Practical Guide to 
the Legal and Insurance Implications (1998) LLP, London, at p. 16.
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the 145 countries party to SOLAS, which when combined have 98.53% of the world’s 
tonnage.775
In general, the ISM Code provides a framework under which shipowners are 
required to specify objectives in relation to safety management, develop procedures in 
order to obtain the safety management objectives, and maintain records detailing the 
implementation of the safety management procedures.776 Specifically, the shipowner,777
has the obligation to develop and implement a Safety Management System (SMS), which 
if compliant with the ISM Code, will enable the shipowner to obtain a Document of 
Compliance (DOC) from the Flag State certifying compliance with the ISM Code.778 As 
well, a separate Safety Management Certificate is issued “to a ship to signify that the 
Company and its shipboard management operate in accordance with the approved 
SMS.”779 Article 1.4 of the ISM Code specifies that each SMS must include the 
following: (1) “a safety and environmental-protection policy;”780 (2) “instructions and 
procedures to ensure safe operation of ships and protection of the environment in 
compliance with relevant international and flag State legislation;”781 (3) “defined levels 
of authority and lines of communication between, and amongst, shore and shipboard 
personnel;”782 (4) “procedures for reporting accidents and non-conformities with the 
provisions of this Code;”783 (5) procedures to prepare for and respond to emergency 
situations;”784 and (6) “procedures for internal audits and management reviews.”785
  
775 Tetley, W. International Maritime and Admiralty Law (2002) Yvon Blais, Cowansville, Quebec, at p. 
465; De Maeyer, F. “A Cargo Underwriter’s Approach”  [1999] ETL 45, at p. 45. 
776 Tetley, W. Marine Cargo Claims, 4th Ed., in “Chapter 15: Due Diligence to Make the Vessel 
Seaworthy”, at p. 48. Available online at: http://tetley.law.mcgill.ca/maritime, 
777 Which for the purposes of the ISM Code includes, the shipowner, the bareboat charterer, manager, and 
any organization with has assumed responsibility for the operation of the vessel. 
778 Sahatjian, L. “The ISM Code: A Brief Overview” (1998) 29 JMLC 405, at p. 406; Gold, E. et al. 
Maritime Law (2003) Irwin Law, Toronto, at p. 227; Allen, C. “The ISM Code and Shipowner Records: 
Shared Safety Goals vs. Industry’s Privacy Needs” (1998) 11 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. 1, at p. 5; Özçayir, Z. Port 
State Control (2001) LLP, London, at p. 324-326.  
779 Poulos, G. “Legal Implications of the ISM Code: New Impediments to Sea Fever” (1996) 9 U.S.F. Mar. 
L.J. 37, at p. 44; ISM Code Article 13.4 & 13.5; Sahatjian, ibid.
780 ISM Code Article 1.4.1.
781 Ibid, Art. 1.4.2.
782 Ibid, Art. 1.4.3.
783 Ibid, Art. 1.4.4.
784 Ibid, Art. 1.4.5.
785 Ibid, Art. 1.4.6.
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Many of the obligations under the ISM Code relate to or impact the navigation 
and management of the vessel. Article 7 of the ISM Code entitled Development of Plans 
for Shipboard Operations, stipulates: “The Company should establish procedures for the 
preparation of plans and instructions for key shipboard operations concerning the safety 
of the ship and the prevention of pollution. The various tasks involved should be defined 
and assigned to qualified personnel.” There are a number of subjects that have been 
recommended to be included in the operational documentation of the SMS procedures 
manuals that may have a bearing on navigation, for example: bridge and engine room 
watchkeeping arrangements, special requirements in bad weather and fog, fitness for duty 
and avoidance of excessive fatigue, operational and maintenance instructions for 
equipment, verifying that up-to-date nautical charts are carried, manoeuvring data, 
emergency procedures, tests of engines and steering gear, and port information.786
Furthermore, the ISM Code provides numerous responsibilities for the master of the 
vessel, including those related to implementing the safety and environmental-protection 
policy, verifying that specified requirements are observed, and reviewing the SMS and 
reporting deficiencies to the shore based management.787 Finally, the ISM Code obliges 
the shipowner to have a designated person ashore (DPA), who is one or more of the 
employees of the shipowner, to serve as the line of communication between the highest 
level of the management of the shipowner and the vessel, and whose duties include 
monitoring the safety and pollution prevention aboard each vessel and ensuring adequate 
resources and shore-based support.788
The ISM Code is not directly concerned with issues of civil liability, nevertheless, 
the aforementioned obligations under the ISM Code have the potential to impact the 
availability of the nautical fault exemption in several ways. Certain articles arguably 
  
786 Appendix 6 of the ICS/ISF Guidelines identify subjects recommended to be in the SMS procedures 
manuals, see Anderson, P. ISM Code: A Practical Guide to the Legal and Insurance Implications (1998) 
LLP, London, at p. 114-115, for a more complete list. 
787 ISM Code, Article 5, specifically 5.1.1, 5.1.4, and 5.1.5.
788 ISM Code, Article 4; See Pamborides, G. International Shipping Law: Legislation and Enforcement
(1999) Kluwer Law International, The Hague, at p. 150, who notes that the inclusion of the stipulation that 
the DPA must have “…direct access to the highest level of management”, has generated a lot of speculation 
regarding both its meaning and its potential effects on industry practices. 
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increase the obligations incumbent on the shipowner to satisfy his duty exercise due 
diligence to both make the vessel seaworthy and to properly crew the vessel. In addition, 
the designation of the DPA provides a direct link through which the shipowner may 
become privy to errors and deficiencies in the safety and management of the vessel. 
Finally, the obligations with respect to documenting and recording the implementation of 
the SMS results in a wealth of documentation concerning vessel operations, now 
available to claimants and their attorneys. With respect to the potential impacts of the 
ISM Code on shipowner liability, it must be underscored that these are for the most part 
speculative. Unfortunately, despite the fact that the ISM Code has now been in force for 
certain classes of vessels for over a decade, to date there is little jurisprudence under the 
Code. As such, although many commentators agree on the forecasted effects, only time 
will tell whether they play out as envisioned in the context of actual disputes. 
7.1.2.1. Obligation to Exercise Due Diligence to Make the Vessel Seaworthy
A failure to fully comply with the ISM Code, may be characterized as a failure on 
the part of the shipowner to exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy. 
Currently, “the objective standard of seaworthiness with which the vessel and owner 
must comply will now be tested against the requirements of the [ISM] Code and Chapter 
IX of SOLAS.”789 There is as of yet no judicial authority on whether simply the absence 
of a DOC or SMS, is in itself sufficient to constitute unseaworthiness,790 or whether 
something more will be required. It has nevertheless been confidently stated that 
wherever cargo loss or damage can be attributed to negligence, errors or actions on the 
part of the crew resulting from the shipowner’s lack of compliance with the ISM Code, 
the shipowner will be unable to avail himself of the nautical fault exemption.791
The following case considered the ISM Code in relation to the obligation to 
exercise due diligence, despite the fact that compliance with the Code was not yet 
  
789 Chance, C. “Legal Implications of the International Safety Management Code”, cited by Anderson, P. 
ISM Code: A Practical Guide to the Legal and Insurance Implications (1998) LLP, London, at pp. 131-
132. 
790 Michel, K. War, Terror and Carriage by Sea (2004) LLP, London, at p. 739. Moreover, judicial 
research current to January 2008 has also failure to uncover any authority speaking to that point. 
791 Baughen, S. Shipping Law 3rd Ed. (2004) Cavendish Publishing, London, at p. 129. 
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required for that vessel at the time of the incident. In The Eurasian Dream, a fire 
consumed a car carrier, resulting in the total loss of the cargo.792 Justice Cresswell 
considered whether the vessel was unseaworthy, as the claimants alleged, or if the carrier 
should benefit from Art. IV(2). Before ruling, Justice Cresswell considered the 
implications of ISM Code: “The ISM Code became mandatory for passenger ships, 
tankers of all types and bulk carriers on July 1, 1998 and will become mandatory for all 
other types of ships…on July 1, 2002. The International Association of Classification 
Societies (IACS) noted that the number of phase 2 ships (of which the Eurasian Dream
was an example) holding Safety Management Certificates on June 30, 1998 was 1704 out 
of a total of approximately 17,000 classes with IACS. The fact that the vessel did not 
hold a Safety Management Certificate at the time of the fire was no more than a reflection 
of the fact that none would be required until 2002. [Despite the fact that the ship was not 
obliged to be ISM certificated,] the ship was provided with copies of the fleet ISM 
procedural documentation and was subject to the same company procedures as all other 
vessels in the fleet. Captain Haakansson said that: …the ISM Code…is a framework 
upon which good practices should be hung. Even for companies – or for that matter 
vessels – who have waited until the last minute to apply for certification the principles are 
so general and good that a prudent manager/master could very well organize their 
company/vessels work following those guidelines.”793 Justice Cresswell then held that the 
vessel was unseaworthy due to the fact that, among other reasons,794 the master was new 
to the vessel and car carriers in general, the master and crew were ignorant of the 
particular hazards of carriers and the ship’s fire fighting systems, they were not properly 
trained and given drills, there was no ship specific manual dealing with fire prevention 
and control, the emergency procedures manual was inadequate, and there was a 
substantial amount of ship specific documentation required by SOLAS and dealing with 
  
792 Papera Traders Co. v. Hyundai Merchant Marine (The Eurasian Dream) [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 719 
(Q.B.). 
793 Ibid, at p. 739. 
794 Other reasons included, inadequacies in the vessel’s fire fighting equipment and communications 
equipment, the training of the master was inadequate in that he was simply directed to read all the literature 
on board the vessel, which was not given to the master in advance, was not related to his lack of prior 
experience, it was a vast amount of documentation and would have occupied two to three weeks of his time 
while aboard the vessel (Ibid, at p. 742-743.). 
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essential subjects absent from the vessel.795 It is difficult to determine from the judgment 
to what extent the standard of seaworthiness was influenced by the requirements of the 
ISM Code, nevertheless the case provides an instructive example of the use of the ISM 
Code as a standard for use by courts to measure whether the carriers actions were 
sufficient to satisfy his obligation to exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel.
The Chambre Arbitrale Maritime de Paris recently found that a captain’s errors in 
travelling at an excessive speed, during a storm, in a direction perpendicular to the wind, 
constituted nautical fault.796 The Tribunal, in considering the loss of sixty-one containers, 
however held the carrier liable for two-thirds of the loss, on the basis of errors relating to 
the lashing of the containers.797 What proves to be interesting about this arbitral decision 
is its mention of the ISM Code, in a fashion similar to Justice Creswell’s consideration in 
The Eurasian Dream. The Tribunal expressed its discontent with the carrier for not 
having established precise and complete instructions concerning the stowing and lashing 
of containers, and noted that the only material on board the vessel on the topic was a half 
page text.798 The Tribunal stated that certainly no formal breaches of the ISM Code could 
be imputed to the carrier on the basis that it was not in force at the time of the incident, 
however given the Code was in existence at the time, the carrier should have nonetheless 
developed and established precise instructions and procedures in accordance with the 
Code.799 It is clear that the Tribunal is therefore using the ISM Code as the benchmark 
standard for how a reasonable shipowner would behave. 
It has been argued that presumably error in the “management” of the vessel, as 
found in Art. IV(2)(a), also extends to management of the SMS.800 It is possible therefore 
  
795 Ibid, at pp. 742-744. Cresswell J. held that the vessel ought to have had the following documentation: (a) 
the characteristics of car carriers in general and the Eurasian Dream in particular, (b) the carriage of 
vehicles in general and on the Eurasian Dream in particular, (c) the danger of fire on car carriers, (d) the 
precautions to be taken to avoid fire on car carriers, (e) the importance of gas tight doors in fire fighting, (f) 
the importance of using CO2, (g) procedures for evacuating fire zones.  
796 Sentence 1077 du 18 novembre 2002, Chambre Arbitral Maritime de Paris, DMF 2003, 995, at p. 997.
797 Ibid. 
798 Ibid, at p. 996. 
799 Ibid. 
800 Anderson, P. ISM Code: A Practical Guide to the Legal and Insurance Implications (1998) LLP, 
London, at p. 130. 
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that in a cargo claim “the question whether or not the ship was unseaworthy/uncargo-
worthy or whether there had been a failure to care for the cargo as a consequence of a 
failure in the management of the safety system could prove crucial.”801 Instinctively, one 
may postulate that if there is a deficiency in the SMS itself or if it was not properly 
implemented and cargo damage ensues, then the vessel would be unseaworthy, while if 
there was a single error committed in adhering to the procedures of the SMS by an 
otherwise competent and well trained crew member and cargo damage ensued, a court 
may perhaps find that the error constituted an error in the management of the vessel. 
Although this may not be likely, as one commentator suggests, “if a satisfactory SMS is 
in place, but the owner or operator has failed to live up to it on the occasion in question, 
this may result in arguments either that the ship is unseaworthy because the SMS is not in 
fact being implemented properly (in breach of Article III, Rule 1) r that the owner failed 
to properly care for the cargo, in breach of Article III, Rule 2.”802
The essential element that impacts the analysis on whether the shipowner 
exercised due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy, can be characterized with the 
following question: was there a proper functioning system in place? Indeed, the aspects 
of due diligence affected by the ISM Code’s implementation will centre on whether the 
appropriate procedures were established and properly implemented.  One author has 
commented that “[t]here surely can be no doubt that [the ISM Code] will have an impact 
on the assessment of the steps taken by the shipowner to comply with the requirement of 
exercising due diligence to make the ship seaworthy. To prove due diligence, shipowners 
will now be called upon to prove full implementation and understanding of the ISM 
Code, both on shore and onboard.”803
7.1.2.2. Properly Man the Vessel
Although the obligation incumbent on a shipowner to exercise due diligence to 
render the vessel seaworthy in essence includes providing a properly trained and 
  
801 Ibid. 
802 Chance, C. “Legal Implications of the International Safety Management Code” in Anderson, P. ISM 
Code: A Practical Guide to the Legal and Insurance Implications (1998) LLP, London, at p. 132. 
803 Hare, J. Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, (1999) Juta & Co, Cape Town, at p. 
234. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
155
competent crew, the notion of properly manning the vessel and all its attendant duties 
bears separate consideration. As mentioned previously, the ISM Code seeks to address 
the human contribution to maritime incidents, through training and properly implemented 
procedures. As such, the ISM Code has a significant number of guidelines and policies 
relating directly to the master and crew of the vessel. For example, Article 6.1 contains 
the following stipulations: “The Company should ensure that the Master is: 1. Properly 
qualified for command; 2. Fully conversant with the Company’s safety management 
system; and 3. Given the necessary support so that the master’s duties can be safely 
performed.”804 Moreover, the following extracts from Article 6 are particularly relevant 
with respect to crew members; “6.2. The Company should ensure that each ship is 
manned with qualified, certified and medically fit seafarers in accordance with national 
and international requirements…6.3 The Company should establish procedures to ensure 
that new personnel transferred to new assignments…are given proper familiarization with 
their duties. Instructions which are essential are to be provided prior to sailing should be 
identified, documented and given…6.5 The Company should establish and maintain 
procedures for identifying any training which may be required in support of the SMS and 
ensure that such training is provided for all personnel concerned.”805 The ISM Code 
therefore impresses upon the shipowner the obligation to ensure that all mariners aboard 
the vessel are fully competent and fully trained to carry out their duties in light of the 
requirements of the vessel to which they are assigned and in accordance with the vessel’s 
SMS. 
  
804 Moreover, Article 6.4 provides that the “Company should ensure that all personnel involved in the 
Company’s SMS have an adequate understanding of relevant rules, regulations, codes and guidelines.” In 
addition Article 6.7 provides that the “Company should ensure that the ship’s personnel are able to 
communicate effectively in the execution of their duties related to the SMS.”
805 ISM Code, Articles 6.2, 6.3., & 6.5; Weitz, L. “International Maritime Law: The Nautical Fault Debate” 
(1998) 22 Tul. Mar. L.J. 581, at p. 592-593, has indicated that among the duties and obligations in the ISM 
Code the following three are important with regard to selection and training of crew: “(1) The Company 
should ensure that each ship is manned with qualified, certificated and medically fit seafarers, (2) The 
Company should ensure that all personnel involved in the Company’s SMS have an adequate 
understanding of the relevant rules, regulations, codes and guidelines, and (3) The Company should 
[arrange for] the ship’s personnel [to] receive relevant information on the SMS in a working language 
understood by them.” (Quoting para. 6.2., 6.4. & 6.6. of the ISM Code); See also Anderson, P. ISM Code: 
A Practical Guide to the Legal and Insurance Implications (1998) LLP, London, at pp. 121-122, for 
passages of articles impacting the master and the crew of the vessel.  
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If the vessel is not properly manned, in other words if the crew member is not 
certified, or if he is not trained for the specific vessel, then that mariner’s error will not 
enable the shipowner to benefit from the nautical fault exemption. As aptly stated by one 
commentator: “[I]t must be stressed that even though negligence is an ‘accepted peril’ 
according to the Hague/Visby Rules, incompetence is not.”806 This is well established in 
the jurisprudence, particularly where engineers or masters were not familiar with the 
specific vessel, or plans of the ballast or other systems had not been given to them.807
Although in the past, a failure to properly train the crew has at times been difficult to 
prove. “There was very little prospect of mounting a successful challenge to the 
exemption of crew negligence prior to the ISM Code, because there was little chance of 
showing, other than the most obvious cases, that the ship was not properly manned for 
the purposes of Article III…My feeling is that the ISM Code may well widen the effect 
of the Rules, for example, by reducing the number of cases in which the defence of crew 
negligence is found to be the sole cause of a loss. A number of cases which are presently 
regarded as arising out of crew negligence, will certainly be viewed in the future as 
  
806 Pamborides, G. International Shipping Law: Legislation and Enforcement (1999) Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, at p. 154. 
807 In Robin Hood Flour Mills v N.M. Paterson (The Farrandoc) [1967] 1 Lloyd’s Rep, 232 (Can. Ex. Ct. 
Que.), the second engineer opened the wrong valve during pumping operations and water entered the hold 
and damaged the cargo. The shipowners attempted to rely on 4(2)(a), but Justice Smith found at p. 235, that 
“this officer was engaged on the same day [of the incident]. Apparently he was engaged solely on the basis 
of the fact that he held a second engineer’s certificate. There is no evidence to show that any inquiry was 
made as to this man’s previous experience or record, nor does it appear that he was questioned as to 
whether or not he was familiar with the type of engine room machinery and piping on board the 
Farrandoc.” Justice Smith then went on to hold that the shipowner was liable for lack of due diligence to 
make the vessel seaworthy because he did not check the experience and competence of the second engineer 
and did not make available to him a plan of the engine room’s piping system.  In The Makedonia [1962] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 316, Justice Hewson held the shipowners responsible for a lack of due diligence to make the 
vessel seaworthy as the chief engineer and the second engineer were found to be unqualified and there was 
no plan of the ballast and fuel system. In Standard Oil v. Clan Line (The Clan Gordon) (1923) 17 Ll. L. 
Rep. 120 (H.L.), the master of the vessel had extensive experience, but did not have knowledge of the 
particular vessel including her design and stability. The master ordered to ballast tanks to be emptied 
causing the ship to capsize, and losing the cargo. Lord Atkinson rejected the error defence and found that 
the lack of familiarity with the vessel on the part of the master constituted unseaworthiness. In Manifest 
Shipping v. Uni-Polaris Insurance (The Star Sea) [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 360 (C.A.), Lord Justice Leggatt 
found at p. 374, that if a crew member does not have adequate knowledge about a particular vessel, in this 
instance operation of the CO2 fire-fighting system, or training, in this instance adequate fire fighting 
training, then the crew member is incompetent and the vessel is unseaworthy. Justice Solomon in Hong 
Kong Fir Shipping v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha [1961] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 159 (Q.B.), at p. 168 sets out the test 
as to whether the incompetence of a crew member has rendered the vessel unseaworthy: Would a 
reasonably prudent owner, knowing the relevant facts, have allowed this vessel to put to sea with this 
master and crew, with their state of knowledge, training and instruction? 
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arising not solely by crew negligence, but instead by a lack of systems on board the ship, 
or through inadequate training.”808 With the ISM Code in force, the cargo claimant now 
has available to him, among other things, documents detailing: the SMS, the 
qualifications and experience of the crewman, the support that was given and the relevant 
procedures, what familiarisation was given on joining the ship and the instructions, 
documents, procedures, and training, as well as the plans and checklists prepared with 
regard to particular operations, and who has access to the plans.809 In the instance of a 
ballasting error, for example, if the carrier is unable to provide the above documents or 
demonstrate that the appropriate training and plans were given to the crewmember, the 
vessel may be considered unseaworthy and thus reliance on the nautical fault exemption 
becomes problematic. 
A illustrative example of a case that most certainly would have been decided 
differently is a Hanseatic Court of Appeal of Hamburg case where the first officer, 
trained as a second officer, was keeping watch alone and without knowledge of the 
regulations on watch-keeping, when the vessel grounded.810 In commentary on the 
judgment, it is noted that “[i]n view of the clear allocation of responsibilities on all levels 
of management and the high standard of information and documentation set by the ISM 
Code, it would seem problematic to deny the liability of the carrier if certain 
precautionary organizational measures relating to watch-keeping were not taken. 
Particularly the fact that master and crew did not have notice of requirements of the 
Merchant Shipping (Certification and Watchkeeping) Regulation would suggest a 
different approach to the question of the carrier’s fault in organising his business and in 
the management of the vessel.”811
  
808 Martyr, P. as quoted by Anderson, P. ISM Code: A Practical Guide to the Legal and Insurance 
Implications (1998) LLP, London, at p. 130-131.  One authors advises cargo interests that when faced with 
the defence of error in navigation, the first inquiry must be as to the expertise of the crew (Kasanin, M. 
“Cargo Rights and Responsibilities in Collision Cases” (1977) 51 Tul. L. Rev. 880, at p. 884). 
809 Anderson, ibid, at pp. 122-123. 
810 Cargo Interests on Board MV Cita v. Time-charterers of MV Cita (2003) 6 U 220/00 (Hanseatic Court 
of Appeal of Hamburg) available at: www.onlinedmc.co.uk. Affirmed by Cargo Interests on Board MV 
Cita v. Time-charterers of MV Cita (2006) I ZR 20/04 (Federal Supreme Court), available at: 
www.onlinedmc.co.uk. In this instance the carrier was exempted under the error in navigation provision of 
the German Commercial Code, HGB 607.  
811 Ibid, in commentary following the decision by Bracker Boehlhoff & Luebbert. 
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A further illustration of a judicial approach to the failure to properly train the crew 
in accordance with applicable law and guidelines, is found in the decision by the Turku 
Court of Appeal in Finland, where it was determined that a cargo of pig iron had been 
damaged due to improper lashing and securing of the cargo.812 The Court of Appeal came 
to this conclusion solely on the basis of non-compliance with the IMO Code of Safe 
Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes, 1987, which had not been applied on board. The Court 
of Appeal determined that the master and the crew of the vessel were obliged to know the 
requirements of the Code, and as they did not, the vessel was therefore unseaworthy.813  
The Eurasian Dream, discussed supra in the context of the failure to exercise due 
diligence, has become the preferred example of authors when examining the potential 
effects of the ISM Code. This is the case primarily due to the fact that there is a complete 
lack of ISM related jurisprudence. Few authors note however, the impractical nature of 
the ISM Code requirements in certain respects as they relate to training the crew. On the 
facts of the Eurasian Dream, it has been noted that “it would have taken the Master 
several weeks to read all the manuals relevant to his command of the vessel, some 150 
manuals running to some 75-100 pages each; and even then he would have probably 
missed the CO2 manual as it was in the Chief Engineer’s cabin.”814 With respect to the 
training and preparation of the crew or the master in certain instances, the requirements 
of the ISM Code may prove to be impractical when faced with certain realities of the 
shipping industry. One author has noted that “[e]ven in the best-run companies a master 
may have to join a vessel with precious little time to get to grips with the minutiae of its 
SMS.”815
  
812 NMCases 1995.76 Ra (Turku Court of Appeal, Finland), as summarized in Honka, H. “New Carriage of 
Goods by Sea – The Nordic Approach,” in New Carriage of Goods by Sea. (1997) H. Honka (Ed.) Institute 
of Maritime and Commercial Law, Abo, at p. 51
813 Ibid. 
814 Kverndal, S. “The ISM and ISPS Codes: Influence on the Evolution of Liabilities” in Liability Regimes 
in Contemporary Maritime Law (2007) D. Rhidian Thomas (Ed.), Informa, London, at p. 155.
815 Ibid, at p. 154. 
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7.1.2.3. Actual Fault or Privity
As previously discussed, Art. IV(2)(a) does not protect the carrier where faults 
committed can be imputed to the carrier himself. The ISM Code provides that the 
‘designated person ashore’ (DPA), who is appointed in relation to each ship, must have 
direct access to the highest level of management within the company.  The DPA has the 
obligation to monitor safety and ensure that defects in the vessel are detected, reported 
and corrected quickly.816 This has potentially profound implications with respect to the 
actual or imputed knowledge of the shipowner.  It has been noted that “it will be but a 
short step to attribute to the designated person a substituted status as the directing mind of 
the company…[and it will be] very difficult for a shipowner to deny the knowledge or 
disclaim the actions or inactions of its designated person in relation to ISM Code 
obligations.”817 Another commentator is certain that the DPA creates a direct link to the 
directing mind of the corporation: “…the DPA’s duty to report to what must surely be the
‘alter ego’ or the directing mind of ‘the Company’ bridges the gap between the 
inadequacies on board ship and the knowledge or privity of the owner/manager.”818 As 
such, where the DPA is advised of a problem or a failure with respect to a certain system 
on board, and action is not or the problem is not corrected promptly, then the shipowner 
will be considered privy to the fault or errors.819 There is a general agreement among 
authors that the ISM Code will render it much more difficult for carriers to demonstrate 
their lack of ‘actual fault or privity’,820 with one author predicting “there can be little 
doubt that a shipowner which sails its ships in disregard of the Code should fail the test of 
an absence of fault or privity.”821 In the United States, in particular, where the courts have 
demonstrated a tendency to be particularly expansive in their interpretation of the notion 
  
816 Hare, J. Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, (1999) Juta & Co, Cape Town, at p. 
230 and p. 401; Tetley, W. International Maritime and Admiralty Law (2002) Yvon Blais, Cowansville, 
Quebec, at p. 290. 
817 Hare, ibid, at p. 233. 
818 Kverndal, S. “The ISM and ISPS Codes: Influence on the Evolution of Liabilities” in Liability Regimes 
in Contemporary Maritime Law (2007) D. Rhidian Thomas (Ed.), Informa, London, at p. 157. 
819 Edelman, P. “The Maritime Industry and the ISM Code” (1999) 8 Currents Int’l Trade L.J. 43, at p. 45. 
820 Tetley, W. International Maritime and Admiralty Law (2002) Yvon Blais, Cowansville, Quebec, at p. 
290; Hare, J. Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, (1999) Juta & Co, Cape Town, at p. 
233 and 401; Kverndal, S. “The ISM and ISPS Codes: Influence on the Evolution of Liabilities” in Liability 
Regimes in Contemporary Maritime Law (2007) D. Rhidian Thomas (Ed.), Informa, London, at p. 157; 
Edelman, ibid, at p. 45.
821 Hare, ibid, at p. 401. 
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of ‘privity or knowledge’, there is concern that the ISM Code will have a tremendous 
impact. “Since the owner’s ‘privity or knowledge’ of unseaworthy conditions is the most 
common basis for denying limitation, some attorneys believe that limitation of liability in 
the United States will be effectively eliminated once the ISM Code is implemented.”822
Under United States law, the courts have determined that the ‘privity and knowledge’ of 
the shipowner includes the privity and knowledge of individuals such as the managing 
agent, an officer of the corporation, a manager and a supervising employee, including in 
particular supervisory shore side personnel.823 An American commentator has concluded, 
“given the broad scope of the duties of the “Designated Person” under the ISM Code, it is 
a virtual certainty that the courts will impute the knowledge of the “Designated Person” 
to the owner.”824
One may therefore also predict, that where cargo interests can demonstrate that 
the DPA negligently advised the master with regard to an incident, or failed to ensure that 
systems are in place and are being adhered to, and such faults caused loss or damage to 
cargo, the shipowner will be deemed to be privy to the faults and denied the benefit of the 
nautical fault exemption. 
7.1.2.4. Documentary Evidence and Discovery
In 1969, the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals opined that “it is almost impossible for 
the shipper to prove that the carrier was negligent or lacked due diligence because as a 
practical matter all evidence on those issues is in the carrier’s hands.”825 It has been 
widely argued that with the implementation of the ISM Code, cargo interests will no 
  
822 Poulos, G. “Legal Implications of the ISM Code: New Impediments to Sea Fever” (1996) 9 U.S.F. Mar. 
L.J. 37, at p. 46, relying on commentary in Lloyd’s List and Fairplay. 
823 Poulos, ibid, at p. 50; See also In re Hercules Carriers Inc., 768 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1985), for a 
particularly expansive view of ‘privity or knowledge’ of the shipowner. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals 
considered the instance where the vessel collided with a bridge in Florida while under the control of a pilot 
causing both property loss and loss of life. The Court of Appeals found that excessive speed in poor 
visibility was the principle cause of the collision, but nevertheless held the shipowner fully responsible on 
the basis that it was lax in enforcing the regulations and guidelines that the master retained responsibility 
for the navigation of the vessel, and in effect demonstrated a policy of instructing crews not to countermand 
pilots.
824 Poulos, ibid, at p. 51. 
825 Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc v. S.S. Hong Kong Producer [1969] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 536 (2 Cir. 1969), at p. 
543. 
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longer be finding themselves empty handed with regard to documentary evidence. By 
virtue of the requirements under the ISM Code, the SMS not only provides procedures by 
which a shipowner may verify that it is in fact in continual compliance with the rules and 
regulations, it mandates that these procedures must be documented and recorded.826
Indeed, the mandated written documentation includes comprehensive safety and 
environmental programs, training requirements for master and crew, and internal 
audits.827 Moreover, copies of vessel and equipment maintenance procedures, including 
inspections, discrepancy reports and corrective actions, are also kept aboard the vessel.828
Finally, the ISM Code requires that the SMS contain procedures for the internal reporting 
of and corrective action relating to any “non-conformities, accidents and hazardous 
situations”,829 including “near-accidents”.830
The result is that there is a now a wealth of documentation concerning ship 
operations that may be available to interested parties.831 The potential impact of such 
documents for claimants or litigants with respected to maritime liability disputes has not 
gone unnoticed; “[p]rior to ISM implementation deadlines it may well have been hoped 
that such evidence would exist – it can now be presumed that it will exist or, if it does 
not, then the ship operator may need a very good explanation as to why it does not 
exist!”832 Moreover it is thought that the existence of voluminous written documentation 
may lead to speculative litigation, as one author notes that “[t]ransparency may indeed 
  
826 Anderson, P. ISM Code: A Practical Guide to the Legal and Insurance Implications (1998) LLP, 
London, at p. 18.
827 Rodriguez, A. & Hubbard, M. “The International Safety Management (ISM) Code: A New Level of 
Uniformity” (1999) 73 Tul. L. Rev. 1585, at p. 1599. 
828 Allen, C. “The ISM Code and Shipowner Records: Shared Safety Goals vs. Industry’s Privacy Needs” 
(1998) 11 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. 1, at p. 12. 
829 ISM Code, Article 9. 
830 Allen, C. “The ISM Code and Shipowner Records: Shared Safety Goals vs. Industry’s Privacy Needs” 
(1998) 11 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. 1, at p. 12, noting that the United States Coast Guard has interpreted the ISM 
Code to require both the reporting of actual accidents, and the reporting of “near-accidents”.
831 Pamborides, G, “The ISM Code: Potential Legal Implications” noted that “[i]n general the new Code 
introduces transparency in shipping and something which will shed light on the everyday operations of a 
ship, and area which up until now has remained as an exclusive privilege of the shipowner. This is now 
bound to change, giving access to such information to all other interested parties.” (As quoted by Anderson, 
P. ISM Code: A Practical Guide to the Legal and Insurance Implications (1998) LLP, London, at p. 19).  
832 Anderson, P. “The ISM and ISPS Codes: A Critical Analysis of Content, Philosophy and Legal 
Implications” in Liability Regimes in Contemporary Maritime Law (2007) D. Rhidian Thomas (Ed.), 
Informa, London, at p. 178.
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lead to an open invitation to plaintiffs to press claims hoping that examination of 
documents may lead to discovery of shortcomings.”833 Should the claimant find any 
deficiencies in the documentary evidence, this will likely lead the court to draw an 
adverse inference against the carrier. It has been noted that  “the documentation chain is 
almost invariably going to contain some imperfections, and these are likely to be 
exploited by claimants – the greater the volume of documentation, the greater the risk of 
inconsistencies…There is also a risk that more documentation will make things look 
worse than they actually are – many non-compliances may be minor, but in the hands of a 
skilled claimant lawyer they will be made to look like a chapter of disasters…The 
claimant lawyer will also be looking for additional documents in order to establish what 
systems were or should have been in place…He will then consider whether, under the 
circumstance, the system was adequate and whether it was being operated properly.”834
One aspect of the issue that has yet to be fully addressed, however, is whether all 
the documentation produced by virtue of the requirements of the ISM Code will be 
discoverable by civil litigants. Neither SOLAS nor the ISM Code address whether 
documentation produced in compliance with the Code, such as records and reports, are 
discoverable by claimants or admissible against the shipowner.835 An American Professor 
has argued that several evidence rules may be implicated, for example, the documents 
may be privileged under the work-product doctrine,836 they may be barred as evidence of 
remedial actions under the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the documents could 
constitute hearsay but may be admissible as a party admission or under the business 
  
833 Somers, E. “Effects of ISM on the Limitation of Liability: the End or a New Beginning?” [1999] ETL 
37, at p. 41.
834 Anderson, P. ISM Code: A Practical Guide to the Legal and Insurance Implications (1998) LLP, 
London, at p. 119-120. 
835 Allen, C. “The ISM Code and Shipowner Records: Shared Safety Goals vs. Industry’s Privacy Needs” 
(1998) 11 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. 1, at p. 29. 
836 Ibid, at p. 15. The work-product doctrine is a construct of American evidence law by virtue of which, all 
documents including internal reports and memorandum, including those not prepared by an attorney, will 
be privileged if they were prepared in anticipation of litigation. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 
(1947) at p. 510-511, where the United States Supreme Court first used the term “work product doctrine”. 
It is a more expansive doctrine than the solicitor-client privilege and the litigation privilege known to 
Canadian and English solicitors, and both jurisdictions have rejected it. See Strass v. Goldsack (1975) 58 
D.L.R. (3d) 397 (Alta. C.A.), at p. 426, where the Alberta Court of Appeal, a Canadian Provincial Court of 
Appeal, explicitly rejected the approach. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
163
records exception.837 Under English law however, it has been argued that documentation 
produced under the ISM Code will likely not be privileged on the basis of the Waugh v. 
British Railways case.838 In that instance, the question arose whether an internal Railway 
Inspectorate Report was privileged following an incident.839 The House of Lords 
questioned whether the report was created for the sole or dominant purpose of obtaining 
information for contemplated litigation or for the purposes of legal advice.840 The House 
of Lords held that as the aim of the report was with respect to safety analysis, it was not 
privileged and therefore discoverable.841 Documentation produced for the purposes of 
compliance with the ISM Code, can therefore hardly be argued to fall within either the 
solicitor-client privilege or the litigation privilege, given that their sole or dominant 
purpose is compliance. One is therefore left to conclude that whether the documentation 
produced by virtue of the ISM Code is discoverable or admissible will likely be 
determined on a case-by-case basis depending on the facts, and will arguably vary 
considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
Contrary to the speculations above, it has been argued that the documentation of 
shipboard operations as required by the ISM Code is not by any means a drastic departure 
from the existing practice. Rather, most companies already maintain manuals for key 
shipboard operations, deck and engine logs, survey reports and maintenance records, 
which have in the past often been relied on by plaintiff’s counsel to establish negligence 
or unseaworthiness.842 Nevertheless, one cannot discount that the ISM Code 
documentation relating to the training requirements, internal audits, accidents and near 
accidents, if discoverable and admissible, is a potentially powerful tool in the arsenal of 
any attorney.  
  
837 Allen, ibid, at pp. 15-16. 
838 Özçayir, Z. Port State Control (2001) LLP, London, at p. 333. 
839 Waugh v. British Railways Board [1980] A.C. 521 (H.L.) 
840 Ibid, at p. 531-533. 
841 Ibid, at p. 533 & 538. 
842 Poulos, G. “Legal Implications of the ISM Code: New Impediments to Sea Fever” (1996) 9 U.S.F. Mar. 
L.J. 37, at p. 49. 
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7.1.3. The ISPS Code
Although the events of September 11, 2001 created an impetus with respect to the 
development and implementation of a security code, it has been noted that the 
development of a security code was advancing prior to 2001.843 Nevertheless, after 2001 
the work intensified with the IMO Assembly adopting a resolution calling for a thorough 
review of existing measures to prevent terrorist acts against ships and improve security 
aboard and ashore.844 A diplomatic conference was convened in December 2002 to adopt 
new security regulations, the most far reaching of which was the International Ship and 
Port Facility Security Code, the ISPS Code, which came into force on July 1, 2004, 
through its incorporation into the SOLAS Convention.845
Under the ISPS Code, the shipowner must undertake a ship security assessment 
and ensure that a ship security plan is created for each ship that conforms to the extensive 
mandatory requirements of the ISPS Code and have the plan approved by the 
Administration of the Flag State.846 Moreover, the shipping company must obtain a ship 
security certificate, and in order to do so, a company security officer for the company and 
a ship security officer for each vessel must be appointed.847 It is the company security 
officer and the ship security officer who bear the responsibility for ensuring that the 
aforementioned ship security plan is prepared, approved, and then kept on board each 
vessel.848 Where vessels are non-compliant or do not carry the necessary certificates and 
  
843 Kverndal, S. “The ISM and ISPS Codes: Influence on the Evolution of Liabilities” in Liability Regimes 
in Contemporary Maritime Law (2007) D. Rhidian Thomas (Ed.), Informa, London, at p. 164.
844 Balkin, R. “The International Maritime Organization and Maritime Security” (2006) 30 Tul. Mar. L.J. 1, 
at p. 16; Michel, K. War, Terror and Carriage by Sea (2004) LLP, London, at p. 745, notes that following 
September 11, 2001, the United States was one of the primary sponsors of regulating security and safety in 
the shipping industry.  
845 Balkin, ibid, at p. 16-17 describes the diplomatic conference held in 2002, noting that it attracted a great 
deal of interest. Balkin at p. 17 also describes the tacit amendment procedure by virtue of which the ISPS 
Code, incorporated as Chapter XI-2 of SOLAS, entered into force automatically for all state parties to the 
SOLAS Convention. 
846 Kverndal, S. “The ISM and ISPS Codes: Influence on the Evolution of Liabilities” in Liability Regimes 
in Contemporary Maritime Law (2007) D. Rhidian Thomas (Ed.), Informa, London, at p. 164. Kverndal 
notes that the ISPS Code allows, in certain instances, the ship security plan to be approved by a substitute 
for the Flag State, such as a recognized security organization in accordance with articles 4.3 and 9.2 of the 
ISPS Code. 
847 Balkin, R. “The International Maritime Organization and Maritime Security” (2006) 30 Tul. Mar. L.J. 1, 
at p. 18-19; Michel, K. War, Terror and Carriage by Sea (2004) LLP, London, at pp. 800-801. 
848 Balkin, ibid, at p. 19. 
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documentation, they “run the risk of not being allowed to enter their chosen ports of 
call.”849
ISPS Code compliance has become not only an issue between the vessel owner 
and the Flag State, it has evolved from simply a statutory requirement to become a 
contractual requirement as well. Owners, charterers, brokers and insurers have rendered 
compliance with the ISPS Code a standard contractual requirement.850 For example, both 
BIMCO’s voyage charterparties and time charterparties contain clauses mandating ISPS 
compliance.851 Moreover, even without express compliance clauses, it could very well be 
argued that the failure to become ISPS compliant would render the vessel unseaworthy, 
in particular, in the context of voyage charters. “A vessel is not seaworthy unless she is in 
possession of the documents necessary to her legal and efficient performance of the 
voyage undertaken, such as those required by the law of her flag, by her classification 
society and by the laws, regulations or lawful administrative practices of governmental or 
local authorities at the vessel’s ports of call.”852 With respect to any damage or loss, the 
unseaworthiness would have to be causative of that loss. Given the subject matter of the 
ISPS Code, the most likely scenario would be loss or damage arising from the vessel 
being detained or turned away from the port of delivery on the basis of non-compliance 
with the ISPS Code.853 In the context of time charterers, non-compliance with the ISPS 
Code causing delays may have ramifications with respect to the payment of hire.854
Arguably, it would depend on the facts of the case, in particular the wording of the 
offhire clause, and whether delays resulting from ISPS non-compliance constitute an off-
hire event under the charterparty. Nevertheless, one author has concluded that where an 
  
849 Ibid, at p. 20.
850 Kverndal, S. “The ISM and ISPS Codes: Influence on the Evolution of Liabilities” in Liability Regimes 
in Contemporary Maritime Law (2007) D. Rhidian Thomas (Ed.), Informa, London, at p. 164.
851 The 2005 ISPS/MTSA Clauses for Time Charterparties and Voyage Charterparties are re-printed in 
Kverndal, ibid, at pp. 167-168.
852 Cooke, J., et al, Voyage Charters 2nd Ed. (2001) LLP, London, at p. 205. 
853 The ISPS Code mandates that in order to enter a ISPS compliant port, a vessel must demonstrate that it 
has obtained a “Declaration of Security” at each of the last ten ports that it has entered. If the vessel cannot 
demonstrate this, it is prevented from entering ISPS compliant ports, and as such may very well be 
considered unseaworthy for the purposes of trading to ISPS compliant ports. See Williams, R. “The Effect 
of Maritime Violence on Contracts if Carriage by Sea” (2004) 10 JIML 343, at pp. 349-351.  
854 Michel, K. War, Terror and Carriage by Sea (2004) LLP, London, at p. 806-812, for an extensive 
review of English jurisprudence on timecharters in relation to regulatory requirements, delay and off-hire 
clauses. 
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offhire clause contains the wording “whatsoever” after “any other cause”, particularly in 
the context of the NYPE form, and the vessel is “unable to work on account of security 
considerations, [it] may lead to argument as to whether or not the vessel should be 
considered as offhire during such period.”855
The volume of available documentation created by virtue of ISM Code 
compliance provides the litigant with a wealth of discovery material to use when 
mounting a claim against the shipowner for loss or damage. In this respect, the ISPS 
Code differs. The documented procedures required under the ISPS Code, such as the ship 
security plan and the company security plan, are confidential with access restricted to a 
limited number of individuals.856 As such, one could argue that its practical significance 
with respect to discovery in civil litigation is limited. In general, it has been noted that the 
ISPS Code “sets a practical rather than a legal standard of what is required of a 
reasonable and prudent shipowner.”857 Nevertheless, despite increased shipowner 
obligations under the ISPS Code, it appears that its potential effects, if any, with respect 
to carriage litigation centre on document and compliance oriented delays. As such, its 
impact in relation to the nautical fault exemption is likely to be minimal. 
7.2. THE JUDICIAL TREND TOWARDS A RESTRICTIVE VIEW OF THE 
EXEMPTION 
Is has been noted on numerous occasions that the courts are becoming 
increasingly hostile to the concept of nautical fault, or that where the exemption is 
pleaded it is often unsuccessful in the current judicial climate. Assertions of restrictive 
treatment of the exemption by the judiciary are rarely supported by jurisprudential 
examples.858 Rather the statements are made as if such a trend was widely known fact, 
  
855 Michel, K. War, Terror and Carriage by Sea (2004) LLP, London, at p. 813. 
856 Anderson, P. “The ISM and ISPS Codes: A Critical Analysis of Content, Philosophy and Legal 
Implications” in Liability Regimes in Contemporary Maritime Law (2007) D. Rhidian Thomas (Ed.), 
Informa, London, at p. 178.
857 Ibid.
858 For example, Sturley, M. “An Overview of the Considerations Involved in Handling the Cargo Case” 
(1997) 21 Tul. Mar. L.J. 263, at p. 308, states that “In view of the difficulties in establishing negligence in 
the navigation or management of the ship, and the courts’ hostility towards the defence, it is not surprising 
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and should thus be taken for granted. Indeed, most maritime law practitioners, 
particularly with respect to cargo claims, can attest to the noticeable decline in claims 
litigation in recent years. Is the fact that nautical fault is less frequently pleaded with 
success evidence of a judicial hostility towards the defence? Arguably, it is difficult to 
say. In practice, there are several factors that have impacted the volume of jurisprudence 
on the topic of the nautical fault exemption. It has been noted that “even where the Hague 
or Hague-Visby Rules are applied, in practice the defences available to the carrier have 
become more restricted. In the context of the Hague Rules, this means that in many 
countries it is increasingly difficult for the carrier to prove the exercise of due diligence 
to make the ship seaworthy, and it more difficult for him to rely on some of the 
exceptions listed in Article 4 Rule 2.”859 The ever increasing number of regulations, 
codes and conventions that impact the manning, management and maintenance of vessels 
has arguably impacted the notion of seaworthiness, render it increasingly difficult for the 
shipowner to demonstrate due diligence. In addition, there has been a marked increase in 
arbitration in the past several decades, evidently resulting in a marked decline in cargo 
claims litigation. Alternative dispute resolution and the increasing amount of regulatory 
requirements only partially explain that there are fewer successful applications of the 
exemption in recent years. Although such a statement regarding the decline of the 
successful use of the exemption may be technically accurate, one may very well argue 
that it is due to the fact that the clearer instances of application are being settled, while 
only the most contentious and uncertain areas are being litigated. Despite statements that 
the protection offered by the defence is being eroded, one cannot help but take note of the 
fact that in other instances it is being expanded. This is exemplified by nautical fault in 
the context of charterparties, where the courts have most certainly not adopted a 
restrictive approach to the interpretation of the defence. Specifically, in the United States, 
the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that the nautical fault exemption is 
available before the commencement of the voyage, thus expanding the previous scope of 
     
that the defence rarely succeeds, particularly in recent years.” However Sturley provides no jurisprudential 
support for his statement; See also Delwaide, L. “The Hamburg Rules: A Choice for the EEC? Conclusion” 
in The Hamburg Rules: A Choice for the EEC? (1994) European Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, 
Maklu, Antwerpen, at p. 206: “…the Court’s decisions show a growing reluctance to admit the existence of 
nautical fault…”.
859 Goldie, C. “Effect of the Hamburg Rules on Shipowners’ Liability Insurance” (1993) 24 JMLC 111, at 
p. 112. 
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the defence. For one to pronounce on a clear judicial trend, is perhaps an 
oversimplification of what in practice is a much more complex phenomenon. That being 
said, three nations can exemplify differing approaches with regard to trends. France is 
truly the only nation where there is a definite, clear and easily discernable trend to 
judicially restrict the exemption. In contrast, in the United States, certain authors have 
commented on the trend towards a restrictive interpretation, yet an examination of the 
past century of jurisprudence fails to reveal a hostile judiciary. Finally, in Germany, the 
courts have acknowledged hostility towards the exemption, yet they have openly refused 
to judicially restrict the exemption on the basis that the legislature has expressly chosen 
not to amend the applicable provision of the German Commercial Code (HGB).
7.2.1. France
Under French law, the exemption of nautical fault is the main departure from the 
droit commun liability of carrier which is a strict obligation de resultat.860 France has 
always had a strong principle of vicarious liability, and prior to the Law of 2 April 1936 
and the Law of 18 June 1966, carriers would be held liable for acts such as the master 
mistreating a crewman, or even a master shooting a seaman on board the vessel.861 It has 
been noted that faute nautique is often pleaded before the French courts, yet the decisions 
of the courts have not always been consistent.862 In recent years, however, a trend is most 
certainly developing. “Le champ d’application de ce cas excepté a fluctué au gré d’une 
evolution jurisprudentielle constante dans son hostilité, pour finalement être réduit á une 
application restrictive voire résiduelle.”863 Not only are the courts more hostile to the 
defence, “ils expriment surtout leur reticence à venir admettre l’exonération du 
transporteur pour faute nautique.”864 In 2001, the Cour de Cassation considered the 
  
860 Song, S. A Comparative Study on Maritime Cargo Carrier’s Liability in Anglo-American and French 
Laws (1970) PhD Thesis, Cornell University, Ann Arbor, Michigan, at p. 124. 
861 Ibid, at p. 217. 
862 Rodière, R. & du Pontavice, E., Droit Maritime, 12th Ed. (1997) Dalloz, Paris, at p. 345. 
863 Tassel, Y. & Le Bayon. “40 ans D’Application des Cas Exceptés de Responsibilité des Règles de La 
Haye-Visby” [2005] DMF 908, at p. 912. [Author’s translation: The field of application of this exemption 
has fluctuated due a constant jurisprudential evolution in its hostility, with the application finally being 
reduced to a restrictive and residual application.] 
864 Molfessis, N. “Observations” following the judgment of the Cour de Cassation, 20 fevrier 2001, DMF 
2001, 919, at p. 922.[Author’s translation: they are expressing above all their reticence to allow the 
exoneration of the carrier for nautical fault.] Similarly, Bonassies, P. & Delebecque, P. “Le droit positif 
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instance in which a cargo of sugar was wetted as a result of an error in ballasting on the 
part of a crewmember.865 The Cour d’Appel de Paris in that instance had found that “une 
manoeuvre de ballastage, destinée à assurer la stabilité et, par là, la sécurité du naivre 
étant une operation nautique, la faute commise à cette occation par l’un des officiers, 
exonère le transporteur maritime de sa responsabilité.”866 The Cour de Cassation 
annulled the decision, holding that to benefit from the exemption the carrier must prove 
that his error actually affected the stability and the safety of the vessel, otherwise he is 
liable.867 The Cour de Cassation opined that “le caractère nautique d’une operation 
n’entrainant pas nécessairement le caractére nautique de la faute commise au cour de 
cette operation…”868 This is a departure from the jurisprudence in other jurisdictions 
where it is the purpose of the act, rather than its unintended effects, that is the defining 
characteristic. This is also a departure from the earlier leading French jurisprudence. 
Previously, it was irrelevant whether the fault of the master or the crewmember actually 
affected the stability or security of the vessel; the only relevant criteria was the object or 
purpose of the faulty act, thus if the purpose of the act was in relation to the management 
of the cargo (loading, stowing discharging) it was not a nautical fault.869 In commentary, 
it has been previously noted that the French position was in line with the position adopted 
by the American courts, with particular reference made to The Germanic.870 This, 
however, is not the case today. The 2001 Cour de Cassation decision has been followed 
     
francais en 2003” [2004] DMF (H.S.) 1, at p. 81, have noted that the French courts are openly hostile 
towards nautical fault.
865 Cour de Cassation, 20 fevr er 2001, DMF 2001, 919. 
866 Molfessis, N. “Observations” following the judgment of the Cour de Cassation, 20 fevrier 2001, DMF 
2001, 919, at p. 921. Note that it is practice in France to have several pages of doctrinal commentary 
following decisions, that quote from the courts and often explain the reasoning, as the French justices, 
unlike their Commonwealth and American brethren, tend to simply have a page or two at the most that 
simply records the decision and the briefest of reasons. [Author’s translation: an act of ballasting, aimed at 
assuring the stability and the safety and security of the ship is a operation ‘nautique’, as the fault was 
committed by one of the officers, the carrier is exonerated of responsibility.] 
867 Cour de Cassation, 20 fevrier 2001, DMF 2001, 919, at p. 920.
868 Ibid. [Author’s translation: the nautical character of the act does not necessarily mean that the fault 
committed during that act is nautical.] 
869 Cour de Cassation, 26 fevrier 1991, (Aude), DMF 1991, 358, where during discharge The Aude listed, 
due to an error in the discharging, causing the crewmen to sacrifice cargo in order to right the vessel, and 
the Cour de Cassation found this to be a faute commerciale. See also Lafage, G.H. “Faute commercial at 
faute nautique” DMF 1963, 105, at p. 111 noting that to determine whether a fault is nautical or not, one 
must look to the type of act and the purpose of the act. 
870 Bonassies, P. “Le droit positif francais en 1991 (III)” DMF 1992, 147, at p. 160. In Oceanic Steam 
Navigation Co. v. Aitken (The Germanic), 196 U.S. 589 (1904), the United State Supreme Court opined 
with respect to the “primary purpose text” in the context of an error in ballasting. 
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in The Fort Fleur d’Epee, where a ballasting error had wetted the cargo and the carrier 
pleaded faute nautique.871 The Cour d’Appel de Versailles held the carrier liable for faute 
commerciale as he failed to satisfy his obligation to prove that the inundation resulting 
from the error had affected the stability and safety of the vessel.872 In commentary 
following The Fort Fleur d’Epee, Tassel suggested that either faute nautique will soon 
effectively disappear as an exonerating defence, or through restrictive interpretation the 
only errors that may be characterized as faute nautique are ones that would fall under the 
strictest interpretation of the English phrase ‘error in navigation’.873 The Cour de 
Cassation heard the appeal of the Fort Fleur d’Epee, and rejected it on the basis that the 
carrier had not demonstrated that the infiltration of ballast water affected the safety and 
stability of the vessel.874 The analysis in relation to incidents that affect the safety and the 
stability of the vessel has continued in subsequent cases. In The MSC Regina, the Cour 
d’Appel de Rouen found that the existence of a faute nautique was not established even 
though the carrier proved that “le capitaine a fait un mauvais choix de route et adopté 
une vitesse excessive, il n’est pas démontré que ces fautes étaient de nature à intéresser 
l’equilibre et la s’écurité du navire.”875 The Chambre Arbitral Maritime de Paris 
considered the instance where sixty-one containers were lost overboard in a storm, while 
the captain was travelling both at an excessive speed and perpendicular to the direction of 
the wind.876 The Tribunal acknowledged that as the navigational errors affected the safety 
of the entire maritime adventure as opposed to simply the safety of the containers, then 
this constituted faute nautique. Nevertheless, the Tribunal found also that errors in 
  
871 Cour d’Appel de Versailles, 20 decembre 2001, (Fort Fleur d’Epee), DMF 2002, 251. 
872 Ibid, at p. 255. 
873 Tassel, Y. “Observations” following the judgement of the Cour d’Appel de Versailles, 20 decembre 
2001, (Fort Fleur d’Epee), DMF 2002, 251, at p. 259.  As well, Bonassies, P. “Le droit positif français en 
2002” [2003] DMF (H.S.) 1, at p. 71, comments that the judgement in the Fort Fleur d’Epee, “ce n’est 
peut-être pas encore (ou pas tout à fait) le requiem de la faute nautique, mais le refoulement continue – et 
la chose est certainement justifiée.”[Author’s translation: is not quite yet, or rather not entirely, requiem for 
nautical fault, however the repression continues, which is certainly justified.]
874 Cour de Cassation, 3 décembre 2003, (Fort Fleur d’Epée), DMF 2004, 626, at p. 629. 
875 Cour d’Appel de Rouen, 11 septembre 2003, (MSC Regina), DMF 2004, 622, at p. 624. In this instance, 
a container went overboard, and the Cour d’Appel held the carrier liable, on the basis of faulty lashing.  
[Author’s translation: the captain selected the wrong route and travelled at an excessive speed, because the 
carrier had not demonstrated that these faults were of a nature that would affect the safety and the stability 
of the vessel.]
876 Sentence 1077 du 18 novembre 2002, Chambre Arbitral Maritime de Paris, DMF 2003, 995, at p. 997.
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relation to the lashing of the containers caused two-thirds of the damage, and accordingly 
held the carrier liable to cargo interests.877
Restricting the notion of faute nautique in relation to errors affecting the cargo is 
not the only means by which the French tribunals have sought to narrow the exemption. It 
has been noted that in order to neutralize the effects of the exemption, the French 
tribunals will, where there is a faute nautique, examine the actions of the carrier, master 
and crew in order to find some inadequacy that can be characterized as a failure to 
exercise due diligence.878 A prime example of this is the recent decision by the Cour 
d’Appel de Bordeaux in The Heiberg.879 In that instance, the Captain left the bridge for 
the engine room in order to stop the ballasting operation, leaving a seaman without 
extensive training and the pilot alone on the bridge. A collision followed which 
extensively damaged the cargo, and the shipowner pleaded faute nautique. The Cour 
d’Appel de Bordeaux refused to allow the shipowner to benefit from the exemption on 
the basis that “…si la faute du commandant du navire a bien été une faute nautique 
puisqu’elle a été commise à l’occasion du pilotage du navire, cette faute a été elle-même 
la suite et le résultat des fautes de l’armateur qui ne s’était pas assuré de la cohesion de 
l’équipage.”880
The restrictive judicial attitude towards nautical fault has prompted one author to 
comment; “la faute nautique n’a pas la faveur des tribunaux français. Ils ne peuvent 
l’éliminer de leurs décisions, puisqu’elle leur imposée par les texts. Ils font tout pour en 
réduire le domaine. Cela ne saurait étonner eu étonner eu égard au caractère 
contradictoire de la notion, laquelle veut que l’entreprise maritime soit d’autant 
responsible que son préposé est fautif.”881 Indeed, the future of the nautical fault 
  
877 Ibid.
878 Bonassies, P. & Scapel, C. Droit Maritime (2006) Librairie générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, Paris, 
at p. 702. 
879 Cour d’Appel de Bordeaux, 31 mai 2005, (Heidberg), DMF 2005, 839. 
880 Ibid, at p. 844. [Author’s translation: even if the master of the vessel’s fault is a nautical fault on the 
basis of its relation to the pilot of the vessel, this fault followed and was the result of the shipowner’s 
failure to assure the proper cohesiveness and functioning of the crew.]
881 Molfessis, N. as quoted by Bonassies, P. “Le droit positif francais en 2001” DMF (H.S.) 2002, 1, at p. 
72. [Author’s translation: the nautical fault exemption finds no favour with the French tribunals. They 
cannot actually eliminate the exemption as it is imposed on them by law. They are however doing 
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exemption under French law is bleak, as it is evidently a notion whose popularity is in 
decline.882 Given this, it is therefore highly unlikely that the judicial trend in France 
towards a restrictive interpretation of faute nautique will reverse itself. 
7.2.2. United States
Greenwood, in 1971, after a review of jurisprudence involving due diligence to 
make the vessel seaworthy, the obligation to care for the cargo, and the nautical fault 
exemption, concluded: “It would be of interest, no doubt, to state, if the situation 
warranted such a statement, that a comparison of recent cases in this area with the 
landmark decisions of the past shows a discernable trend in favour of either the shipper or 
the carrier. However, in this writer’s opinion, no such statement is possible. During the 
period when personal injury plaintiffs have enjoyed greater and greater assistance from 
the courts…it would appear that cargo plaintiffs…have been able to do little more than to 
hold the ground already held by them.”883 On the other hand, Sturley, over twenty years 
later, argued that “[i]n view of the difficulties in establishing negligence in the 
navigational management of the ship, and the courts’ hostility towards the defence, it is 
not surprising that the defence rarely succeeds, particularly in recent years.”884 Sturley, 
however, provides no support, jurisprudential or otherwise, for his statement.885 A review 
of American jurisprudence on nautical fault fails to produce judgments or opinions that 
     
everything possible to reduce its scope. This is not surprising given the contradictory character of the 
exemption, which is that the maritime carrier is not responsible for the faults of his officials.]  
882 Bonassies, P. & Scapel, C. Droit Maritime (2006) Librairie générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, Paris, 
at p. 706; Bonassies, P. & Delebecque, P. “Le droit positif français en 2005” [2006] DMF (H.S.) 1, at p. 60 
comment that it is without a doubt that that faute nautique is being interpreted in an increasingly strict 
manner, however they attribute it to the fact that it is a notion from a past era; Bonassies, P. & Delebecque, 
P. “Le droit positif français en 2004” [2005] DMF (H.S.) 1, at p. 85, noting the increasingly strict 
interpretation of the notion of faute nautique. 
883 Greenwood, E. “Problems of Negligence in Loading, Stowage, Custody, Care, and Delivery of Cargo” 
(1971) 45 Tul. L. Rev. 790, at p. 806. 
884 Sturley, M. “An Overview of Considerations in Handling the Cargo Case” (1997) 21 Tul. Mar. L.J. 263, 
at p. 308. See also Sturley, M. “Proposed Amendments to the US Carriage of Goods by Sea Act: A 
Response to English Criticisms” [1999] LMLCQ 519, at p. 527, stating “[u]nder US law as currently 
applied, however, the [nautical fault] defence is very rarely successful.”
885 In Sturley, M. “Uniformity in the Law Governing the Carriage of Goods by Sea” (1995) 26 JMLC 553, 
at p. 577, he comments “shippers certainly have trouble understanding why they should lose any recovery 
for cargo damage when a carrier is able to prove that its own employees were negligent. Court also have 
trouble understanding this, with the result that the navigational fault defence is rarely, if ever, successful in 
the United States.” Again, no support is provided in the article for the above statement. Although, Sturley’s 
statement has been taken as a given and is quoted by several authors with approval. See Hare, J. Shipping 
Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, (1999) Juta & Co, Cape Town, at p. 632. 
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are overtly hostile to nautical fault in any manner even remotely resembling the French 
courts. It would perhaps be overly simplistic to note the fact that there are fewer instances 
of the successful use of the nautical fault exemption in American courts and attribute it to 
the hostility of the courts. Rather, one cannot discount the fact that the scope of the 
exemption, though not entirely settled, can be described as fairly well delineated such 
that settlement has become much more likely in practice. The grey areas, where courts 
are perhaps not as likely to find in favour of the carrier are the ones being pleaded. As 
well, comments such as Sturley’s statement become slightly more difficult to justify in 
light of The Jalavihar in 1997, in which the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a view 
of the exemption that is arguably much wider than what courts had previously found.886 It 
would appear that Greenwood’s view of the body of jurisprudence is preferable, as there
are instances where the balance swings in favour of the carrier and others where the 
shipper benefits, yet overall one would have a difficult time discerning a clear trend from 
the American jurisprudence. 
7.2.3. Germany
The Hanseatic Court of Appeal of Hamburg recently displayed a notable respect 
for the express wording in the German Commercial Code (HGB) despite having voiced 
its awareness of opposition to the notion of nautical fault. The Hanseatic Court of Appeal 
of Hamburg in 2003 overturned the Regional Court’s holding that where a first officer, 
qualified as a second deck officer, had insufficient knowledge concerning watch-keeping 
regulations and had turned off the watch-alarm, fallen asleep, and grounded the vessel, 
the carrier was not protected by the nautical fault exemption.887 The Higher Regional 
Court considered what it felt to be clear wording in s.607, which provides: “1. The carrier 
shall be liable for any fault on the part of his servants and the crew. 2. If the loss is due to 
any conduct in the navigation or management of the ship or to fire, then carrier shall only 
be liable if there is actual fault or privity on his part. The management of the ship does 
not include such conduct that is primarily directed towards the care of the cargo.” The
  
886 Usinas Siderugicas De Minas Geras v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. (The Jalavihar), 1997 AMC 2762 
(5 Cir. 1997), where the Court of Appeals saw no reason to restrict the nautical fault exemption to errors 
occurring after the commencement of the voyage. 
887 Cargo Interests on Board MV Cita v. Time-charterers of MV Cita (2003) 6 U 220/00 (Higher Regional 
Court Hamburg) available at: www.onlinedmc.co.uk. 
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Hanseatic Court of Appeal therefore “found itself prevented from reducing the scope of 
application of this provision by way of judicial construction, since the legislature had to 
date, in spite of a) the well-known concerns about this provision and b) the technical 
developments in shipping, not seen the need for any adjustment.”888 In 2006, the Federal 
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Hanseatic Court of Appeal, finding that the 
Court of Appeal had correctly adjudged that the defendant was not liable due to the 
exemption of liability for errors in navigation and management of the vessel.889 The 
Federal Supreme Court held that all the contributing causes of the loss, setting a new 
course, switching off the watch-alarm, watch keeping with only one person, and fatigue, 
were in fact measures relating to the navigation and management of the vessel. Moreover, 
the Federal Supreme Court stated that based on the express wording of s. 607 of the 
HGB, the exemption for errors in navigation or management of the vessel applies both in 
cases of negligence and in cases of intent.890 Unlike the Court of Appeal who considered 
judicially reducing the scope of the exemption, but found itself prevented from doing so, 
the Federal Supreme Court saw no reason to judicially restrict the exemption, and opined 
in obiter on the potentially expansive nature of the exemption. The MV Cita provides a 
clear example of judicial resistance to narrowing the scope of the nautical fault 
exemption. The argument could be made that this is perhaps the best approach, given that 
such decisions should be left to the legislature. Regardless of one’s opinion with regard to 
legal reform, when compared with the French approach, the German one, at least from 
the vantage point of legal certainty, is preferable.
7.3. A NARROW EXCEPTION?
Can nautical fault be accurately characterized as a narrow and restricted 
exemption that rarely finds any success with the judiciary?  A certain number of 
commentators would arguably find such a characterization to be an accurate 
representation of nautical fault. Experts in a field generally have a sense of the trends in 
  
888 Ibid. Description of the court’s reasoning by Bracker Boehlhoff & Luebbert.  
889 Cargo Interests on Board MV Cita v. Time-charterers of MV Cita (2006) I ZR 20/04 (Federal Supreme 
Court), available at: www.onlinedmc.co.uk. 
890 Ibid.
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their domain. If several reputable scholars and practitioners have indicated a trend with 
respect to a certain topic, one should not discount it. Nevertheless, to attribute a decline in 
the successful use of the nautical fault exemption solely to judicial hostility may in some 
respects be an erroneous assumption given the number of factors at play. Aforementioned 
factors such as alternative dispute resolution and settlement do have a significant impact. 
Recent uniform law would appear to expand the obligations incumbent on a 
shipowner with respect to seaworthiness. Just prior to the turn of the millennium, journals 
and texts were filled with commentary on the codes and conventions and their sizable 
impacts on carrier liability. Such notable predictions as “the ‘designated person’ [under 
the ISM Code] will constitute the epicentre of the strongest ‘earthquake’ ever to hit the 
seas”891 left little doubt as to the impending waves of change. However, the potentially 
far-reaching implications of the ISM Code with respect to cargo claims have remained 
just that, potential implications. One author has referred to them as “the dog that did not 
bark”.892 They have yet to materialize, as ten years after the ISM Code has come into 
force there remains a lack of jurisprudence. The same is true of the STCW Convention. 
The ISPS Code as well has not provided a boon for attorneys, and as such is a Code 
whose presence is widely felt in the shipping industry rather than the courts. It bears 
mention however, that despite the paucity of civil litigation centred around loss or 
damage resulting from the failure of shipowners to comply with one or more of their 
obligations under the aforementioned codes and conventions, the new uniform law has 
most certainly impacted the shipping industry in other areas and has arguably been a 
powerful weapon in the fight against substandard shipping.893
  
891 Pamborides, G. International Shipping Law: Legislation and Enforcement (1999) Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, at p. 178. 
892 Shaw, R. “The ISM Code and STCW Convention – Their Impact on Marine Insurance Coverage and 
Claims” in Marine Insurance at the Turn of the Millennium Volume 1 (1999) Huybrechts, M. (Eds) 
Intersentia, Antwerpen, at p. 71. 
893 See for example Özçayir, Z. Port State Control (2001) LLP, London, at pp. 344-345 detailing the 
successes of the inspection campaigns of vessels subject to the ISM Code conducted by the Paris MOU and 
Tokyo MOU. See also Michel, K. War, Terror and Carriage by Sea (2004) LLP, London, at pp. 741-745, 
for a discussion on the Paris MOU and port state control in light of the ISM Code and the ISPS Code. 
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In relation to the narrowing of the nautical fault exemption, one jurisdiction where 
the trend is both obvious and uncontested is France. The overt judicial hostility towards 
the nautical fault exemption is unmistakable. Perhaps this ensures that any subtle 
movements in other jurisdictions pale in comparison, and therefore go undetected. One 
may state with certainty that there is a general movement away from policy-based 
defences in shipping, towards fault-based approaches. This is true politically, as 
evidenced by both UNCITRAL Conventions.894 Whether this political view is finding 
root in the judiciaries of countries other than France is less clear. What can be said 
conclusively is that nautical fault generally remains a viable and key exemption in the 
shipowners’ arsenal. To date, the effects of recent uniform law appear to have more 
significance in the academic journals than the courts. While the judicial hostility towards 
the defence, seems to have truly flourished only in France. One may therefore state that 
nautical fault is in theory narrowed by recent developments, but in practice, those who 
must be truly concerned are shipowners who have the misfortune to find themselves 
before the French tribunals. 
  
894 The Hamburg Rules, and the current UNCITRAL Draft Convention.
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Chapter 8
A Failed Attempt at Modernization: The Hamburg Rules
The Hamburg Rules stand in stark contrast to the Hague Rules, both in their 
content and in their lack of success. Of the differences between the two conventions, one 
of the most notable is the glaring absence of the nautical fault exemption from the 
Hamburg Rules. There were many factors that have contributed to the lacklustre support 
that the Hamburg Rules have garnered, however chief among those is the carrier liability 
regime. The decision to eliminate nautical fault was a contentious one, that was 
influenced both by the changes in the shipping industry in the intervening years since the 
drafting of the Hague Rules and by the political nature of the drafting and negotiation 
process that produced the Hamburg Rules. Persuasive arguments were made on both side 
of the liability issue with respect to the impact any changes would have on the shipping 
industry as a whole. Due to the stillborn nature of the Hamburg Rules, the theories and 
arguments concerning the impact of the liability scheme remain unproven and untested. 
Nevertheless, a detailed discussion of the forces giving rise to the negotiation and 
drafting of the Hamburg Rules, the factors impacting the decision to eliminate nautical 
fault, and the reaction to the proposed liability scheme is warranted. Many of the 
criticisms aimed at the Hamburg Rules have resurfaced with respect to the UNCITRAL 
Draft Convention, demonstrating that perhaps the lessons from the failure of the 
Hamburg Rules have yet to be learned.
8.1. NEW PLAYERS IN A CHANGING INDUSTRY 
By the 1960s, technical advancements in shipping had begun to revolutionize 
carriage by sea. The industry as it was in the time of the Harter Act and the Hague Rules, 
was becoming unrecognisable when compared to what shipping had become half a 
century later. Moreover, technology was evolving at an exponential rate. Advancements 
such as the ‘container revolution’ were far beyond anything that the drafters of the Hague 
Rules could have anticipated. One commentator has observed that “without the container 
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the global village would still be a concept, not a reality.”895 The container revolution 
began in the late 1950s, and by the 1970s had expanded to all trading routes and 
revolutionized liner shipping “from a stagnating industry at the very limits of its 
technological capacity into a transport system of almost unlimited dynamism.”896
Previously, the liner trades were using general cargo or break bulk ships, where cargo 
arrived at the vessel by truck or boxcar and was subsequently broken into small quantities 
that were then loaded onto the vessel by slings and booms.897 Impact of the container 
revolution with respect to labour costs was drastic. “By 1960, labour costs in port 
accounted for 80% of the total cost of a typical voyage. It was estimated that the average 
handling time per voyage fell from 157 hours for a non-containerised ship to 31 hours for 
a containerised ship, reducing cargo handling costs 65 to 80%.”898 Those nations whose 
merchant fleets failed to adapt suffered drastic falls in market share and became 
marginalized in world shipping.899 While other nations, such as Great Britain, made great 
progress in adapting to the changes in the shipping industry in the 1960s.900 Not only was 
the technological and logistic side of shipping becoming increasingly modernized, the 
players involved were also changing. 
By the time UNCITRAL was preparing to consider reforming the rules of carriage 
in the late 1960’s, the interests involved in shipping differed greatly from those involved 
during the 1920’s. Former colonies had now become independent nations in their own 
right, with their own agendas.901 In the intervening years since the Hague Convention, 
  
895 C.C. Tung, CEO of Orient Overseas Container Line, quoted in Broeze, F. The Globalization of the 
Oceans: Containerisation from the 1950s to the Present (2002) Int’l Maritime Economic History Assoc., 
St. John’s, Newfoundland, at p. 1. 
896 Broeze, F. The Globalization of the Oceans: Containerisation from the 1950s to the Present (2002) Int’l 
Maritime Economic History Assoc., St. John’s, Newfoundland, at p. 3. 
897 Mandelbaum, S. “International Ocean Shipping and Risk Allocation for Cargo Loss, Damage and 
Delay: A U.S. Approach to COGSA, Hague-Visby, Hamburg and the Multimodal Rules” (1995) 5 J. 
Transnational L. & Policy 1, at p. 4. 
898 Ibid.
899 Rajnayar, B. The State and Market in India’s Shipping (1996) Manohar, New Delhi, at pp. 360-361 & 
365, describes how India’s expansion in tonnage during the 1960s, particularly in dry bulk and general 
cargo, suffered a dramatic fall in market share due to “the failure of Indian shipping to adapt to the 
container revolution.” (Ibid, at p. 361). 
900 Jamieson, A. Ebb Tide in the British Maritime Industries: Change and Adaptation, 1918-1990 (2003) 
University of Exeter Press, Exeter, at p. 137-141. 
901 Robertson, D. et al. Admiralty and Maritime Law in the United States (2001) Carolina Academic Press, 
Durham, at p. 323.
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shipping had taken on an important role in the economies of developing nations, as 
exports had begun to account for a high percentage of their gross national product.902 By 
the early 1970’s, the developing nations accounted for approximately 65 percent of all 
maritime shipments, while owning only a fractional percentage of the world’s maritime 
fleet.903 Indeed, fleet ownership was squarely in the hands of the traditional maritime 
nations. In 1970, the traditional maritime nations controlled more than 83 percent of the 
world’s gross registered tonnage, while developing nations owned 6.7 percent, with 
African countries owning a total of 0.8 percent of the world’s tonnage.904 As such, 
developing nations were viewed as ‘users’ of shipping services rather than suppliers.905
An international development strategy was adopted by the United Nations in 1970, which 
included the following objective: “to promote, by national and international action, the 
earnings of developing countries from invisible trade and to minimize the net outflow of 
foreign exchange from these countries arising from invisible transactions, including 
shipping.”906
  
902 Frederick, D. “Political Participation and Legal Reform in the International Maritime Rulemaking 
Process: From Hague Rules to the Hamburg Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 81, at p. 107.
903 Ibid, citing Haiji, “UNCTAD and Shipping” (1972) 6 World Trade L. 58, at p. 58; Karan, H. The 
Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, and Hamburg 
Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 32, noting the reverse statistic, that while newly 
independent nations were responsible for 65% of the shipments in maritime commerce, industrialized 
nations owned 93% of the mercantile fleet. 
904 Iheduru, O. The Political Economy of International Shipping in Developing Countries (1996) University 
of Delaware Press, Newark, at p. 22. Iheduru, argues that world maritime power is distressingly skewed in 
favour of traditional maritime nations, and he is particularly critical of the lack of consideration that the 
topic of maritime power and its effects on Africa have received. At p. 33, he quotes an Africanist historian 
as noting that “with few notable exceptions historians of Africa have turned their back on the [shipping] 
problem, and ignored the sea and Africa’s interactions with it…Africa’s comparative underdevelopment in 
maritime economics and technology has found expression in an underdeveloped maritime history.” Some 
African nations however were exceptionally successful with respect to the size of their merchant fleets. For 
example, in 1967, Liberia replaced Great Britain as the nation with the largest merchant fleet in the world 
(Jamieson, A. Ebb Tide in the British Maritime Industries: Change and Adaptation, 1918-1990 (2003) 
University of Exeter Press, Exeter, at p. 1). 
905 Brooks, M. Fleet Development and the Control of Shipping in Southeast Asia (1985) Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, at p. 98, also discusses first world nations, who are not traditional 
shipowning nations, such as Canada and Australia, and therefore follow a ‘user’ orientation as well. For an 
examination of nations dependent on foreign shipping and traditional shipowning nations in the 1970s and 
1980s see Brooks, at pp. 98 and ff. 
906 Iheduru, O. The Political Economy of International Shipping in Developing Countries (1996) University 
of Delaware Press, Newark, at p. 22-23. 
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The dissatisfaction with the Hague Rules had become, for the traditional maritime 
nations,907 centred around the rules for unit limitation of liability (the monetary value 
along with the rules determining the unit), time bars, the law of agency in the context of 
non-delegable duties and the use of carrier defences.908 Conversely, the developing 
nations had focused their ire on other issues. Their dissatisfaction revolved around the 
carrier’s 17 exculpatory provisions, including the “catch-all” exemption, and in particular 
the existence of the fire and nautical fault defences.909 Essentially, it was viewed by the 
developing nations that the allocation of risk was slanted heavily in favour of the carrier.  
An UNCITRAL report from the last UN session of 1969 describes the statements of the 
representatives from the developing countries: “[They] stated that present-day legislation 
in the field reflected, in many respects, an earlier economic phase of society, as well as 
attitudes and practices which seemed unduly to favour ship-owners at the expense of the 
shippers.” 910 Moreover, it was felt that the existing carriage regime, in particular the 
  
907 Although notably it was such cargo-oriented states as the U.S., Canada, Australia and France, that 
pushed for improvements. See Herber, R. “The Hamburg Rules: Origin and Need for the New Liability 
System” in The Hamburg Rules: A Choice for the EEC? (1994) European Institute of Maritime and 
Transport Law, Maklu, Antwerpen, at p. 44. 
908 Sweeney, J. “The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea (Part 1)” (1975) 7 JMLC 
69, at p. 72-73. With respect to the agency complaints, they centred around two judgments: Riverstone 
Meat Co. v. Lancashire Shipping Co (The Munster Castle) [1961] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 57 (H.L.), which rejected 
the carrier’s assertion that hiring a competent repairer or inspector was sufficient to demonstrate due 
diligence, and Adler v. Dickson (The Himalaya) [1955] 1 Q.B. 158, [1957] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 267 (C.A.) 
which opened the door for use of such Himalaya clauses to extend the benefit of the carriers exemptions to 
other parties in the maritime transaction, such as stevedores as exemplified in Scruttons v. Midland Silicons 
(1962) A.C. 446 (H.L.)).  The traditional maritime states were concerned about the non-delegable nature of 
the seaworthiness obligation and preferred to implement a duty to make a careful selection of repairers or 
inspectors (Sweeney, ibid). Secondly, there was concern about the extent of the use of the carriers defences, 
particularly where wilful acts were involved and where it was extended beyond the crew, for example to 
the stevedores (Ibid).
909 Shah, M. “The Revision of the Hague Rules on Bills of Lading Within the UN System – Key Issues” in 
The Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (1978) S. Mankabady (Ed.), British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law, Chameleon Press, London, at p. 5; Sweeney, J. “The UNCITRAL 
Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea (Part 1)” (1975) 7 JMLC 69, at p. 73-74. Other contentions 
regarding carrier’s potential liability revolved around the limits of liability, the possibility of over-all 
limitation and the fact that Article 3 was subject to Article 4 (Sweeney, ibid). 
910 Report of the United Nations Committee on International Trade Law on the work of its Second Session, 
para 26, U.N. Doc. A/7747, quoted in Werth, D. “The Hamburg Rules Revisited – A Look at the US 
Options” (1991) 22 JMLC 59, at p. 64; See Basnayake, S. “Carriage of Goods by Sea” (1979) 27 Am. J. 
Comp. L. 353, at p. 354, noting that developing nations felt that the existing international regimes did not 
strike a fair balance between shippers and shipowners; See also Shah, M. “The Revision of the Hague 
Rules on Bills of Lading Within the UN System – Key Issues” in The Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea (1978) S. Mankabady (Ed.), British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 
Chameleon Press, London, at p. 6, who makes an interesting comparison with respect to the dissatisfaction 
of the developing nations by noting that: “some fifty years after the adoption of the Hague Rules, we find, 
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exemption for nautical fault, was harmful to the economies of the developing nations.911
Sweeney has commented on the position of the developing nations in a more politically 
oriented fashion; “Dissatisfaction of the developing world stems essentially from the 
belief that the operation of traditional maritime law (along with other aspects of world 
trade) impairs the balance of payments position of developing states so as to insure 
continued poverty and perpetual under-development in an industrial age.”912 It was this 
state of affairs, that initiated a re-examination of the uniform law on carriage of goods by 
sea. 
8.2. A POLITICAL PROCESS
Arguably, the Hamburg Rules were born out of a fundamentally different process 
than the Hague Rules.  As opposed to the Hague Rules Diplomatic Conferences, which 
was attended by merchants, cargo interests, shipowners, insurers, underwriters, lawyers 
and adjusters, with many hailing from the same nation yet representing opposing 
commercial interests,913 the negotiations culminating in the Hamburg Rules were 
infinitely more politicised. Several commentators have noted that the defining feature of 
the Hamburg Rules was that it was born out of political agreement rather than 
     
again, primarily the users of shipping services, in this case the developing countries, raising at the political 
level practically the very same complaints generated earlier by shipper interests in the then British 
Dominions, Western Europe and United States – excessive exemptive privileges for carriers, exoneration 
from negligence in key shipowner operations such as navigation, and restrictive jurisdiction clauses in Bills 
of Lading.”. 
911 Herber, R. “The UN Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 1978, Hamburg Rules, Its Future and 
the Demands of Developing Countries” in Yearbook Maritime Law Vol 1 (1984) Arroyo, I. (Ed.) Kluwer 
Law, Antwerp, at p. 85-87. Herber argued that with respect to the impetus for the Hamburg Rules, “it was 
mainly the basic political decision of the Hague Rules which formed the subject of economic investigation: 
The rule providing for legal exoneration of the carrier from liability for damages caused by fault or neglect 
of the crew in connection with the management or navigation of the ship. It seemed to be clear that such a 
rule was contrary to the interest of the shipper who had to insure this risk on his own. And, in addition, this 
situation was considered to be detrimental to the interests of the Developing Countries in particular which 
were considered mainly to be in a position of predominantly cargo-interested countries…It was, therefore, 
from the beginning of the work in UNCTAD and UNCITRAL an important issue for Developing Countries 
to do away with this exception for nautical fault.” (Ibid). 
912 Sweeney, J. “The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea (Part 1)” (1975) 7 JMLC 
69, at p. 73; repeated in Sweeney, J. “UNCITRAL and The Hamburg Rules – The Risk Allocation Problem 
in Maritime Transport of Goods” (1991) 22 JMLC 511, at p. 520-521; Also quoted in Yancy, B. “The 
Carriage of Goods: Hague, COGSA, Visby and Hamburg” (1983) 57 Tul. L. Rev. 1238, at p. 1250, and 
Werth, D. “The Hamburg Rules Revisited – A Look at the US Options” (1991) 22 JMLC 59, at p. 65.  
913 Frederick, D. “Political Participation and Legal Reform in the International Maritime Rulemaking 
Process: From Hague Rules to the Hamburg Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 81, at p. 88-90. 
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commercial compromise.914 It has been noted that one particularly frustrating aspect of 
the conferences for more commercially oriented observers was how politically minded 
the delegates were.915 The “delegates, selected under political auspices, formally 
represented countries and voted on specific draft provisions as such.”916 The absence, 
therefore, of official commercial delegates resulted in political compromises rather than 
the economic bargaining that characterized the Hague Conferences.917 These political 
compromises are exemplified in the vague language of the Hamburg Rules, which was a 
necessity in order to obtain consensus.918 One author has noted that the interaction 
between the groups of first world nations, and the group containing Asia, Africa, South 
America and Yugoslavia, was “so inflexible that when agreement was reached no one 
dared even insert a comma for fear that the whole deal would be upset.”919A further 
difficulty with the politicised nature of the negotiations resided in the fact that many 
delegates represented nations with conflicting interests and were therefore unable to 
advance a consistent position.920 Delegates from many of the traditional maritime nations 
were forced to represent cargo interests, shipowners, banking and underwriters among 
others, while the developing nations were almost exclusively representing cargo interests, 
thus enabling them to form a unified group and achieve political majorities.921 Moreover, 
  
914 Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, 
and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 35; Frederick, ibid at p. 105; 
Chandler, G. “After Reaching a Century of the Harter Act: Where Should We Go From Here?” (1993) 24 
JMLC 43, at p. 45; Conversely, Donovan, J. “The Hamburg Rules: Why a New Convention on Carriage of 
Goods by Sea” (1979) 4 Mar. Law. 1, at p. 1 comments that “the experience in Hamburg has proven that 
the international commercial community can resolve differences in an international forum.” As optimistic 
as that statement is, unfortunately almost 30 years later it is clear that it was woefully inaccurate. 
915 Frederick, D. “Political Participation and Legal Reform in the International Maritime Rulemaking 
Process: From Hague Rules to the Hamburg Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 81, at p. 97.
916 Ibid, at p. 103-104. 
917 Ibid, at p. 105. 
918 Chandler, G. “A Comparison of COGSA, the Hague/Visby Rules, and the Hamburg Rules” (1984) 15 
JMLC 233, at p. 236, noting “because of the very delicate balance between the conflicting groups 
vagueness was utilized to obtain consensus and avoid debate that threatened to disrupt resolution of other 
issues.”; Tetley, W. “The Hamburg Rules – A Commentary” [1979] LMCLQ 1, at p. 5, has described this 
process that took place during the Hamburg Conferences as “compromise by drafting”.  
919 Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, 
and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 35
920 Frederick, D. “Political Participation and Legal Reform in the International Maritime Rulemaking 
Process: From Hague Rules to the Hamburg Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 81, at p. 105.
921 Ibid, at p. 105-106. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
183
the developing countries in UNCITRAL possessed a 2/3 majority.922 The developing 
nations, however, could not impose their will without inciting revolt among the 
traditional maritime nations, again resulting in the vague language of compromise found 
in the text.923 Despite its many inadequacies, the procedural change from private 
conferences with experts in the industry, to the use of intergovernmental organizations 
with a heavier and lengthier politicised process, has been argued as been inevitable.924
The politicised nature of the Hamburg Rules conferences, and the voting 
majorities of the developing nations, resulted in serious changes with regard to the 
liability of shipowners. The provisions regarding the basis of liability were re-written, 
removing entirely the nautical fault exemption. One commentator explains that, “under 
the Hague Rules process, the shipowners had sufficient commercial power to insist on 
liability exceptions for negligent navigation and management. The difference in the 
1970’s was less the carriers’ commercial bargaining power – which was still great – than 
their inability to translate that strength into a political majority in the UNCITRAL 
process.”925 The fact that the erosion of the carriers’ defences was a political process 
rather than a commercially oriented one has not been well received by certain 
commentators. Japikse in particular has questioned the political process; “What are the 
true motives of the Hamburg Rules? Are they of purely commercial nature and, if so, 
why then is the matter not left to the commercial interests themselves, being parties of 
  
922 Herber, R. “The UN Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 1978, Hamburg Rules, Its Future and 
the Demands of Developing Countries” in Yearbook Maritime Law Vol 1 (1984) Arroyo, I. (Ed.) Kluwer 
Law, Antwerp, at p. 85.
923 Frederick, D. “Political Participation and Legal Reform in the International Maritime Rulemaking 
Process: From Hague Rules to the Hamburg Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 81, at p. 105-106.
924 This change has been argued by Herber, R. “The Hamburg Rules: Origin and Need for the New Liability 
System” in The Hamburg Rules: A Choice for the EEC? (1994) European Institute of Maritime and 
Transport Law, Maklu, Antwerpen, at p. 36-38, to be necessary for two reasons. The first of which was that 
international organizations are growing and therefore it would have been exceptional to maintain the 
previous informal procedure used at the Brussels Conferences, which included no secretariat, and no drafts 
at a government level. Global participation therefore is the most important aspect in favour of the shift to 
the use of international organizations. The second reason centres around the fact that the Visby Protocol did 
not satisfy many states, who were displeased with being unable to address issues such as liability as the 
CMI program prevented any discussion of problems not specifically envisaged by the Protocol. 
925 Frederick, D. “Political Participation and Legal Reform in the International Maritime Rulemaking 
Process: From Hague Rules to the Hamburg Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 81, at p. 112. 
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equal standing and force? In other words, why should not first an attempt at a commercial 
consensus be preferred?”926  
8.3. THE DRAFTING OF THE RULES AND THE NEGOTIATIONS 
SURROUNDING THE NAUTICAL FAULT EXEMPTION
A Working Group on International Legislation on Shipping, composed of seven 
members, was convened by UNCITRAL.927 Due to objections, however, the Working 
Group was expanded to twenty on members in March of 1971.928 The Working Group 
held six sessions from January 1972 to February 1975 wherein the Draft Convention on 
Carriage of Goods by Sea was prepared.929 The liability provision, or what would become 
Art. 5 of the Rules, was the subject of considerable attention, and was discussed in five 
out of the six sessions.930 The notion of liability based on fault was supported by both 
carrier and shipper nations on the Working Group, although a split developed between 
those who wanted the provision harmonized with the fault-based regimes of Warsaw, 
CIM, and CMR, and the majority who felt ocean transport was sufficiently distinct and 
involved vastly different risks such that fully harmonizing the provisions would be 
impossible.931 The United States and the United Kingdom proposed altering the existing 
list of the Hague Rules Art. IV, but the majority of the delegates, including practically all 
the developing nations, supported a drastic reform wherein the carrier’s liability would be 
  
926 Japikse, R.E. “Deck Cargo Exclusion, Nautical Fault Exemption, Fire Exception” in The Hamburg 
Rules: A Choice for the EEC? (1994) European Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, Maklu, 
Antwerpen, at p. 191. 
927 Chile, Egypt, Ghana, India, U.S.S.R., U.K. and U.S.A. (Sweeney, J. “The UNCITRAL Draft 
Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea (Part 1)” (1975) 7 JMLC 69, at p. 77). 
928 Sweeney, ibid. The members of the working group for all sessions were: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, 
Brazil, Chile, Egypt, France, Ghana, Hungary, India, Japan, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Singapore, Tanzania, 
U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, U.S.A. and Zaire. Spain attended the first few meetings but was then replaced 
by the Federal Republic of Germany. (Ibid). Of the ten largest shipowning nations, Japan, Norway, U.K., 
U.S.S.R., U.S.A., and Germany, were in the working group, while Liberia, Greece, Panama, and Italy were 
not. (Ibid).  
929 Sweeney, J. “UNCITRAL and The Hamburg Rules – The Risk Allocation Problem in Maritime 
Transport of Goods” (1991) 22 JMLC 511, at p. 523. 
930Sweeney, J. “The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea (Part 1)” (1975) 7 JMLC 
69, at p. 103-117; Sweeney, “UNCITRAL and The Hamburg Rules – The Risk Allocation Problem in 
Maritime Transport of Goods” ibid, at p. 524. 
931 Sweeney, “The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea (Part 1)” ibid, at p. 102-
103. 
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expressed in a single paragraph.932 When discussing the merits of the two policy based 
exceptions, nautical fault and fire, the United Kingdom opposed any changes to the 
existing system on the basis of a likely 1-2% increase in freight rates, and its negative 
effects on general average and salvage.933 The Polish and Belgian delegates supported the 
United Kingdom position on the retention of nautical fault and fire, although the United 
Kingdom and Poland were open to a compromise on error in management.934 The United 
States disagreed with the United Kingdom position,935 and put forward a proposal that 
amended the existing Hague Rules with the effect for nautical fault that the claimant must 
make out a prima facie case for loss resulting from poor navigation or management, but 
the carrier may rebut it by demonstrating that he was not at fault.936 Japan responded by 
opposing any changes to the policy-based exceptions for negligent navigation, 
management or fire.937 India, supported by Brazil, Nigeria, Singap re, Tanzania and 
Spain, adopted the opposing position arguing that neither of the policy-based exemptions 
should be found in the general principle of fault-based liability.938 Russia suggested a 
compromise wherein the Working Group would submit a text to the Drafting Committee 
retaining the two exemptions in square brackets.939 At the end of the debates, the 
majority, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, France, Ghana, India, Nigeria, 
Norway, Singapore, Spain, Tanzania, and the United States, favoured no exemption for 
  
932 Ibid, at p. 103. The provision stated that neither the carrier nor the shipowner is responsible for loss or 
damage “arising without the actual fault or privity of the carrier, or without the fault or neglect of the 
servants or the agents of the carrier,” with a second paragraph placing the burden of proof on the carrier. 
(Ibid). 
933 Ibid, at p. 104. The objections with regard to salvage and general average were such that the carrier 
would be unlikely to give guarantees for cargo in those situations if one removed the element of risk borne 
by cargo for matters of navigation (Ibid). 
934 The U.K. and Poland noted that they would agree to eliminate the error in navigation element of the 
defence in the interests of eliminating friction, provided however that fire and error in navigation were 
retained. (Ibid). 
935 The U.S. discussed the compromise nature of the Harter Act and its aims, but felt that the U.K. proposal 
necessitated “a shift from the present methods of vessel ownership to the single-ship corporation operating 
with minimum capital.” (Ibid, at p. 105-107). 
936 Frederick, D. “Political Participation and Legal Reform in the International Maritime Rulemaking 
Process: From Hague Rules to the Hamburg Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 81, at p. 108. The text of the U.S. 
proposal may be found at Frederick, ibid, at p. 108, footnote 113; Sweeney, ibid, at p. 109. 
937 Frederick, ibid, at p. 111; Sweeney, ibid, at p. 109.
938 Sweeney, ibid, at p. 110. 
939 Ibid.
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negligent navigation and management, while Belgium, Japan, Poland, U.S.S.R., and the 
United Kingdom, opposed its deletion.940
During the Drafting Committee’s deliberations, the exemptions for nautical fault 
and fire were debated again. Nigeria proposed a “horse-trader’s compromise” in which 
the defence of negligent navigation was eliminated, but the fire exception was retained.941
France, Egypt and Spain indicated that they would support such a compromise, while 
India, Ghana, and Singapore, pressed for the complete elimination of the fire defence.942
Belgium, Poland, Japan, United Kingdom, West Germany and the U.S.S.R. attempted to 
reintroduce the exemption of negligent navigation and management, but those attempts 
failed.943 On the vote, twelve states voted to keep the compromise text,944 while five 
states voted to reintroduce the nautical fault exemption.945 This was noted as “a 
substantive change accomplished by the cargo-owning majority.”946 The draft convention 
was debated in the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the General Assembly, and endorsed by 
the General Assembly in December 1976.947
The Diplomatic Conference was held in Hamburg from 6 – 31 March 1978.948
“When the 78 Delegations from States and observers from 8 intergovernmental and 7 
non-governmental organizations started to discuss the UNCITRAL Draft Convention at 
the Diplomatic Conference in Hamburg, it became obvious in the general debate that the 
  
940 Ibid, at p. 111. 
941 Ibid, at p. 112. 
942 Ibid, at p. 115. 
943 Frederick, D. “Political Participation and Legal Reform in the International Maritime Rulemaking 
Process: From Hague Rules to the Hamburg Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 81, at p. 112; Sweeney, ibid, at p. 
116.
944 Including a provision on fire which read: “In case of fire, the carrier shall be liable, provided the 
claimant proves that the fire arose due to the fault or negligence on the part of the carrier, his servants or 
agents.” (Sweeney, ibid, at p. 117). 
945 Ibid, at p. 116. 
946 Frederick, D. “Political Participation and Legal Reform in the International Maritime Rulemaking 
Process: From Hague Rules to the Hamburg Rules” (1991) 22 JMLC 81, at p. 112, although Frederick 
notes that perhaps this change was not as great as the cargo interested nations would have desired. 
947 Sweeney, J. “UNCITRAL and The Hamburg Rules – The Risk Allocation Problem in Maritime 
Transport of Goods” (1991) 22 JMLC 511, at p. 526. 
948 Herber, R. “The Hamburg Rules: Origin and Need for the New Liability System” in The Hamburg 
Rules: A Choice for the EEC? (1994) European Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, Maklu, 
Antwerpen, at p. 40.
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deletion of the so-called nautical fault exception proposed by the Commission was one of 
the key stones which had to be decided upon.”949 It was decided that Articles 5, 6, and 8 
would be negotiated together as a package, instead of independently of each other, 
therefore the President of the Conference and Chairman of the first Committee, Prof. 
Chafik, appointed a special “Package Deal” Committee of fourteen of the attending 
states.950 After several days of unproductive negotiation, Chairman Chafik reduced the 
group to five nations, the Netherlands, U.S.S.R., Mexico, Norway, and the United 
States.951 “The Netherlands and the U.S.S.R. proposed retention of nautical fault, an 
amended but weaker fire defence, and unbreakable limits…[while] Mexico proposed no 
nautical fault, a vastly weaker fire defence, and a new vague compromise on 
unbreakability.”952 Norway’s proposal was that nautical fault would be removed but that 
a formula for unbreakable limits would be inserted.953 The United States then suggested 3 
SDR per kilo with no nautical fault or fire defences, but with unbreakable limits, and the 
U.S.S.R. and the Netherlands countered with 1.5 SDR per kilo limit and that the fire 
defence must remain unchanged.954 The United States responded with the proposal of 
2.75 SDRs with no nautical fault or special fire defence.955 When consensus was finally 
reached, the compromise consisted of: “2.5 SDR per kilo with a complex fire defence, 
(Article 5(4))), no nautical fault defence, and unbreakable limits (Article 8).”956 The 
  
949 Herber, ibid; See also Bauer, G. “Conflicting Liability Regimes: Hague-Visby v. Hamburg Rules – A 
Cases by Case Analysis” (1993) 24 JMLC 53, at p. 55, noting that during the diplomatic conference, there 
was extensive controversy concerning the elimination of the defence of error in navigation and
management. 
950 Sweeney, J. “UNCITRAL and The Hamburg Rules – The Risk Allocation Problem in Maritime 
Transport of Goods” (1991) 22 JMLC 511, at p. 527; Herber, ibid, at p. 41. Note however, Herber mentions 
that the group consisted of “about ten delegations”, nevertheless Sweeney reported directly from the 
diplomatic conference, and has written extensively about the negotiations over the past twenty years, 
therefore his precise figure of fourteen attending nations, with reference to the Official Records, is to be 
preferred. 
951 Sweeney, ibid, at p. 527. 
952 Ibid.
953 Ibid.
954 Ibid, at p. 527-528. 
955 Ibid, at p. 528.
956 Ibid. See also Herber, R. “The Hamburg Rules: Origin and Need for the New Liability System” in The 
Hamburg Rules: A Choice for the EEC? (1994) European Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, Maklu, 
Antwerpen, at p. 41.
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entire text of the new convention was voted on at midnight on March 30, 1978,957 and 
was signed on Friday, March 31, 1978.958  
8.4. THE DEBATE SURROUNDING THE EFFECTS OF THE LIABILITY 
SCHEME
8.4.1. Fault-Based Liability
Rather than the enumerated list of exemptions as had been found in uniform law 
to date, the Hamburg Rules provided a single basis of liability: “The carrier is liable for 
loss resulting from the loss of or damage to the goods, as well as from delay in delivery, 
if the occurrence which caused the loss, damage or delay took place while the goods were 
in his charge as defined in art. 4, unless the carrier proves that he, his servants or agents 
took all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence and its 
consequences.”959
The result of the above provision is that when an error in navigation or 
management of the vessel occurs, it is “never exempted anymore: it cannot then be 
proved that the carrier, his servant or agent ‘took all measures that could reasonably be 
required to avoid the occurrence and its consequences’. The carrier will, accordingly, 
become liable for cargo damage arising, for instance, from a collision attributable to the 
fault of his vessel.”960 In such an instance, the carrier will be held liable even where there 
is negligence on the part of a compulsory pilot,961 or where the other vessel is partially to 
  
957 Of the seventy eight states present, sixty eight voted in favour, none opposed and three abstained.
958 Sweeney, J. “UNCITRAL and The Hamburg Rules – The Risk Allocation Problem in Maritime 
Transport of Goods” (1991) 22 JMLC 511, at p. 529. 
959 Article 5.1. 
960 Japikse, R.E. “Deck Cargo Exclusion, Nautical Fault Exemption, Fire Exception” in The Hamburg 
Rules: A Choice for the EEC? (1994) European Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, Maklu, 
Antwerpen, at p. 189. 
961 Where the Hague-Visby Rules specifically exempted the shipowner for the acts of a pilot under Art. 
IV(2)(a), the Hamburg Rules remain silent. Arguably, as the master of the vessel in many instances remains 
ultimately responsible for the implementation of the pilot’s orders, it would be difficult for the carrier to 
prove that all measures were taken to avoid the occurrence.  For example, Section 35 of the English 
Pilotage Act 1983 renders the shipowner liable for any loss or damage “caused by the vessel or by any fault 
of the navigation of the vessels” regardless of whether the pilotage was compulsory or not.” (Pilotage Act 
1983, s.35 as cited in Douglas, R. The Law of Harbours and Pilotage 4th Ed. (1993) London: LLP, at p. 
199.) Moreover, the new English Pilotage Act 1987, s.22, allows the pilotage authority, where there is 
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blame as well.962 What has been acknowledged to be the largest repercussion of the 
single basis for liability is the removal of the protection of the nautical fault defence for 
the carrying vessel in instances of collision.963 Other forms of navigational error such as 
grounding and improper anchoring will also render the carrier liable, as will all the 
instances of error in management previously discussed. It has been noted that the 
elimination of the nautical fault defence is bound “to affect the outcome of an 
indeterminable number of factually sensitive cases.”964 On the other hand, some 
commentators view the resulting change in the liability of the carrier as less drastic. For 
instance, when reviewing jurisprudence where the carrier has benefited from the nautical 
fault exemption, one author predicts that not all of the factual situations if now litigated 
under the Hamburg Rules would result in liability.965 Furthermore, whether the carrier 
will actually be held responsible for the negligent acts of a compulsory pilot has been 
questioned.966 Another commentator considered an analysis that determined, among other 
     
organisational fault or similar fault, to limit its liability to £1000 (Gault, S. (Ed.) Marsden on Collisions at 
Sea, 13th Ed. (2003) Sweet & Maxwell, London, at p. 618). Although this is arguably not with respect to 
cargo liability, it demonstrates that the law may very well be unsympathetic to shipowners who suffer 
losses resulting from the actions of a compulsory pilot. This is not the case in the United States however, by 
virtue of the Supreme Court decision in The China, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 53 (1868), which resulted in the rule 
that “under U.S. law the shipowner cannot be held personally liable for the negligence of a compulsory 
pilot. The ship may be liable in rem, but not her owner. The compulsory pilot is not considered the owner’s 
servant.” (Bauer, G. “Conflicting Liability Regimes: Hague-Visby v. Hamburg Rules – A Cases by Case 
Analysis” (1993) 24 JMLC 53, at p. 62). 
962 Japikse, R.E. “Deck Cargo Exclusion, Nautical Fault Exemption, Fire Exception” in The Hamburg 
Rules: A Choice for the EEC? (1994) European Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, Maklu, 
Antwerpen, at p. 189; Lüddeke, C. The Hamburg Rules: From Hague to Hamburg Via Visby 2nd Ed. (1995) 
LLP, London, at p. 12.
963 Goldie, C. “Effect of the Hamburg Rules on Shipowners’ Liability Insurance” (1993) 24 JMLC 111, at 
p. 116. 
964 Force, R. “A Comparison of the U.S. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act – Present Text and Proposed 
Changes – and The Hamburg Rules” in New Carriage of Goods by Sea. (1997) H. Honka (Ed.) Institute of 
Maritime and Commercial Law, Abo, at p. 414. 
965 Bauer, G. “Conflicting Liability Regimes: Hague-Visby v. Hamburg Rules – A Cases by Case Analysis” 
(1993) 24 JMLC 53, at p. 61-63. Bauer appears to argue that although negligence is not excused, where for 
example the master makes “only an error in judgment” the carrier would not be liable provided the master 
“acted in all ways reasonably required under the circumstances.”(Ibid, at p. 61). It becomes evident that 
Bauer’s interpretation of the text of the provision differs significantly from Japikse’s interpretation above. 
On a purely textual interpretation one would tend to agree with Japikse as all measures “reasonably 
required to avoid the occurrence” does not appear to leave room for errors. In any event, even Bauer, who 
provides a very carrier friendly interpretation of the provision, finds that most jurisprudence would if 
litigated today, hold in favour of cargo (Ibid, at p. 62). 
966 Ibid, at p. 62 argues that as it is only the carriers servants or agents that must take all reasonable 
measures, if the courts adopt the view “that a compulsory pilot is not the servant of the owner, groundings, 
collisions or other accidents caused by compulsory pilots may still be excused under Hamburg.” Certain 
courts have found that the pilot is not the servant of the owner. A Belgian court, in the M.S. Duburg held 
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things, the causes of cargo claims by reviewing of all major claims967 covering a period 
just shy of four years968 at United Kingdom Mutual Steam Ship Assurance 
Association.969 The analysis demonstrated that almost half the claims were concerning 
bad stowage, hatch cover defects and bad handling, while a further fifteen percent of the 
claims were incidents of inadequate tank cleaning, shell plate failure, fire and sinkings.970
On the basis of these statistics, it was argued that the incidents that resulted in major 
claims are those for which the shipowner is currently held liable for under the Hague-
Visby Rules, thus the application of the Hamburg Rules would not significantly alter his 
liabilities.971 Arguably, this is questionable given that the statistics are based on claims 
brought within the context of the Hague-Visby Rules, and would not account for claims 
not brought on the basis that the carrier is exempted. Using existing claim demographics, 
although potentially informative, cannot address the difficult question of how, in practice, 
the carrier’s liability would change as a result of the Hamburg Rules. What is desperately 
needed, and unfortunately does not exist is reliable empirical data on the actual effects of 
the Hamburg Rules.972 Without such data, “making an argument about what will happen 
in real-world transactions if certain changes take place in the legal rules governing those 
     
that the captain of a vessel has no authority over a pilot, who is therefore an independent advisor and is not 
an agent of the captain or of the owner of the vessel (Hof van Beroep te Antwerpen, February 10, 2003 
(The M.S. Duburg) [2003] ETL 633). For a similar holding, see also Rechtbank van Eerste Aanleg te 
Dendermonde, June 28, 1991 [1992] ETL 107. As well, the English common law adopts the position that a 
shipowner should not be vicariously liable for a compulsory pilot: “The opinion I have thus formed in this 
case is founded upon the general principles of reason and justice; that no one should be chargeable with the 
acts of another who is not an agent of his own election and choice; and I further think, that it would be 
contrary to all sense of equity, to say to the owners of a foreign vessel, ‘You shall take a pilot of our 
selection, of our appointment; be he drunk or sober, negligent or careful, skilful or ignorant, you shall be 
responsible for his conduct, unless you choose to submit to the penalty, and penalty it is, of paying the 
pilotage for nothing.” (The Maria (1839) 166 E.R. 508 (Adm.), at 514).  Perhaps, the position of the 
common law as not viewing the carrier vicariously liable for the pilot, may aid to inform the 
characterization that a compulsory pilot is not the servant of a carrier. 
967 A claim for which the amount paid and the amount of any outstanding estimate together totalled at least 
$100,000. 
968 20th February 1987 through to 20th December 1991. 
969 Goldie, C. “Effect of the Hamburg Rules on Shipowners’ Liability Insurance” (1993) 24 JMLC 111, at 
p. 116. 
970 Ibid.
971 Ibid.
972 See Sturley, M. “Changing Liability Rules and Marine Insurance” (1993) 24 JMLC 119, who 
demonstrates that although advocates on both sides of the Hamburg debates have ‘predicted’ what the 
effect of the change in liability scheme will be, there is no empirical evidence to support such assertions. 
Sturley concludes that without such empirical evidence, “making an argument about what will happen in 
real-world transactions if certain changes take place in the legal rules governing those transactions” is a 
futile endeavour (Ibid, at p. 148-149). 
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transactions” is a futile endeavour.973 One commentator, after noting arguments relating 
to potential freight rate increases and insurance, concludes as follows: “the writer desires 
to avoid the role of prophet…The writer’s ignorance of the type of economic impact the 
Hamburg Rules would have on the shipowner and the impact they were intended to have 
is equalled only by that of the academic proponents of the rules.”974
8.4.2. The Insurance Debate
Without a doubt, a large percentage of the discussion surrounding the elimination 
of the nautical fault exemption has centred around its effects on the costs and structure of 
insurance in the shipping industry.  Moreover, both the opponents and the proponents of
the exemption use opposing sides of the same economic and insurance-based argument to 
support their position. The difficulty arises however, when attention is drawn to the fact 
that there is comparatively little statistical data available with which to support the 
assertions being made.975 After reviewing the various positions, one is left with the 
impression that perhaps the insurance debate cannot be resolved. Nevertheless, 
understanding the issues involved is beneficial as the same arguments were again put 
forward during the drafting of the new UNCITRAL Draft Convention. 
The Hamburg Rules were created with the aim of reducing shipping costs, 
particularly for developing countries.976 One of the main arguments in support of the 
Hamburg liability scheme is that it would reduce shipping costs by addressing the 
problem of “double insurance” or “overlapping insurance”. The current division of risks 
between cargo interests and carriers under the Hague-Visby system, requires a dual 
system of insurance, i.e. the cargo interests obtain insurance for a given loss, while the 
  
973 Ibid, at p. 148. 
974 Yancy, B. “The Carriage of Goods: Hague, COGSA, Visby and Hamburg” (1983) 57 Tul. L. Rev. 1238, 
at p. 1259. Yancy goes on to conclude, despite having proclaimed his ignorance with respect to the 
economic impact, that “it certainly seems a truism of common sense that the Hamburg Rules can result 
only in increased insurance premiums for the shipowner; these eventually will become embodied in freight 
rates, and the customer, as usual, will be the ultimate loser.” (Ibid). 
975 See Lee, S. “The Changing Liability System of Sea Carriers and Maritime Insurance: Focusing on the 
Enforcement of the Hamburg Rules” (2002) 15 Transnat’l Law. 241; Sturley, M. “Changing Liability Rules 
and Marine Insurance” (1993) 24 JMLC 119; Sweeney, J. “UNCITRAL and The Hamburg Rules – The 
Risk Allocation Problem in Maritime Transport of Goods” (1991) 22 JMLC 511. 
976 Chandler, G. “A Comparison of COGSA, the Hague/Visby Rules, and the Hamburg Rules” (1984) 15 
JMLC 233, at p. 237. 
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carrier insures himself against liability with respect to cargo for the same loss.977
Furthermore, extra expenses are incurred through cargo underwriters bringing recourse 
actions against shipowners as well as by virtue of the fact that two insurance companies 
have to keep documents and staff dealing with the same issue.978 Although initially hopes 
were expressed that altering the shipowner’s basis for liability under Hamburg would 
result in cargo interests no longer needing to procure insurance,979 it has become clear 
that cargo insurance is still desired for several reasons. For example, P&I insurance does 
not extend from the warehouse to the place of destination,980 the shipowner has an overall 
limitation of liability,981 cargo insurance affords protection against an insolvent carrier,982
and finally it allows cargo interests to collect directly from their insurer.983 Given that 
cargo insurance therefore will not be eliminated,984 the debate centres on whether, as a 
result of shifting the liability to the carrier, cargo interests will incur less expense, as they 
will not longer need to insure for risks for which the carrier was exempt under the Hague-
Visby Rules. Interestingly enough with regard to the “double insurance” debate, one 
author draws parallels between one’s jurisdictional influences and one’s stance with 
respect to the debate: “Supporters of the Hamburg Rules, who appear to have been 
influenced by civil law traditions, have argued that double insurance and overall 
  
977 Honour, J.P. “The P & I Clubs and the New United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by 
Sea 1978” in The Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (1978) S. Mankabady (Ed.), British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law, Chameleon Press, London, at p. 241; Sturley, M. 
“Changing Liability Rules and Marine Insurance” (1993) 24 JMLC 119, at p. 143. 
978 Honour, ibid. 
979 Sturley, M. “Changing Liability Rules and Marine Insurance” (1993) 24 JMLC 119, at p. 143
980 Honour, J.P. “The P & I Clubs and the New United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by 
Sea 1978” in The Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (1978) S. Mankabady (Ed.), British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law, Chameleon Press, London, at p. 241.
981 Sweeney, J. “The NCITRAL Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea (Part 1)” (1975) 7 JMLC 
69, at p. 108. Selvig, E. “The Hamburg Rules, the Hague Rules and Marine Insurance Practice” (1981) 12 
JMLC 299, at p. 307. 
982 Honour, J.P. “The P & I Clubs and the New United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by 
Sea 1978” in The Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (1978) S. Mankabady (Ed.), British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law, Chameleon Press, London, at p. 241-242; Sturley, M. 
“Changing Liability Rules and Marine Insurance” (1993) 24 JMLC 119, at p. 144. 
983 Sturley, ibid; Selvig, E. “The Hamburg Rules, the Hague Rules and Marine Insurance Practice” (1981) 
12 JMLC 299, at p. 312, notes that on average cargo interests will be able to obtain compensation for their 
losses much faster from their insurers than from the shipowner’s P&I club; Diamond, A. “The Division if 
Liability As Between Ship and Cargo (Insofar As It Affects Cargo Insurance) under the New Rules 
Proposed by UNCITRAL” [1977] LMCLQ 39, at p. 44, noting the fear that if the Hamburg Rules came 
into force, the cargo owners will likely have to deal directly with the carrier’s liability insurer.  
984 Lee, S. “The Changing Liability System of Sea Carriers and Maritime Insurance: Focusing on the 
Enforcement of the Hamburg Rules” (2002) 15 Transnat’l Law. 241, at p. 249 notes that to a certain degree 
double insurance would be unavoidable under the Hamburg Rules. 
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insurance costs would be decreased by adopting the Hamburg Rules. Opponents, who are 
seemingly influenced by common law traditions, assert that these costs are even lower 
under the Hague or the Hague-Visby Rules than under Hamburg Rules.”985
Opponents of the “double insurance” argument suggest that altering the liability 
system would not save costs for cargo interests as there would be a corresponding 
increase in freight. There are several prongs to the argument that should the risk be 
shifted from the shippers and cargo insurance, to carriers and P&I insurance, the result 
would be an increase in freight rates. The basic argument is; if the risk shifts, then cargo 
owners would either need to take out less cargo insurance, or the cargo insurance rates 
would decrease. The result would be that carriers would be required to procure more 
liability insurance, and therefore would pass on the increased cost in the form of freight. 
Opponents of the Hamburg liability scheme argue that liability insurance is costlier than 
cargo insurance; thus in the end shippers would end up paying higher costs in freight than 
they would actually save from paying less for cargo insurance.986 The converse is argued, 
however, that P&I insurance is less expensive than cargo insurance and thus shifting the 
risk to the P&I Clubs will in the end reduce the shipper’s costs.987 One is left in a difficult 
position when attempting to evaluate the argument, as both sides in the debate supply 
credible supporting arguments.988 Putting aside the debate as to which insurance is more 
  
985 Ibid, at p. 241. 
986 Shah, M. “The Revision of the Hague Rules on Bills of Lading Within the UN System – Key Issues” in 
The Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (1978) S. Mankabady (Ed.), British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law, Chameleon Press, London, at p. 11; Kimball, J. “Shipowner’s Liability 
and the Proposed Revision of the Hague Rules” (1975) 7 JMLC 217, at p. 250; Williams, B.K. “The 
Consequences of the Hamburg Rules on Insurance” in The Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by 
Sea (1978) S. Mankabady, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Chameleon Press, 
London, at p. 259; Diamond, A. “The Division if Liability As Between Ship and Cargo (Insofar As It 
Affects Cargo Insurance) under the New Rules Proposed by UNCITRAL” [1977] LMCLQ 39, at p. 44; 
Meng, T. “The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1972 and the Hamburg Rules” (1980) 22 Malaya L. Rev. 
199, at p. 211.
987 Selvig, E. “The Hamburg Rules, the Hague Rules and Marine Insurance Practice” (1981) 12 JMLC 299, 
at p. 316; Zamora, S. “Carrier Liability For Damage or Loss to Cargo In International Transport” (1975) 23 
Am. J. Comp. L. 391, at p. 394. 
988 With regard to P&I insurance being the costlier of the two, it has been argued that with regard to the risk 
distribution, cargo insurance is able to spread the risk of a major catastrophe over several insurers, while in 
P&I insurance that risk has been concentrated on one insurer (McGilchrist, N. “The New Hague Rules” 
[1974] LMLCQ 255, at p. 260). The opposing argument is that P&I insurance is mutual insurance and thus 
not profit driven, where as cargo insurance inherently will have a measure of profit built in and therefore be 
the costlier of the two (Selvig, E. “The Hamburg Rules, the Hague Rules and Marine Insurance Practice” 
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costly, the question must still be addressed as to whether an increase in the carrier’s 
premiums would be passed on in the form of freight. As a preliminary matter, the 
question of whether the calls would increase is far from settled. Certain authors attest that 
they are bound to increase,989 while others assert that an increase is not likely.990 It is 
acknowledged, that in any event, it is difficult to predict as it is based on a multitude of 
factors.991 Furthermore, if the data exists to aid in predicting such increases, insurance 
companies are unwilling to release it as they consider it to be confidential.992
Nevertheless, presuming liability premiums do increase, the potential of a resulting 
increase in freight is hotly contested. Moreover, as with the debates above, credible 
arguments exist on both sides. It has been predicted that carriers would avoid increasing 
the freight rates because of the competitive nature of the market.993 The opposing 
     
(1981) 12 JMLC 299, at p. 316), or in other words P&I insurers can provide carriers with lower cost 
insurance than cargo insurers can provide for cargo interests because “economically, P&I clubs would seem 
to be more efficient and able to pursue more cost-saving measures than profit minded cargo insurance 
companies” (Lee, S. “The Changing Liability System of Sea Carriers and Maritime Insurance: Focusing on 
the Enforcement of the Hamburg Rules” (2002) 15 Transnat’l Law. 241, at p. 254).  
989 Honour, the General Manager for the West of England Ship Owners Mutual Insurance Association, 
argued that alterations in the law such as the Hamburg Rules that increase the liability of the shipowner, 
“are bound to increase the cost of insuring the risk, and such increase may be fairly substantial…One is led 
to the conclusion that the new Convention will, to what extent it is impossible to say, increase the cost of 
goods to the consumer arising from the increase in freights which will be inevitable as a result of the 
increase in the cost of P&I Insurance to the shipowner.” (Honour, J.P. “The P & I Clubs and the New 
United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea 1978” in The Hamburg Rules on the Carriage 
of Goods by Sea (1978) S. Mankabady (Ed.), British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 
Chameleon Press, London, at pp. 240 and 249). Notably, there have been reports of higher P&I rates for 
carriers that are trading to countries with the Hamburg Rules (Sturley, M. “Changing Liability Rules and 
Marine Insurance” (1993) 24 JMLC 119, at p. 146, f.n. 113). 
990 “It is not likely that an increase in carrier’s liability due to a removal of exceptions under the Hague-
Visby Rules will result in an equivalent increase in the liability insurance premium. Due to the fact that the 
safety of marine cargo transport is inherently unpredictable…”(Lee, S. “The Changing Liability System of 
Sea Carriers and Maritime Insurance: Focusing on the Enforcement of the Hamburg Rules” (2002) 15 
Transnat’l Law. 241, at p. 254). 
991 Sweeney, J. “UNCITRAL and The Hamburg Rules – The Risk Allocation Problem in Maritime 
Transport of Goods” (1991) 22 JMLC 511, at p. 531, noting that P&I club rates structures “can be highly 
individualized, and also dependent on fierce competition, fleet size and claims experience.”
992 Sweeney, J. “The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea (Part 1)” (1975) 7 JMLC 
69, at p. 108, when discussing the implications of the elimination of the nautical fault defence, states: “it 
was unlikely that solicitation of information from insurance companies would provide as hard factual basis 
to determine whether a change in the law would cause a change in rates since the marine insurance industry 
was highly competitive and regarded any information used in fixing rates as proprietary information to be 
kept confidential.”
993 Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, 
and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY at p. 92. Karan argues that “competition 
between conference and non-conference liner carriers and between liner and tramp carriers would curtail 
their ability to raise rates.” See also See Hellawell, R. “Allocation of Risk Between Cargo Owner and 
Carrier” (1979) 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 357, at p. 366-367 noting the effect of competition on freight rates. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
195
argument is that the increase in liability will result in increased costs which the carrier 
will have no choice but to pass on in order to remain in business.994 Concern has been 
expressed that regardless of need or necessity, carriers may simply use the Hamburg 
Rules as an excuse to raise freights even if their costs have not risen.995 Certain authors 
have cautioned that an argument based on a potential increase in freight rates is 
inherently difficult to make.996 There appears to be primarily two reasons for this. First, 
there are no reliable figures to support such assertions.997 This has led one commentator 
to argue that after “years of futile searches for reliable data the effort to resolve the 
economic argument had to be abandoned. Neither economic proposition is provable to its 
opposition, and the economic situations of both the maritime industry and maritime 
insurers are sufficiently troubled and unique so that past changes in the law do not 
     
Shah, M. “The Revision of the Hague Rules on Bills of Lading Within the UN System – Key Issues” in The 
Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (1978) S. Mankabady (Ed.), British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law, Chameleon Press, London, at p. 12, noted that “since liner freights rise 
in any case even now, under the Hague Rules, in most trades from 10 to 20 percent annually, fear of 
additional substantial freight rate increases identifiably escalating from the deletion of the negligence 
exception was not entertained seriously by the majority of representatives who spoke on the subject.”
994 Williams, B.K. “The Consequences of the Hamburg Rules on Insurance” in The Hamburg Rules on the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea (1978) S. Mankabady, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 
Chameleon Press, London, at p. 259; Sturley, M. “Changing Liability Rules and Marine Insurance” (1993) 
24 JMLC 119, at p. 147. 
995 Zamora, “Carrier Liability For Damage or Loss to Cargo In International Transport” (1975) 23 Am. J. 
Comp. L. 391, at p. 394-395. 
996 Shah, M. “The Revision of the Hague Rules on Bills of Lading Within the UN System – Key Issues” in 
The Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (1978) S. Mankabady (Ed.), British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law, Chameleon Press, London, at p. 12; Sturley, M. “Changing Liability 
Rules and Marine Insurance” (1993) 24 JMLC 119, at p. 147; Hellawell, R. “Allocation of Risk Between 
Cargo Owner and Carrier” (1979) 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 357, at p. 366-367; 
997 Several authors have noted the fact that statistics are unavailable or that reliable data is simply absent 
from the debate. See Tetley, W. “The Hamburg Rules – A Commentary” [1979] LMLCQ 1, at p. 4; 
Kimball, J. “Shipowner’s Liability and the Proposed Revision of the Hague Rules” (1975) 7 JMLC 217, at 
p. 250; Honour, J.P. “The P & I Clubs and the New United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods 
by Sea 1978” in The Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (1978) S. Mankabady (Ed.), British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law, Chameleon Press, London, at p. 243; Shah has noted,  “in 
regard to the possibility of freights rising, despite wide inquiry within UNCTAD and UNCITRAL no 
reliable supporting figures could be secured.” (Shah, M. “The Revision of the Hague Rules on Bills of 
Lading Within the UN System – Key Issues” in The Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by Sea
(1978) S. Mankabady (Ed.), British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Chameleon Press, 
London, at p. 11). When a joint CMI/ICC working group tried to secure date in 1975, they were told by the 
industry: “it is impossible to provide true statistical information based on an extremely hypothetical 
situation.” (Shah, ibid). Sturley has argued that the insurance debate cannot be resolved because at it’s core 
it is an ‘empirical argument’ yet “there has been very little reliable empirical evidence anywhere in there 
debates.”( Sturley, M. “Changing Liability Rules and Marine Insurance” (1993) 24 JMLC 119, at p. 148).  
Honka  noted that “such assertions have not been verified with ‘cold’ figures. It remains the target for 
uncertainty what the empirical facts in this respect are.” (Honka, H. “Introduction” in New Carriage of 
Goods by Sea. (1997) H. Honka (Ed.) Institute of Maritime and Commercial Law, Abo, at p. 8). 
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provide useful analogies.”998 It is worth noting however, that some figures are available, 
albeit on a small scale or within the context of specific industries.999 Secondly, those 
projections in rating practice are speculative in any event given the unpredictable nature 
of shipping and marine insurance.1000
The final contentious point involved in this heated debate is whether cargo 
insurance rates would actually decrease if liability for nautical fault was shifted to the 
carriers. The assumption made by supporters of the Hamburg Rules that cargo insurance 
rates would decrease is based on the simple theory that if the carrier has increased 
liability, then the cargo insurers will see a decrease in costs.1001 On the other hand, 
opponents have argued that regardless, cargo underwriters would refuse to lower the 
rates.1002 The response from supporters has been that as the cargo insurance industry is 
  
998 Sweeney, J. “UNCITRAL and The Hamburg Rules – The Risk Allocation Problem in Maritime 
Transport of Goods” (1991) 22 JMLC 511, at p. 531. 
999 Lee, S. “The Changing Liability System of Sea Carriers and Maritime Insurance: Focusing on the 
Enforcement of the Hamburg Rules” (2002) 15 Transnat’l Law. 241, at footnote 103, notes that in the U.K. 
the main freight forwarders association changed its liability regime from one with almost non existent 
liability to one where the forwarder is now liable for carriage subject to a few exemptions. Lee has argued 
this was a change in magnitude that was greater than the Hague to Hamburg liability shift, yet after the 
change the industry reported that rates had not increased, nor has liability insurance premiums. Nicoll, C. 
“Do the Hamburg Rules Suit a Shipper-Dominated Economy?” (1993) 24 JMLC 151, at p. 175-176, 
obtained data from P&I Services, who represented the majority of liability insurers in the New Zealand 
market. Based on the 1983 figures, cargo liability costs the carrier 15.6 cents per tonne of shipment. If, 
taking the worst-case scenarios predicted by P&I club managers in London, liability to cargo was to 
increase under Hamburg by 25%, that would raise the cargo liability figure to 19.5 cents a tonne. Liability 
to cargo would therefore even be able to double, yet it would only translate into a freight increase of 15.6 
cents per tonne, providing the carrier passed that cost on. 
1000 Shah, M. “The Revision of the Hague Rules on Bills of Lading Within the UN System – Key Issues” in 
The Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (1978) S. Mankabady (Ed.), British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law, Chameleon Press, London, at p. 12, notes that “[t]he exclusion of the 
negligence exemption could not, in any case, per se necessarily affect freight and insurance charges 
uniformly in all markets. Neither cargo nor P&I insurance markets are tariff based or organically inter-
related, Premiums are experience-rated and vary in different trades. Further, the assumption by western 
market insurers that present day freight and insurance premium levels are the most economical is itself 
highly questionable. They might be much higher than perhaps they ought to be.” 
1001 Selvig, E. “The Hamburg Rules, the Hague Rules and Marine Insurance Practice” (1981) 12 JMLC 
299, at p. 313; Herber, R. “The UN Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 1978, Hamburg Rules, Its 
Future and the Demands of Developing Countries” in Yearbook Maritime Law Vol 1 (1984) Arroyo, I. 
(Ed.) Kluwer Law, Antwerp, at p. 92; Sweeney, J. “UNCITRAL and The Hamburg Rules – The Risk 
Allocation Problem in Maritime Transport of Goods” (1991) 22 JMLC 511, at p. 532-533, argues that 
given “cargo insurance protects shippers against unit limitation of liability, global limitation of liability, 
general average, salvage claims and other unexpected charges…[s]uch insurers feel that these instances of 
carrier non-liability will not fully sustain the existing premium structure of cargo insurance.”
1002 Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-
Visby, and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 92. 
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highly competitive, the underwriters would be forced to pass on the benefit of a decrease 
in costs to their clients.1003 A further argument from opponents is that cargo insurance 
premiums are not based on risk statistics, and therefore a change in risk would not 
translate into a benefit.1004 Nevertheless, it has been noted that in practice, most insurers 
prefer to establish a loss record in advance prior to reducing rates, and therefore changes 
in premium levels may only occur in the long run if the new liability regime has had a 
substantial impact on their net subrogation recoveries.1005
Contrary to what would likely be intuitive, cargo insurers have maintained that 
the nautical fault exemption is “extremely important”.1006 The cargo insurers subscribe to 
the view that the increase in carrier liability will impact on freight.1007 It would appear 
therefore that the supporters of the Hamburg liability regime are the cargo interests 
themselves, while those preferring the Hague-Visby exemptions and nautical fault are the 
shipowners, the P&I clubs, and the cargo insurers. One of the arguments made to explain 
cargo insurers’ opposition to the Hamburg Rules fault-based liability scheme is that 
“reducing the cargo losses that shippers bear reduces the scope of the risks that cargo 
insurers carry and, in this competitive industry, reduces the level of premiums they can 
charge.”1008 Indeed, certain authors considered cargo insurance premiums bound to 
decrease as carrier liability increased, making “serious inroads into hitherto so profitable 
‘nautical fault risk’ sector.”1009 In addition it has been argued that “the only change [with 
  
1003 Selvig, E. “The Hamburg Rules, the Hague Rules and Marine Insurance Practice” (1981) 12 JMLC 
299, at p. 313 and 316. 
1004 Lee, S. “The Changing Liability System of Sea Carriers and Maritime Insurance: Focusing on the 
Enforcement of the Hamburg Rules” (2002) 15 Transnat’l Law. 241, at p. 242, who notes that cargo 
insurance premiums are not based on risk statistics are reliable statistics are not available, rather 
“underwriters use a variety of variables to set premiums, such as the size of the account, the length of time 
the client has been with the insurer and even the insurer’s institution.”
1005 Sturley, M. “Changing Liability Rules and Marine Insurance” (1993) 24 JMLC 119, at p 146. 
1006 Mankabady, S. “Comments on the Hamburg Rules” in The Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods 
by Sea (1978) S. Mankabady (Ed.), British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Chameleon 
Press, London, at p. 53. 
1007 Gahmberg, H. “Carrier Liability and Insurance” in New Carriage of Goods by Sea (1997) H. Honka 
(Ed.) Institute of Maritime and Commercial Law, Abo, at p. 271-272. 
1008 Honnold, J. “Ocean Carriers and Cargo; Clarity and Fairness – Hague or Hamburg?” (1993) 24 JMLC 
75, at p. 106. It should be noted, however, that Honnold is an ardent supporter of the Hamburg Rules. 
1009 Lejnieks, M. “Diverging Solutions in the Harmonisation of Carriage of Goods by Sea: Which Approach 
to Choose?” (2003) 8 Unif. L. Rev. 303, at p. 305. Lejneiks argues that the cargo insurance industry was 
one of the main reasons that the vast majority of the world’s nations refrained from adopting the Hamburg 
Rules. He concludes this argument by stating: “The insurance industry plays a very important role in the 
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regard to Hamburg liability] would be in the market share between cargo insurers and 
P&I Clubs. By reason of the carrier’s liability for nautical fault and fire, P&I Clubs, 
which are generally based in a small number of countries such as the UK and 
Scandinavia, would get a bigger share from the market whereas cargo insurers, which are 
domestic, would lose substantial business.”1010 For example, Germany is a cargo country, 
and as such it has been suggested that would oppose increased liabilities for carriers, on 
the basis of the loss of business for the cargo insurers.1011 Commentators have argued that 
the Hamburg liability scheme would not be problematic for cargo insurers if they were 
also able to insure carriers.1012 In this respect, the shipping industry is contrasted with 
other forms of transport where Hamburg style risk allocation was accepted without 
complaint by insurers, however, in air, rail, and road transport the same segment of the 
insurance industry provides both carriers and shippers with insurance cover.1013
Interestingly enough, all the above arguments have been made with the 
assumption that cargo is always insured.1014 This however may in fact be somewhat of an 
erroneous presumption. Authors have remarked that even with the shift in liability, cargo 
will still need to insure, and in theory the reasoning is sound. In practice, however, it 
appears that few commentators have investigated the extent to which cargo currently does 
insure. In the mid-1990’s a relatively new container vessel was lost on a voyage from 
Denmark to Iceland, and of the 2000 consignments only 600 of them were insured.1015
     
global economy and, as may be seen from this example, also has an important impact on the law. Not that 
the industry is admitting as much but, as the saying goes, murder will out.” (Ibid, at p. 305). 
1010 Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-
Visby, and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 96; Tetley, W. “The Hamburg 
Rules – A Commentary” [1979] LMCLQ 1, at p. 5 comments on the position of the P&I Clubs who 
initially were not opposed to the increased responsibilities of the Hamburg Rules as it would provide 
additional business. 
1011 Herber, R. “The UN Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 1978, Hamburg Rules, Its Future 
and the Demands of Developing Countries” in Yearbook Maritime Law Vol 1 (1984) Arroyo, I. (Ed.) 
Kluwer Law, Antwerp, at p. 95.
1012 Honnold, J. “Ocean Carriers and Cargo; Clarity and Fairness – Hague or Hamburg?” (1993) 24 JMLC 
75, at p. 106
1013 Selvig, E. “The Hamburg Rules, the Hague Rules and Marine Insurance Practice” (1981) 12 JMLC 
299, at p. 312-314. 
1014 See Sturley, M. “Carriage of Goods by Sea” (2000) 31 JMLC 241, at p. 250 stating that with regard to 
cargo claims, “most disputes are between two insurers.”
1015 Falkanger, T. et al. Scandinavian Maritime Law: the Norwegian Perspective (2004) 
Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, at p. 297, citing Bursell, “How Prevalent is Insurance in Sea Carriage?” (1998) 
in Cargo Liability in Future Maritime Carriage.
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Indeed, cargo frequently moves without insurance cover on short trade routes such as the 
North Sea routes.1016 It is possible therefore that in the push by cargo interests for a shift 
in liability in order to reduce insurance costs, advocates for cargo have failed to 
investigate what percentage of cargo does actually incur insurance expenses. One may 
posit therefore that cargo interests overall would have been better served by some other 
benefit under the Rules, as the potential expenses or savings that would materialize 
according to the insurance debate may very well be simply academic.  
8.4.3. Litigation and Friction Costs
With the elimination of the nautical fault exemption in favour of a broadly 
worded liability provision, concerns have arisen with regard to the settlement of claims, 
both privately and through litigation. It has been widely suggested that the new and 
ambiguous wording will result in extensive and unproductive litigation.1017 Moreover, 
with regard to settlements, the new provision will lead to added friction costs in the 
process of settlement.1018 Justice Haight has commented that “The Hamburg rules might 
well be sub-titled: ‘The Reasonable Man Puts to Sea’…Everything will now turn upon 
whether the carrier’s employees ‘took all measures that could reasonably be required.’ In 
such soil are the seeds of controversy sown; and lawyers share in the harvest.”1019
  
1016 Selvig, E. “The Hamburg Rules, the Hague Rules and Marine Insurance Practice” (1981) 12 JMLC 
299, at p. 108. 
1017 Williams, B.K. “The Consequences of the Hamburg Rules on Insurance” in The Hamburg Rules on the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea (1978) S. Mankabady, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 
Chameleon Press, London, at p. 257; Chandler, G. “A Comparison of COGSA, the Hague/Visby Rules, and 
the Hamburg Rules” (1984) 15 JMLC 233, at p. 237; Honour, J.P. “The P & I Clubs and the New United 
Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea 1978” in The Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea (1978) S. Mankabady (Ed.), British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 
Chameleon Press, London, at pp. 239-240; See also Sturley, M. “Changing Liability Rules and Marine 
Insurance” (1993) 24 JMLC 119, at p. 133, for a discussion of this view from an economics and law 
perspective. 
1018 Goldie, C. “Effect of the Hamburg Rules on Shipowners’ Liability Insurance” (1993) 24 JMLC 111, at 
p. 113-114; See Hellawell, R. “Allocation of Risk Between Cargo Owner and Carrier” (1979) 27 Am. J. 
Comp. L. 357, at p. 363, on the elimination of friction costs. See also Sturley, ibid, at p. 133 for a 
discussion of this perspective. 
1019 Judge Haight, The Speakers’ Papers for the Bill of Lading Convention Conference (New York) at 
Haight-4, as quoted by Werth, D. “The Hamburg Rules Revisited – A Look at the US Options” (1991) 22 
JMLC 59, at p. 71, footnote 79. 
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A vast body of law has been developed with regard to the Hague and Hague-
Visby Rules, such that practically all the different points of construction on any 
individual provision of the Rules has been adjudicated on by one or more courts.1020 By 
the late 1970’s, it was comparatively rare for any litigation to revolve around the 
interpretation of the Rules, and therefore the vast majority of cargo claims were settled 
out of court.1021 Under the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules, in the case of routine damage 
claims the shipowners and the Clubs would often negotiate and settle claims for less than 
the full amount if the claims were litigated and won.1022 “The possibility of successful 
reliance on Article 4 Rule 2 of the Hague Rules has in the past at least encouraged cargo 
interests to accept reasonable settlements.”1023 P&I Clubs have been concerned about the 
percentage of legal and commercial costs for years, and Hill notes that “[c]osts form a 
much larger proportion of total claims expense than outsiders to the P&I world would 
imagine – twenty to thirty percent would not be unrealistic.”1024 It was therefore projected 
that the likely effect of the Hamburg Rules becoming the dominant legal regime would be 
increased costs in the handling and resolution of cargo claims.1025 In essence this is not 
only the actual liability payments with regard to claims, but also costs in relation to 
claims, as “the old certainties of the Hague Rules, certainties of interpretation and 
meaning which have been produced by decades of laborious litigation, will disappear as 
the commercial world has to start again and try to make sense of the Hamburg Rules.”1026
This sentiment has been expressed by Professor Tetley; “The drafting is also vague and
the meaning of many articles will not be known without litigation so that the delicate 
balance between carriers and shippers has been replaced by a new and confusing 
  
1020 Honour, J.P. “The P & I Clubs and the New United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by 
Sea 1978” in The Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (1978) S. Mankabady (Ed.), British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law, Chameleon Press, London, at pp. 239-240. This is 
particularly so in the courts of England and the United States (ibid). 
1021 Ibid, at pp. 240. 
1022 Goldie, C. “Effect of the Hamburg Rules on Shipowners’ Liability Insurance” (1993) 24 JMLC 111, at 
p. 113. 
1023 Ibid.
1024 Hill, C. “The Clubs Reaction to the Coming into Effect of the Hamburg Rules” in The Hamburg Rules: 
A Choice for the EEC? (1994) European Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, Maklu, Antwerpen, at p. 
197. 
1025 Ibid.
1026 Goldie, C. “Effect of the Hamburg Rules on Shipowners’ Liability Insurance” (1993) 24 JMLC 111, at 
p. 115. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
201
relationship.”1027 Claims that otherwise would have been settled under Hague-Visby, now 
will be litigated or arbitrated.1028 The impact of the Hamburg Rules with regard to 
litigation may differ between civilian and common law jurisdictions. It has been 
predicted that the wording of the new provision will give rise to extensive litigation in the 
common law countries, but that “…civil law lawyer[s] will be more prepared to handle 
this rule because it closely resembles the general rule of contract law liability usually 
found in civil codes.”1029
Increased litigation will arise not only on the basis of the new wording, but with 
regard to its uncertain effects as well, as “in the great majority of cases it will be apparent 
whether or not the damage is connected with the navigation/management of the ship. In 
such a case the parties involved will accept that the carrier (and his P&I insurer) will be 
exempt from liability. In other words, the cargo insurer will compensate the cargo owner 
without seeking recourse from the carrier/P&I insurer. Under the Hamburg Rules…the 
carrier will, for example, be liable for damages caused by grounding – assuming that the 
carrier or his servant has been negligent. Once the cargo insurer has paid the cargo 
owner, he must evaluate whether anyone on the carrier’s side is to blame…But evaluating 
questions of negligence is not always easy, nor will the cargo insurer’s evaluation always 
be accepted by the opposing party. There is therefore an incentive for litigation, which 
can be both lengthy and expensive.”1030 As one admiralty attorney put it, the removal of 
the nautical fault defence in favour of a single basis of liability, ensures that the resulting 
confusion will likely result in “a lifetime endowment” for lawyers.1031
  
1027 Tetley, W. “Article 9 to 13 of the Hamburg Rules” in The Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by 
Sea (1978) S. Mankabady, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, Chameleon Press, 
London, at p. 207. Tetley continues to comment that ““the Hamburg Rules which were intended to create 
order and correct errors in the Hague Rules may have created disorder by making almost random changes 
favouring one side or the other without changing the ultimate result.” (Ibid).
1028 Honour, J.P. “The P & I Clubs and the New United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by 
Sea 1978” in The Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (1978) S. Mankabady (Ed.), British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law, Chameleon Press, London, at p. 240.  
1029 Weitz, L. “International Maritime Law: The Nautical Fault Debate” (1998) 22 Tul. Mar. L.J. 581, at p. 
586. 
1030 Falkanger, T. et al. Scandinavian Maritime Law: the Norwegian Perspective (2004) 
Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, at p. 297. 
1031 Buglass, L. Marine Insurance and General Average in the United States: An Average Adjuster’s 
Viewpoint, 3rd Ed. (1991) Cornell Maritime Press, Centreville, Maryland, at p. 448. 
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The argument has been made that it is simply familiarity with the existing system 
that draws opposition to Hamburg.1032 This has led one author to comment that “[t]o 
argue against the Hamburg Rules on the principle ground that they will herald a period of 
uncertainty and confusion is, with respect to those who advance this argument, a little 
like refusing to update computer software because it takes a certain investment in to learn 
the new program and derive the full benefits from the innovation.”1033 Other authors have 
noted that it is inevitable that such an argument is tabled; “The argument that a new 
Convention would invite prolific litigation is always put forward whenever any new legal 
text is drafted.”1034 In fact opponents of the Hague Rules made the same litigation and 
friction argument at the time of its implementation.1035 Nevertheless, the criticism of the 
new wording does have a measure of validity to it. This is particularly the case where the 
status quo has now been in existence since the birth of uniform carriage law. The 
reluctance to delineate the boundaries of new wording through litigation is 
understandable, given that it can take years, decades even, as exemplified by the fact that 
the meaning of “navigation” was debated up to the House of Lords in 2000.1036
8.4.4. Varied Reactions to the Elimination of the Nautical Fault
Unsurprisingly, the notable absence of the nautical fault exemption from the 
Hamburg Rules invited a flood of commentary, both positive and negative. Somewhat 
surprisingly however, is the argument that the elimination of nautical fault is in essence a 
non-event. Force has commented that the loss of the error in management aspect of the 
defence, “ultimately, may prove to have comparatively little impact on carrier 
  
1032 “[The Hamburg Rules are] revolutionary, an upset to tradition, a rude awakening from the comfortable 
and familiar legal life of world maritime transport. We Club men have basked in the easy familiarity of the 
Hague Rules for close on seventy years. We know it backwards. Furthermore, we British are 
traditionalists…we dislike change, particularly sweeping changes, we distrust it. It interrupts and detracts 
from the things we value most in the development of law – continuity and certainty.” (Hill, C. “The Clubs 
Reaction to the Coming into Effect of the Hamburg Rules” in The Hamburg Rules: A Choice for the EEC?
(1994) European Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, Maklu, Antwerpen, at p. 197). 
1033 Nicoll, C. “Do the Hamburg Rules Suit a Shipper-Dominated Economy?” (1993) 24 JMLC 151, at p. 
179. 
1034 Shah, M. “The Revision of the Hague Rules on Bills of Lading Within the UN System – Key Issues” in 
The Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (1978) S. Mankabady (Ed.), British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law, Chameleon Press, London, at p. 13. 
1035 Sturley, M. “Changing Liability Rules and Marine Insurance” (1993) 24 JMLC 119, at p. 133. 
1036 Whistler International Ltd. v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha (The Hill Harmony) [2001] 1 All ER 403; [2001] 
1 Lloyd’s Rep. 147 (H.L.). 
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liability.”1037 In support of this assertion, Force argues that American cases have routinely 
demonstrated that when the error threatens both the cargo and the vessel, the error is 
classified as a failure to properly care for the cargo.1038 Force’s assertion is by no means 
uncontested, as exemplified by Professor Tetley’s statement, on the basis of English, 
European, and Commonwealth jurisprudence, that “where the single error that causes the 
cargo loss or damage is both in the management of the ship and in the care of the cargo, 
the carrier normally is not responsible, because the error relates to the whole venture.”1039
As well, it has been noted that the issue of error in management has “no internationally 
uniform interpretation”1040 and remains “a hot bone of contention”1041 with respect to 
distinguishing between it and care of the cargo. Given therefore the lack of consensus as 
to the extent, impact, and application, of the error in management defence it would 
perhaps be premature to postulate that the removal of it would have little effect on carrier 
liability.  
The removal of the nautical fault exemption did elicit a fair amount of support.1042
One author commented that “[a]t Hamburg the delegates finally if gingerly grasped the 
  
1037 Force, R. “A Comparison of the U.S. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act – Present Text and Proposed 
Changes – and The Hamburg Rules” in New Carriage of Goods by Sea. (1997) H. Honka (Ed.) Institute of 
Maritime and Commercial Law, Abo, at p. 386. Force does acknowledge, however, that the elimination of 
error in navigation, especially in a collision situation, would most certainly be a change to the existing 
Hague system.  Nevertheless, Force argues that this change is more illusory than real given the courts 
tendency to find that there was a failure to exercise due diligence or the occurrence of “both to blame” 
situations in U.S. law (Ibid, at p. 387). 
1038 Ibid. Arguably, this is not the strongest position, given the wealth of case law granting immunity to 
carriers on the basis of error in management. As well, given that the Hamburg Rules were created with the 
aim of establishing an international uniform framework for the carriage of goods, it is suggested that Force 
may want look beyond the American borders before declaring the change in international law to be a 
somewhat of a non-event.  
1039 Tetley, W. Marine Cargo Claims, 4th Ed., Ch. 16, at p. 7 (Available online only at: 
http://tetley.law.mcgill.ca/maritime). 
1040 Japikse, R.E. “Deck Cargo Exclusion, Nautical Fault Exemption, Fire Exception” in The Hamburg 
Rules: A Choice for the EEC? (1994) European Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, Maklu, 
Antwerpen, at p. 185. Although, Japikse does note that some progress has been made in defining the 
boundaries of the exception. 
1041 Ibid.
1042 See for example, Werth, D. “The Hamburg Rules Revisited – A Look at the US Options” (1991) 22 
JMLC 59, at p. 80; Tetley, W. “The Hamburg Rules – A Commentary” [1979] LMLCQ 1, at p. 7; Karan, 
H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, and 
Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 97; Selvig, E. “The Hamburg Rules, the 
Hague Rules and Marine Insurance Practice” (1981) 12 JMLC 299, at p. 324.  
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nettle and abolished the archaic principle of ‘error in navigation’.”1043 Supporters of the 
Hamburg Rules commented that its “deletion of out-moded and/or unfair rules such as 
the defence of error of navigation is justified in order to bring cargo liability into the 
Twenty-First Century.”1044 Of the arguments in this vein, one in particular that has been 
repeated on numerous occasions is the fact that the defence is unique to transportation 
law.1045 It has been argued that the special exemptions of the Hague Rules “create 
practical difficulties when, as is increasingly common, carriage to destination requires 
different types of transport – road, rail, sea and air…[and] none of the other international 
conventions grant the carrier immunity for negligent loss or damage.”1046 Article 5(1) of 
the Hamburg Rules on the other hand is “patterned broadly on the comparable basic rule 
on the liability of the air carrier in the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules 
relating to International Carriage by Air of 1929, as amended by the Hague Protocol 1955 
(Warsaw Convention).”1047 It has therefore been argued that “the deletion of the nautical 
fault defence and the adoption of the Hamburg Rules would place sea transport in line 
with modern jurisprudence and with other international conventions in the field of 
transport, such as the CMR, CIM, and the Warsaw Convention.”1048 Conversely, it has 
been argued that the unique nature of nautical fault is not a reason for its abolition, in that 
sea carriage is in fact unique from other modes of transportation: “There is no 
comparison between the quantity of cargo that may be carried by air or by road or by 
railway. If the carrier were to be liable in respect of loss or damage to the goods carried 
  
1043 Tetley, ibid. 
1044 Chandler, G. “After Reaching a Century of the Harter Act: Where Should We Go From Here?” (1993) 
24 JMLC 43, at p. 45.
1045 For example, Tetley who notes that with respect to Hamburg, the nautical fault principle “which is 
found in virtually no other modern law of transport, has disappeared.” (Tetley, W. “The Hamburg Rules –
A Commentary” [1979] LMLCQ 1, at p. 7. 
1046 Honnold, J. “Ocean Carriers and Cargo; Clarity and Fairness – Hague or Hamburg?” (1993) 24 JMLC 
75, at p. 98. 
1047 Shah, M. “The Revision of the Hague Rules on Bills of Lading Within the UN System – Key Issues” in 
The Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (1978) S. Mankabady (Ed.), British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law, Chameleon Press, London, at p. 17-18. 
1048 Weitz, L. “International Maritime Law: The Nautical Fault Debate” (1998) 22 Tul. Mar. L.J. 581, at p. 
587. See also Nicoll, C. “Do the Hamburg Rules Suit a Shipper-Dominated Economy?” (1993) 24 JMLC 
151, at p. 179, who describes Hamburg as “a cohesive instrument to a large degree consistent in its overall 
structure with other transport regimes.”; Honnold, J. “Ocean Carriers and Cargo; Clarity and Fairness –
Hague or Hamburg?” (1993) 24 JMLC 75, at p. 98, argues that Hamburg’s handling of the carrier’s liability 
was “a necessary step towards preparation of the 1980 Multimodal Convention.”
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arising out of faults in the navigation of the vessel, litigation would increase enormously 
without any real advantage for anybody.”1049
Conversely, the removal of nautical fault was not well received by some, as is 
exemplified by Chen’s statement: “this time-honoured provision was ruthlessly 
eliminated from the Hamburg Rules.”1050 Lord Roskill, in a 1978 address argued that 
“[t]he law had always distinguished between the fault of the shipowner himself and the 
shipowner’s responsibility for the negligence of his servants. For the former he must 
remain responsible; for the latter he has historically always been allowed to disclaim 
responsibility. The Hague Rules had worked well for fifty years and should not be 
changed lightly.”1051 Opponents of Hamburg have argued that the supporters of the new 
liability structure fail to recognize the valid reaction from shipowners in refusing to 
support Hamburg: “Why should we? What’s in it for us?”1052 Pragmatically, 
“shipowners, insurers (both P&I and cargo), charterers, etc. resent having one-sided 
solutions imposed upon them and naturally resist such actions.”1053 The alteration of the 
liability structure was argued to have a “notable impact on the carrier’s position and finds 
no compensation in an introduction of new exemptions or defences.”1054 Not only has the 
widely used exemption been eliminated, it will now become increasingly difficult for 
shipowners to recover general average contributions.1055 Furthermore, it has also been 
argued that the removal of the carrier’s exemptions is inequitable. “In contrast to the 
  
1049 Berlingieri, F. “The Period of Responsibility and the Basis of Liability of the Carrier” in The Hamburg 
Rules: A Choice for the EEC? (1994) European Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, Maklu, 
Antwerpen, at p. 95. 
1050 Chen, X.  “Chinese Law on Carriage of Goods by Sea under Bills of Lading” (1999) 8 Currents Int’l 
Trade L. J. 89, at p. 97. 
1051 Address to the British Association of Average Adjusters in 1978, described by Buglass, L. Marine 
Insurance and General Average in the United States: An Average Adjuster’s Viewpoint, 3rd Ed. (1991) 
Cornell Maritime Press, Centreville, Maryland, at p. 448. 
1052 Chandler, G. “After Reaching a Century of the Harter Act: Where Should We Go From Here?” (1993) 
24 JMLC 43, at p. 45.
1053 Ibid.
1054 Japikse, R.E. “Deck Cargo Exclusion, Nautical Fault Exemption, Fire Exception” in The Hamburg 
Rules: A Choice for the EEC? (1994) European Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, Maklu, 
Antwerpen, at p. 189. 
1055 Goldie, C. “Effect of the Hamburg Rules on Shipowners’ Liability Insurance” (1993) 24 JMLC 111, at 
p. 115. Although it has been noted that where larger sums of money have been claimed from cargo interests 
for general average contributions, it has become almost normal practice for cargo interests to refuse to pay 
(ibid). The Hamburg Rules, therefore, may not change the litigation situation drastically with regard to 
general average, it may simply make the task of recovery all the more difficult. 
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carrier’s enhanced cargo liabilities, his possibility of recovery from sub-contractors 
where their negligence has brought about those liabilities, remains restricted…It looks 
rather inconsistent and unbalanced…and indeed unjust.”1056 With regard to pilots, for 
example, the carrier is often faced with compulsory pilotage areas, and in the vast 
majority of instances the pilotage authorities are exempt from responsibility to the carrier 
under statue.1057 Previously, the carrier was protected from liability for cargo damage 
under the Hague Rules for the pilot’s error in navigation, but under Hamburg the carrier 
benefits from no such protection. It is probable, therefore, that under the Hamburg Rules 
the carrier will be responsible for cargo loss or damage resulting from the negligent 
actions of pilots. Nevertheless, the argument has been made that under the Hamburg 
Rules only the “servants or agents” must take all reasonable measures to avoid the 
occurrence, which “if the courts uphold the precedent that a compulsory pilot is not the 
servant of the owner [then] groundings, collisions or other accidents…will be excused 
under Hamburg.”1058
The elimination of nautical fault has been noted for its effect on general average. 
“The elimination of that [nautical fault] defence would greatly alter general average 
practice as it is known today. Since the end of the 19th century, general average sacrifices 
have included numerous claims of carriers, not merely for cutting away of the mast or 
anchors as the result of a peril, but also where the carrier has been at fault. Exonerating 
ocean carriers for the fault of their servants is not an ancient phenomenon but emerged in 
  
1056 Japikse, R.E. “Deck Cargo Exclusion, Nautical Fault Exemption, Fire Exception” in The Hamburg 
Rules: A Choice for the EEC? (1994) European Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, Maklu, 
Antwerpen, at p. 191. 
1057 For example, s.10 (1) of the Legal Succession to the South African Transport Services Act, 9 of 1989, 
stipulates the harbours of South Africa to be compulsory pilotage harbours, while s.10 (7) provides that 
Portnet, the body operating the South African harbours, “…and the pilot shall be exempt from liability for 
loss or damage caused by a negligent act or omission on the part of the pilot.” In England, shipowner 
liability for errors of pilotage is governed by s.16 of Pilotage Act, U.K. 1987, c.21, while s. 22 exempts the 
pilotage authority from all liability for the acts of a negligent pilot. In Belgium, the Law of 30 August 1988 
exempts the State from liability for damage resulting from the culpable acts or omissions of the pilots who 
are its employees. A Belgian court has found that this exemption from liability in favour of the State will 
also apply in the instance where a pilot de facto took over command of a vessel in disregard of the advice 
that had been given to him (Hof van Beroep te Antwerpen, October 26, 1988 [1990] ETL 678).  See also 
Hof van Beroep te Antwerpen, September 26, 2005 (The M.S. Iberian Express) [2006] ETL 368, where the 
Belgium court considered restricted liability of the provider of pilotage services in the Port of Antwerp.  
1058 Bauer, G. “Conflicting Liability Regimes: Hague-Visby v. Hamburg Rules – A Cases by Case 
Analysis” (1993) 24 JMLC 53.
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the last 100 years. This principle permits an ocean carrier to escape liability for the 
negligence of his servants in the navigation and management of the ship.”1059 In essence, 
the exemption not only permits the carrier to escape liability, but to claim general average 
expenses as well. For example, in collision cases, general average is very often declared 
and the carrier is generally able to recover the cargo interests’ proportion of the general 
average.1060 It has been cautioned that without the nautical fault exemption cargo owners 
will refuse to pay contribution in general average and thus in instances of collision, “[t]he 
situation would become more complicated in case[s] where general average is 
declared.”1061 Moreover, concern has also been expressed that carriers under Hamburg 
will be hesitant to provide security to salvors on behalf of the cargo interests.1062
Finally, it has been argued that the elimination of the defence was a necessary 
policy decision. As mentioned previously, the Hamburg Conference was a political rather 
than a commercial and economic conference, and regardless of the economic, insurance 
and commercial arguments made elsewhere, the exemption has become somewhat of an 
anomaly when regarded in the context of modern legal systems. Arguably, “a statutory 
exception of the general rule that the contractor has to be liable a least for the grave fault 
of his main employees in performing the basic obligations of the contract would not fit 
into the law making policy of nearly any legislator.”1063 Moreover, a provision or 
contractual waiver such as the nautical fault exemption which relieves the carrier from 
liability in the event of the fault or neglect of his servants, the master or the officers, in 
the navigation or management of the vessel, would if stipulated in a contract, not be valid 
  
1059 Tetley, W. International Maritime and Admiralty Law (2002) Yvon Blais, Cowansville, Quebec, at p. 
373. 
1060 Honour, J.P. “The P & I Clubs and the New United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by 
Sea 1978” in The Hamburg Rules on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (1978) S. Mankabady (Ed.), British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law, Chameleon Press, London, at p. 243. 
1061 Berlingieri, F. “The Period of Responsibility and the Basis of Liability of the Carrier” in The Hamburg 
Rules: A Choice for the EEC? (1994) European Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, Maklu, 
Antwerpen, at p. 96, who outlines the difficulties that will arise in both-to-blame situations and general 
average situations with regard to litigation and apportionment of fault between the parties. 
1062 See Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-
Visby, and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY, at p. 90. 
1063 Herber, R. “The Hamburg Rules: Origin and Need for the New Liability System” in The Hamburg 
Rules: A Choice for the EEC? (1994) European Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, Maklu, 
Antwerpen, at p. 44. 
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under the laws of most nations.1064 It has been observed that with regard to the debate 
concerning the elimination of nautical fault, “this is a matter of legal policy and far from 
economic considerations.”1065
8.5. THE POSITION OF CERTAIN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Over a decade after the Hamburg Rules were drafted, the fault-based liability 
regime failed to find support with either the CMI or the International Group of P&I 
Clubs.
During the CMI Paris Conference in 1990, the Hamburg Rules were discussed 
along with potential future improvements to the Hague-Visby system of liability. This 
conference demonstrated that the maintenance of the nautical fault exemption was far 
from being a dead issue from a legislative perspective. The CMI representatives dealt 
with the nautical fault exemption differently from the participants at the Hamburg 
Conference. As in the Hamburg Conference, “it was mainly the exception of liability for 
nautical fault of the servants which spilt up the opinions.”1066 With respect to the CMI 
delegates however, “a majority was in favour of retaining this exemption in order not to 
overburden the carrier.”1067 The CMI Conference approved a document entitled 
“Uniformity of the Law of the Carriage of Goods by Sea in the 1990’s”, which stated; 
“Two different views have been expressed in respect of this [nautical fault] defence: the 
first is that it should be retained; the second is that the defence should be abolished. The 
strongly prevailing view is that the exemption should be retained because it ensures a 
more balanced spreading of the risks and because its abolition would not ensure a more 
significant uniformity. In favour of the second view, it can be said that the defence is 
unique in respect of the carrier by sea and that the spreading of risk and the avoidance of 
undue concentration of risks ensured by the exception of the perils of the sea, by the 
  
1064 Ibid, noting as well that “modern laws against unfair contract practices do not allow for such a waiver 
of main obligations of the carrier.”
1065 Ibid. 
1066 Ibid, at p. 43.
1067 Ibid. 
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limitation of liability of the carrier and by the global limitation of liability.”1068 Of the 
delegations present, twenty-two of them supported maintaining the nautical fault 
exemption,1069 while only nine were in favour of deleting it.1070
The fault-based liability scheme of Hamburg has proved to be even less popular 
with the International Group of P&I Clubs. Following the coming into force of the 
Hamburg Rules, the P&I Clubs reacted by altering their club rules, creating amendments 
to the bills of lading, and issuing circulars to their members describing such changes.1071
Primarily, unless the Club exercises its discretion to decide otherwise, costs incurred by 
members as a result of carriage on terms less favourable than those of Hague or Hague-
Visby are not covered.1072 Gard, for example, altered their rules with the effect that Rule 
34: Cargo Liability, which covers cargo loss or damage,1073 stipulates that “the cover 
under this Rule 34.1 does not include:…(ii) liabilities, costs and expenses which would 
not have been incurred by the Member if the cargo had been or could have been carried 
on terms no less favourable to the Member than those laid down under the Hague or 
Hague-Visby Rules (save where the contract of carriage is on terms less favourable to the 
Member solely because of the incorporation by operation of law of the Hamburg 
Rules).”1074 If a shipowner therefore voluntarily adopts the Hamburg Rules or any portion 
thereof, his cover will be jeopardized. The P&I Clubs also prepared a clause for 
incorporation into bills of lading, which “is designed to ensure that where one or other of 
the Hague, Hague-Visby or Hamburg Rules regimes would be applicable on its own 
terms by reason of the location of the port of shipment or by reason of the port of 
  
1068 Berlingieri, F. “The Period of Responsibility and the Basis of Liability of the Carrier” in The Hamburg 
Rules: A Choice for the EEC? (1994) European Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, Maklu, 
Antwerpen, at p. 95. 
1069 Those delegations were: Australia-New Zealand, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, India, 
Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Norway, Panama, Peru, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, 
United States and Yugoslavia. 
1070 Those delegations were: Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, Italy, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal and Spain. 
1071 Hazelwood, S. P & I Clubs: Law and Practice, 3rd Ed. (2000), LLP, London, at p. 167. 
1072 Ibid.
1073 Rule 34.1 “The Association shall cover the following liabilities when and to the extent that they relate 
to cargo intended to be or being or having been carried on the Ship: (a) liability for loss, shortage, damage 
or other responsibility arising out of any breach by the Member, or by any person for whose acts, neglect or 
default he may be legally liable, of his obligation properly to load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for, 
discharge or deliver the cargo or out of unseaworthiness or unfitness of the Ship…” (Poland, S. & Rooth, 
T. Gard Handbook on P&I Insurance (1996) Gard, Arendal, Norway, at p. 257). 
1074 Poland, S. & Rooth, T. Gard Handbook on P&I Insurance (1996) Gard, Arendal, Norway, at p. 257
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discharge, the Hague or Hague-Visby Rules have been preferred.”1075 Technically the 
wording of the clause cannot prevent a claimant from bringing proceedings in a state that 
has ratified the Hamburg Rules. The clause does, however, restrict the application of the 
Hamburg Rules as much as is legally possible, to render them inapplicable when at all 
possible, and ensure the carrier is not viewed as voluntarily incorporating more the 
onerous Hamburg duties.  
8.6. THE LIMITED SUCCESS OF THE HAMBURG RULES
A multitude of arguments have been made as to what the potential result of the 
Hamburg Rules liability scheme will be, however, the lack of success of the regime 
ensured that those theories were never tested. The Hamburg Rules came into force in 
November of 1992, fourteen years after it was agreed upon, once having reached the 
requite number of twenty ratifications.1076 At the time Hamburg came into force, fifteen 
of the states that had ratified it were from the Continent of Africa,1077 making sixteen 
with Cameroon joining shortly thereafter, and with a fair number of them being land 
locked states.1078 Subsequent ratifications have not improved the situation or the 
desirability of the Hague Rules.1079 One commentator noted with regard to the countries 
willing to accept the Hamburg Rules, “[they are] hardly an imposing group of trading 
nations and not a list to get too excited about because they do not include the world’s 
  
1075 Hazelwood, S. P & I Clubs: Law and Practice, 3rd Ed. (2000), LLP, London, at p. 167-168. The text of 
the sample clause can be found in Appendix II(i) entitled “Hamburg Rules Clauses” at p. 414, of 
Hazelwood’s text. 
1076 For an explanation of the factors and lobbying that finally created enough interest for the Hamburg 
Rules to come into force see Katz, S. “New Momentum Towards Entry Into Force of the Hamburg Rules” 
[1989] ETL 297. Katz attributes the sluggishness in adherence to the Hamburg Rules in part to a well 
organized group of ocean carriers effectively campaigning against the Rules (Ibid, at p. 298). 
1077 Botswana, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania. See also Delwaide, L. “The Hamburg Rules: A 
Choice for the EEC? Conclusion” in The Hamburg Rules: A Choice for the EEC? (1994) European 
Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, Maklu, Antwerpen, at p. 215. 
1078 Such as Botswana, Lesotho, Uganda, Zambia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Malawi. 
1079 According to UNCITRAL, as of January 15, 2008, the 33 parties to the Hamburg Rules are: Albania, 
Austria, Barbados, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chile, Czech Republic, Dominican 
Republic, Egypt, Gambia, Georgia, Guinea, Hungary, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, 
Morocco, Nigeria, Paraguay, Romania, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Syrian Arab Republic, 
Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia. Available at: 
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/transport_goods/Hamburg_status.html. 
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major seafaring and industrial nations. In fact these nations control no more than 2% of 
the world shipping tonnage and most probably even less of the world’s trade.”1080 Given 
that the developing nations provided the impetus for the Hamburg Rules, it is somewhat 
ironic therefore that Professor Nubukpo, examining the Rules a decade after their 
creation, concluded that they have little that is attractive to developing nations.1081 In 
1994, a conference entitled “The Hamburg Rules: A Choice for the EEC?” concluded 
with one observer remarking that “the general feeling of the speakers at this Symposium 
[was that] the Hamburg Rules are not acceptable and not good enough as such.”1082
It has been noted by one author that to date the only jurisprudence beginning to 
emerge on the Hamburg Rules is out of Chile.1083 This is not entirely the case, as for 
example, the Moroccan courts have also applied the Hamburg Rules,1084 nevertheless, it 
is indicative of the scant nature of the body of Hamburg Rules jurisprudence. Indeed, not 
only is there a lack of jurisprudence interpreting the Hamburg Rules, certain courts have 
recently demonstrated hostility towards their application. The Cour d’Appel de Paris 
considered a cargo claim for shortage ascertained at discharge in Conakry, Guinea.1085
The court of first instance held that the Hamburg Rules applied on the basis that the port 
of discharge was in a State party to the Hamburg Rules.1086 The Cour d’Appel de Paris 
held that the Hamburg Rules did not apply, regardless of the port of discharge, on the 
basis that France had not ratified the Hamburg Rules. Equally dismissive of the Hamburg 
Rules is the instance where the Cour de Cassation considered carriage between Thailand 
  
1080 Kisteman, K. “The Hamburg Rules: A Marine Underwriter’s Viewpoint” Paper presented at the 
Seminar on The Hamburg Rules (Gold Reef City, South Africa, 20 September 1991), at p. 1. 
1081 Nubukpo, C. “La Convention des Nations Unies sur le Transport International de Marchandises par 
Mer Dix Ans Après” [1989] DMF 538, at p. 557. Nubukpo argues that it is actually the Hague Rules that 
have proved to be more attractive to the developing nations. 
1082 Delwaide, L. “The Hamburg Rules: A Choice for the EEC? Conclusion” in The Hamburg Rules: A 
Choice for the EEC? (1994) European Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, Maklu, Antwerpen, at p. 
215.
1083 Rozas, R. “The Hamburg Rules Enforcement in Chile”, unpublished paper, at p. 3.
1084 Cherkaoui H. “Chronique de Jurisprudence Marocaine” [2002] DMF 629, at p. 752-753, in which 
Cherkaoui discussed to decisions from the Court of Appeal of Casablanca dealing with the application of 
the Hamburg Rules to the dispute, and the limitation of liability under the Rules.
1085 Cour d’Appel de Paris, 3 décembre 1997, DMF 1998, 588.
1086 Article 2(1)(b) of the Hamburg Rules provides that it is applicable where the port of discharge is 
located in a Contracting State. 
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and Senegal, with Senegal being a State party to the Hamburg Rules.1087 The Cour de 
Cassation found that the Court of Appeal had correctly exercised its powers of 
interpretation in holding that the Hague Rules were applicable since they were referred to 
by a Paramount Clause in the bill of lading.1088 Similarly, the Chambre Arbitral de Paris 
considered a dispute in which the shipment was outbound from Morocco, a State party to 
the Hamburg Rules, and the claimant pleaded that the Hamburg Rules applied to the 
dispute.1089 The arbitral tribunal commented that the Hamburg Rules had only a few 
signatories who were States with little impact in the maritime community, moreover, a 
new convention to replace the Rules is currently being drafted by UNCITRAL with the 
help of CMI.1090 The arbitral tribunal concluded that on the basis that France has not 
ratified the Hamburg Rules, and the fact that the parties had incorporated the Hague 
Rules by virtue of a clause Paramount, the Hague Rules thus governed the dispute.1091
Nor have the Hamburg Rules found favour with the Corte di Cassazione, the Supreme 
Court of Italy. The Court of Appeal of Naples had determined that the Hamburg Rules 
applied to damaged cargo discharged in Naples on the basis that Law No. 40 of January 
25, 1983 authorized their ratification. The Corte di Cassazione however determined that 
the Hamburg Rules did not apply because although their ratification was authorized by 
Parliament, they were never in fact ratified.1092
As a result of the failure of the Hamburg Rules over political and commercial 
bargaining tables, we are left without any practical experience drawn from its actual 
application to validate or disprove its critics and supporters. This leaves us in the 
unfortunate position of resurrecting the same arguments for use with regard to the new 
UNCITRAL Draft Convention. If there were lessons to be learned from the application of
the Hamburg Rules in practice, they have been lost. Moreover, an opportunity to 
modernize uniform carriage law was also lost. With outdated carriage regimes, and no 
  
1087 Cour de Cassation, 28 mai 2002, (World Apollo) [2003] ETL 67.
1088 Ibid. Moreover, the Cour de Cassation found that there was no binding rule to conflict with the parties 
choice of governing law. 
1089 Sentence 1090 du 24 juin 2003, Chambre Arbitral Maritime de Paris, DMF 2004, 747.
1090 Ibid, at p. 749.
1091 Ibid.
1092 Corte di Cassazione, February 14, 2001, Brendani AB v. Magazzini Generali & Frigoriferi S.p.A., 2002 
Dir. Mar. 227, summary available at: www.comitemaritime.org/jurisp/ju_hamburg.html
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viable international alternative, states therefore began enacting their own carriage 
regimes, thus fracturing the uniformity that existed at the time of the Hamburg Rules.1093
  
1093 Sweeney, who was present during the diplomatic conferences, commented with particular foresight at 
the completion of the draft that “if this draft convention fails, the prospect for the harmonious conduct of 
world trade will be diminished as a multiplicity of local rules will surely take the place of the Hague 
Rules.” (Sweeney, J. “The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea (Part V)” (1977) 8 
JMLC 167, at p. 194). 
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Chapter 9
An Alternative to Uniform Law: National Initiatives
By the 1980’s and 1990’s, and particularly after it was evident that the Hamburg 
Rules were not a success, many nations found themselves with wholly outdated carriage 
regimes and began to turn to domestic solutions. Despite the unwillingness of the vast 
majority of trading nations to adopt the Hamburg Rules, it has nevertheless been noted 
that the Hamburg Rules do have many strengths. This has evidently not gone unnoticed 
by domestic legislatures as much of the resulting domestic legislation proved to be 
inspired by both the Hague-Visby and the Hamburg Rules. Several nations have opted to 
incorporate certain aspects of the Hamburg Rules into domestic legislation or national 
maritime codes, while at the same time retaining elements from the Hague and Hague-
Visby Regime. Those nations, in pursuing an alternative to the existing carriage regimes, 
have attempted to create a solution that is widely accepted in practice by domestic 
shipping interests and may be viewed as a modern alternative by the international 
shipping community. What is significant however is that those nations, with few 
exceptions, have retained the Art. IV(2)(a) defence of the Hague Rules, even those who 
have chosen to eliminate the other Art. IV defences. 
9.1. THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
At one time, China was one arguably the world’s leading maritime power. For 
over four centuries during the Song-Yuan Period, China had reached a level of maritime 
technology and trade that was centuries ahead of the European powers.1094 This balance 
of power changed during the 16th century, when European advancements essentially 
  
1094 Deng, G. Chinese Maritime Activities and Socioeconomic Development c.2100 B.C – 1900 A.D. (1997) 
Greenwood Press, Connecticut, at p. 163. The Song-Yuan Period ran from 960 to 1368 A.D. At the time, 
the Chinese technology had reached such a level that it was in effect technologically similar to the 
European maritime powers of the late 15th century. (Ibid); Mo, J. Shipping Law in China (1999) Sweet & 
Maxwell Asia, Hong Kong, at pp. 5-10 detailing the history of shipping in China dating from 6,000 years 
ago. In particular at p. 7-8, Mo describes the seven maritime adventures of Zheng He during the Ming 
Dynasty between 1405 and 1433, where he was ordered to sail seven times to Southeast Asia, the Middle 
East and North Africa, with approximately 27,000 people aboard hundreds of ships for each journey. The 
largest vessel used for the voyages measured 140 meters long and 57 meters wide. 
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eclipsed the prior developments by the Chinese.1095 This was largely due to the embargo 
on overseas trade and intermittent military blockages along the coasts, which began 
during the 14th century reign of Ming Dynasty.1096 Foreign trade and shipping in China 
continued to be heavily restricted for centuries, continuing well into the 19th century.1097
It was not until after the Opium Wars in the mid 19th century, that Chinese markets began 
to open for foreign traders.1098 By the 1960’s however, it was predicted that China would 
inevitably become one of the world’s leading shipbuilding and operating nations.1099
Such predictions held true, and over the past 30 years, China has rapidly become a heavy 
player in the shipping industry. Over 90% of China’s import and export goods are 
transported by sea,1100 and her fleet is rapidly expanding.1101 To date, this trend has 
shown no signs of reversal.1102 China’s ever-increasing foreign international trade and 
continually expanding shipping interests have ensured that China has become one of the 
world’s major shipping nations. Despite having a long history of maritime trade, “the 
ancient Chinese culture, in particular Confucianism, disrespected the merchants and their 
wealth…[t]his led to the underdevelopment of commercial law in Chinese legal 
history.”1103 As a result, there was no Chinese equivalent to the mercantile and shipping 
law found in the Western nations.1104 As China did not have a domestic maritime law, nor 
  
1095 Deng, G. Chinese Maritime Activities and Socioeconomic Development c.2100 B.C – 1900 A.D. (1997) 
Greenwood Press, Connecticut, at p. 163.
1096 Mo, J. Shipping Law in China (1999) Sweet & Maxwell Asia, Hong Kong, at p. 11
1097 Ibid. During the first half of the 19th century, the only port open to foreign traders was Guangzhou. 
Moreover, it was illegal to build any vessels that could carry over 28 people. (Ibid). 
1098 Ibid. 
1099 Harbron, J. Communist Ships and Shipping (1962) Adlard Coles Ltd., London, at p. 249. Harbron 
however viewed the past state of Chinese shipping rather negatively, commenting at p. 249 that “until the 
coming of the Communist regime in late 1949 China…displayed incredible ineptitude where shipping was 
concerned and allowed almost the entire industry to be operated by foreign concerns.”
1100 Li, K. & Ingram C. Maritime Law and Policy in China (2002) Cavendish Publishing, London, at p. 6; 
Zhang, L. “Shipping Law and Practice in China” (1990) 14 Tul. Mar. L.J. 209, at p. 209; Mo, J. Shipping 
Law in China (1999) Sweet & Maxwell Asia, Hong Kong, at p. 2. 
1101 Li, ibid, at p. 1, has noted that “the annual growth rate is about 13% in number of ships and 7.7% in 
tonnage, which is much higher than the world average of 1.1% and 1.3% respectively.” In 1974, China’s 
fleet was ranked twenty-third in size in the world, but by the end of 1984, China ranked ninth (Zhang, ibid, 
at p. 210.). Another impressive example is, from the years 1961 through to 1985, the size of the China 
Ocean Shipping Company’s fleet, a state-owned enterprise, increased from just under 50 vessels, to 614 
vessels. (Zhang, ibid, at p. 211). 
1102 Chan, F. et al. Shipping and Logistics Law: Principles and Practice in Hong Kong (2002) Hong Kong 
University Press, Hong Kong, at p. 242 and p. 638. 
1103 Mo, J. “Maritime Law” in Chinese Law (1999) Wang, G. & Mo, J. (Eds), Kluwer Law International, 
The Hague, at p. 678. 
1104 Ibid.
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were they party to any of the international conventions,1105 the law as applied to maritime 
matters was simply the principles of China’s civil law, which was also uncodified.1106
Originally, the drafting of the Maritime Code began in the early 1950s,1107 with 
the study and the translation of Russian Maritime Law.1108 The drafting of the Maritime 
Code was interrupted during the period from 1963 to 1981 as a result of various political 
events.1109 When the drafting resumed, it became evident that neither the Hague Rules, 
nor the Hamburg Rules, were desirable to follow. China is a developing nation with a 
large volume of export and import, and thus the cargo interests favoured the Hamburg 
Rules. Cargo interests presented the following major arguments in favour of a Hamburg 
Rules inspired Maritime Code: Firstly, it was considered that neither the Hague nor the 
Hague-Visby Rules “are fair in distributing the risks in the carriage of goods by sea 
between the shipowners and cargo interests”; secondly, “that the Hamburg Rules are the 
trend in the development of international maritime law in this field”; and thirdly, “as a 
developing country, China was all for the adoption of the Hamburg Rules in 1978.”1110  
Conversely, China possesses a strong merchant marine and a long coastline, therefore, 
carrier interests raised similar objections to Hamburg as were raised in the other 
prominent maritime nations.1111 In particular it was argued that none of the other 
powerful maritime nations have adopted the Hamburg Rules.1112 It has been noted that 
“[t]he PRC cannot be labelled as being predominantly “shipowning” or “cargo nation”; it 
is both.”1113 In order to balance the needs of cargo interests and carriers, China 
  
1105 Chen, X.  “Chinese Law on Carriage of Goods by Sea under Bills of Lading” (1999) 8 Currents Int’l 
Trade L. J. 89, at p. 90; Li, L. “The Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China” [1993] LMLCQ 
204, at p. 205-206. 
1106 Li, ibid, at p. 204. 
1107 Beaumont, B. & Yang, P. Chinese Maritime Law and Arbitration (1994) Simmonds & Hill, London, at 
p. 61; Mo, J. Shipping Law in China (1999) Sweet & Maxwell Asia, Hong Kong, at p. 15.  
1108 Li, K. & Ingram C. Maritime Law and Policy in China (2002) Cavendish Publishing, London, at p. 2. 
1109 Zhengliang, H. & Huybrechts, M. “The Underlying Principles & Highlights of the Maritime Code of 
the P.R. China” [1995] ETL 287, at p. 287. 
1110 Zhengliang  & Huybrechts, ibid at p. 290.
1111 Chen, X.  “Chinese Law on Carriage of Goods by Sea under Bills of Lading” (1999) 8 Currents Int’l 
Trade L. J. 89, at p. 90.
1112 Zhengliang, H. & Huybrechts, M. “The Underlying Principles & Highlights of the Maritime Code of 
the P.R. China” [1995] ETL 287, at p. 290.
1113 Beaumont, B. & Yang, P. Chinese Maritime Law and Arbitration (1994) Simmonds & Hill, London, at 
p. 76.
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compromised by borrowing from both the Hague-Visby and the Hamburg Rules,1114 thus 
creating, in the words of one commentator, “a balance between all shipping interests.”1115
On November 7th, 1992, the Maritime Code was passed with an overwhelming majority 
of the legislators,1116 and was promulgated by the President of the People’s Republic of 
China, to enter into force on July 1st, 2003.1117 In Chinese, the words for the Maritime 
Code are Hai Shang Fa, when translated literally mean ‘law relating to maritime 
commerce (or trade)’.1118
The Maritime Code “appears to have been the first major effort to draw from both 
the Hague-Visby Rules and the Hamburg Rules.”1119 The Maritime Code, in Article 51, 
substantively maintains the carrier defences that are found in Hague-Visby, although they 
have been reformatted into twelve defences rather than seventeen.1120 Article 51 provides: 
“The carrier shall not be liable for the loss of or damage to the goods occurring during the 
period of the carrier’s responsibility arising or resulting from any of the following causes: 
(1) Fault of the Master, crew members, pilot or servant of the carrier in the navigation or 
management of the ship…”1121 It was felt that the Hague-Visby defences, including 
  
1114 Chen, X.  “Chinese Law on Carriage of Goods by Sea under Bills of Lading” (1999) 8 Currents Int’l 
Trade L. J. 89, at p. 90. 
1115 Beaumont, B. & Yang, P. Chinese Maritime Law and Arbitration (1994) Simmonds & Hill, London, at 
p. 76. The authors go on to comment that the Maritime Code is in effect a fair distribution between the 
shipowning interests and the cargo interests highlighting “[t]he cautious way in which only a pinch of the 
Hamburg Rules has been sprinkled into the Hague-Visby Rules [as] indicative of this.” (Ibid). 
1116 Li, K. & Ingram C. Maritime Law and Policy in China (2002) Cavendish Publishing, London, at p. 2 
notes that it passed with “98 votes in favour out of a total if 101 votes, which was rare in Chinese 
legislation.”
1117 Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China, Order No 64, 1993. English translations of the 
Maritime Code can be found in Chan, F. et al. Shipping and Logistics Law: Principles and Practice in 
Hong Kong (2002) Hong Kong University Press, Hong Kong, at Annex 1, p. 659 and ff; Li, K. & Ingram 
C. Maritime Law and Policy in China (2002) Cavendish Publishing, London, at p. 55 and ff; Beaumont, B. 
& Yang, P. Chinese Maritime Law and Arbitration (1994) Simmonds & Hill, London, at p. 79 and ff; 
Zhang, L. “Recent Maritime Legislation and Practice in the People’s Republic of China” (1994) 6 U.S.F. 
Mar. L.J. 273, at p. 302 and ff. 
1118 Mo, J. Shipping Law in China (1999) Sweet & Maxwell Asia, Hong Kong, at p. 1.
1119 Sturley, M. “Uniformity in the Law Governing the Carriage of Goods by Sea” (1995) 26 JMLC 553, at 
p. 561. 
1120 Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China, Order No. 64, 1993, Chapter 4: Carriage of Goods 
by Sea, Art. 51. See also Mandelbaum, S. “Creating Uniform Worldwide Liability Standards for Sea 
Carriage of Goods Under the Hague, COGSA, Visby and Hamburg Conventions” (1996) 23 Transp. L.J. 
471, at p. 495. 
1121 Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China, Order No. 64, 1993. For a judicial discussion of the 
defence of error in navigation and management of the vessel, or Art. 51(1) of the Maritime Code, see 
Insurance Companies v. Hanzhou Shipping Co. and Ningbo Shipping Co., as summarized in Chen, X.  
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nautical fault, were important for protecting carriers, while cargo interests were protected 
by adopting the stricter rules with respect to deck cargo as found in the Hamburg 
Rules.1122 Other provisions for the benefit of cargo interests also include the carrier’s
responsibility for delay,1123 an increased period of responsibility,1124 and a definition of 
“carrier” in line with the Hamburg Rules.1125 The Maritime Code has also clarified the 
burden of proof with regard to the carrier’s defences, in that it stipulates that in order for 
the carrier to be entitled to exoneration under Article 51, he must bear the burden of 
proof.1126
It is noteworthy that Article 2 of the Maritime Code stipulates that “the provisions 
concerning contracts of carriage of goods by sea as contained in Chapter IV of this Code 
shall not be applicable to the maritime transport of goods between the ports of the 
People’s Republic of China.”1127 Domestic cabbotage in China is regulated by local 
Chinese regulations, wherein the “carriers undertake strict liability for loss or damage to 
the cargo carried unless the loss or damage is caused by force majeur, an inherent vice of 
the cargo, or the negligent act or omission of the cargo-owner.”1128 As well, the carriers 
do not benefit from a package limitation and are thus liable for all losses to the full 
     
“Chinese Law on Carriage of Goods by Sea under Bills of Lading” (1999) 8 Currents Int’l Trade L. J. 89, at 
p. 96-97.
1122 Chen, ibid, at p. 90. 
1123 Article 50 of the Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China, Order No. 64, 1993. Although it 
should be noted that the article renders the carrier liable for delay only where the carrier has failed to 
deliver the goods within the time expressly agreed upon. Failing an express agreement, there will be no 
liability for delay. 
1124 Article 46 of the Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China, Order No. 64, 1993, stipulating in 
the case of containerized goods, that the carrier shall be liable for the entire period during which the carrier 
is in charge of the goods, starting from the time the carrier has taken over the goods at the port of loading, 
until the goods have been delivered at the port of discharge.
1125 Article 42 of the Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China, Order No. 64, 1993, which includes 
the notion of both the contracting carrier and the performing or actual carrier. 
1126 Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China, order No. 64, 1993, Article 51: “…The carrier who 
is entitled to exoneration from the liability for compensation as provided for in the preceding paragraph 
shall, with the exception of the causes given in the sub-paragraph (2) [Fire], bear the burden of proof.” See 
also Li, L. “The Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China” [1993] LMLCQ 204, at p. 210. 
1127 Article 2(2) of the Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China, July 1, 1993. 
1128 Chan, F. et al. Shipping and Logistics Law: Principles and Practice in Hong Kong (2002) Hong Kong 
University Press, Hong Kong, at p. 645. 
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extent.1129 During the drafting of the Maritime Code, domestic carrier interests lobbied 
firmly to harmonize the two regimes, however it was to no avail.1130  
Apart from the unfortunate disparity between the Chinese domestic regulations 
and the Maritime Code, the Chinese initiatives, with respect to the law of carriage, do 
manage to balance broad aspects of both the Hague-Visby and the Hamburg Rules. Dr. 
Hazelwood has commented along these lines stating that “[t]he drafters of the new 
Chinese Code went on a ‘window shopping’ exercise with a view to selecting the best 
products that they saw from the jurisdictions around the world for incorporation into their 
shopping basket.”1131 The result has been, according to one commentator, that China has 
“at a stroke, done what other leading maritime nations have been struggling to achieve in 
a piecemeal fashion over many decades…[thus] the PRC puts a number of the so-called 
leading maritime nations to shame.”1132 With roughly a quarter of the world’s 
population, and with ever increasing trade fuelling the current shipping market, China’s 
initiative in this respect cannot be ignored. 
A discussion on Chinese maritime law would not be complete without a brief 
mention of Hong Kong.  In Hong Kong, the Hague-Visby Rules are in force by virtue of 
being included in a schedule to the 1994 Carriage of Goods by Sea Ordinance.1133 Post 
1997, Hong Kong maintained its Common law legal system inherited by virtue of its 
previous status as a British colony.1134 It has been noted that “to the relief of many, the 
status of Hong Kong as a free port and an international shipping centre has been 
successfully maintained in the years since 1997.”1135 As between mainland China and 
  
1129 Chan, ibid; Li, K. & Ingram C. Maritime Law and Policy in China (2002) Cavendish Publishing, 
London, at p. 10. Carrier are however exempted from liability for any delay in delivery (Li & Ingram, ibid). 
1130 Li & Ingram, ibid, at p. 8.
1131 Hazelwood, S. “New Maritime Code – maritime insurance”, a Paper for the International Conference 
on Maritime Law, 11-14 October 1994, Shanghai Maritime University, at p. 9, as quoted in Li & Ingram, 
ibid, at p. 8. 
1132 Beaumont, B. & Yang, P. Chinese Maritime Law and Arbitration (1994) Simmonds & Hill, London, at 
p. 76. 
1133 Carriage of Goods by Sea Ordinance, No. 104 of 1994, December 16, 1994. (Hong Kong). 
1134 Li, M. L’Etat de Navigabilité du Navire (2005) D.E.S.S. Thesis, Université de Droit, D’Economie et 
des Sciences D’Aix-Marseille, France. Available online at: www.cdmt.droit.u-3mrs.fr, at p. 7.
1135 Chan, F. et al. Shipping and Logistics Law: Principles and Practice in Hong Kong (2002) Hong Kong 
University Press, Hong Kong, at p. 639.
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Hong Kong, is it thought that carriage will be treated “international” thus invoking the 
application of the Maritime Code, rather than the domestic cabotage regulations.1136 It 
appears therefore that despite the differences between the legal systems of mainland 
China and Hong Kong, “there are signs that Hong Kong maritime law and mainland 
Chinese maritime law are interacting with each other to keep in line with international 
maritime practices.”1137
9.2. THE NORDIC NATIONS
Several nations, following the failure of the Hamburg Rules, opted to modernize 
their carriage law by drawing from the preferred elements of the Hamburg Rules while 
maintaining certain features of the Hague-Visby Regime, notably certain Article IV(2) 
exemptions. The Nordic countries are the prime example as they have incorporated large 
portions of the Hamburg Rules into their maritime codes, including the Hamburg inspired 
liability scheme of presumed fault, yet have explicitly retained the nautical fault 
exemption of the Hague-Visby Rules. 
The Nordic countries are considered to be Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway 
and Sweden, however in the context of the Maritime Codes, Iceland is not included.1138
The Nordic countries have a long history of cooperation with respect to legislation, based 
on many reasons including historical, cultural and political similarities, for example, the 
languages spoken in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, all have a common ground.1139
There is also long history of cooperation with regard to maritime legislation, exemplified 
by the fact that a Maritime Code was introduced in Sweden-Finland in 1667.1140 In the 
1890s, Maritime Codes were reformed in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, resulting in 
virtually identical codes being enacted in 1893.1141 Finland eventually adopted similar 
  
1136 Ibid, at p. 645. 
1137 Ibid, at p. 639.
1138 Honka, H. “New Carriage of Goods by Sea – The Nordic Approach,” in New Carriage of Goods by 
Sea. (1997) H. Honka (Ed.) Institute of Maritime and Commercial Law, Abo, at p. 15.
1139 Ibid at p. 15.   
1140 Ibid, at p. 16
1141 Falkanger, T. et al. Scandinavian Maritime Law: the Norwegian Perspective (2004) 
Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, at p. 26. 
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legislation in June of 1939, however it was structured differently.1142 All the Nordic 
countries implemented the 1968 Visby Protocol into their national legislation in the early 
1970s; however by the 1980s it was felt that new legislation was needed.1143 The national 
maritime law committees of each of the Nordic countries were instructed by their 
respective governments to co-operate in preparing new legislation governing the carriage 
of goods by sea.1144 The committees, as well as interest groups, debated over several 
major issues including whether the liability regime should reflect Hague-Visby or 
Hamburg.1145 Solutions were eventually reached, and on October 1st, 1994, the Nordic 
countries respectively adopted four maritime codes.1146 Despite the fact that they do 
differ slightly in their respective structure and numbering systems, the codes can 
collectively be referred to as the Nordic Maritime Code, as in substance the codes are 
identical.1147  
With regard to the liability scheme, the Nordic Maritime Code has eliminated the 
enumerated defences of Hague, replacing them with “a general formula of the same 
nature as in the Hamburg Rules.”1148 The formula, in part, reads: “The carrier is liable for 
loss resulting from the goods being lost or damaged while they are in his charge on board 
  
1142 Falkanger, ibid; Honka, H. “New Carriage of Goods by Sea – The Nordic Approach,” in New Carriage 
of Goods by Sea. (1997) H. Honka (Ed.) Institute of Maritime and Commercial Law, Abo, at p. 16. 
1143 Honka, ibid.
1144 Ibid. 
1145 Ibid, at p. 17. 
1146 The four Maritime Codes, were presented to their respective governments in 1993-1994, and all four 
entered into force on October 1, 1994. (Honka, ibid, at p. 17). Falkanger, T. et al. Scandinavian Maritime 
Law: the Norwegian Perspective (2004) Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, at p. 26, however notes that the dates of 
enactment of the codes were as follows: the Norwegian Code on 24 June 1994, the Danish on 16 March 
1994, the Finnish on 5 July 1994, and the Swedish on  9 June 1994. 
Note that “only the chapter on the carriage of goods was really revised, however, while the others either 
remained wholly or practically unchanged under new section numbers or consisted of other legislation, 
such as the ship arrest rules, brought into the Code’s framework.”( Tiberg, H. “Swedish Maritime Law 
1989-1995” [1996] LMCLQ 519, at p. 519). A translation of The Finnish Maritime Code, Chapter 13: 
Carriage of Goods by Sea, can be found as Appendix 1 in New Carriage of Goods by Sea. (1997) H. Honka 
(Ed.) Institute of Maritime and Commercial Law, Abo, at p. 421. The English translation of the Norwegian 
Maritime Code is available online at http://folk.uio.no/erikro/WWW/NMC.pdf. The Norwegian Maritime 
Code can also be found online through www.lovdata.no/info/lawdata.html.
1147 “The structure of the Finnish and Swedish versions of the Code are identical, with the provisions 
divided into chapters and sections. The carriage of goods by sea is treated in Chapter 13, ss. 1 – 61. The 
Danish and Norwegian versions of the Code are identical, with the provisions divided into sections. The 
carriage of goods by sea is treated at ss. 251-311 inclusive.” (Tetley, W. “The Demise of the Demise 
Clause?” (1999) 44 McGill L.J. 807, at p. 845, footnote 193); See also Falkanger, T. et al. Scandinavian 
Maritime Law: the Norwegian Perspective (2004) Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, in Preface.
1148 Ramberg, J. “New Scandinavian Maritime Codes” (1994) Il Dir. Mar. 1222, at p. 1223. 
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or ashore, unless he proves that neither his fault or neglect nor the fault or neglect of any 
one for whom he is responsible has caused or contributed to the loss.”1149 The Nordic 
Maritime Code, however, explicitly retains the defence of nautical fault, along with the 
defence of fire. The exemption can be found in the Swedish and the Finnish Codes, at 
Chapter 13, Section 26.1, whereas in the Norwegian and Danish Codes it is found at 
section 276.1.  The provision reads: “The carrier is not liable if he proves that the loss 
results from 1) fault or neglect of the master, any member of the crew, the pilot or any 
other person performing work in the vessel’s service in the navigation or in the 
management of the vessel...”1150 This formulation of carrier’s liability, the general 
provision along with the retention of nautical fault and fire, was a result of a decision on 
the part of the Nordic countries to alter the formula in favour of Hamburg, but only in so 
much as the substance of the provision remained unaffected.1151 In essence, the Nordic 
countries felt that provided nautical fault and fire were not eliminated, the rest of the 
catalogue of exemptions was unnecessary.1152 By proving that any of the eliminated 
exceptions were the sole cause, the carrier will in essence have proved that neither he, nor 
his servants or agents were at fault. 
9.3. CANADA 
Canada, despite being bordered by three oceans and a major inland waterway, “is 
not a maritime state in the true sense of this expression.”1153 Although Canada has a large 
foreign and international trade sector, the vast majority of trade passes by road and rail to 
the United States or overseas by foreign flagged vessels.1154 “Canada is a nation of 
importers and exporters, of shipper and consignees, but not a carrier nation in ocean 
  
1149 Chapter 13, Section 25, of the Finnish Maritime Code. The remainder of the provision reads: “The 
carrier is not liable for loss resulting from measure to save life of from reasonable measures to save vessels 
or other property at sea. Where fault or neglect on the part of the carrier combines with another cause to 
produce loss, the carrier is liable only to the extent that the loss is not attributable to fault or neglect on his 
part.” A translation of The Finnish Maritime Code, Chapter 13: Carriage of Goods by Sea, can be found as 
Appendix 1 in New Carriage of Goods by Sea. (1997) H. Honka (Ed.) Institute of Maritime and 
Commercial Law, Abo, at p. 421.
1150 Finnish Maritime Code, 13:26.1. 
1151 Honka, H. “New Carriage of Goods by Sea – The Nordic Approach,” in New Carriage of Goods by 
Sea. (1997) H. Honka (Ed.) Institute of Maritime and Commercial Law, Abo, at pp. 22-23. 
1152 Ibid, at p. 42. 
1153 Gold, E. et al. Maritime Law (2003) Irwin Law, Toronto, at p. 23. 
1154 Ibid.
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trade.”1155 Canada’s national flag fleet is therefore quite small. Nevertheless, this was not 
always the case, as Canada in previous centuries had a rather extensive merchant marine, 
primarily owing to its position as an important extension of British Imperial shipping.1156
This connection also resulted in Canadian maritime law being firmly rooted in British 
law,1157 including Canadian shipping legislation in the early 20th century, which was very 
closely related to prior British legislation.1158
In the early 1980s Canadian academics studied the potential impact of the 
Hamburg Rules from the perspective of Canadian interests.1159 It was concluded that the 
Hamburg Rules would be an improvement on the Carriage of Goods by Water Act 1936, 
and thus their adoption was recommended.1160 In 1984 Transport Canada published a 
consultation paper recommending the Hamburg Rules, however shipowners, P&I 
Insurance, cargo insurers and legal experts preferred adopting the Hague-Visby Rules.1161
Consensus between various industry groups was not reached, therefore a two-pronged 
approach was agreed upon which involved adopting the Hague-Visby regime 
immediately with a provision to bring into force the Hamburg Rules when a sufficient 
number of Canadian trading partners had ratified them.1162 In 1993, Canada implemented 
the Hague-Visby Rules in Part I of the Carriage of Goods by Water Act 1993.1163 Part II 
of the Act permitted the implementation of the Hamburg Rules in the future,1164 and 
required the Minister of Transport to submit in 1999 a report evaluating whether the 
Hamburg Rules should replace the Hague-Visby Rules, and then continue this process 
  
1155 Tetley, W. “Canadian Comments on the Proposed UNCITRAL Rules” (1978) 9 JMLC 251, at p. 252.
1156 Gold, E. et al. Maritime Law (2003) Irwin Law, Toronto, at p. 23.
1157 Tetley, W. “A Definition of Canadian Maritime Law” (1996) 30 U.B.C. L.Rev. 137.
1158 Gold, E. et al. Maritime Law (2003) Irwin Law, Toronto, at p. 24. 
1159 “The Future of Canadian Carriage of Goods by Water Law” report by Dalhousie Ocean Studies 
Program, of Dalhousie University, discussed in Transport Canada, “Marine Liability Act, Part 5: Liability 
for the Carriage of Goods by Water” (2004) Consultation paper dated September 2004, Transport Canada, 
Government of Canada, Doc. TP 14307E, at p. 3.
1160 Ibid.  
1161 Ibid. 
1162 Transport Canada, “Marine Liability Act, Part 5: Liability for the Carriage of Goods by Water” (2004) 
Consultation paper dated September 2004, Transport Canada, Government of Canada, Doc. TP 14307E, at 
p. 3. 
1163 Carriage of Goods by Water Act 1993, c. 21 (Canada). 
1164 Ibid, Section 10. 
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every five years.1165 By 1999, the Minister’s report concluded that “Canada would 
continue, for the time being, to be party to the Hague-Visby Rules 1968/1979, in 
accordance with the practice of most of its major trading partners.”1166 In the 2004 
Transport Canada consultation paper and report, it was noted that “the overall lack of 
support [the Hamburg Rules] have received from the international community has 
resulted in their no longer being considered at viable replacement for the Hague/Visby 
Rules.”1167 The report therefore recommended that the Hague-Visby Regime remain, and 
the Hamburg Rules be reconsidered in the next review cycle ending January 1, 2010.1168
Although the liability regime is entirely based on Hague-Visby and will remain so until at 
least 2010 if not longer, the recent Marine Liability Act has however, implemented 
certain important advantages for cargo claimants.1169
9.4. AUSTRALIA
The events leading up to the current carriage regime in Australia resemble the 
series of positions adopted by the Canadian legislators. In 1991, the Carriage of Goods by 
Sea Act,1170 which provided for the implementation of the Hague-Visby Rules, came into 
force. The Act contained a provision that brought the Hamburg Rules into force in late 
1994, unless steps were taken to delay their entry.1171 Australian cargo interests supported 
the Hamburg Rules, while the carriers supported the existing regime, and thus the 
Australian government in search of alternative regimes, consulted with members of the 
  
1165 Ibid, Section 4. 
1166 Tetley, W. “Canadian Maritime Legislation and Decisions 1999-2001” [2001] LMCLQ 551, at p. 553. 
1167 Transport Canada, “Marine Liability Act, Part 5: Liability for the Carriage of Goods by Water” (2004) 
Consultation paper dated September 2004, Transport Canada, Government of Canada, Doc. TP 14307E, at 
p. 5. 
1168 Ibid. 
1169 The 1993 Carriage of Goods by Water Act is no longer in force, having been replaced by the Marine 
Liability Act 2001, c. 6, in force August 8, 2001, which covers carriage of goods in Part 5. Section 44 of 
the Marine Liability Act now governs the Minister’s responsibility to present the House of Parliament with 
a report every five years considering whether Hague-Visby should be replaced by Hamburg. The Marine 
Liability Act does implement Hague-Visby, as did its predecessor, however, in s.46 a significant advantage 
has been gained for cargo interests wherein right of access to Canadian litigation and arbitration has been 
granted to plaintiffs in cargo claims regardless if the contract of carriage contains an arbitration or 
jurisdiction clause selecting a forum other than Canada.   
1170 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, No. 160 of 1991, in force Oct. 31, 1991. 
1171 Hetherington, S. “Australian Hybrid Cargo Liability Regime” [1999] LMCLQ 12, at p. 12.
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shipping community prior to the 1994 deadline.1172 The trigger was delayed for another 
three years in 1994,1173 and the Minister then directed that discussions should be held 
“with a view to developing a [cargo liability] regime which provides fair and reasonable 
protection for both shippers and carriers.”1174 The Department of Transport gathered 
experts from carriers, cargo interests, marine insurance, and legal advisors, and by 1995 a 
report was released, which was then indorsed by industry.1175 Further industry comments 
were sought on the suggested changes to Australia’s carriage regime in 1996.1176 In order 
to buy time, in 1997 the Carriage of Goods by Sea Amendment Act, repealed the trigger 
mechanism thus ensuring that the Hamburg Rules would not come into force.1177
Amendments to the carriage regime were made, and on July 1st, 1998 the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea Regulations 1998, came into force.1178 The Hague-Visby defences, 
including nautical fault, have remained, however, the period of responsibility of the 
carrier has been extended, deck cargo is included, as is liability for delay in certain 
circumstances, and the amendments cover EDIs and sea waybills.1179 “Australia’s 
position is that it has remained within the internationally popular framework of Hague-
Visby Rules, while satisfying the bulk of its national maritime shipping industry’s 
  
1172 Thornton, S. “An Optimal Model for Reforming COGSA in the United States: Australia’s COGSA 
Compromise” (2001) 29 Transp. L.J. 43, at p. 51. 
1173 Hetherington, S. “Australian Hybrid Cargo Liability Regime” [1999] LMCLQ 12, at p. 12.
1174 Thornton, S. “An Optimal Model for Reforming COGSA in the United States: Australia’s COGSA 
Compromise” (2001) 29 Transp. L.J. 43, at p. 51.
1175 Davies, M. “Australian Maritime Law Decisions 1997” [1998] LMLCQ 394, at p. 394-395; Thornton, 
ibid, at p. 52; Hetherington, S. “Australian Hybrid Cargo Liability Regime” [1999] LMCLQ 12, at p. 12. 
1176 Hetherington, ibid, at p. 13. 
1177 Davies, M. & Dickey, A. Shipping Law 3rd Ed (2004) Lawbook Co, Pyrmont, Australia, at p. 171; 
Tetley, W. “The Proposed New United States Senate COGSA: The Disintegration of Uniform International 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Law” (1999) 30 JMLC 595, at p. 611; Hetherington, ibid; At the time, it was 
thought unlikely that the Hamburg Rules would ever be implemented in Australia in their entirety, and the 
piece meal nature of their implementation had been noted:  “on the Hamburg Rules [Ian Davis] said it is 
still a very long way from achieving international recognition as its adoption has so far been piecemeal and 
tentative.” (“Halfway to Hamburg: Australia to amend COGSA” [1997] Fairplay 10th July, at p. 22.); See 
also Cremean, D. Admiralty Jurisdiction: Law and Practice in Australia and New Zealand 2nd Ed. (2003) 
The Federation Press, Sydney, at p. 50-51, discussing the “Amended Hague Rules”.
1178 Davies, M. “Australian Maritime Law Decisions 1998” [1999] LMCLQ 406, at p. 406; 
1179 Hetherington, S. “Australian Hybrid Cargo Liability Regime” [1999] LMCLQ 12, at p. 13-14; See also 
White, M. Australian Maritime Law, 2nd Ed. (2000) Federation Press, Sydney, at p. 79-80 discussing the 
implications of Article 4A (delay) with respect to the exemptions under Article 4(2); See also Davies, M. & 
Dickey, A. Shipping Law 3rd Ed (2004) Lawbook Co, Pyrmont, Australia, at pp. 173 and ff. discussing the 
overall effect of the modified provisions. 
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priorities.”1180 Certain commentators have viewed Australia’s compromise between the 
Hague-Visby Rules and the Hamburg Rules as a model for modern reform of outdated 
carriage law.1181
9.5. OTHER NATIONS
Many nations whose transportation law was in need of modernization, decided in 
the 1990s to opt for a carriage regime based predominantly on Hague-Visby, despite the 
fact that the Hamburg Rules had entered into force. Often, these new carriage statutes, 
may have a few modern elements and modifications inspired by Hamburg, but the 
general scheme, and in particular the liability scheme, opted for is the Hague-Visby 
scheme. 
Japan amended its carriage of goods regime and ratified the Hague-Visby Rules in 
1992, bringing the new legislation into force in June 1993.1182 Although it is largely 
based on the Hague-Visby Rules, Japan’s legislation includes liability for delay, an 
extended period of responsibility, and applies to both inbound and outbound 
shipments.1183 Also in 1992, Greece acceded to the both the Hague and the Hague-Visby 
Rules.1184 The ratification was made by Law 2107/1992, which by virtue of its Article 2 
renders the rules applicable to “any sea carriage performed under a Bill of Lading 
between ports belonging to different States as well as to sea carriage between Greek 
ports.”1185 The result being that anywhere Greek law is applicable, the Hague and Hague-
Visby Rules will be enforced, even if the carriage is between non-contracting States.1186
In 1994, New Zealand enacted a new Maritime Transport Act, which essentially adopts 
  
1180 Thornton, S. “An Optimal Model for Reforming COGSA in the United States: Australia’s COGSA 
Compromise” (2001) 29 Transp. L.J. 43, at p. 52. 
1181 Ibid. 
1182 Transport Canada, “Marine Liability Act, Part 5: Liability for the Carriage of Goods by Water” (2004) 
Consultation paper dated September 2004, Transport Canada, Government of Canada, Doc. TP 14307E, at 
p. 5. Available online from the Canadian Maritime Law Association website at: 
www.cmla.org/papers/2004/TransportReport-Oct.4,%202004.pdf.
1183 Ibid.
1184 Timagenis, G. “Greece Acceded to Hague and Hague/Visby Rules” [1993] ETL 535, at p. 535. 
1185 Article 2 of Law 2107/1992 (Gov. Gazette 203A/29.12.1992) (Greece); Timagenis, ibid.
1186 Timagenis, ibid.
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the Hague-Visby Rules, but has been modified to cover sea waybills.1187 South Africa has 
also incorporated the Hague-Visby Rules into its domestic legislation, but modified it 
with regard to waybills as well.1188 A South African commentator has explained; “South 
Africa did not adopt the Hamburg Rules, but followed the direction of the United 
Kingdom and incorporated the Hague-Visby Rules into our domestic legislation even 
though the South African sea carriage industry is shipper dominated. However, this 
seems to be the result of a strong carrier/ship owner interest with considerable support 
from the marine insurance industry.”1189 German shipowners also proved to be influential 
when it became clear that the German law on carriage was in serious need of 
modernization. Based on strong shipowner opposition, and a reticence on the part of 
major maritime states to adopt the Hamburg Rules, amendments based on the Visby 
Protocol were made to the German Commercial Code (HGB).1190
Several nations have recently adopted new maritime codes. The Republic of 
Madagascar, at the turn of the millennium, reformed their 1966 National Maritime 
  
1187 Maritime Transport Act 1994, No. 104 (New Zealand); Nicoll, C. “Significant Carriage of Goods by 
Sea Reform in New Zealand” (1995) 26 JMLC 443, at p. 463, comments that “[i]n view of the Ministry of 
Transport’s consistent support of the Hamburg Rules it is surprising that nothing have been done by 
legislation even to anticipate their adoption.”
1188 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1 of 1986, s. 1(c). (South Africa), amended by the Shipping General 
Amendment Act 23 of 1997 (giving force to the Visby SDR Protocol of 1979). See Staniland, H. “The New 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act in South Africa” [1987] LMCLQ 305, for a discussion of the differences 
between the former South African shipping legislation, ss. 307-311 of the Merchant Shipping Act 57 of 
1951, and the new Act. 
1189 Lourens, M. “An Overview of the Regimes Governing the Carriage of Goods By Sea” (1999) 10 
Stellenbosch L. Rev. 244, at p. 248. 
1190 Herber, R. “German Law on the Carriage of Goods by Sea” in New Carriage of Goods by Sea. (1997) 
H. Honka (Ed.) Institute of Maritime and Commercial Law, Abo, at p. 346. The amendments were brought 
in by The Law to Amend the Commercial Code and Other Law (Second Maritime Law Amendment Act) of 
25 July 1986 (Ashton, R. “A Comparative Analysis of the Legal Regulation of Carriage of Goods by Sea 
Under Bills of Lading in Germany” (1998) Available at: www.mlaanz.org/docs/99journal7d.html). In 1998, 
the German law with respect to transport on inland waterways was harmonized with the maritime 
provisions of the HGB. See Herber, R. “German Transport Law Reform Act, June 25, 1998” [2000] ETL 
23; See also Trappe, J. “The Reform of German Transport Law” [2001] LMCLQ 392. 
It should be noted that Germany has a history of domestically incorporating law based on the uniform law, 
but in a hybrid form. The Law of August 10th, 1937, amended the Commercial Code with the principles 
from the Hague Rules, but with modifications such as the fact that it applies to all contract for the carriage 
of any cargo from the time the goods are taken into the custody of the carrier until their delivery to the 
consignee (Yiannopolous, A. Negligence Clauses in Ocean Bills of Lading (1962) Louisiana State 
University Press, Louisiana, at p. 51). Germany’s tendency to incorporate uniform law into domestic 
legislation without having acceded to the uniform law itself, as it did with the Visby Protocol, has caused 
problems in certain instances. See Rubin, D. & Windahl, J. “Is Germany a Hague-Visby State under 
Scandinavian Law?” [2000] ETL 459. 
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Code.1191 The Code, described as modern, complete and balanced, has retained the 
nautical fault defence.1192 Poland has also recently adopted a new maritime code.1193 The 
Polish Maritime Code entered into force on June 4th, 2002,1194 and contains the original 
Hague Rules list of carrier exemptions, including nautical fault, along with certain newer 
modifications with regard to the responsibility of the carrier.1195 Russia enacted a new 
Code of Commercial Navigation in 1999, which is similar to the Chinese Maritime Code 
in that the nautical fault exemption can only be invoked by the carrier when there is 
transport involving a foreign port, and not in the case of cabbotage.1196 Finally, in both 
the recently enacted Algerian Maritime Code,1197 and the Latvian Maritime Code,1198 the 
liability regimes were inspired by the Hague Rules rather than the Hamburg Rules.1199
9.6. ELIMINATION OF NAUTICAL FAULT
As mentioned above, the majority of nations have specifically incorporated or 
enacted the nautical fault defence, or selected the Hague-Visby liability regime over the 
Hamburg one; nevertheless there are instances where the defence has been eliminated. 
Korea, in 1993, revised their Commercial Code, and the Hague-Visby Rules, not 
Hamburg, inspired the revisions.1200 The Koreans, however, “took liberties” when 
  
1191 Delebecque, P. “Le nouveau code maritime de Madagascar” [2001] DMF 931. The National Maritime 
Code, Law July 5, 1966, was reformed by virtue of Law No. 99-028 of the Republic of Madagascar.
1192 Delebecque, ibid, at p. 934.
1193 The previous maritime code dated from 1961 (Zuzewicz, I. “Le Nouveau Code Maritime Polonais” 
[2003] DMF 975, at p. 975). 
1194 Zuzewicz, ibid, at p. 977. The new Maritime Code was promulgated in the Law Journal of the Republic 
of Poland 2001, No. 138, 1545. 
1195 Zuzewicz, ibid, at p. 982.
1196 Litvinski, D. “Le Nouveau Code de la Navigation Commerciale de la Fédération de Russie” [2000] 
DMF 601, at p. 148. 
1197 Algerian Maritime Code, 1998, Law 98-05 of 25/05/1998. 
1198 Latvian Maritime Rules (Maritime Code) – Cabinet Rule No. 168 (1994). 
1199 Boukhatmi, F. “Les Nouvelles Dispositions de la Loi 98-05 Portant Code Maritime Algérien” [2000] 
DMF 610, at p. 1040 and p. 1048. Boukhatmi notes that the Algerian legislators were not inspired by the 
Hamburg Rules in particular, which is contrary to the general approach of Algeria who tends to harmonize 
with recent private international codes. (Boukhatmi, ibid at p. 1040); Lejnieks, M. “Diverging Solutions in 
the Harmonisation of Carriage of Goods by Sea: Which Approach to Choose?” (2003) 8 Unif. L. Rev. 303, 
at p. 304, footnote 7, notes that Chapter 22 of the Latvian Maritime Code entitled Carriage by Sea contains 
the Hague Rules based liability regime.
1200 Sturley, M. “Uniformity in the Law Governing the Carriage of Goods by Sea” (1995) 26 JMLC 553, at 
p. 562.
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incorporating the Hague-Visby amendments into their domestic law.1201 Art. 789 of the 
Korean Carriage of Goods Law for Maritime Commerce contains the Hague-Visby 
defences, although the nautical fault and fire defences were specifically eliminated.1202
Chile also eliminated the nautical fault defence, preferring instead the Hamburg liability 
regime. The fault-based regime of Hamburg has been specifically incorporated into its 
Chilean Code of Commerce, with the result that Article 5.1 of Hamburg forms the basis 
for Article 984, Title V of Book III of the Code.1203 Nevertheless, Korea is the only 
notable example, of the countries not a party to the Hamburg Rules, who opted for a 
Hamburg based liability regime. 
9.7. THE UNITED STATES
In the United States, there has been long standing frustration at the out-moded 
carriage regime still in force.1204 In the 1980’s Congress was unwilling to act, as 
underwriters, carriers and the Maritime Law Association (MLA) favoured the Visby 
Protocol, while the cargo interests favoured the Hamburg Rules.1205 As the government 
was unwilling to be caught in the middle of the dispute between the various commercial 
interests, other bodies attempted to resolve the deadlock.1206 The American Bar 
Association, with the support of the MLA, proposed in 1987 that the Visby Protocol be 
ratified, but that further changes should also be implemented such as the elimination of 
the nautical fault defence.1207 The proposal failed when major cargo interests declined to 
  
1201 Mandelbaum, S. “Creating Uniform Worldwide Liability Standards for Sea Carriage of Goods Under 
the Hague, COGSA, Visby and Hamburg Conventions” (1996) 23 Transp. L.J. 471, at p. 492.
1202 Korean Commercial Code, CH. IV, 1, at Art. 787 – 89, cited in Mandelbaum, ibid.
1203 Rozas, R. “The Hamburg Rules Enforcement in Chile” unpublished paper, at p. 3. Although Chile is a 
signatory to the Hamburg Rules which have been in force there since the 1st of November 1992.  
1204 Which is COGSA 1936, based on the Hague Rules, as the United States never ratified the Visby 
Protocol.  
1205 Force, R. “A Comparison of the U.S. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act – Present Text and Proposed 
Changes – and The Hamburg Rules” in New Carriage of Goods by Sea. (1997) H. Honka (Ed.) Institute of 
Maritime and Commercial Law, Abo, at p. 373, noting that the state of affairs was such that “neither the 
carrier interests who favoured Visby amendments nor the shipper interests which favoured Hamburg had 
enough support to prevail.” Congress would have admittedly enacted any changes that the major interests 
agreed on, but it was a stalemate between the two sides.
1206 Sturley, M. “Uniformity in the Law Governing the Carriage of Goods by Sea” (1995) 26 JMLC 553, at 
p. 569. 
1207 Mandelbaum, S. “International Ocean Shipping and Risk Allocation for Cargo Loss, Damage and 
Delay: A U.S. Approach to COGSA, Hague-Visby, Hamburg and the Multimodal Rules” (1995) 5 J. 
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support it.1208 These failures, coupled with the failure of the Hamburg Rules to provide an 
acceptable international regime, resulted in calls in the early 1990s for a domestic 
solution to the problem. A United States commentator, in response to the question “Is 
there a way out of this impasse?” replied: “The answer is yes, if we follow what we did 
for the Harter Act; when faced with an unsatisfactory international situation, seek a 
commercial solution among U.S. commercial interests.”1209
9.7.1. The Compromise
In 1992, the MLA convened an Ad Hoc Liability Study Group “to attempt to 
reach a commercial compromise that could be presented to Congress with consensus 
support from the industry.”1210 The cargo interests and shipper groups had made “the 
elimination of the navigational fault defence a precondition to their support of any new 
legislation in this field.”1211 It has been therefore noted that as a “matter of political 
necessity” the nautical fault exemption would have to be eliminated in order to obtain a 
successful compromise. 1212 The carriers on the other hand were unwilling to lose the 
defence. “Carriers view the exemption of nautical fault as an important device of risk 
distribution among insurers in major casualties. It works to spread the loss among 
numerous underwriters, with little effect on the world’s cargo premiums.”1213 Moreover, 
in the United States the total elimination of the nautical fault exemption would have the 
effect that “the rule in Schnell v. Vallescura would require the carrier either to prove 
absence of negligence or to prove the extent to which the loss is attributable to each 
cause. Carrier interests suspect[ed] that in many courts this burden would be impossible 
     
Transnational L. & Policy 1, at p. 21-22; Sturley, ibid, at p. 569; Sturley, M. “Proposed Amendments to the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act” (1996) 18 Hous. J. Int’l L. 609, at p. 614-615. 
1208 Mendelsohn, A. “Why the U.S. Did not Ratify the Visby Amendments” (1992) 23 JMLC 29, at p. 52.
1209 Chandler, G. “After Reaching a Century of the Harter Act: Where Should We Go From Here?” (1993) 
24 JMLC 43, at p. 46. 
1210 Sturley, M. “Proposed Amendments to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act” (1996) 18 Hous. J. Int’l L. 
609, at p. 616. 
1211 Sturley, M. “Uniformity in the Law Governing the Carriage of Goods by Sea” (1995) 26 JMLC 553, at 
p. 577. 
1212 Ibid. 
1213 Mandelbaum, S. “International Ocean Shipping and Risk Allocation for Cargo Loss, Damage and 
Delay: A U.S. Approach to COGSA, Hague-Visby, Hamburg and the Multimodal Rules” (1995) 5 J. 
Transnational L. & Policy 1, at p. 28. 
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to carry.”1214 The proposal therefore tried to respond to cargo interests by eliminating the 
traditional version of nautical fault, but attempted to cater to carrier concerns by changing 
the burden of proof structure. The rationale was that in imposing “on the cargo claimant 
the burden of proving the carrier’s negligence in navigation or management …in cases 
where the carrier has a legitimate defence to liability, that defence will not be lost on 
mere allegations of negligence in navigation or management unless the cargo claimant 
can prove the case.”1215 The proposed compromise found in the new Art. IV(2)(a) 
stipulated that carriers and their ships shall not be responsible for loss or damage arising 
or resulting from: “Act of the master, mariner, pilot, or servants of the ocean carrier in the 
navigation or in the management of the ship, unless the person claiming for such loss or 
damage is able to prove negligence in the navigation or the management of the ship.”1216
The study group’s final proposal was submitted to the MLA in 1996, and was presented 
as a bill before the Senate’s Sub-Committee on Surface Transportation and Merchant 
Marine on April 21st, 1998.1217
9.7.2. The Resulting Discussion
The COGSA bill has called “radical” and described as “a substantial rewrite of 
both Hague-Visby and Hamburg elements and the incorporation of radically new 
definitions and ideas.”1218 Nevertheless, the qualified nautical fault proposal has received 
a measure of support.1219 One commentator has asserted, “a qualified nautical fault 
  
1214 Sturley, M. “Proposed Amendments to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act” (1996) 18 Hous. J. Int’l L. 
609, at p. 630. 
1215 Ibid, at p. 631. 
1216 Quoted in Weitz, L. “International Maritime Law: The Nautical Fault Debate” (1998) 22 Tul. Mar. L.J. 
581, at p. 589; and in Force, R. “A Comparison of the U.S. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act – Present Text 
and Proposed Changes – and The Hamburg Rules” in New Carriage of Goods by Sea. (1997) H. Honka 
(Ed.) Institute of Maritime and Commercial Law, Abo, at p. 387.  Subsequently the numbering the 
provisions were altered such that s. 9(2)(d) dealt with the claimants burden of proving negligence in 
navigation or management. See Asariotis, R. & Tsimplis, M. “The Proposed US Carriage of Goods by Sea 
Act” [1999] LMCLQ 126, at p. 130; and Tetley, W. “The Proposed New United States Senate COGSA: 
The Disintegration of Uniform International Carriage of Goods by Sea Law” (1999) 30 JMLC 595, at p. 
601. 
1217 Thornton, S. “An Optimal Model for Reforming COGSA in the United States: Australia’s COGSA 
Compromise” (2001) 29 Transp. L.J. 43, at p. 49-50. Note that the final version of the bill was presented on 
September 24th, 1999 as it had to be re-written as the Senate declined the 1998 draft (Ibid). 
1218 Myburgh, P. “Uniformity or Unilateralism in the Law of Carriage of Goods by Sea?” (2000) 21 
Victoria U. Wellington L. Rev. 355, at p. 369.
1219 Especially from shipping interests. The National Industrial Transportation League considers “the 
revisions to COGSA [to] represent a balanced compromise between the Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules 
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defence would be equitable to both sides to the debate, and still retain its traditional 
rationale.”1220 It has been argued that the amendment reflects modern shipping realities, 
by “eliminat[ing] the navigational fault exemption and instead provid[ing] for an 
allocation of responsibility where loss or damage is attributable partially to the fault of 
the carrier and partially to exempted perils in the act.”1221 On the other hand, the proposal 
to eliminate the traditional nautical fault defence “has promoted intense opposition from 
influential ocean carriers, which continue to see the value in the defence and remain 
sceptical about the wisdom of the proposal generally.”1222 It has also attracted criticism 
from academics, particularly with regard to the burden of proof. Under the proposal, the 
carrier may become liable for nautical fault if the cargo claimant can satisfy his burden of 
proving negligence.1223 “In many cases, this would be an onerous, if not impossible, 
burden to discharge, because the cargo claimant usually lacks ready access to the facts 
needed to make such proof. The benefit derived from the abolition of the carrier’s 
defence of error in navigation or management of the ship is thus lessened in practice.”1224
9.7.3. The Failure of COGSA 1999
In early 2000, it appeared that the proposed legislation would be put through 
Congress as it had the requisite support. “Senator Hutchinson [had] indicated to the press 
     
and will lead to global uniformity in the treatment of cargo liability.” (Taylor, L. “Proposed Changes to the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act: How Will They Affect the United States Maritime Industry at the Global 
Level” (1999) 8 Currents Int’l Trade L.J. 32, at p. 37). 
1220 Mandelbaum, S. “Creating Uniform Worldwide Liability Standards for Sea Carriage of Goods Under 
the Hague, COGSA, Visby and Hamburg Conventions” (1996) 23 Transp. L.J. 471, at p. 501. 
1221 Taylor, L. “Proposed Changes to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act: How Will They Affect the United 
States Maritime Industry at the Global Level” (1999) 8 Currents Int’l Trade L.J. 32, at p. 34. 
1222 Papavizas, C. & Kiern, L. “1999-2000 U.S. Maritime Legislative Developments” (2001) 32 JMLC 349, 
at p. 368; Wood, S. “Multimodal Transportation” (1998) 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 403, at p. 410, notes that the 
elimination of the defence produced a “furore among carriers [in the United States] and abroad.”; In 
particular the AWO, which represents carriers operating on United States inland waterways, is opposed to 
the proposal citing their biggest concern as the fact that they would become responsible for errors of 
navigation and management, which arguably is justified given their accident rate is higher due to congested 
waterways, bridges and docks (Taylor, ibid, at p. 37). BIMCO also opposed the proposal arguing that in 
eliminating nautical fault it overturns the well-founded principle in shipping that the vessel owner is not 
liable where crew negligence has put the cargo and vessel at risk (Taylor, ibid). 
1223 Asariotis, R. & Tsimplis, M. “The Proposed US Carriage of Goods by Sea Act” [1999] LMCLQ 126, at 
p. 130. For a scathing response to this article see Sturley, M. “Proposed Amendments to the US Carriage of 
Goods by Sea Act: A Response to English Criticisms” [1999] LMCLQ 519; For an equally scathing 
response to Sturley, see Asariotis, R. & Tsimplis, M. “The Proposed amendments to the US Carriage of 
Goods by Sea Act: a Reply to Professor Sturley’s Response” [1999] LMCLQ 530.
1224 Tetley, W. “The Proposed New United States Senate COGSA: The Disintegration of Uniform 
International Carriage of Goods by Sea Law” (1999) 30 JMLC 595, at p. 601-602. 
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that she was firmly behind the U.S. COGSA proposal by the United States Maritime Law 
Association, and that she was prepared to see it through. Furthermore, the proposal [had] 
obtained significant support from such organizations as NITleague and the American 
Institute of Marine Underwriters.”1225 It had been anticipated that Senator Hutchinson 
would have been able to push the proposed legislation through Congress during the 106th
Session, in 2000, however, she was reassigned from Chairman of the Surface 
Transportation and Merchant Marine Subcommittee to chair another committee.1226 “The 
Senator was a supporter of U.S. COGSA reform, well-versed in maritime cargo shipping 
concerns and not easily replaceable in such matters.”1227 The Senator’s departure slowed 
the progress of the reform, and by 2002 “the COGSA reform effort was focused on 
negotiating the elements of the International Cargo Liability Convention drafted by the 
[CMI] at the request of [UNCITRAL].”1228 It has now been agreed that “it seems unlikely 
that this bill will be of congressional priority in the near future,”1229 or even at all.1230
9.8. CONCLUSION
The past two decades have shown that due to an ever-increasing dissatisfaction 
with the current international regime, many nations have adopted a unilateral approach to 
the modernization of the law of carriage of goods by sea. Despite domestic legislation 
and statutory instruments providing the impetus for the Hague Rules close to a century 
ago, one may question whether the same is true today. The Harter Act provided a 
  
1225 De Orchis, “Speech to the Maritime Administrative Bar Association Regarding Status of Cargo 
Liability Regimes” January 26, 2001. Available at: www.marinelex.com/marinelex/statuscargo.cfm. Note 
that the NITleague, is the National Industrial Transportation league, which is a group of shippers and 
associations of shippers that conduct industrial and commercial enterprises of all size throughout the United 
States (Taylor, L. “Proposed Changes to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act: How Will They Affect the 
United States Maritime Industry at the Global Level” (1999) 8 Currents Int’l Trade L.J. 32, at p. 37). 
1226 Papavizas, C. & Kiern, L. “1999-2000 U.S. Maritime Legislative Developments” (2001) 32 JMLC 349, 
at p. 368.
1227 Thornton, S. “An Optimal Model for Reforming COGSA in the United States: Australia’s COGSA 
Compromise” (2001) 29 Transp. L.J. 43, at p. 50. 
1228 Papavizas, C. & Kiern, L. “2001-2002 U.S. Maritime Legislative Developments” (2003) 34 JMLC 451, 
at p. 477. 
1229 Thornton, S. “An Optimal Model for Reforming COGSA in the United States: Australia’s COGSA 
Compromise” (2001) 29 Transp. L.J. 43, at p. 50.
1230 Papavizas, C. & Kiern, L. “2001-2002 U.S. Maritime Legislative Developments” (2003) 34 JMLC 451, 
at p. 478, noting that “[a]lthough many in the maritime industry consider that COGSA’s sixty-seven years 
puts it past retirement age, COGSA will likely live to celebrate more birth-days beyond the 108th Congress 
if COGSA reform is to wait for the UN convention.”
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template for many European and Commonwealth nations, and due to its proliferation, a 
de facto uniform regime began to develop. With respect to the recent domestic carriage 
regimes, they differ significantly in certain respects, thus adding to the breakdown of 
uniformity in the law of carriage of goods. Given the divergent nature of the domestic 
carriage regimes, they do not provide a template for reforms in the same manner as the 
Harter Act did. They do however provide indicators of successful commercial 
compromises between carrier and cargo interests that may be used by international 
drafting committees as a barometer for what would be palatable to the shipping industry. 
Moreover, what does emerge from the foregoing is that despite inherently divergent 
carriage regimes, nautical fault remains a key element. Demonstrating therefore, the 
continued relevance and importance of nautical fault.
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Chapter 10
UNCITRAL Draft Convention on the Carriage of Goods
The uniform carriage of goods regime created by the Hague Rules, had become 
fragmented with many carriage regimes in place, from Hague, to Hague-Visby, to 
Hamburg, to the growing body of national legislation. Despite the widespread 
applicability of the Hague and Hague-Visby regime, it was recognized that they failed to 
meet “the world’s needs for a modern, uniform law on the subject.”1231 In other words, 
they were outdated. The Hamburg Rules had failed to unify the carriage regime, twenty 
years of consultations on the reform of the Hague-Visby Rules were unproductive;1232
therefore a new process began. 
10.1. PRELIMINARY WORK BY THE CMI
There was a general recognition in the 1990’s that the uniform system of carriage 
of goods had begun to fracture to the point where action needed to be taken. In May 
1994, the Executive Council of the CMI decided that carriage of goods by sea required 
the further attention of the CMI and appointed a Working Group to consider the 
problem.1233 The Working Group sent out questionnaires to the national associations to 
compile their views on the necessary direction to take.1234 In response to the question as 
to whether the CMI should push for the adoption of the Hamburg Rules, all but one 
association, Spain, replied in no uncertain terms: no.1235 Rather, the most favourable 
  
1231 Sturley, M. “The United Nations Commissions on International Trade Law’s Transport Law Project: 
An Interim View of a Work in Progress” (2003) 39 Tex. Int’l L.J. 65, at p. 67. Sturley, M. “Uniformity in 
the Law Governing the Carriage of Goods by Sea” (1995) 26 JMLC 553, examining the diverse legal 
regimes in place and advocating the need for uniform law on carriage of goods.
1232 Tetley, W. “Reform of Carriage of Goods – The UNCITRAL Draft and Senate COGSA ’99.” (2003) 28 
Tul. Mar. L.J. 1, at p. 15, noting that after twenty years of consultations and negotiations with pressure 
groups, CMI’s consideration of reforming the Hague-Visby Rules, was finally abandoned in 1998 without 
so much as a vote or a final text.
1233 Comité Maritime International, CMI Yearbook 1995, Scandinavian University Press, Stockholm, at p. 
107.  
1234 Ibid. There were twenty-eight national maritime associations that replied to the questionnaire, as did the 
International Chamber of Shipping. (Ibid, at p. 115).  
1235 Ibid, at pp. 123-138. 
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option was to amend the Hague-Visby regime,1236 and interestingly enough the majority 
of respondents were opposed to a new convention.1237 After receiving the replies from the 
various national associations, in May 1995 an International Sub-Committee on the 
Uniformity of the Law on Carriage of Goods by Sea was established,1238 with the aim of 
studying “the most relevant issues with proposals as to the best manner in which they 
should be solved with a view to obtaining international uniformity.”1239 Over the course 
of two years the International Sub-Committee met four times, during which carrier 
liability and nautical fault remained a contentious subject.1240 In 1997, the International 
Sub-Committee released a report detailing the discussions on the various aspects of 
carriage.1241 With respect to the discussions concerning the nautical fault exemption, 
“there was a clear majority in favour of the maintenance of the errors in navigation 
defence, whilst the views were almost equally balanced in respect of the maintenance or 
abolition of the fault in the management defence.”1242
  
1236 Ibid, at pp. 158-170. 
1237 Ibid, at pp. 170-173. Ireland and Indonesia were in favour of a new convention, while the United States 
and Switzerland gave positive responses that were qualified. 
1238 Ibid, at p. 107. 
1239 Comité Maritime International, CMI Yearbook 1997, Scandinavian University Press, Stockholm, at p. 
288.
1240 During the first session in November 1995, the representatives hailing from Ireland, Australia and New 
Zealand, Poland and Japan, proposed retaining the list of exemptions including error in navigation, but 
would be willing to delete error in management, while the representatives hailing from the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Korea, and the U.K. would keep the list, including errors in management, but suggested shifting 
the burden of proof (Comité Maritime International, CMI Yearbook 1995, Scandinavian University Press, 
Stockholm, at p. 234-235). The representatives from Canada, Venezuela, Spain, Finland, and the U.S. were 
in favour of deleting the nautical fault exemption (CMI Yearbook, 1995, ibid, at p. 235). During the second 
session in March 1996, the subject of nautical fault proved decisive again with eleven members suggesting 
that the list of defences in Hague-Visby at present be retained, with Bonassies from France suggesting the 
only way to overcome to problem with the error in navigation defence was to return to the original Harter 
solution (where is was only applicable after cast off), and finally with four other members suggesting that 
various differing combinations of the three defences, fire, error in management or error in navigation, be 
retained (Comité Maritime International, CMI Yearbook 1996, Scandinavian University Press, Stockholm, 
at p. 370). During the third session in September 1996, the discussion focused on whether the catalogue 
approach of Hague-Visby was preferable to the Hamburg approach, with the representatives voting 13 in 
favour of the catalogue and 3 opposed (CMI Yearbook 1996, ibid, at p. 395). With regard to nautical fault, a 
vote was held as well. As far as retaining the error in management defence, 8 were in favour, 7 were 
opposed, and with regard to retaining the error in navigation defence, 10 were in favour, and 4 were 
opposed (CMI Yearbook 1996, ibid , at p. 394). The fourth session in February of 1997, did not deal with 
the issue of nautical fault or carrier liability (CMI Yearbook 1996, ibid, at p. 403-419). 
1241 Comité Maritime International, CMI Yearbook 1997, Scandinavian University Press, Stockholm, at p. 
288, with the report found at pp. 291-356. 
1242 Ibid , at p. 290. See the summary of the various positions at pp. 318-320. 
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10.2 THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
LAW PROPOSAL
At the twenty-ninth session of the Commission in 1996, “it was proposed that the 
Commission should include in its work programme a review of current practices and laws 
in the area of the international carriage of goods by sea, with a view to establishing the 
need for uniform rules in the areas where no such rules existed and with a view to 
achieving greater uniformity of laws than has so far been achieved.”1243 This has been 
credited as the starting point for UNCITRAL’s work on the Draft Convention, which at 
the time was referred to as the draft instrument on transport law.1244 In the proposal, 
UNCITRAL noted that with regard to information gathering the CMI, among other 
organizations, should be consulted.1245 In 1998, CMI welcomed the invitation to 
cooperate with the Secretariat,1246 and set up a structure to organize the project and carry 
out a study on the issues, 1247 nevertheless they incorporated the pre-existing International 
Sub-Committee on the Uniformity of the Law on Carriage of Goods by Sea.1248 In 1999, 
the CMI working groups sent out questionnaires to all the CMI member organizations 
with a view to collecting information that would be used to harmonize the law of carriage 
of goods.1249 Originally, when the CMI considered the project in 1998 issues of liability 
were not included, however in 1999 CMI recommended that the project be extended to 
  
1243 “Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of its Twenty-
Ninth Session 28 May-14 June 1996”, reprinted in Comité Maritime International, CMI Yearbook 1996, 
Scandinavian University Press, Stockholm, at p. 354-355.  
1244 UNECE “Comments to the UNICTRAL draft Instrument on Transport Law”(2002) Document 
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.21/Add.1, at p. 3. 
1245 “Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of its Twenty-
Ninth Session 28 May-14 June 1996”, reprinted in Comité Maritime International, CMI Yearbook 1996,
Scandinavian University Press, Stockholm, at p. 355. 
1246 At the thirty-first session, in 1998, CMI made a statement to the effect that it welcomed the invitation to 
cooperate in soliciting views and preparing an analysis of the information, and that the analysis would 
allow the Commission to make an informed decision (UNCITRAL, “Transport Law: Preliminary draft 
instrument on the carriage of goods by sea” 8 January, 2002, Document A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.21, at p. 4). 
1247 Comité Maritime International, “Issues of Transport Law: Report of the CMI Steering Committee” in 
CMI Yearbook 1998, Scandinavian University Press, Stockholm, at p. 109-110. A Steering Committee was 
established to oversee the various Working Groups and International Sub-Committees and dialogue with 
other international organizations involved. A Working Group and International Sub-Committee on the 
Uniformity of the Law on Carriage of Goods by Sea (liability aspects), a Working Group on Issues of 
Transport Law, and a Working Group on EDI were convened (Ibid). 
1248 Ibid.
1249 UNCITRAL, “Transport Law: Preliminary draft instrument on the carriage of goods by sea” 8 January, 
2002, Document A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.21, at p. 5.
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draft provisions relating to liability.1250 The previous work by the CMI on carrier liability 
was therefore incorporated into the project.1251 The CMI’s International Sub-Committee’s 
terms of reference were: “To consider in what areas of transport law, not at present 
governed by international liability regimes, greater international uniformity may be 
achieved; to prepare the outline of an instrument designed to bring about uniformity of 
transport law; and thereafter to draft provisions to be incorporated in the proposed 
instrument including those relating to liability.”1252 After four meetings in 2000, the 
International Sub-Committee had prepared a draft Outline Instrument by the end of the 
year.1253 The draft Outline Instrument addressed the liability of the carrier in Art. 5.1254
There was a consensus that the Hague-Visby liability system should be retained, 
however, views were divided as to whether errors in navigation and management should 
be deleted.1255 A specific provision was not drafted, but in view of the potential of the 
instrument to extend to door-to-door, in addition to the Hague-Visby enumerated regime, 
  
1250 Comité Maritime International, “Draft Instrument on Carriage of Goods [Wholly or Partly] [By Sea]”, 
available at: www.comitemaritime.org/draft/draft.html; Tetley, W. “Reform of Carriage of Goods – The 
UNCITRAL Draft and Senate COGSA ’99.” (2003) 28 Tul. Mar. L.J. 1, at p. 4. “The report of the 29th
session [of UNCITRAL] makes clear that a review of the liability regime was not the main objective of the 
project and within the CMI it was at that time the subject of the work being undertaken by the International 
Sub-Committee on the Uniformity of the Law on Carriage of Goods by Sea (“the Uniformity Sub-
Committee) chaired by Professor Francesco Berlingieri…However, it became clear form consultation with 
the international organizations…that there was a strong desire that liability issues should be developed and 
that Professors Berlingieri’s report on the work of the Uniformity Sub-Committee should not be put to one 
side.” (Beare, S. “Liability Regimes: Where we are, how we go there, and where we are going.” [2002] 
LMCLQ 306, at p. 307). 
1251 See quotation from Beare, ibid.
1252 Comité Maritime International, “Issues of Transport Law” in CMI Yearbook 2000, CMI Headquarters 
Pub., Antwerpen, Belgium, at p. 112.  
1253 Comité Maritime International, “Draft Outline Instrument” in CMI Yearbook 2000, CMI Headquarters 
Pub., Antwerpen, Belgium, at pp. 122. For reports on the first four meetings see Comité Maritime 
International, “Report of the First Meeting of the International Sub-Committee on Issues of Transport Law 
– 27th and 28th January 2000” in CMI Yearbook 2000, CMI Headquarters Pub., Antwerpen, Belgium; 
Comité Maritime International, “Report of the Second Meeting of the International Sub-Committee on 
Issues of Transport Law – 6th and 7th April 2000” in CMI Yearbook 2000, CMI Headquarters Pub., 
Antwerpen, Belgium; Comité Maritime International, “Report of the Third Meeting of the International 
Sub-Committee on Issues of Transport Law – 7th and 8th July 2000” in CMI Yearbook 2000, CMI 
Headquarters Pub., Antwerpen, Belgium; Comité Maritime International, “Draft Report of the Fourth 
Meeting of the International Sub-Committee on Issues of Transport Law – 12th and 13th October 2000” in 
CMI Yearbook 2000, CMI Headquarters Pub., Antwerpen, Belgium. 
1254 Comité Maritime International, “Draft Outline Instrument” in CMI Yearbook 2000, CMI Headquarters 
Pub., Antwerpen, Belgium, at p. 131.
1255 Ibid.
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two additional options, one modelled on Article IV(2)(q) of Hague-Visby1256 and the 
other on Article 17 of the CMR,1257 were suggested.1258 The draft Outline Instrument was 
discussed at the CMI Conference in Singapore in February 2001.1259 At the Singapore 
Conference, the liability provision modelled on Article 17 of the CMR which imposed a 
“more stringent basis of liability,” received no support, and “the Conference by a large 
majority favoured a regime based on the Hague-Visby Rules, setting out first the duties 
of the carrier and then its liabilities and exemptions.”1260 The International Sub-
Committee, pursuant to that discussion, continued work and revision on the draft 
instrument,1261 including circulating a draft for comment to all the national associations 
and amending the draft on the basis of replies and comments.1262 The final revision took 
place in November 2001,1263 with the finished document adopted by the CMI Executive 
on December 10, 2001, after three and a half years of intensive work.1264
  
1256 “The carrier shall be liable for the total or partial loss of the goods and for damage thereto occurring 
between the time when it receives the goods and the time of delivery, as well as for delay in delivery, 
unless the carrier can prove that the loss, damage or delay did not result from any fault or neglect on the 
part of the carrier or its servants or agents.”
1257 “ (i) The carrier shall be liable for the total or partial loss of the goods and for damage thereto occurring 
between the time when it receives the goods and the time of delivery, as well as for the delay in delivery. 
(ii) The carrier shall however be relieved of liability if the loss, damage or delay was caused by: (a) The 
wrongful act or neglect of the claimant; (b) The instructions of the claimant given otherwise than as the 
result of a wrongful act or neglect on the part of the carrier; (c) Inherent vice of goods; (d) Perils, dangers, 
and accidents of the sea or other navigable waters; (e) Saving or attempting to save life or property at sea; 
(f) Circumstances which the carrier could not avoid and the consequences of which it was unable to 
prevent. (iii) The burden of proving the loss, damage or delay was due to one of the causes specified in 
2(a)-(f) shall rest upon the carrier.” (Modeled on the Convention on the Contract for the International 
Carriage of Goods by Road, 1956). 
1258 Comité Maritime Internat onal, “Draft Outline Instrument” in CMI Yearbook 2000, CMI Headquarters 
Pub., Antwerpen, Belgium, at p. 131-132.
1259 UNCITRAL, “Transport Law: Preliminary draft instrument on the carriage of goods by sea” 8 January, 
2002, Document A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.21, at p. 7. For a discussion of the conclusions at the conference see 
Girvin, Stephen, “The 37th Comité Maritime International Conference: a report” [2001] LMCLQ 406.
1260 Berlingieri, F. “Basis of liability and exclusions of liability.” [2002] LMCLQ 336, at p. 337. 
1261 See Comité Maritime International, “Report of the Fifth Meeting of the International Sub-Committee 
on Issues of Transport Law – 16th to 18th July 2001” in CMI Yearbook 2001, CMI Headquarters Pub., 
Antwerpen, Belgium. 
1262 Comité Maritime International, “Draft Instrument on Carriage of Goods [Wholly or Partly] [By Sea]”, 
available at: www.comitemaritime.org/draft/draft.html. For a synopsis of the comments received see 
Comité Maritime International, “Synopsis of the Responses of National Associations, Consultative 
Members and Observers to the Consultation Paper and Other Comments on the Draft Outline Instrument” 
in CMI Yearbook 2001, CMI Headquarters Pub., Antwerpen, Belgium
1263 See Comité Maritime International, “Draft Report of the Sixth Meeting of the International Sub-
Committee on Issues of Transport Law – 12th and 13th November 2001” in CMI Yearbook 2001, CMI 
Headquarters Pub., Antwerpen, Belgium. 
1264 Tetley, W. “Reform of Carriage of Goods – The UNCITRAL Draft and Senate COGSA ’99.” (2003) 28 
Tul. Mar. L.J. 1, at p. 4-5; Comité Maritime International, “Draft Instrument on Carriage of Goods [Wholly 
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10.3 CMI DRAFT INSTRUMENT ON TRANSPORT LAW 2001
The CMI Draft Instrument on Transport Law1265 was in essence a template. “[I]t 
is important to emphasize that the Draft Instrument is not a final draft in the traditional 
sense. There are two reasons for this. First, the CMI no longer has the role of preparing 
draft Conventions for consideration at a diplomatic conference…Secondly, UNCITRAL 
did not ask for a final draft.”1266 Rather, UNCITRAL wanted a preliminary working 
document,1267 and the terms of reference of the International Sub-Committee were simply 
“to prepare the outline of an instrument…[and] drafts provisions.”1268
The provisions on carrier liability were modelled after the Hague-Visby Rules, 
Art. IV(2), although with a few significant changes.1269 Article 6.1 concerns the basis of 
liability for the carrier, with 6.1.1 providing a basic rule similar to Art. IV(2)(q) of the 
Hague-Visby Rules,1270 and 6.1.3 providing an enumerated list of exempted perils.1271
Provision 6.1.2 contains the nautical fault exemption: “Notwithstanding the provisions of
article 6.1.1 the carrier is not responsible for loss, damage or delay arising or resulting 
from (a) act, neglect or default of the master, mariner, pilot or other servants of the carrier 
in the navigation or in the management of the ship…”.1272 The nautical fault exemption 
     
or Partly] [By Sea]”, available at: www.comitemaritime.org/draft/draft.html; Beare, S. “Liability Regimes: 
Where we are, how we go there, and where we are going.” [2002] LMCLQ 306, at p. 308. 
1265 CMI Draft Instrument on Transport Law, December 10, 2001 [2002] LMLCQ 418-441; Comité
Maritime International, CMI Yearbook 2001, CMI Headquarters Pub., Antwerpen, Belgium, at p. 532; 
Available online at: www.comitemaritime.org. It should be noted that the version published in Lloyd’s 
Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly contains only the provisions of the draft instrument, while the 
versions in the CMI Yearbook and online contain explanatory notes on each provision. 
1266 Beare, S. “Liability Regimes: Where we are, how we go there, and where we are going.” [2002] 
LMCLQ 306, at p. 308.
1267 Ibid, at p. 309. 
1268 Comité Maritime International, “Issues of Transport Law” in CMI Yearbook 2000, CMI Headquarters 
Pub., Antwerpen, Belgium, at p. 112.
1269 Berlingieri, F. “Basis of liability and exclusions of liability.” [2002] LMCLQ 336, at p. 337.
1270 “6.1.1 The carrier shall be liable for loss resulting from loss of or damage to the goods, as well as from 
delay in delivery, if the occurrence that caused the loss, damage or delay took place during the period of the 
carrier’s responsibility as defined in article 4, unless the carrier proves that neither its fault nor that of any 
person referred to in article 6.3.2(a) caused or contributed to the loss, damage or delay.”
1271 Although the list has been modified, for example the exemption of “war” has been expanded by adding 
“hostilities, armed conflict, piracy and terrorism”. Provision 6.1.3., however has been termed a modified 
presumption regime in the accompanying CMI notes to the provision.
1272 CMI Draft Instrument on Transport Law, December 10, 2001 [2002] LMLCQ 418-441. Provision 
6.1.2(b) contains the exemption for fire. 
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however is presented in the draft in square brackets thus indicating its contentious 
nature.1273 Comments submitted by the national associations regarding the draft, prior to 
the final revision in November 2001, included the suggestion by the Netherlands that 
nautical fault “should be listed between [].”1274 Other associations had also noted that the 
divisive nature of the exemption should be indicated.1275 The accompanying explanations 
to provision 6.1.2 stipulated that there was little support for the “management” element of 
the defence, but the exemption “was justified on the basis that, should it be removed, 
there would be a considerable change to the existing position regarding the spreading of 
risks of sea carriage, which would of course impact the insurance position.”1276 The 
explanatory notes for the provision also raise the point that should the exemption be 
removed, support exists for an exemption addressing the nautical fault of a compulsory 
pilot.1277
10.4. RESPONSES TO THE INCLUSION OF NAUTICAL FAULT
Despite the support for the nautical fault exemption at the International Sub-
Committee meetings and the Singapore conference, there were critics of the presence of 
the exemption in the draft instrument. Professor Berlingieri notes that although the 
exemption for nautical fault is supported, there is growing interest in abolishing the error 
in management portion of the defence.1278 In addition, Berlingieri argues that 
navigational fault should be abolished as well, pointing to the fact that the argument to 
  
1273 Asariotis, R. “Allocation of liability and burden of proof in the Draft Instrument on Transport Law.” 
[2002] LMCLQ 382, at p. 390, noting that the provision has been expressly left open for discussion. 
1274 Comité Maritime International, “Synopsis of the Responses of National Associations, Consultative 
Members and Observers to the Consultation Paper and Other Comments on the Draft Outline Instrument” 
in CMI Yearbook 2001, CMI Headquarters Pub., Antwerpen, Belgium, at p. 440.
1275 For example, Japan, replied that “this Association strongly wishes that the draft Instrument should refer 
to the different views on the issue in the commentary, since the issue has long been discussed and various 
views have been expressed in ISC and in Singapore Conference.” (Comité Maritime International, 
“Synopsis of the Responses of National Associations, Consultative Members and Observers to the 
Consultation Paper and Other Comments on the Draft Outline Instrument” in CMI Yearbook 2001, CMI 
Headquarters Pub., Antwerpen, Belgium, at p. 439).
1276 CMI Draft Instrument on Transport Law, December 10, 2001 [2002] LMLCQ 418-441. Note 
accompanying provision 6.1.2.
1277 “There is also a view that even if this exemption is removed an exemption should remain for “act, 
neglect or default of a compulsory pilot in the navigation of the ship”, on the ground that this covers a 
situation in which the carrier can justifiably feel aggrieved at being expected to answer.”
1278 Berlingieri, F. “Basis of liability and exclusions of liability.” [2002] LMCLQ 336, at p. 342. 
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maintain the exemption, the insurance argument, is not supported by any reliable data.1279
Secondly, Berlingieri argues “on the basis of a logical allocation of the risks, the fact that 
the shipper should bear the risk of loss, damage or delay resulting from the fault of the 
servants of the carrier is lacking any justification and is contrary to the general rule that 
exists in most jurisdictions.”1280 UNCTAD released a commentary on the draft instrument 
in February 2002 that was extremely critical with regard to the provision 6.1.2.1281 It 
referred to the exemption as unsustainable, and commented that “[t]his approach is 
without parallel in any existing Transport Convention and no justification exists for its 
continued availability in any new international regime.”1282 UNCTAD even rejects the 
notion of an exemption concerning compulsory pilotage, reasoning that “[a]s a matter of 
commercial risk allocation, one of the parties to any contract of carriage (including 
charterparties) has to take responsibility for the actions of the pilot. The carrier is clearly 
in a much better position than a shipper or a consignee to take on this responsibility and 
to protect its interests.”1283 Regardless, the inclusion of the exemption in the draft 
instrument was a testament to its continued popularity in certain circles, despite the 
objections to its presence.  
10.5. UNCITRAL DRAFT CONVENTION 
The UNCITRAL Draft Convention has inspired effort and cooperation in many 
respects. Several governments have indicated their willingness to support and participate 
in the process of achieving uniformity through the new Draft Convention.1284
Furthermore, certain nations have also placed domestic legislation on hold pending the 
  
1279 Ibid. 
1280 Ibid..
1281 UNCTAD, “Draft Instrument on Transport Law – Comments Submitted by the UNCTAD Secretariat”, 
February 6, 2002, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/W.P.21/Add.1, at pp. 22-23. 
1282 Ibid, at p. 23. 
1283 Ibid.
1284 For example see Transport Canada, “Marine Liability Act, Part 5: Liability for the Carriage of Goods 
by Water” (2004) Consultation paper dated September 2004, Transport Canada, Government of Canada, 
Doc. TP 14307E, at p. 6, recommending that “Transport Canada continue to make efforts in UNCITRAL, 
in consultation with industry and in cooperation with like-minded countries, to develop a new international 
regime of liability for the carriage of goods by sea which would achieve a greater uniformity than the 
Hague/Visby Rules.”  
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outcome of the Draft Convention.1285 It is an ambitious project, given that the Draft 
Convention aims to cover all aspects of contracts for the carriage of goods by sea.1286 In 
2003, the president of the CMI, Patrick Griggs, commented that the UNICITRAL Draft 
Convention “seems to be the best, and probably the last, chance of restoring international 
uniformity in th[e] area [of carriage of goods].”1287 After the CMI draft instrument was 
delivered to UNCITRAL in December of 2001, the draft, with only minor changes was 
converted into the UNICITRAL Preliminary Draft Instrument on the Carriage of Goods 
by Sea, dated January 8, 2002.1288 UNCITAL then established a working group, Working 
Group III (Transport Law), to whom the draft was referred.1289
10.5.1. The Working Group Sessions
The Working Group considered the Draft Convention at its first meeting, (the 
ninth session), held in New York from April 15 to 26, 2002.1290 The Working Group 
discussed provision 6.1.2., and in its report, noted  “[a] strong argument was made that, 
given the central aim of the draft instrument was modernization, then exemption from 
liability for errors in navigation and management in the ship was out of date, particularly 
  
1285 The United States placed the efforts with respect to the new COGSA on hold to focus on the 
UNCITRAL process. Canada has also stalled triggering domestic legislation that would implement the 
Hamburg Rules, partially due to the fact that the convention does not impact Canadian trade and is stagnant 
internationally, but also due to Canada’s active work with UNCITRAL since 1999 on the development of a 
new convention (Transport Canada, “Marine Liability Act, Part 5: Liability for the Carriage of Goods by 
Water” (2004) Consultation paper dated September 2004, Transport Canada, Government of Canada, Doc. 
TP 14307E, at p. 6). 
1286 Delebecque, P. “Le Projet CNUDCI d’Instrument Sur le Transport de Merchandises Par Mer” [2003] 
DMF 915, at p. 917.
1287 Griggs, P. “Obstacles to Uniformity of Maritime Law” (2003) 34 JMLC 191, at p. 195. For an opposing 
view, see Tassel, Y. “Projet CNUDCI: Une Double Critique de Fond” [2004] DMF 3, at p. 9, who after 
reviewing the progress on the project so far, concludes that the project far from simplifying the situation in 
carriage law actually complicates it. Tassel, at p. 9, considers that the work on the project to date is “une 
forte régression” or a significant regression in the law of carriage. 
1288 UNCITRAL, “Transport Law: Preliminary Draft Instrument on the Carriage of Goods by Sea”, January 
8, 2002, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.21. 
1289 Comité Maritime International, “Draft Instrument on Carriage of Goods [Wholly or Partly] [By Sea]”, 
available at: www.comitemaritime.org/draft/draft.html;
1290 UNCITRAL, “Report of the Working Group on Transport Law on the work of its ninth session (New 
York, 15-26 April 2002)”, 7 May 2002, UN Doc. A/CN.9/510. For a discussion of who was present, 
including national representatives of UNCITRAL member states, other states active in the maritime 
community, and several international organizations, for a total of over 50 people present, see Delebecque, 
P. “Le Projet CNUDCI d’Instrument Sur le Transport de Merchandises Par Mer” [2003] DMF 915, at p. 
916-917.  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
244
in light of other conventions dealing with other modes of carriage.”1291 Two arguments 
were raised in defence of nautical fault. First, concern was raised that marine transport 
was unique and that the elimination of the defence would have adverse economic impacts 
on the parties.1292 Secondly, it was argued that “it was not appropriate to compare sea 
with road, rail and air transport, notwithstanding technological advancements on vessel 
security and monitoring of vessels at sea.”1293 During the second meeting, or tenth 
session, of the Working Group, five months later, the question of the nautical fault 
exemption arose again.1294 During the meeting, the working group decided that provision 
6.1.2., para (a), should be deleted.1295 The removal of nautical fault was justified on the 
grounds that there was considerable opposition to it, and that a similar exemption had 
been removed from the Warsaw Convention in 1955 to reflect improved navigation 
techniques.1296 It was felt that the deletion of nautical fault “would constitute an 
important step towards modernizing and harmonizing international transport law,”1297 and 
despite the fact that the insurance argument was raised, the Working Group deleted 
6.1.2.(a).1298 Keeping the exemption only with regard to compulsory pilotage was 
suggested, however the Working Group rejected the idea.1299
10.5.2. The Removal of Nautical Fault
It has been reported that the removal of the nautical fault defence was done after 
extensive debate between the members of the Working Group,1300 although this debate is 
  
1291 UNCITRAL, “Report of the Working Group on Transport Law on the work of its ninth session (New 
York, 15-26 April 2002)”, 7 May 2002, UN Doc. A/CN.9/510, at p. 16. 
1292 Ibid. 
1293 Ibid. 
1294 UNCITAL, “Report of the Working Group on Transport Law on the work of its tenth session (Vienna, 
16-20 September 2002)”, 7 October 2002, UN Doc. A/CN.9/525.
1295 Ibid, at p. 15. 
1296 Ibid, at p. 14. 
1297 Ibid, at p. 15. 
1298 Ibid. 
1299 Ibid, at p 17. It was suggested that error in navigation when under compulsory pilotage should be listed 
under 6.1.3. as one of the exempted perils. It was rejected with the justification that pilotage should not 
exonerate the carrier because the pilot was regarded as assisting the carrier. As well, it would be unfair to 
burden the shipper with liability for pilots, as the carrier was actually involved and maintained control of 
those situations. Thus the Working Group refused to expand the list of exemptions. 
1300 Transport Canada, “Agenda for Meeting of International Marine Policy & Liability sector of Transport 
Canada on discussion of Draft UNCITRAL Transport Law Convention”, October 7, 2004, at p. 15. 
Available online from the Canadian Maritime Law Association website at: 
www.cmla.org/papers/2004/TransportReport-Oct.4,%202004.pdf
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not reflected in the Working Group reports.1301 This was one of the first substantive 
decisions taken by the Working Group over the first three meetings.1302 The decision 
generated controversy, and both the removal of the exemption and the timing of the 
removal were opposed: “the carrier interests felt that the elimination of the exception was 
still premature…they did not feel it should be deleted except as part of a compromise 
under which carriers received some other benefit.”1303 Moreover, during the tenth session, 
the Working Group rejected the suggestion that the defence remain in square brackets 
pending a decision made at a later stage on a liability package.1304 The dangers of 
considering the articles individually rather than as a whole, in relation to equitable risk 
allocation has also been commented on by the International Group of P&I Clubs.1305
After the decision was taken during the tenth session, there have subsequently 
been several attempts to reintroduce nautical fault in one form or another, however all 
have proved unsuccessful.1306 In late 2002 and early 2003, the Working Group received 
replies to a questionnaire it had sent out on door-to-door transport and the scope of the 
Draft Convention.1307 Several of the replies contained strong arguments for the retention 
  
1301 In total two paragraphs were devoted to the decision, which do not reflect extensive debate, nor the 
contentious nature of the decision taken. See UNCITAL, “Report of the Working Group on Transport Law 
on the work of its tenth session (Vienna, 16-20 September 2002)”, 7 October 2002, UN Doc. A/CN.9/525, 
at p. 14-15, para. 35-36. 
1302 Sturley, M. “The United Nations Commissions on International Trade Law’s Transport Law Project: 
An Interim View of a Work in Progress” (2003) 39 Tex. Int’l L.J. 65, at p. 95. 
1303 Ibid.
1304 UNCITAL, “Report of the Working Group on Transport Law on the work of its tenth session (Vienna, 
16-20 September 2002)”, 7 October 2002, UN Doc. A/CN.9/525, at p. 15. 
1305 In a response to a questionnaire inviting comments on the UNCITRAL draft, the International Group 
stated: “The primary purpose of international carriage conventions is not only to promote international 
uniformity but also to ensure an acceptable and fair balance of rights and liabilities and thus allocation of 
risk between the parties to the carriage contract…The Working Group is and has been considering the 
provisions of the Instrument on an article by article basis, in particular those articles relating to the carrier’s 
rights, liabilities and responsibilities that have quite correctly been described as the heart of the Instrument. 
The IG believes that in considering these articles individually rather than as a whole, the Working Group is 
in danger of overlooking the principle and accordingly preserving an equitable allocation of risk between 
carrier and cargo interests.” Found in UNCITRAL, “Preparation of a draft instrument on the carriage of 
goods [by sea]: Compilation of replies”, 31 January 2003, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.28, at p. 38. 
1306 Transport Canada, “Agenda for Meeting of International Marine Policy & Liability sector of Transport 
Canada on discussion of Draft UNCITRAL Transport Law Convention”, October 7, 2004, at p. 15. 
Available online from the Canadian Maritime Law Association website at: 
www.cmla.org/papers/2004/TransportReport-Oct.4,%202004.pdf
1307 The answers to the questionnaires are published in two UN documents: UNCITRAL, “Preparation of e 
draft instrument on the carriage of goods [by sea]: Compilation of replies”, 31 January 2003, UN Doc. 
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of nautical fault. The Institute of Chartered Shipbrokers (ICS) noted the piecemeal 
adoption of the Hamburg Rules, and argued that any new convention must address the 
reasonable requirements of the major liner companies, such as error in navigation, in 
order to succeed.1308 The ICS supported the retention of error in navigation, but suggested 
that error in management could be removed, with the reasoning being: “The purely 
pragmatic view that without retention there will be a much harder route to securing 
adoption of the draft instrument…[and] change in the spread of risk impacting upon 
insurance.”1309 The International Group of P&I Clubs, in response to the argument that 
the nautical fault defence is out of step with other conventions and does not reflect 
technological advances in shipping, stated; “we believe that it is misleading to compare 
sea transport with other forms of transport. Cargo quantities and values (and therefore 
frequently claims) are much greater, transit times are longer and the carriage is subject to 
many more factors over which the carrier has no control. Furthermore, even though 
sophisticated navigational aids are now in place on most ships, the master and other 
senior officers are faced with greatly increased workload, partly resulting from increased 
legislation and inspections. Further, a master is often called upon to make immediate and 
difficult decisions with limited information quite possibly in the face of competing 
interests, which if loss or damage occur are likely to be closely scrutinized with the 
benefit of hindsight.”1310 The International Group also addressed pilot error, noting that it 
comprised 5% of all major claims in an analysis conducted,1311 and suggested that should 
nautical fault be eliminated, at the minimum it should be retained in respect of pilot 
error.1312 There was also support for the removal of the nautical fault exemption.1313
     
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.28, and UNCITRAL, “Preparation of a draft instrument on the carriage of goods [by 
sea]: Addendum to compilation of replies”, 18 September 2003, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.28/Add.1. 
1308 Institute of Chartered Shipbrokers, replies to the UNCITRAL questionnaire on the draft instrument, 
found in UNCITRAL, “Preparation of a draft instrument on the carriage of goods [by sea]: Compilation of 
replies”, 31 January 2003, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.28, at p. 7.
1309 Ibid, at p. 8. 
1310 In UNCITRAL, “Preparation of a draft instrument on the carriage of goods [by sea]: Compilation of 
replies”, 31 January 2003, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.28, at p. 39. The International Group also notes 
that in an analysis off all claims arising between 1987 and 1997, at a major club, 40% of all major claims 
were cargo claims, and Deck Officer Error, which relates to error in the navigation or management of the 
ship, represented 25% of all major claims. One can therefore understand the International Group argument 
that the risk allocation would most certainly change should the exemption be eliminated. 
1311 See ibid.
1312 In UNCITRAL, “Preparation of a draft instrument on the carriage of goods [by sea]: Compilation of 
replies”, 31 January 2003, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.28, at p. 40. 
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Interestingly, the International Union of Marine Insurance (IUMI),1314 “believes that the 
present risk allocation should be modified…[and] is in favour of eliminating the error in 
navigation or management.”1315 These replies however, were considered after the initial 
decision to remove nautical fault had already been taken. 
During the twelfth session of the Working Group, reinstating error in navigation 
was discussed again. Several delegations favoured the exemption, and one of the 
arguments for reinstating it was made on the basis that “an error might be easy to 
characterize in hindsight, but that it was often the error of the master, forced to make 
rapid decisions in bad weather, and that no shipowner would generally interfere with his 
masters decisions in these circumstances.”1316 It was also cautioned during the meeting 
that the removal of the exemption, when paired with the burden of proof, would result in 
carrier liability wherever it could be demonstrated that there was any navigational 
fault.1317 The United States delegation, despite supporting the elimination of the defence, 
     
1313 The United States submitted a proposal dated August 7th 2003 that advocated retaining the Hague-
Visby style list of carrier exemptions, although with the elimination of the nautical fault defence found at 
Article 6.1.2.(a). (“Proposal by the United States”, 7 August 2003, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.34, at p. 
5). On the September 17th 2003, the European Shippers’ Council, the Asian Shippers’ Group, and the 
National Industrial Transportation League, issued a Joint Shippers’ Declaration stating the positions that 
should be advocated by national governments at the UNCITRAL Working Group, and included in the list 
the elimination of nautical fault and error of navigation. (“Joint Shippers’ Declaration of European 
Shippers’ Council, Asian Shippers’ Group, The National Industrial Transportation League” (2003) 2003 
Tripartite Shippers Meeting September 11-13, 2003 Margaux, France. Available at: 
www.europeanshippers.com/public/statements/archives/030917declaration.htm.)   
1314 Who represent 53 national marine insurance associations from markets all over the world. IUMI 
members cover 80% of the world premium in marine insurance, and represent both carriers and cargo. In 
the International Union of Marine Insurance replies to UNCITRAL questionnaire, in UNCITRAL, 
“Preparation of e draft instrument on the carriage of goods [by sea]: Addendum to compilation of replies”, 
18 September 2003, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.28/Add.1., at p. 5. 
1315 Ibid, at p. 6. The IUMI note that “no statistical records are available to evaluate the reduction of cargo 
insurers risks, but underwriters estimate that the reduction of risk would be less than 4%. 
1316 UNCITRAL, “Report of Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its twelfth session 
(Vienna, 6-17 October 2003)”, 16 December 2003, UN Doc. A/CN.9/544, at p. 40. 
1317 Ibid, at p. 28-29 it was argued that “the elimination of the exception based on navigational error could 
have unintended consequences. It was suggested that in most cases where goods were lost or damaged at 
sea, the claimant would generally have a plausible argument that the carrier might have been able to reduce 
the loss by having made a different navigational decision, and that thus a navigational error had been made. 
Under the current law, the argument would not succeed because navigational error was listed as an 
“excepted peril”. However, it was suggested that if navigational error was deleted from the list of “excepted 
perils”, as the Working Group had decided it should be, and if the burden of proof was not adjusted 
accordingly, the carrier would have to prove the apportionment of the cause of the loss, which was 
considered to be virtually an “insuperable burden”. The view was expressed that the practical result would 
be that the carrier would be fully liable in most cases for all of the damage when there was any navigational 
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noted the burden of proof issue and commented that “the elimination of the navigational 
fault may well have the unintended effect of depriving the carrier of every statutory 
defense in any case in which navigational fault could plausibly be argued.”1318
Nevertheless, the prevailing view was that the deletion of the error in navigation should 
remain.1319
10.5.3. Subsequent Drafts and Negotiations
An updated draft of the instrument was released in September of 2003.1320 Several 
provisions had been altered, and the Draft Convention had been renumbered and 
reorganized. Carrier liability is dealt with in Chapter 5, with the basis of liability, the 
provision that previously contained nautical fault, found in Article 14.1321 Error in 
navigation and management remained eliminated, while the fire defence is retained, 
although found in “Chapter 6: Additional provisions relating to carriage by sea”, and 
specifically, Article 22 entitled ‘Liability of the Carrier’.1322 All exempted perils of a 
purely maritime character were removed from Article 14, and placed in Article 22.1323
     
fault, and that it could render irrelevant the “excepted peril” provisions in most cases where the damage 
occurred at sea.” 
1318 UNCITRAL, “Proposal by the United States of America”, 7 August 2003, UN Doc. 
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.34, at p. 6. 
1319 Ibid. 
1320 UNCITRAL, “Draft instrument on the carriage of goods [wholly or partly] [by sea]”, 4 September 
2003, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.32.  
1321 Ibid, at p. 20. Briefly, Article 14 contains a basic liability provision that provides for carrier liability for 
loss resulting from loss, damage or delay, unless the carrier proves that neither his fault, nor the fault of his 
servants or agents. Nevertheless, Article 14 also contains a list of exempted perils, wherein if the carrier 
proves that the loss, damage or delay was caused by one of them, then it is presumed that the loss, damage 
or delay was not caused by the carrier or his servants or agents. This provision has attracted criticism, in 
particular with regard to the list of exempted perils. See for example, Delebecque, P. “Les Travaux du 
Comité Droit des Transports du CMI sur le Projet CNUDCI” [2004] DMF 820, at p. 820, who asks what is 
the use of having a list of exempted perils in Article 14 when we consider that the carrier is by virtue of law 
liable unless he can establish that he is without fault.  
1322 Ibid, at p. 32. 
1323 Berlingieri, F. “Background Paper on the Basis of the Carrier’s Liability” in CMI Yearbook 2004, CMI 
Headquarters Pub., Antwerp, Belgium, at p. 144. These exemptions include: (a) saving or attempting to 
save life or property at sea, (b) perils, damages and accidents of the sea or other navigable waters, and (c) 
fire on the ship, unless caused by the fault or privity of the carrier. 
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Error in navigation was reconsidered with respect to pilot error in the fourteenth 
session of the Working Group in December 2004.1324 It was proposed that 
notwithstanding the deletion of error in navigation, pilot error should be introduced into 
the list of excepted perils in the following form: “act, neglect or default of the pilot in the 
navigation of the ship.”1325 Although arguments similar to those made in relation to 
pilotage in previous sessions of the Working Group were raised, it was also argued that 
pilot error would not be covered under the general liability rule,1326 or the peril of the sea 
exemption.1327 Conversely it was suggested that it was covered, as one may prove 
absence of fault under Article 14.1328 Although the Working Group opted not to introduce 
such an exemption, it was acknowledged that there was confusion as to whether Article 
14 would in fact cover compulsory pilots.1329 In 2005, a draft entitled “Draft Convention 
on the Carriage of Goods [Wholly or Partly] [by Sea]” was released, and although it 
made no substantive changes with regard to nautical fault, the provisions regarding the 
basis of carrier liability and the exemptions were reorganized.1330 The basis of liability 
and the exemptions, including those of a purely maritime character, were now all 
contained in Chapter 6, in particular Article 17, entitled “Basis of Liability”.1331 A 
subsequent draft was released in February of 2007, however the basis of liability 
  
1324 UNCITRAL, “Report of the Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its fourteenth session 
(Vienna, 29 November-10 December 2004)” 21 December 2004, UN Doc. A/CN.9/572. 
1325 Ibid, at p. 18. 
1326 Article 14(1). 
1327 UNCITRAL, “Report of the Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its fourteenth session 
(Vienna, 29 November-10 December 2004)” 21 December 2004, UN Doc. A/CN.9/572, at p. 18.
1328 Ibid. 
1329 Ibid. 
1330 UNCITRAL, “Draft convention on the carriage of goods [wholly or partly] [by sea]”, 8 September 
2005, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.56. 
1331 Ibid, at p. 20. Article 17(2) provides that the basis of carrier liability is fault based, and that the carrier 
may prove that an exempted peril caused or contributed to the loss, damage, or delay, to be relieved of all 
or part of its liability. This is subject however to several qualifications, including that if the claimant proves 
that the fault of the carrier, or the fault of any person (including any performing party and their 
subcontractors, employees and agents) acting at the carrier’s request or under the carrier’s supervision or 
control, caused or contributed to the exempted peril on which the carrier relies, then the carrier is liable for 
all or part of the loss, damage or delay. (Article 17(2)(a) in conjunction with Article 19). One of the results 
is that the last defence where the carrier was exonerated despite the existence of fault that existed as of the 
2003 draft, fire, has thus been narrowed from “Fire on the ship, unless caused by the fault or privity of the 
carrier”, to read “Fire on the ship” (Article 17(3)(f)). When taken in conjunction with the rest of Article 17, 
the defence of fire therefore is significantly narrowed. 
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remained unaltered.1332 The Working Group did not consider the issue of the carrier’s 
basis of liability at the fifteenth session held in April 2005,1333 or the sixteenth session in 
December 2005.1334 In 2006, the CMI noted that the text of Article 17 is considered to be 
“broadly acceptable” by the Working Group.1335 The carrier’s basis of liability went 
unconsidered during the both the seventeenth and eighteenth sessions in 2006,1336 before 
being addressed at the nineteenth session held in April 2007.1337 Prior to considering the 
text of Article 17, the Working Group impressed on the delegates that the article as 
drafted “was the result of a broad and carefully negotiated consensus that emerged from 
intense discussions in the Working Group over several sessions,” and that “caution 
should be exercised in suggesting any changes to the carefully balanced text.”1338 Article 
17(3) contains the list of fifteen exemptions, which upon consideration proved to be 
contentious. A number of delegations advocated the removal of the exemptions entirely, 
as it was argued that the list was overly generous to carriers.1339 Certain other delegations 
suggested that the removal of error of navigation from this Article should be 
reconsidered, or at the very least born in mind when assessing the overall balance of 
liabilities.1340 The Working Group concluded that the Article 17(3) should be approved as 
drafted, as the majority of the Working Group supported the list of exemptions, citing in 
particular the delicate balance and consensus that had been reached in the negotiations of 
this article in previous sessions.1341
  
1332 UNCITRAL, “Draft convention on the carriage of goods [wholly or partly] [by sea]”, 13 February 
2007, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.81.
1333 UNCITRAL, “Report of the Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its fifteenth session 
(New York, 18-28 April 2005)” 13 May 2005, UN Doc. A/CN.9/576.
1334 UNCITRAL, “Report of the Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its sixteenth session 
(Vienna, 28 November – 9 December 2005)” 4 January 2006, UN Doc. A/CN.9/591. 
1335 Comité Maritime International, “Draft Convention on the Carriage of Goods [Wholly or Partly] [By 
Sea]”, 2006, available online at: www.comitemaritime.org/draft/draft.html
1336 UNCITRAL, “Report of the Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its seventeenth session 
(New York, 3-13 April 2006)” 24 April 2006, UN Doc. A/CN.9/594; UNCITRAL, “Report of the Working 
Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its eighteenth session (Vienna, 6-17 November 2006)” 27 
November 2006, UN Doc. A/CN.9/616. 
1337 UNCITRAL, “Report of the Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its nineteenth session 
(New York, 16-27 April 2007)” 17 May 2007, UN Doc. A/CN.9/621.
1338 Ibid, at p. 17. 
1339 Ibid. 
1340 Ibid.
1341 Ibid.
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The basis of liability was not considered at the twentieth session held in October 
2007,1342 however following that session the most recent version of the Draft Convention 
was released.1343 Chapter 5, Article 18, now provides for the basis of liability, which is 
essentially identical in meaning to the previous draft, save several minor changes.1344
Despite having been raised during the nineteenth session, error in navigation was in effect 
a dead issue. It was unlikely that the tide of opinion on the matter would have changed 
sufficiently to enable the error in navigation exemption to be seriously reconsidered. This 
was particularly the case that late in the drafting process, as strong emphasis had been 
placed on the fragile consensus that has been achieved thus far. By the fortieth session of 
the Commission held during June-July of 2007, the Working Group informed the 
Commission that it planned to complete its third and final reading by the end of 2007, 
with a view to submitting the draft convention for consideration during the forty-first 
session of the Commission in 2008.1345 At the twentieth session held in October 2007, 
the Working Group did in fact conclude its third reading.1346 The twenty-first session 
took place in January 2008,1347 and according to the Canadian Delegate on the Working 
Group, the work on the Draft Convention has been completed.1348 The Working Group 
was therefore able to complete its work on schedule, and accordingly the Draft 
Convention will be presented to the Commission during its forty-first session in June 
2008. There is the possibility that certain contentious issues may be raised during the 
Commission session in June,1349 however nautical fault is most certainly not one of them. 
  
1342 UNCITRAL, “Report of the Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its twentieth session 
(Vienna, 15-25 October 2007)” 2 November 2007, UN Doc. A/CN.9/642.
1343 UNCITRAL, “Draft convention on the carriage of goods [wholly or partly] [by sea]”, 14 November 
2007, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.101.
1344 The changes were predominantly variations in wording aimed at clarifying certain provisions. Notably, 
three of the exemptions found in(g) (h), (i) and (k) of Article 17(3), along with provisions (4) and (5) of 
Article 17. See UNCITRAL, “Draft convention on the carriage of goods [wholly or partly] [by sea]”, 14 
November 2007, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.101, at pp. 16-18, footnotes 31-36. 
1345 UNCITRAL, “Annotated Provisional Agenda: Working Group III (Transport Law), Twenty-first 
session (Vienna, 14-25 January 2008)” 7 November 2007, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.100, at p. 11.
1346 Ibid, at p. 12. 
1347 Ibid.
1348 Interview with Tracy Chatman, Transport Canada Policy Advisor  (International Marine Policy) 
Member of the Canadian Delegation for the UNCITRAL Working Group III, (6 February 2008).
1349 Ibid, who noted that the issue of volume contracts may be raised, but cautioned that generally the 
Commission session does not consider substantive issues unless there is tremendous support to do so. 
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10.6. PILOTAGE WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF NAUTICAL FAULT
A potential exemption for compulsory pilotage discussed in relation to nautical 
fault, and to date unresolved by the Working Group, bears closer examination. At the 
time of the removal of nautical fault from the Draft Convention, during the tenth session, 
it was argued that an exemption should be retained for instances where the error in 
navigation is committed under compulsory pilotage.1350 At the time, the Working Group 
rejected the notion of compulsory pilotage as an exempted peril. Nevertheless, although 
the issue arose again during the fourteenth session, the Working Group maintained their 
objection to an exempted peril for error of the pilot in the navigation of the ship.1351 What 
spawned confusion and was left unresolved was whether the carrier would be responsible 
for the errors of a compulsory pilot.1352 Currently, Article 19 of the Draft Convention, 
entitled “Liability of the carrier for other persons” provides as foll ws: “The carrier is 
liable for the breach of its obligations under this Convention caused by acts or omissions 
of: (a) Any performing party; (b) The master or crew of the ship; (c) Employees or agents 
of the carrier or a performing party; or (d) Any other person that performs or undertakes 
to perform any of the carrier’s obligations under the contract of carriage, to the extent that 
the person acts, either directly or indirectly, at the carrier’s request or under the carrier’s 
supervision or control.”1353 The question remains, is the carrier liable for the faults of a 
compulsory pilot by virtue of the foregoing text?
Liability with regard to pilotage is one of the older issues in maritime law.  
During medieval times, Article XXIII of the Laws of Oleron stipulated that if a pilot’s 
actions brought the ship to grief “and the merchants sustain damage thereby, he shall be 
obliged to make full satisfaction of the same, if he hath wherewithal; and if not, lose his 
head.”1354 The English case of Re Rumney and Wood, rendered August 1, 1541, involved 
  
1350 UNCITAL, “Report of the Working Group on Transport Law on the work of its tenth session (Vienna, 
16-20 September 2002)”, 7 October 2002, UN Doc. A/CN.9/525, at p. 17.
1351 UNCITRAL, “Report of the Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its fourteenth session 
(Vienna, 29 November-10 December 2004)” 21 December 2004, UN Doc. A/CN.9/572. 
1352 Article 14(1). 
1353 UNCITRAL, “Draft convention on the carriage of goods [wholly or partly] [by sea]”, 14 November 
2007, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.101. 
1354 This is an English translation of a French text published by Cleirac, and quoted by Haight, Jr., C. 
“Babel Afloat: Some Reflections on Uniformity in Maritime Law” in The Healy Lectures (2005) Kimball, 
J. (Ed.) LLP, London, at p. 61. Cleirac, a French author, published in the middle of the 17th century his 
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two pilots who permitted their vessels to go aground the shoals of the Isle of Peytewe.1355
Anthony Husse, the president of the Admiralty Court, found the pilots guilty of 
negligence, sentenced them to imprisonment for a year and forbade them from ever 
piloting ships again.1356 Today, pilots remain criminally liable for faults and errors on 
their part, however the punishments are decidedly less severe.1357 Moreover, pilots are 
civilly liable for negligent acts, although the limits of liability are so low as to render suit 
almost pointless.1358 What is and has been infinitely more variable over the years is 
whether the shipowner is liable to third parties for the negligent acts of a pilot.  
Prior to considering the liability of the shipowner for the negligent actions of a 
pilot, one must distinguish between compulsory and voluntary pilotage. Compulsory 
pilotage can be traced as far back as the Romans,1359 and historically, it has its origins in 
     
work “Us et Coustumes de la Mer”, which contains both the Laws of Oleron and the Laws of Wisby 
(Hughes, R. Handbook of Admiralty Law, 2nd Ed. (1920) West Pub. Co., St. Paul, Minnesota, at p. 6); 
Hare, J. Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, (1999) Juta & Co, Cape Town, at p. 351 
also quotes The Rolls of Oleron, “Yf a shyp is lost by defaulte of the lodeman the maryners may, if they 
please, bring the lodeman to the windlass…and cut off his head withoute the maryners being bounde to 
answer before any judge…”
1355 The Latin text of the judgment is reported at p. 102, Vol I, Select Pleas in the Court of Admiralty, A.D. 
1390-1404 and A.D. 1527-1545, with the English translation at p. 213, as referenced by Parks, A. & 
Cattell, E. The Law of Tug, Tow and Pilotage (1994) Cornell Maritime Press, Maryland, at p. 981. 
1356 Parks & Cattell, ibid, at p. 981-982, who quotes the judgement condemning the pilots: And I dismiss, 
absolve and discharge you and each of you as being unworthy, unfit, unskilful, inexperienced, lazy, 
negligent and careless men from the charge, care and practice of conducting, commanding, and piloting any 
ships whatsoever as well from any ports whatsoever within this famous realm of England as to ports over 
the seas. 
1357 For example, section 21 of the United Kingdom Pilotage Act 1987 provides for criminal liability in the 
form of fines and terms of imprisonment for certain acts and omissions causing or likely to cause damage, 
injury or death. 
1358 Mandaraka-Sheppard, A. Modern Admiralty Law (2001) Cavendish Publishing, London, at p. 862; 
Section 22(2) of the United Kingdom Pilotage Act 1987 provides for limitation in the amount of £1000 for 
civil liability where the pilot was negligent; Parks, A. & Cattell, E. The Law of Tug, Tow and Pilotage
(1994) Cornell Maritime Press, Maryland, at p. 1011 note that “suits against pilots are relatively rare either 
because of low limits of statutory liability…or because the pilot is usually without sufficient financial 
resources to make it worthwhile to attempt to pursue recovery.” For a discussion of the statutory limits of 
liability in various jurisdictions in the United States see Parks, A. & Cattell, ibid, at pp. 1014-1018.
1359 The United State Supreme Court opined as follows on the origins of compulsory pilotage: “The 
obligation of the captain to take a pilot, or be responsible for the damages that may ensue, was prescribed in 
the Roman Law. The Hanseatic ordinances, about 1457, required the captain to take a pilot under the 
penalty of the mark of gold. The maritime law of Sweden, about 1500, imposed a penalty for refusing a 
pilot of 150 thalers, one-third to go to the informer, one-third to the pilot who offered, and the residue to 
poor mariners. By the maritime code of the Pays Bas the captain was required to take a pilot under a 
penalty of 50 reals, and to be responsible for any loss to the vessel. By the maritime law of France, 
ordinance of Louis the XIV, 1681, corporal punishment was imposed for refusing to take a pilot, and the 
vessel was to pay 50 livres, to be applied to the use of the marine hospital and to repair damages from the 
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the need for security and the protection of life and property in harbour areas.1360
Compulsory pilotage refers to instances where “a vessel is compelled by statute to take 
on a licensed pilot to conduct the vessel over certain well-defined pilotage grounds, or, 
upon failure to do so, is liable for the payment of half-pilotage, or the entire pilotage fee, 
or subjects the owner and/or master to criminal penalties, whichever may be required by 
the particular statute involved.”1361 Voluntary pilotage is simply where a pilot is engaged 
by the shipowner, his servants or his agents, without being compelled to do so by 
statute.1362 This distinction, depending on the jurisdiction, is often pivotal to establishing 
shipowner liability for the actions of a pilot. 
Traditionally, under English common law the shipowner was not liable for the 
actions of a compulsory pilot, as illustrated by an Admiralty judgment rendered in 1839: 
“The opinion I have thus formed in this case is founded upon the general principles of 
reason and justice; that no one should be chargeable with the acts of another who is not 
an agent of his own election and choice; and I further think, that it would be contrary to 
all sense of equity, to say to the owners of a foreign vessel, ‘You shall take a pilot of our 
selection, of our appointment; be he drunk or sober, negligent or careful, skilful or 
ignorant, you shall be responsible for his conduct, unless you choose to submit to the 
penalty, and penalty it is, of paying the pilotage for nothing.”1363 The reasoning was in 
essence that the compulsory pilot could not be characterized as the shipowner’s servant 
or agent.1364 This is opposed to a voluntary pilot, who was clearly treated as the servant of 
the carrier, with the result that the carrier was vicariously liable for the pilot’s actions.1365
The defence of compulsory pilotage was also found in the United Kingdom Merchant 
     
stranding. In England (3 George, ch. 13), if a vessel were piloted by any but a licensed, a penalty of £20 
was to be collected for the use of the use of superannuated pilots, or the windows of pilots. In the United 
States, provisions more or less stringent, requiring the payment of a sum when no pilot is taken, are found 
to be in the statutes of ten of the states. The earliest of these statutes is Massachusetts of 1783.” (Ex Parte 
McNeil, 80 U.S. 236 (1872), at pp. 239-240).
1360 Hill, C. Maritime Law, 6th Ed. (2003) LLP, London, at p. 463.
1361 Parks, A. & Cattell, E. The Law of Tug, Tow and Pilotage (1994) Cornell Maritime Press, Maryland, at 
p. 1018-1019.
1362 Hare, J. Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, (1999) Juta & Co, Cape Town, at p. 
355. 
1363 The Maria (1839) 166 E.R. 508 (Adm.), at 514.
1364 Mandaraka-Sheppard, A. Modern Admiralty Law (2001) Cavendish Publishing, London, at p. 864.
1365 Fogarty, A. Merchant Shipping Legislation, 2nd Ed. (2004) LLP, London, at p. 313. 
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Shipping Act 1894, at s. 633: “An owner or master of a ship shall not be answerable to 
any person whatever for any loss or damage occasioned by the fault or incapacity of any 
qualified pilot acting in charge of that ship within any district where the employment of a 
qualified pilot is compulsory by law.”1366 By the 20th century however, the defence of 
compulsory pilotage was being eroded. The 1910 Collision Convention, Article 5 
provided that “The liability imposed by the preceding articles shall attach, in cases where 
the collision is caused by the fault of the pilot, even when the carrying of the pilot is 
obligatory.”1367 In the United Kingdom, the Pilotage Act 1913, eliminated the defence by 
stipulating that “…the owner or master of a vessel navigating under circumstances in 
which pilotage is compulsory shall be answerable for any loss or damage caused by the 
vessel or by any fault of the navigation of the vessel in the same manner as he would if 
pilotage were not compulsory.”1368 The United Kingdom is not alone, the Commonwealth 
nations,1369 along with France and Germany, 1370 have all abolished the defence of 
compulsory pilotage. Justice Dube, of the Federal Court of Canada, in The Irish Stardust, 
opined on the matter; “At first blush it does appear harsh for owners of a ship to be liable 
for damage occurring to their ship while she is being navigated by a pilot who has been 
imposed upon them and who is not one of their servants. But the role of the pilot is to 
provide local knowledge about areas foreign to the master of the ship; he does not relieve 
the master of his responsibilities. The officers and the crew on the bridge are there for a 
  
1366 Merchant Shipping Act 1894, (1894) 57 & 58 Vict. c. 60, s. 633.
1367 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law with Respect to Collision 
Between Vessels, Brussels, September 23, 1910.
1368 Section 15 of the Pilotage Act, 1913, U.K. 2 & 3 Geo. 5, c. 31; Hill, C. Maritime Law, 6th Ed. (2003) 
LLP, London, at p. 466 notes that the Pilotage Act 1913 repealed s. 633 of the Merchant Shipping Act 
1894. Hill also notes that there is in fact an exception to the rule that shipowners are responsible for a 
compulsory pilot found in the Defence of the Realm Act, 1914, which applies in war time to enable the 
government to put ships in the full control of pilots regardless if the ship is navigating in a compulsory 
pilotage area.  
1369 Parks, A. & Cattell, E. The Law of Tug, Tow and Pilotage (1994) Cornell Maritime Press, Maryland, at 
p. 1018. See also p. 991 for a discussion specifically on the elimination of the defence in Canadian law; See 
also Dumurra v. Maritime Telegraph & Telephone Co. [1977] 2 F.C. 679 (F.C.A.) where the Canadian 
Federal Court of Appeals found the shipowner liable for damaged caused by a collision with underwater 
cables, despite the fact that she was under compulsory pilotage; See also Pilotage Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-14, 
at s. 41 which does not exempt the shipowner or the master from liability for loss or damage cause by his 
vessel where the pilot was negligent. 
1370 Tetley, W. International Maritime and Admiralty Law (2002) Yvon Blais, Cowansville, Quebec, at p. 
248 notes the following: “France has abolished all pilotage defences in its internal Law no. 67-545 of July 
7, 1967, at art. 5, as did Germany by its Commercial Code, art. 737.”
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purpose, to be on guard, alert and ready to provide quick assistance.”1371 More recently, 
the Justice Clark, of the English Commercial Court, in The Cavendish, held that s.16 of 
the Pilotage Act 1987 maintained the master-servant relationship between the carrier and 
a compulsory pilot that was established by s. 15 of the Pilotage Act 1913, thus rendering 
the carrier liable both with respect to third parties and with respect to damage done to the 
vessel itself.1372
There are several jurisdictions that retain the defence of compulsory pilotage. In 
the United States, where the pilot is compulsory, the shipowner and the master are 
relieved from in personam liability for the faults of the pilot.1373 The compulsory pilotage 
defence, however, does not provide a defence to a suit against the vessel in rem.1374
Moreover, the sole cause of the loss or damage must be the fault of the pilot, as when the 
master or the crew have contributed to the incident then the defence fails.1375 In essence 
the United States have retained the common law reasoning for the defence. The 
compulsory pilot is not considered to be a servant or an agent of the shipowner, and as 
such, the shipowner cannot be held personally liable for their actions.1376 The common 
law rule is also retained in South Africa. Under Roman Dutch law, the South African 
common law, the liability of the shipowner to third parties is determined as follows: “If 
the cause of the damage was the action of the pilot, and there was no contribution to that 
cause by wrongful acts of the shipowner’s own employees demanding apportionment of 
liability, there would be no claim against the shipowner because the pilot was the servant 
  
1371 The Irish Stardust [1977] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 195 (F.C.T.D.), at p. 205
1372 Gibraltar Ltd. v. Port of London Authority (The Cavendish) [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 292. 
1373 Bauer, G. “Conflicting Liability Regimes: Hague-Visby v. Hamburg Rules – A Cases by Case 
Analysis” (1993) 24 JMLC 53, at p. 62; Tetley, W. International Maritime and Admiralty Law (2002) 
Yvon Blais, Cowansville, Quebec, at p. 247-248; Parks, A. & Cattell, E. The Law of Tug, Tow and Pilotage
(1994) Cornell Maritime Press, Maryland, at p. 1018-1025; The China, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 53 (1868) at p. 67-
69.
1374 Bauer, ibid; Tetley, ibid, at p. 247; Parks & Cattell, ibid, at p. 1025.
1375 Parks & Cattell, ibid, at p. 1025
1376 The China, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 53 (1868); Bauer, G. “Conflicting Liability Regimes: Hague-Visby v. 
Hamburg Rules – A Cases by Case Analysis” (1993) 24 JMLC 53, at p. 62.
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nor of the shipowner, but of Portnet [who operates and controls South African ports].”1377
Similarly, Liberia also allows the defence of compulsory pilotage.1378
The interpretation of Article 19 of the Draft Convention by various jurisdictions, 
may in fact be informed by whether that jurisdiction retains the defence of compulsory 
pilotage. The Draft Convention does not expressly provide for liability with respect to 
pilotage. Rather, the Working Group has left the issue of whether a carrier will be liable 
for the actions of a compulsory pilot to the interpretation of national law and national 
jurisprudence.1379 Article 19(d) of the Draft Convention provides that the carrier is liable 
for “[a]ny other person that performs or undertakes to perform any of the carrier’s 
obligations under the contract of carriage, to the extent that the person acts, either directly 
or indirectly, at the carrier’s request or under the carrier’s supervision or control.”1380
Traditionally, a compulsory pilot is neither requested nor under the master’s control per 
se. Where a vessel is under compulsory pilotage, in all the aforementioned jurisdictions, 
the master retains command of the vessel.1381 While the pilot has the con, however, he 
supersedes the master with respect to the command of the vessel in matters of navigation, 
during which time he has sole control of navigation.1382 Nevertheless, the master has the 
obligation to intervene where he ascertains that the pilot is manifestly incompetent or in 
situations of emergency to preserve the safety of his ship, cargo or crew.1383 Article 19(d) 
in therefore not self-evident in the context of compulsory pilotage. It is no wonder that 
  
1377 Hare, J. Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, (1999) Juta & Co, Cape Town, at p. 
365. 
1378 Tetley, W. International Maritime and Admiralty Law (2002) Yvon Blais, Cowansville, Quebec, at p. 
247.
1379 Interview with Tracy Chatman, Transport Canada Policy Advisor  (International Marine Policy) 
Member of the Canadian Delegation for the UNCITRAL Working Group III, (6 February 2008).
1380 UNCITRAL, “Draft convention on the carriage of goods [wholly or partly] [by sea]”, 14 November 
2007, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.101. 
1381 Mandaraka-Sheppard, A. Modern Admiralty Law (2001) Cavendish Publishing, London, at p. 859; 
Parks, A. & Cattell, E. The Law of Tug, Tow and Pilotage (1994) Cornell Maritime Press, Maryland, at p. 
1008. 
1382 Hare, J. Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, (1999) Juta & Co, Cape Town, at p. 
365; Parks & Cattell, ibid; See also the M.S. Duburg, where a Belgian court held that the captain of a vessel 
has no authority over a pilot, who is therefore an independent advisor and is not an agent of the captain or 
of the owner of the vessel (Hof van Beroep te Antwerpen, February 10, 2003 (The M.S. Duburg) [2003] 
ETL 633). For a similar holding, see also Rechtbank van Eerste Aanleg te Dendermonde, June 28, 1991 
[1992] ETL 107.
1383 Parks & Cattell, ibid; Hare, ibid, at p. 360.  
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the Working Group found it difficult to pronounce with any certainty whether the above 
wording would in fact include compulsory pilots, and have accordingly left it to national 
law. Arguably, those jurisdictions that maintain the defence of compulsory pilotage will 
have a greater tendency to view Article 19 as a provision providing for vicarious liability, 
and as such to interpret it to be inapplicable to pilots, in line with their domestic law on 
the matter. In particular, recent English decisions characterizing the compulsory pilot as a 
servant of the owner, would most certainly lend favour to an interpretation of Article 19 
that renders the shipowner vicariously liable. Jurisdictions that have abolished the 
defence are more difficult to predict, however it would stand to reason that Article 19 
would be interpreted in accordance with their existing domestic policy on the matter. It 
would also appear that the policy of certain international bodies runs counter to those 
who would like to retain pilotage as an exempted peril. UNCTAD has commented that: 
“This is difficult to justify. As a matter of commercial risk allocation, one of the two 
parties to any contract of carriage (including charterparties) has to take responsibility for 
actions of the pilot. The carrier is clearly in a much better position than a shipper or 
consignee to take on this responsibility and to protect its interests. Traditionally, and 
contractually, under most standard charterparty forms, the carrier is responsible to the 
charterer for any actions of the pilot.”1384
This is an issue that will likely arise often should the Draft Convention come into 
force. Compulsory pilotage is fairly universal for most harbours. Moreover, most 
groundings, collisions, and allisions tend to happen when manoeuvring in tight quarters 
in port, near shore or in channels. A significant number of the aforementioned cases in 
previous chapters, where the shipowner was exempt from liability for the negligence of a 
compulsory pilot by virtue of the nautical fault exemption, would likely be decided 
differently under the Draft Convention.1385 If such is the case, a shipowner is unlikely to 
  
1384 UNCTAD, “Draft Instrument on Transport Law – Comments Submitted by the UNCTAD Secretariat”, 
February 6, 2002, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/W.P.21/Add.1, at p. 23.
1385 For example, see Lyric Shipping Inc. v Intermetals Ltd. (The Al Taha) [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 117 
(Q.B.); Grace Line Lim Procs (The Santa Leonor) 517 F.2d 404 (2 Cir. 1975); The Torepo [2002] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 535 (Q.B.); Bunge North American Grain Co. v. Steamer Skarp [1932] Ex. C.R. 212 where 
the vessel stranded twice in areas well known to be dangerous, the Exchequer Court of Canada held that the 
carrier was exempt from liability of the errors in navigation of the pilot under the Harter Act; Shell 
Petroleum Co. v. Dominion Tankers [1940] 3 D.L.R. 646, where the Supreme Court of Canada held that 
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find any satisfaction by pursuing or impleading the employers of the negligent pilots. 
Statutory immunity for pilotage authorities from liability for the negligent acts of pilots is 
a common occurrence.1386 Clarity with respect to the issue of liability for the faults of the 
compulsory pilot, if it is to be forthcoming, will undoubtedly only happen once the issue 
has been considered by the courts.  
     
where the vessel stranded as a result of the pilot dozing for a few moments, the carrier was exempt from 
liability for nautical fault; See also American Independent Oil Co. v. M.S. Alkaid, 1968 AMC 748 
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); Grace Line Lim Proc (The Santa Leonor) (1973) 397 F.Supp. 1258 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
1386 For example, s.10 (7) of the Legal Succession to the South African Transport Services Act, 9 of 1989, 
provides that Portnet, the body operating the South African harbours, along with the pilot “…shall be 
exempt from liability for loss or damage caused by a negligent act or omission on the part of the pilot.” In 
England, the Pilotage Act, U.K. 1987, c.21, at s. 22 exempts the pilotage authority from all liability for the 
acts of a negligent pilot; In Belgium, the Law of 30 August 1988 exempts the State from liability for 
damage resulting from the culpable acts or omissions of the pilots who are its employees; In Canada, s. 39 
of the Pilotage Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-14, provides that neither Canada nor the pilotage authority is liable 
for any damage or loss as a result of the fault, neglect or wrongful act of a licensed pilot.
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10.7. VOLUME CONTRACTS: A RETURN TO FREEDOM OF CONTRACT IN 
SHIPPING 
After an examination of the carrier liability provisions, one may question whether 
the UNCITRAL Draft Convention is in danger of repeating the mistakes of the Hamburg 
Rules by eliminating nautical fault, and not providing enough incentive for the carrier 
interests to support the Draft Convention. Due to the recent developments with respect to 
the treatment of volume contracts in the Draft Convention, nothing could be farther from 
the truth.  
Article 1(2) of the Draft Convention defines a volume contract to mean “a contact 
of carriage that provides for the carriage of a specified quantity of goods in a series of 
shipments during an agreed period of time.”1387 The notion of a volume contract is not 
novel, rather it is a well-established construct that has been commonly used for some 
time. The use of volume contracts is particularly common in the dry bulk, oil and other 
non-liner trades, where they are often referred to as contracts of affreightment (COA) or 
tonnage contracts.1388 In the 1980s, both BIMCO and INTERTANKO issued standard 
form volume contracts governing bulk dry cargoes and tanker trade respectively.1389 As 
well, the Hamburg Rules specifically provided for volume contracts in Article 2(4): “If a 
contract provides for future carriage of goods in a series of shipments during an agreed 
period, the provisions of this Convention apply to each shipment.”1390 As such, it is a 
  
1387 UNCITRAL, “Draft convention on the carriage of goods [wholly or partly] [by sea]”, 14 November 
2007, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.101, Article 1(2). Note that the definition of volume contract also 
provides that “The specification of the quantity may include a minimum, a maximum or a certain range.”
1388 Beare, S. “UNCITRAL Draft Convention on the Carriage of Goods” in CMI Yearbook 2005-2006, CMI 
Headquarters Pub., Antwerpen, Belgium, at p. 399; Comité Maritime International, “Volume Contracts: 
Document presented for the information of the Working Group by the Comité Maritime International” 17 
February 2006, UN Doc A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.66, at p. 2.
1389 Comité Maritime International, “Volume Contracts: Document presented for the information of the 
Working Group by the Comité Maritime International” 17 February 2006, UN Doc A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.66, 
at p. 2. The BIMCO standard COA was VOLCOA, since reissued in 2004 as GENCOA, while the 
INTERTANKO standard COA is INTERCOA, which has been adopted by BIMCO. (Ibid). 
1390 For further discussion on volume contracts under the Hamburg Rules see Ramburg, J. “The Vanishing 
Bill of Lading & the Hamburg Rules Carrier” (1979) 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 391, in particular at pp. 404-405, 
where Ramburg puts forward the notion that the provisions governing charterparties in the Rules were quite 
sufficient to protect the independent bill of lading holders under volume contracts. 
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concept familiar to the industry, nevertheless, it is being treated in a manner that is to date 
unprecedented. 
The flash point of discussion and controversy surrounding volume contracts is 
Article 83, entitled “Special rules for volume contracts”, which provides for the freedom 
to derogate from the obligations and liabilities found in the draft convention in the 
context of volume contracts.1391 Article 83 does, however, restrict the freedom to 
derogate with respect to certain obligations, notably, the obligation to exercise due 
diligence to properly crew, equip and make the vessel seaworthy.1392 Moreover, by virtue 
of Article 83(5) certain protections have been put in place in relation to third parties.1393
Despite the aforementioned restrictions, the introduction of freedom of contract in 
relation to volume contracts has proven to be contentious both within the Working Group 
  
1391 UNCITRAL, “Draft convention on the carriage of goods [wholly or partly] [by sea]”, 14 November 
2007, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.101. Article 83(1) to (3) provides: “1. Notwithstanding article 82, as 
between the carrier and the shipper, a volume contract to which this Convention applies may provide for 
greater or lesser rights, obligations, and liabilities than those set forth in this Convention provided that the 
volume contract contains a prominent statement that it derogates from this Convention, and: (a) Is 
individually negotiated; or (b) Prominently specifies the sections of the volume contract containing the 
derogations. 
2. A derogation pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article shall be set forth in the volume contract and may not 
be incorporated by reference from another document. 
3. A carrier’s public schedule of prices and services, transport document, electronic transport record, or 
similar document is not a volume contract for the purposes of this article, but a volume contract may 
incorporate the provisions of such documents by reference as terms of the contract.”
1392 UNCITRAL, “Draft convention on the carriage of goods [wholly or partly] [by sea]”, 14 November 
2007, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.101. Article 83(4) provides: “Paragraph 1 of this article does not apply 
to rights and obligations prov ded in articles 15, subparagraphs (a) and (b), 30 and 33 or to liability arising 
from the breach thereof, nor does paragraph 1 of this article apply to any liability arising from an act or 
omission referred to in article 64.” Article 15(a) and (b) provide that “the carrier is bound before, at the 
beginning of, and during the voyage by sea to exercise due diligence to: (a) Make and keep the ship 
seaworthy; (b) Properly crew, equip and supply the ship and keep the ship so crewed, equipped and
supplied throughout the voyage…”. Article 30 imposes on the shipper the obligation to provide 
information, instructions, and documents relating to the goods that are not otherwise reasonably available 
to the carrier, while Article 33 concerns the shipper’s obligations in relation to dangerous goods. The final 
limitation on the freedom to derogate is in relation to Article 64, which refers to the loss of the benefit of 
limitation of liability where loss or delay is attributable to acts or omissions “done with the intent to cause 
such loss or recklessly with the knowledge that such loss would probably result.”  Any liability, therefore, 
that is resulting from the aforementioned acts or omissions cannot be derogated from by virtue of Article 
83. 
1393 Ibid. Article 83(5) provides: “The terms of the volume contract that derogate from this Convention, if 
the volume contract satisfies the requirements of paragraph 1 of this article, apply between the carrier and 
any person other than the shipper provided that: (a) Such person received information that prominently 
states that the volume contract derogates from this Convention and expressly consents to be bound by such 
derogations; and (b) Such consent is not solely set forth in a carrier’s public schedule of prices and services, 
transport document, or electronic transport record.”
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and the shipping industry generally.  A large portion of this controversy derives from the 
far-reaching implications of freedom of contract with respect to volume contracts. 
Depending on the source somewhere between 80 to 90 per cent of liner carriage is under 
volume contract.1394 The use of volume contracts is also becoming more prevalent as the 
liner shipping and freight-forwarding industries become increasingly concentrated.1395
CIFFA has forecast the following: “Based on the pervasive volume contract environment 
in liner shipping today, it is said that only about 10% of the world container traffic would 
be subject to the liability provisions of the new convention. Given the freedom of 
contract, one can conclude that in theory 100% of all liner (container) traffic could be 
under volume contracts, each tailored to qualify under article [83].”1396 The fact that such 
a high percentage of liner shipping would have the freedom to derogate from the 
mandatory applicable minimum levels of carrier liability, is entirely novel in the context 
of existing liability regimes. Both the Hamburg Rules and the Hague-Visby Rules, where 
applicable, govern the individual shipments under volume contracts.1397 It is therefore 
both the novel and radical departure from existing international regimes, along with the 
expansive scope of the freedom of contract, which has resulted in this issue becoming 
one of the key issues debated by the Working Group. Indeed, “one delegation indicated 
that the treatment of the issue of freedom of contract in volume contracts would 
determine its position with regard to the adoption of the draft convention.”1398
  
1394 UNCTAD, “Comments from the UNCTAD Secretariat on Freedom of Contract under the draft 
instrument” 18 February 2005, Document A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.46, at p. 2; Hooper, C. “Slowly But Surely” 
(2005) 20 Currents 5, at p. 7.  
1395 UNCTAD, ibid, at p. 2-3. 
1396 Canadian International Freight Forwarders Association. “CIFFA Submission to Transport Canada on 
the UNCITRAL Draft Convention”, May 1, 2007. Available online at: 
www.ciffa.com/downloads/2007/05/10/TC%20Submission%20on%20Uncitral%20Draft%20Conv%20Ma
y%201%202007.pdf
1397 Article 2(4) of the Hamburg Rules expressly provides for the application of the Rules with respect to 
individual shipments under volume contracts. Article Vof the Hague-Visby Rules provides for application 
of the Rules where bills of lading are issued under the charterparty, and is not as precise as the Hamburg 
Rules, however it is thought that the use of the term charterparty is wide enough to encompass volume 
contracts. See Comité Maritime International, “Volume Contracts: Document presented for the information 
of the Working Group by the Comité Maritime International” 17 February 2006, UN Doc 
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.66, at p. 3. 
1398 UNCITRAL, “Annotated Provisional Agenda: Working Group III (Transport Law), Twenty-first 
session (Vienna, 14-25 January 2008)” 7 November 2007, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.100, at p. 11. 
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The incorporation of freedom of contract into the Draft Convention happened 
relatively late in the drafting process as compared with other topics. The initial 
instrument, as drafted by the CMI and presented to the Working Group, contained no 
provisions with respect to freedom of contract.1399 Rather the discussion surrounding 
freedom of contract began during the eleventh session, where a proposal was made to the 
effect that competitively negotiated contracts between “sophisticated parties” should be 
given special treatment by allowing them the freedom to negotiate their own terms.1400
Major concerns were expressed during the session in reaction to the proposal, the first of 
which was the concern that as volume contracts had few distinctive characteristics, it
would be nearly impossible to create a clear definition.1401 In addition, because of 
compulsory application of the current regimes, the Hague or Hague-Visby Regimes, to 
individual shipments, such contracts cannot be imposed on small shippers. Concern was 
therefore expressed that by creating an opting-out possibility, “that protection would be 
lost and the parties would be faced with the situation that prevailed in the 19th
century.”1402 Given the large percentage of container trade that is performed under 
volume contracts, delegates also worried that excluding such contracts, and the individual 
shipments under them, would undermine the scope of the Draft Convention with the 
effect that it would be virtually non-existent in many trades.1403 Finally, concern was 
expressed for the effects such an opting-out provision would have in relation to non-
vessel operating carriers, as its interaction with certain national legislation would have 
the effect that they would be prevented from opting-out, thus having highly detrimental 
effects on freight-forwarding interests.1404 Despite concerns, interest was expressed in 
  
1399 UNCITRAL, “Transport Law: Preliminary Draft Instrument on the Carriage of Goods by Sea”, January 
8, 2002, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.21.
1400 UNCITRAL, “Report of Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its eleventh session (New 
York, 24 March – 14 April 2003)”, 9 May 2003, UN Doc. A/CN.9/526, at p. 55. 
1401 Ibid, where it was noted in particular: “Expressions such as ‘contract of affreightment’, ‘volume 
contract’, ‘tonnage contract’, and ‘quantity contract’ were also used and depending on the legal system, 
appeared to be treated as synonymous. The characteristics of such contracts were: that the carrier undertook 
to perform a ‘generic’ obligation (i.e. generally defined duty which later needs to be further specified) to 
carry a specified quantity of goods; that no ships were as yet nominated in the contract; that the cargo 
consisted of a large quantity which was to be carried in several ships over a certain period of time; that the 
freight was calculated on the basis of an agreed unit or lump sum; and that the risk of delay was borne by 
the carrier.”
1402 Ibid, at p. 56. 
1403 Ibid. 
1404 Ibid. 
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relation to the exclusion for competitively negotiated contracts, and as such it was 
indicated that draft provisions would be circulated before the next session.1405
Accordingly, prior to the twelfth session, the United States put forward a proposal 
to the Working Group addressing, among other things, the notion that parties to an ocean 
liner service agreement (OLSA) should be permitted to depart from the provisions of the 
Draft Convention.1406 The United States argued that OLSAs are competitively negotiated 
liner service contracts that should be subject to the Draft Convention, except to the extent 
that parties agree to derogate from some or all of the provisions.1407 The concept of an 
OLSA is not unfamiliar to the United States, as United States shipping legislation has 
specifically provided for such contracts.1408 Indeed, it was the United States that had 
pushed for freedom of contract, as one commentator notes, it was “a point on which the 
US has insisted from the outset.”1409 The head of the United States delegation on the 
Working Group, Mary Helen Carlson, has gone so far as to describe a failure to include a 
provision allowing parties to mutually negotiated agreements to derogate from the terms 
  
1405 Ibid, at pp. 56-57.
1406 UNCITRAL, “Proposal by the United States of America”, 7 August 2003, UN Doc. 
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.34, at p. 6-9. 
1407 Ibid, at p. 6-7. The United States, suggested that OLSA be defined in the draft convention as follows: 
“(a) An “Ocean Liner Service Agreement” is a contract in writing (or electronic format), other than a bill of 
lading or other transport document issued at the time that the carrier or performing party receives the 
goods, between one or more shippers and one or more carriers in which the carrier or carriers agree to 
provide a meaningful service commitment for the transportation by sea (which may also include inland 
transport and related services) of a minimum volume of cargo in a series of shipments on vessels used in a 
liner service, and for which the shipper or shippers agree to pay a negotiated rate and tender a minimum 
volume of cargo.” (Ibid, at p. 8).  
1408 The United States Shipping Act of 1984, as amended by the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998, 
defines a “Service Contract” in section 3(19): “a written contract, other than a bill of lading or a receipt, 
between one or more shippers and an individual ocean common carrier or an agreement between or among 
ocean common carriers in which the shipper or shippers makes a commitment to provide a certain volume 
or portion of cargo over a fixed time period, and the ocean common carrier or the agreement commits to a 
certain rate or rate schedule and a defined service level, such as assured space, transit time, port rotation, or 
similar service features. The contract may also specify provisions in the event of non-performance on the 
part of any party.” (Comité Maritime International, “Volume Contracts: Document presented for the 
information of the Working Group by the Comité Maritime International” 17 February 2006, UN Doc 
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.66, at p. 4). Chester Hooper, a member of the United States delegation to the Working 
Group has commented that the definition of an OLSA which the United States proposed to the Working 
Group, is in fact narrower than the definition of a service contract as found in domestic law (Hooper, C. 
“Slowly But Surely” (2005) 20 Currents 5, at p. 7). 
1409 Beare, S. “UNCITRAL Draft Convention on the Carriage of Goods” in CMI Yearbook 2005-2006, CMI 
Headquarters Pub., Antwerpen, Belgium, at p. 399.
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of the convention as a “deal breaker”.1410 The United States proposal, despite having a 
certain measure of support, was found to be problematic by many delegations. Although 
the United States proposal was briefly discussed during the twelfth session,1411 it was not 
until the fourteenth session that the issue was considered in depth by the Working 
Group.1412 In the interim, several nations had put forward position papers on the subject 
of freedom of contract. The Chinese delegation, despite noting that “there are many 
problems in respect of the definition of OLSAs,” supported freedom of contract to a 
certain extent in a position paper submitted after the twelfth session.1413 The Chinese 
delegation suggested that the term “agreement concluded through free negotiation” 
should be used rather than seeking to define OLSAs, volume contracts or COAs.1414 In 
addition, it was argued by the Chinese that it was necessary to limit the freedom of 
contract, by rendering null and void any lessening of liability with respect to: i) the 
obligation of seaworthiness, ii) deviation, and iii) any acts or omissions done with intent 
to cause loss, damage or delay, or recklessly and with knowledge that loss, damage or 
delay would probably result.1415 Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, otherwise 
known as the Nordic countries, were equally cautious, supporting “the American idea of 
the non-mandatory approach to OLSAs, but with certain reservations.”1416 The Nordic 
countries felt that it was of the utmost importance that a clear definition of OLSA is 
  
1410 Carlson, M. “U.S. Participation in the International Unification of Private Law: The Making of the 
UNCITRAL Draft Carriage of Goods by Sea Convention” (2007) 31 Tul. Mar. L.J. 615, at p. 636. 
1411 UNCITRAL, “Report of Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its twelfth session 
(Vienna, 6-17 October 2003)”, 16 December 2003, UN Doc. A/CN.9/544, at pp.23-25, where the Working 
Group acknowledged support for the continued attempts at defining criteria where freedom of contract 
should be permitted: “The situation where a contract is freely negotiated; the situation where the focus of 
the contract is on the use of the vessel and not on the carriage of the goods; the situation of non-liner trade; 
and the situation where the object of the chartering is the whole or a large part of the vessel.” (Ibid, p. 24). 
1412 UNCITRAL, “Report of the Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its fourteenth session 
(Vienna, 29 November-10 December 2004)” 21 December 2004, UN Doc. A/CN.9/572, at pp. 22-31. 
1413 UNCITRAL, “Proposal by China on Chapter 19 of the Draft Instrument and the Issue of Freedom of 
Contract”, 29 April 2004, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.37. The Chinese argued that non-mandatory 
application can be quite successful in practice, noting the success of the Chinese Maritime Code. The 
Chinese Maritime Code governs voyage charters, and is mandatory where bills of lading are issued, but is 
non-mandatory in relation to voyage charterparty contracts. There are however limits as the carrier cannot 
exempt himself from the obligation of seaworthiness or the obligation not to deviate. (Ibid, at p. 2). 
1414 Ibid, at p. 4. 
1415 Ibid, at p. 5. Most of the exceptions to freedom of contract suggested by the Chinese were inspired by 
similar provisions in the Chinese Maritime Code. Equity was also a factor: “we think the contract should 
not exempt the liabilities resulting from intentional or gross negligence according to the principle of 
equity.” (Ibid). 
1416 UNCITRAL, “Comments from Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden (the Nordic countries) on the 
freedom of contract”, 30 September 2004, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.40, at p. 4. 
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found in order to prevent misunderstandings.1417 In addition, the Nordic countries felt that 
with respect to third parties, mandatory protection must prevail.1418 Although only 
addressing one of the expressed concerns, the United States updated their original 
proposal prior to the fourteenth session. 1419 In response to concerns with respect to 
NVOCCs, the definition of OLSA was amended and expanded in order to include 
NVOCCs.1420  
At the fourteenth session, in order to begin to properly tackle the issue of freedom 
of contract, the Working Group divided it into three main topics and highlighted the key 
issues to be considered.1421 With respect to the first topic, the scope of application, the 
Working Group considered the alternative approaches to defining what situations and 
contracts would in fact be governed by the Draft Convention.1422 It was concluded that an 
informal drafting group should be requested to draft a provision on the scope.1423 For the 
second topic, the Working Group considered third parties, where it was decided that third 
parties must be protected in the Draft Convention.1424 The draft OLSA provisions were 
the third topic considered and the delegates raised similar concerns to those expressed 
  
1417 Ibid.
1418 Ibid, at p. 5. 
1419 UNCITRAL, “Proposal by the United States of America”, 8 November 2004, UN Doc. 
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.42.
1420Ibid, a pp. 2-3. The definition of OLSA now provided “An Ocean Liner Service Agreement means a 
contract that is mutually negotiated and agreed to in writing or electronically between one or more carriers 
and one or more shippers and that provides for the liner carriage of goods by sea in a series of shipments 
over a specified period of time. Such contract shall obligate the carrier(s) to perform a service not otherwise 
mandatorily required by this instrument and shall obligate the shipper(s) to tender a minimum volume of 
cargo and to pay the rate(s) set forth in the contract. The carrier(s) service obligation shall include ocean 
carriage and may also include carriage by other modes of transport, warehousing, or logistics services, as 
required…” (Ibid, at p. 2). This would now ensure that companies such as FedEx and UPS, would be able 
to contract out of any or all of the terms of the draft convention. (Chatman, T. “The Ultimate Cargo 
Regime?” (2005) The Shipper Advocate 11, at p. 13). 
1421 UNCITRAL, “Report of the Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its fourteenth session 
(Vienna, 29 November-10 December 2004)” 21 December 2004, UN Doc. A/CN.9/572.
1422 Ibid, at pp.22-24.
1423 As was requested by the Working Group, an informal drafting group composed of several delegations 
met and prepared a redraft of the provisions governing the scope of application of the draft convention. The 
redraft is included in the Report of the Working Group from the fourteenth session (ibid, at pp. 28-30). 
1424 UNCITRAL, “Report of the Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its fourteenth session 
(Vienna, 29 November-10 December 2004)” 21 December 2004, UN Doc. A/CN.9/572, at pp. 24-26. 
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during the eleventh session.1425 The Working Group concluded that “particular care 
should be dedicated to the definition of OLSAs and to the protection of the interests of 
small shippers and of third parties, and that further consideration should be given to 
examining which provisions, if any, of the draft convention should be of mandatory 
application in an OLSA.”1426 The fourteenth session therefore provided a roadmap of the 
issues in need of attention and clarification. During the following session, the Working 
Group devoted considerable attention to continuing the work of the fourteenth session 
with respect to freedom of contract.1427 The volume contract provisions became more 
concrete as several key issues were decided. Importantly, it was decided that the broader 
and more universal concept of ‘volume contracts’ would be used in the Draft Convention 
rather than OLSAs.1428 This negated the thorny issue of finding an acceptable definition 
for OLSAs, yet still included them in the Draft Convention on the basis that they were 
subsumed under the broader notion of a volume contract.1429 The Working Group also put 
forward draft criteria concerning what conditions must be present in order to derogate 
from the Draft Convention,1430 along with suggestions on mandatory provisions from 
which derogation would not be permitted, in particular, the obligation of 
  
1425 Ibid, at pp. 26-28; For concerns expressed during the eleventh session see UNCITRAL, “Report of 
Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its eleventh session (New York, 24 March – 14 April 
2003)”, 9 May 2003, UN Doc. A/CN.9/526.
1426 UNCITRAL, “Report of the Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its fourteenth session 
(Vienna, 29 November-10 December 2004)” 21 December 2004, UN Doc. A/CN.9/572, at p. 28.
1427 UNCITRAL, “Report of the Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its fifteenth session 
(New York, 18-28 April 2005)” 13 May 2005, UN Doc. A/CN.9/576, at pp. 5-29. 
1428 Ibid, at p. 6.  
1429 There was support for this prior to the session. After the fourteenth session, the Finnish delegation 
distributed a questionnaire in order to canvass the views on the provisions during that session. At the 
fifteenth session, the Finnish delegation circulated their report, authored by Professor Honka. The report 
considered, among other things, the definition of OLSA. It was noted that there are views that OLSAs are 
truly volume contracts, and as such should therefore be regulated as part of the general provisions on the 
scope of application. (UNCITRAL, “Scope of application and freedom of contract: information presented 
by the Finnish delegation at the fifteenth session”, 22 June 2005, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.51, at p. 8).
1430 UNCITRAL, “Report of the Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its fifteenth session 
(New York, 18-28 April 2005)” 13 May 2005, UN Doc. A/CN.9/576, at p. 6-7, where the Working Group 
considered four conditions that were suggested as a precondition for derogating from the provisions of the 
draft convention: “The contract should be [mutually negotiated and] agreed to in writing or electronically; 
The contract should obligate the carrier to perform a specified transportation service; A provision in the 
volume contract that provides for greater or lesser duties, rights, obligations, and liabilities should be set 
forth in the contract and may not be incorporated by reference from another document; and The contract 
should not be [a carrier’s public schedule of prices and services,] a bill of lading, transport documents, 
electronic record, or cargo receipt or similar documents but the contract may incorporate such documents 
by reference as elements of the contract.” 
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seaworthiness.1431 In addition to other topics, the notion that the derogation from the 
Draft Convention could cover third parties, where they had expressly consented, was 
addressed.1432 The issue of freedom of contract in relation to volume contracts was far 
from non-contentious during the fifteenth session. Certain delegates expressed the view 
that no derogation under any circumstances should be allowed.1433 Moreover, concern 
continued to be expressed that provisions and conditions were unclear.1434 Criticism of 
the freedom of contract initiatives was not restricted to Working Group members. 
UNCTAD submitted comments on freedom of contract to the Secretariat prior to the 
fifteenth session, expressing concern that service or volume contracts would be used to 
circumvent otherwise mandatory liability rules disadvantaging small shippers.1435 Despite 
  
1431 Ibid, at p. 7-8. Along with providing that a carrier may not derogate from either his obligation to furnish 
a seaworthy vessel or liability arising from unseaworthiness, there were other suggestions as to mandatory 
provisions, including obligations relating to maritime safety, and the shipper’s obligations to provide 
information to the carrier. Professor Honka’s report, distributed during the fifteenth session, considered the 
above mentioned provisions as those “provisions in the Instrument [that] are of such fundamental 
importance that they cannot be derogated from even when article 88a [freedom of contract] as such is 
applicable.” (UNCITRAL, “Scope of application and freedom of contract: information presented by the 
Finnish delegation at the fifteenth session”, 22 June 2005, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.51, at p. 14). 
1432 UNCITRAL, “Report of the Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its fifteenth session 
(New York, 18-28 April 2005)” 13 May 2005, UN Doc. A/CN.9/576, at p. 8-10.
1433 Ibid, at p. 7.
1434 Ibid, at p. 7. 
1435 UNCTAD, “Comments from the UNCTAD Secretariat on Freedom of Contract under the draft 
instrument” 18 February 2005, Document A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.46, at p. 4. UNCTAD also remarked that 
“all existing international regimes [for land, sea and air] establish minimum levels of carrier liability, which 
apply mandatorily…thus a central feature of existing international liability regimes is a restriction of 
freedom of contract with the legislative intent to ensure the protection of small parties against unfair 
standard terms. A central question arises for consideration of the Working Group is whether and to which 
extent the draft instrument should follow the same approach as existing international liability regimes.” 
(UNCTAD, ibid, at p. 2) The Working Group at the fifteenth session was cognisant of this noting that in 
certain jurisdictions, “small shippers were virtually economically compelled to conclude volume contract, 
and often on standard terms. Given the danger that these standard terms could pose in terms of hiding 
derogations from the obligations in the draft instrument, it was thought that paragraph (b) [specifying that 
there must be a prominent identifying the sections of the volume contract containing the derogations] 
provided practical and indispensable protection for small shippers faced with such standard terms.” 
(UNCITRAL, “Report of the Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its fifteenth session (New 
York, 18-28 April 2005)” 13 May 2005, UN Doc. A/CN.9/576, at p. 25). The CMI however, have 
responded to the concerns about volume contracts and small shippers as follows: “The concern has 
therefore been expressed that service contracts covering a small number of shipments of relatively small 
quantities of goods, which derogate from the mandatory regime, could disadvantage small or 
unsophisticated shippers with unequal bargaining power to that of the carrier, possibly by sub-service 
contracts made under an overarching framework contract. It should be noted, however, be noted that no 
shipper can be forced to accept a volume contract. A shipper is always entitled to obtain from the carrier an 
appropriate negotiable transport document or electronic transport record…” (Comité Maritime 
International, “Volume Contracts: Document presented for the information of the Working Group by the 
Comité Maritime International” 17 February 2006, UN Doc A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.66, at p. 5). 
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concerns, support for freedom of contract for volume contracts persisted after the 
fifteenth session, and when an updated version of the Draft Convention was released in 
September 2005, it contained an article entitled “Special rules for volume contracts”.1436
It was acknowledged that the drafting of acceptable provisions was a work in progress, 
and as such, Finland submitted a proposal prior to the seventeenth session that suggested 
drafting changes in order to simplify and clarify the existing articles.1437 During the 
seventeenth session, the Working Group considered the proposals submitted by Finland 
along with the text of the articles contained in the September 2005 version of the draft 
convention.1438 Again, “concerns were raised that it could be seen as inconsistent to have 
such broad freedom of contract to derogate from a mandatory convention.”1439
Nonetheless, after debate, the Working Group concluded by accepting the improvements 
in the drafting to ‘Special rules for volume contracts’ suggested by Finland, almost 
without modification.1440
Since the seventeenth session, freedom of contract with respect to volume 
contracts appears to be cast in stone. Found in article 83 in the most recent version of the 
Draft Convention,1441 it has remained virtually unchanged over the past two years, despite 
numerous requests to do so. France and Australia have been vocal with respect to their 
opposition of freedom of contract as currently drafted, in particular noting that a volume 
contract could potentially cover almost all carriage by shipping lines, thus creating “a 
loophole in the convention that would enable parties to release themselves from the 
binding provisions of the instrument.”1442 To attempt to limit the expansive nature of the 
  
1436 UNCITRAL, “Draft convention on the carriage of goods [wholly or partly] [by sea]”, 8 September 
2005, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.56, at p. 146. 
1437 UNCITRAL, “Proposal by Finland on scope of application, freedom of contract and related provisions” 
27 January 2006, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.61, and in particular see pp. 4 and 11-13 for a discussion 
on volume contracts.
1438 UNCITRAL, “Report of the Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its seventeenth session 
(New York, 3-13 April 2006)” 24 April 2006, UN Doc. A/CN.9/594, pp. 32-43. 
1439 Ibid, p. 39.
1440 Ibid, at p. 39-43. The Working Group concluded that although the policies underlying article 95(5)(b), 
which addressed the binding of third parties, were acceptable, they felt that it should be redrafted. (Ibid, at 
p. 42).   
1441 UNCITRAL, “Draft convention on the carriage of goods [wholly or partly] [by sea]”, 14 November 
2007, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.101, at p. 53-54. 
1442 UNCITRAL, “Joint proposal by Australia and France on freedom of contract under volume contracts”, 
22 May 2006, UN Doc. A/CN.9/612, at p. 3. Aside from concerns over the expansive nature of the 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
270
freedom to derogate from the Draft Convention, France and Australia submitted a joint 
proposal to the Secretariat calling for a more restricted freedom of contract.1443
Specifically, the proposal suggested that neither the shipper nor the carrier should be 
permitted to derogate from either their basis of liability or their obligations.1444
Furthermore, the proposal increased the necessary conditions to be met in order for 
parties to derogate from the Draft Convention.1445 Finally, the proposal sought to restrict 
the scope of the definition of a volume contract.1446 During the nineteenth session, the 
Working Group considered Australia and France’s proposal.1447 The proposal did garner 
a measure of support, particularly with respect to narrowing the scope of volume 
contracts in light of the large share of international carriage that would fall within the 
definition as drafted.1448 The Working Group concluded that “the text that appeared in 
draft article 89 [currently 83], therefore, was said to be the result of a carefully crafted 
compromise…[T]he prevailing view within the Working Group was that the current text 
of draft article 89 reflected the best possible consensus solution to address those concerns 
in a manner that preserved a practical and commercially meaningful role for party 
autonomy in volume contracts.”1449 Moreover, the Working Group noted that it would be 
highly unlikely that an equally satisfactory consensus could be achieved, and it was 
     
derogative provisions, France and Australia have argued that this may also harm the draft convention’s 
chances of adoption: “The shift, through the mechanism of volume contracts, from a fundamentally 
mandatory regime to a largely derogative regime represents a major change. The risk is that in some States 
obstacles may arise to ratification of a convention whose provisions, which differ sharply from national 
legislation in the field, appear to be incompatible with fundamental principles of domestic law.” (Ibid, at p. 
2).
1443 Ibid.
1444 Ibid, at p. 4. In essence, any derogation from the liability regime would not be allowed. 
1445 Ibid, at p. 4: “The parties to a volume contract may derogate from the provisions of this convention 
only if: (a) the volume contract is individually negotiated; (b) the derogation is agreed in writing between 
the parties; and (c) the derogation is set forth in highly visible type in the volume contract in a manner that 
identifies the clauses of the volume contract containing derogations.”
1446 Ibid, at p. 3-4. The wording of the definition was amended slightly by UNCITRAL, “Joint proposal by 
Australia and France concerning volume contracts” 14 March 2007, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.88, at p 
2, and now reads: “Volume contract means a contract of carriage negotiated by the parties by which a 
carrier agrees to special terms for the carriage of a substantial quantity of cargo, in a series of shipments 
during a set period of time of no less than one year. The quantity may be specified as a minimum, a 
maximum or a certain range.”
1447 UNCITRAL, “Report of the Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its nineteenth session 
(New York, 16-27 April 2007)” 17 May 2007, UN Doc. A/CN.9/621.
1448 Ibid, at p. 37. With respect to restricting the scope of the definition of volume contract, the comment 
was made that “[f]ailure to do so…might mean that the draft convention would be devoid of practical 
significance.” (Ibid). 
1449 Ibid, at p. 40. 
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strongly urged not to attempt to do so at this late stage in the drafting process.1450 Given 
such as position, it is therefore unsurprising that submissions to the Secretariat by the 
European Shipper’s Council have proven to be unsuccessful with respect to freedom of 
contract. In January 2006, the European Shipper’s Council urged the Working Group to 
reconsider the extent of freedom of contract, stressing that “under no circumstances 
should the parties be authorized to derogate from the material elements of the contract of 
carriage, particularly through provisions that result in the liability of the carrier being 
reduced or even eliminated.”1451 The Council cautioned the Working Group that only a 
small number of very large shippers could actually bargain with carriers on equal terms, 
and as such there were no grounds to derogate from the protection given to shippers 
under the previous carriage conventions.1452 In February 2007, the Council reminded the 
Working Group of its extreme reservations surrounding freedom of contract, and its 
assertions that it would be harmful to small and medium-sized shippers.1453 Nevertheless, 
the Working Group remained highly resistant to alterations with respect to freedom of 
contract during the nineteenth session, a trend that continued into the twentieth session in 
October 2007.1454 Even though alterations to the provisions were not considered during 
the twentieth session, it was by no means fully accepted within the Working Group. One 
delegation made an express reservation with respect to the provisions on volume 
  
1450 Ibid.
1451 UNCITRAL, “Comments of the European Shipper’s Council regarding the draft convention on the 
carriage of goods [wholly or partly] [by sea]”, 27 January 2006, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.64, at p. 6. 
1452 Ibid, at p. 6-7. The Council argued that the drafted articles would allow, for example, “a carrier to be 
released from liability during loading or discharging simply because it had secured the shipper’s signature 
or a ‘contract’ on the basis of a ‘low freight rate’.” Moreover, with respect to requiring consent from the 
consignee to derogate from the draft convention, the Council thought that in practice this offered no 
protection: “To what extent can a consignee that is urgently awaiting goods (which it has probably already 
paid for) really refuse to apply substandard clauses, assuming it is sufficiently well informed to understand 
those clauses and their significance? Contrary to what the members of the Working Group may think, 
shippers generally have only a poor knowledge of maritime law and by no means have the legal analysis 
skills ascribed to them.” (Ibid, at p. 7). 
1453 UNCITRAL, “Position of the European Shippers’ Council submitted to UNCITRAL Working Group 
III (Transport Law)”, 14 February 2007, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.83, at p. 5.  As in its previous 
position paper, the Council advocated maintaining the protections offers under the current carriage regimes: 
“It should be noted that the Hague and Hamburg Rules allow very broad freedom of contract while 
protecting small and medium sized shippers. By simply reproducing their well-known provisions and 
excluding derogations in favour of the carrier alone, it would be possible to dispense with the entire, poorly 
constructed volume contract mechanism.” (Ibid).  
1454 UNCITRAL, “Report of the Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its twentieth session 
(Vienna, 15-25 October 2007)” 2 November 2007, UN Doc. A/CN.9/642, at p. 62. 
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contracts, and informed the Working Group that further consideration is needed, as the 
matter is not the subject of a consensus.1455
Such consideration was given during the twenty-first session held during January 
2008. Although the issue was debated, and efforts were made to re-define and narrow the 
scope of volume contracts in order to protect small shippers, sufficient support for change 
did not exist within the Working Group.1456 The issue, therefore, appears to be settled 
from a drafting standpoint. Whether the issue of volume contracts will be raised when the 
Draft Convention is presented during the forty-first session of the Commission in June 
2008 is debatable. Generally, substantive issues are not re-opened during the 
Commission’s sessions unless there is overwhelming support to do so, however, the issue 
is the subject of intense debate with many delegations who oppose the current definition 
of volume contract.1457 One delegation in particular had previously indicated to the 
Commission, during a past session, that their position with respect to the adoption of the 
draft convention would in the end be determined on the basis of the treatment of the issue 
of freedom of contract in volume contracts.1458 To what extent this continues to be a 
determinative issue of the ratification and adoption of the Draft Convention remains to be 
seen. 
Interestingly, despite being a contentious issue for the delegates, the volume 
contract issue has received little attention from commentators.1459 At first blush, the 
provisions concerning volume contracts appear to have far reaching implications. 
  
1455 Ibid. 
1456 “Short Summary of Decisions Taken by the Working Group During the 21st session (January 16 to 25, 
2008)”, Informal summary circulated to interested parties by email from Tracy Chatman, Transport Canada 
Policy Advisor  (International Marine Policy) Member of the Canadian Delegation for the UNCITRAL 
Working Group III, on February 21, 2008. 
1457 UNCITRAL, “Report of the Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its twentieth session 
(Vienna, 15-25 October 2007)” 2 November 2007, UN Doc. A/CN.9/642, at p. 62.
1458 UNCITRAL, “Annotated Provisional Agenda: Working Group III (Transport Law), Twenty-first 
session (Vienna, 14-25 January 2008)” 7 November 2007, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.100, at p. 11. 
1459 Certain industry groups however have been quite vocal with respect to their opposition to the 
provisions concerning volume contracts. In particular, both the European Shippers’ Council 
(www.europeanshippers.com) and the Canadian International Freight Forwarders Association 
(www.ciffa.com) have posted multiple opinion papers on their respective websites advocating the 
problematic nature of freedom of contract. Both the ESC and the CIFFA believe that allowing carriers to 
contract out of portions of the convention with be detrimental to shippers and freight forwarders. 
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Carriers, provided the contractual arrangement falls within the definition of a volume 
contract, may now exempt themselves from the vast majority of the provisions of the 
Draft Convention. This is particularly significant when one considers that the definition 
of a volume contract requires only a “specified quantity of goods in a series of shipments 
during an agreed period of time.” One has the tendency to conceptualise the shipments in 
terms of containers, however this does not reflect the reality of the definition.1460 Any 
specified quantity will suffice, for example if FedEx were to ship two 1kg boxes during a 
time frame of six months, this would fall within the definition of a volume contract. It 
therefore becomes difficult to imagine the few instances that cannot be characterized as 
falling within the definition of a volume contract. The most immediate and pressing issue 
for the purposes of this thesis is that with freedom of contract comes the nautical fault 
exemption. Arguably, should the Draft Convention come into force, the closest analogous 
situation for carrier liability would be that of pre-Harter Act liability, where freedom of 
contract abounded and from which nautical fault was born. What the provisions on 
volume contracts have done, among other things, is to render the elimination of the 
nautical fault exemption from the Draft Convention almost theoretical.  
10.8 IS THIS HAMBURG REVISITED? 
One commentator has noted that “substantive uniformity…[is] only attainable 
when the various participants in the transactions arrive at a consensus with respect to the 
fairness of their rights and duties. This was the lesson of the success of the Harter Act and 
of the Hague Rules and of the failure of the Hamburg Rules.”1461 The Hague Rules were 
a commercial compromise, of which the nautical fault exemption was an integral part. 
The absence of the nautical fault exemption in the Hamburg Rules proved to be fairly 
central to their downfall. Many of the criticisms aimed at the Hamburg Rules, have 
resurfaced with regard to the Draft Convention.1462 It has been noted that “[a]ny new 
  
1460 Interview with Tracy Chatman, Transport Canada Policy Advisor  (International Marine Policy) 
Member of the Canadian Delegation for the UNCITRAL Working Group III, (6 February 2008), who noted 
the tendency of delegates to conceive of the problem in relation to the shipments of containers, when in 
reality any quantity will suffice. 
1461 Kozolchyk, B. “Evolution and Present State of the Ocean Bills of Lading from a Banking Law 
Perspective” (1992) 23 JMLC 161, at p. 245. 
1462 Prof. Tetley, in reviewing the 2001 Draft Instrument, repeated almost verbatim an argument made by 
him 23 years earlier when commenting on the Hamburg Rules. In relation to the Draft Instrument, Tetley 
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instrument must meet the reasonable requirements of the major international liner 
companies, some twenty of whom probably account for more than three quarters of all 
bill of lading general cargo movements. This includes the issues relating to Hague Rules 
‘exceptions’ and particularly ‘fault in navigation’.”1463 The final Draft Convention 
contains a liability provision similar to Hamburg’s single basis of liability along with an 
extensive list of exempted perils. The Hamburg liability regime is therefore not exactly 
reproduced in the Draft Convention, although the formula is in some instances similar, 
and the politicised process by which the instrument was drafted is more akin to Hamburg 
than Hague. Arguably, the drafters in this respect are cognisant of the importance of the 
list of exempted perils as a feature that would render the Draft Convention less 
objectionable to certain sectors of the industry. It was noted by the Working Group that 
“maintaining the list of excepted perils, particularly in language cl se to that of the 
Hague-Visby language, was valuable for the purposes of legal certainty, even if it could 
be argued that it was logically unnecessary…[as the] events [are] already covered 
pursuant to the general liability rule in draft paragraph 14.”1464 It is evident that the 
Working Group recognized the need to cater to carrier interests as well as cargo interests 
thus not repeating the error of Hamburg’s ‘what about us?’ response. Despite the early 
elimination of the nautical fault exemption, and the wholesale refusal to resurrect it with 
regard to pilotage, initial fears that a package negotiation at a later stage would prove to 
be inadequate are unjustified in the light of the provisions concerning volume contracts. 
The ‘what about us’ response of carriers to Hamburg, was answered by the Working 
Group with freedom of contract. Were it not for the volume contract provisions, one 
would be justified in their concern that the existing carrier liability provisions would be 
repeating mistakes made in Hamburg decades ago. Although criticisms made in relation 
     
noted that: “The drafting and language is so new and so different from Hague and Hague/Visby and 
Hamburg, that all preceding jurisprudence will not be understood or of value. The new principles and the 
language, clauses and phrases will not be clear or familiar to judges, even after considerable study, let alone 
to merchants.” (Tetley, W. “Report of William Tetley RE: Provisional Final Draft Outline Instrument on 
Issues of Transport Law” November 5, 2001. http://tetley.law.mcgill.ca/cmiissues.htm.)
1463 Institute of Chartered Shipbrokers, replies to the UNCITRAL questionnaire on the draft instrument, 
found in UNCITRAL, “Preparation of a draft instrument on the carriage of goods [by sea]: Compilation of 
replies”, 31 January 2003, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.28, at p. 7. 
1464 UNCITRAL, “Report of the Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its fourteenth session 
(Vienna, 29 November-10 December 2004)” 21 December 2004, UN Doc. A/CN.9/572, at p. 12. 
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to the Hamburg Rules have resurfaced with respect to the Draft Convention,1465 the 
elimination of nautical fault is not longer among them. Carrier interests who campaigned 
against the Hamburg Rules have so far been silent. Nevertheless, what is likely to become 
the lightning rod of controversy is the freedom of contract issue, as many delegates 
remain unsatisfied. Moreover, industry groups representing shippers and forwarders have 
also voiced their opposition. Has the pendulum of liability swung too far to the other side 
this time? Has the Draft Convention repeated the mistake of favouring one group over 
another? Unfortunately, only time will provide an answer as to whether the Draft 
Convention is another failed attempt at the modernization of carriage law.  
10.9. CONCLUSION
Arguably, what will determine the success or failure of the Draft Convention will 
be how closely the political compromises obtained mirrors the commercial compromises 
that the shipping industry will accept. The danger that arises with the Draft Convention is 
that during protracted negotiations along political lines, sufficient consideration was not 
given to whether the resulting convention will prove palatable to commercial interests. 
What must not be forgotten is that to date, successful uniform law for the carriage of 
goods by sea has been born of commercial compromise. In this regard, the words of Lord 
Hobhouse are instructive: “What should no longer be tolerated is the unthinking 
acceptance of a goal of uniformity and its doctrinaire imposition on the commercial 
community. Only conventions which demonstrably satisfy the well proven needs of the 
commercial community should be ratified and legislation should only be agreed to if it is 
demonstrably fit to be enacted as part of the municipal law of this country.”1466 If 
commercial interests on both side of the debate can be satisfied, the majority of nations, 
particularly the major trading nations, will likely fall in line.
At first blush, the hasty removal of nautical fault from the Draft Convention 
called into question whether the errors of the Hamburg Rules were being repeated. The 
  
1465 Such criticisms of the Draft Convention reminiscent of the Hamburg Rules include increased friction 
costs; increased insurance costs and freight rates; lengthy and complex drafting; conflict with existing 
conventions; and differing interpretations between civil law and common law countries. 
1466 As quoted in Griggs, P. “Obstacles to Uniformity of Maritime Law” (2003) 34 JMLC 191, at p. 199. 
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exemption was eliminated early on in the process, precluding the possibility of including 
it in a compromise package at a later date. Several Working Group sessions later, 
freedom of contract was introduced, thereby providing a backdoor reintroduction of 
nautical fault.  One wonders whether freedom of contract would have been a necessity, or 
a “deal breaker”, had nautical fault not been eliminated earlier. Nevertheless, only time 
will tell whether the political interests at the bargaining table have truly brokered a 
commercially acceptable compromise. If the Draft Convention is successful, the 
prevalence of the nautical fault exemption will be dependent on market forces and the 
respective bargaining powers of carriers, cargo interests, and their intermediaries. 
Freedom of contract will in essence create market-based carriage terms. It is nevertheless 
difficult, if not impossible, to judge or foresee the potential market evolutions, and thus 
any conclusions on the fate of nautical fault under the Draft Convention are purely 
speculative.
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Chapter 11
Is A Change Justified?
Many commentators have adamantly adopted the position that the nautical fault 
exemption must go.1467 One cannot contest that it is out of step with other transport 
regimes,1468 nor can one refute that from a policy perspective exempting a party from 
liability, for loss stemming from the negligence of his employees, is in stark contrast to 
modern legal principles. What one cannot ignore however is that the nautical fault 
exemption was, and still is under most carriage today, part and parcel of a compromise 
between cargo interests and carriers on duties and liabilities that has in many ways 
shaped the basis of their modern relationship. One cannot underestimate the effects of the 
elimination of nautical fault. As demonstrated by the foregoing, the nautical fault 
exemption plays an important role, not only in regulating the relationship between a 
shipper of goods and the carrier under a bill of lading, but also with regard to other 
maritime contracts. Moreover, by virtue of Himalaya clauses, the effects of the nautical 
fault exemption reach far beyond the shipowner. Nautical fault has become integral to 
both the recovery of general average contributions and the barring of recovery from the 
carrying vessel in both-to-blame collision situations. It is undeniable that the elimination 
of the nautical fault would profoundly impact such situations. 
Provided that the practical effects of the elimination of the nautical fault are not as 
profound as one would imagine, the absence of the exemption nevertheless provides a 
  
1467 See for example, Berlingieri, F. “Basis of liability and exclusions of liability.” [2002] LMCLQ 336; 
Tetley, W. “The Hamburg Rules – A Commentary” [1979] LMLCQ 1; Karan, H. The Carrier’s Liability 
Under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, Hague-Visby, and Hamburg Rules (2004) Edwin 
Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY; Ping-fat, S. Carrier’s Liability under the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg 
Rules (2002) Kluwer Law International, The Hague. 
1468 Road, rail and air conventions, despite containing exempted perils, do not contain any exemptions from 
loss resulting from the fault or negligence of the carrier’s servants or agents. For a concise review of carrier 
liability under rail, road and air regimes see Crowley, M. “The Limited Scope of the Cargo Liability 
Regime Covering Carriage of Goods by Sea: The Multimodal Problem” (2005) 79 Tul. L. Rev. 1461, at pp. 
1462-1467; See also Moreno, C. Legal Nature and Functions of the Multimodal Transport Document
(2002) Helbing & Lichtenhahn, Genève, at pp. 23-39; See also Berlingieri, F. “The UNCITRAL Draft
Instrument on the Carriage of Goods by Sea and other transport Conventions: Comparative Tables”, 30 
December 2002, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.27, who provides an excellent comparative table of the 
UNCITRAL Draft Convention with eight other transport conventions. 
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significant disincentive for carrier and insurance interests in relation to the potential 
adoption of a new convention on the carriage of goods by their State party. Cargo 
interests, and their political representatives, must therefore seriously examine whether the 
benefit derived from the removal of nautical fault justifies the resulting difficulties of 
convincing carriers and other parties to support a new instrument, the cost incurred by 
cargo in a resulting compromise, and the potential upheaval the exemption’s removal 
would create in the shipping industry. One commentator advises, “there are historical 
reasons for the [nautical fault] defence which should not be swept aside without a careful 
examination of the costs that will result if it is abolished.”1469 The costs of eliminating 
nautical fault from the Hamburg Rules were evident. Its absence in the Rules 
significantly contributed to their failure. The costs of eliminating nautical fault from the 
Draft Convention may very well have been the imposition of freedom of contract. 
Beyond a simply cost-benefit analysis, one must still enquire as to whether a change is 
justified. Has nautical fault truly become an anachronism, whose existence is only 
justified by the fact that it has become completely entrenched in modern carriage law? 
Prior to addressing the above query, a preliminary question must be addressed. If 
nautical fault is justified only by the fact that it has permeated the law of carriage, is this 
sufficient? Does the entrenchment of a concept in a legal system constitute justification 
for its continued existence? The foregoing chapters have demonstrated the extent to 
which nautical fault has become an integral part of the law of carriage, both under 
domestic and international carriage regimes, and by virtue of voluntary incorporation. To 
begin to answer to question, one must revive the Hamburg Rules debate. Litigation costs, 
transaction costs, and primarily, insurance and freight, are factors that impact whether the 
existence of nautical fault is justified on the basis of its integration into the law of 
carriage. Interestingly, those same arguments resurfaced with respect to the Draft 
Convention.1470 Despite the fact that the same insurance and freight arguments were 
  
1469 Kimball, J. “Shipowner’s Liability and the Proposed Revision of the Hague Rules” (1975) 7 JMLC 
217, at p. 249.
1470 For example, with respect to the elimination of the nautical fault defence in the Draft Convention, 
Berlingieri commented on the often used ‘increase in freight’ aspect of the argument: “If, as alleged by 
those who want to keep the exoneration in existence, its abolition were to increase freight rates, the 
consequence would be born by shippers and, therefore, one can hardly understand the opposition of the 
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resurrected in commentary, in the CMI International Sub-Committee and the Working 
Group III, the issues remain unresolved. The discussions and arguments with respect to 
the Draft Convention could easily have been extracted verbatim from the discussion with 
regard to the Hamburg Rules. Further, there remains to this day a lack of reliable 
empirical evidence. We know that the elimination of nautical fault will affect recovery 
for general average, recovery in collision situations, and liabilities incurred by the 
carriers, but we do not know to what extent this will impact freight, insurance, and 
litigation. In essence, we cannot predict whether the cost of the elimination of nautical 
fault to all parties in the shipping industry will outweigh any benefit derived. One may 
argue that unless there is an evident, tangible and discernable benefit to a significant 
sector of the shipping industry, disturbing the status quo is not justified. As such, the 
nautical fault exemption can in fact be justified on the basis of its integration into the law 
of carriage of goods by sea. 
In the past, the exemption for nautical fault has been justified on the basis that it 
forms part of a legislative bargain or commercial compromise. Error in navigation and 
management therefore forms part and parcel of “a negotiated compromise between ship 
and cargo interests brought about by commercial circles directly involved in the 
international shipping business.”1471 The detractors of nautical fault have at times argued 
that the exemption is unjust. In reality, the decision as to whether the exemption is 
justified or not, should not be a decision based on equity or justice, rather it should be a 
decision based on bargaining between the major stakeholders in the shipping industry. 
     
carriers and their P&I insurers.” (Berlingieri, F. “Basis of liability and exclusions of liability.” [2002] 
LMCLQ 336, at p. 342.) As well, in a report commissioned by New Zealand’s Ministry of Transport on the 
extent of the country’s legal and economic interest in the Draft Convention, the implications of the location 
of the insurance market was discussed: “[L]iability issues as between carriers and cargo owners…have 
become largely the domain of the parties’s insurers. From a New Zealand perspective, cargo owners are 
able to obtain insurance on the New Zealand market and pay premiums in New Zealand currency. The 
liabilities of carriers for damage to cargo (and many other risks) is almost universally covered by a small 
group of mutual insurers based primarily in England. Carrier’s insurance costs are therefore recovered as an 
element of the freight, generally remitted to a foreign shipowner and therefore a foreign exchange debit so 
far as New Zealand is concerned.” (Broadmore, T. “International Convention on Transport Law” (2002) 
Report to the Ministry of Transport of New Zealand, at p. 5. Available at: 
www.transport.govt.nz/downloads/MaritimeLiabilityReport.pdf); See also Chapter 10: UNCITRAL Draft 
Convention on the Carriage of Goods. 
1471 Japikse, R.E. “Deck Cargo Exclusion, Nautical Fault Exemption, Fire Exception” in The Hamburg 
Rules: A Choice for the EEC? (1994) European Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, Maklu, 
Antwerpen, at p. 186. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
280
Commentators have been apt to point out that “in the context of risk and the nautical fault 
defence, perceptions of ‘equity’ and ‘fairness’ are irrelevant.”1472 Moreover, it has been 
argued that “[m]ost disputes are between two insurers, with no widows or orphans in 
sight. Misguided attempts to achieve what a court believes is a ‘fair’ or ‘equitable’ 
solution on the facts of a particular case are more likely to undermine the certainty and 
predictability that thousands of future parties require to order their business affairs.”1473 It 
has been noted with regard to the Draft Convention that “[f]or this project to succeed, the 
Working Group must produce a final instrument that represents a fair balance among the 
affected commercial interests, and this can be accomplished only be recognizing the need 
for compromise and identifying the provisions that need to be included in a compromise 
package.”1474 To date, the commercial compromise of the Harter Act and the Hague 
Rules remains in effect for the vast majority of nations. As such, it is this compromise 
that governs the vast majority of the relationships between parties to the carriage of 
goods. Until such time as a new commercial compromise is brokered, which may or may 
not be the case with the UNCITRAL Draft Convention, the nautical fault exemption 
remains justified.  
Where a legal concept or rule is unjustified and offensive to the fundamental 
principles of modern law, in certain cases it will be judicially reformed.1475 In recent 
years, there have been allegations of the courts of various jurisdictions becoming 
increasingly hostile to the exemption for nautical fault or judicially narrowing the scope 
of the exemption. Nowhere is this more evident than France.1476 The French judiciary 
have openly demonstrated their disregard for the notion that a carrier may be exempted 
from liability for losses resulting from the faults of his servants. As nautical fault is 
  
1472 Ping-fat, S. Carrier’s Liability under the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules (2002) Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, at p. 212. 
1473 Sturley, M. “Carriage of Goods by Sea” (2000) 31 JMLC 241, at p. 250.
1474 Sturley, M. “The United Nations Commissions on International Trade Law’s Transport Law Project: 
An Interim View of a Work in Progress” (2003) 39 Tex. Int’l L.J. 65, at p. 75. Sturley served as the 
rapporteur for the CMI International Sub-Committee on Issues of Transport Law, and as the senior advisor 
on the United States Delegation to Working Group III (Transport Law) of UNCITRAL.
1475 For an example in Canadian law see the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Bow Valley Husky 
(Bermuda) Ltd. v. St. John Shipbuilding Ltd. [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1210 at pp. 1256-1268, where the Supreme 
Court discarded the contributory negligence bar of the common law in favour of a proportionate fault rule 
for division of damages for one-ship maritime torts. 
1476 See Chapter 7: Restricting the Availability of the Nautical Fault Exemption. 
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provided for explicitly by law, the French courts cannot judicially overrule it, as one 
could with a rule of common law, or droit commun. Nevertheless, the French courts have 
made evident and significant inroads into the effectiveness of the nautical fault exemption 
in practice. This is not, however, a worldwide trend. If it were to be the case that the 
judiciaries of major trading nations were to repeatedly and openly demonstrate overt 
hostility towards the application of the exemption, such that in practice it became 
ineffective as a defence, this would indicate that nautical fault cannot be justified within 
the context of modern legal principles.  Admittedly, reliance on the exemption for 
nautical fault has become increasingly difficult in recent years, owing to numerous 
factors that include the decline in cargo claims litigation, increased regulatory 
requirements for shipowners, and the rise in alternative dispute resolution. Nevertheless, 
the lack of widespread judicial revolt indicates at the very least that, with the exception of 
France, nautical fault has not become repugnant to modern legal principles.   
At the time of its incorporation into statute and then into uniform law, nautical 
fault was justified on the basis of several rationales.1477 Most notably, or notoriously, was 
the historic rationale, which may be summarized as the recognition that communications 
were often difficult, sea carriage was inherently dangerous, and little control could be 
exercised over the crew after the departure of the vessel. This rationale, is the source of 
much mischaracterization by opponents of nautical fault: “Error [in the navigation or 
management of the vessel] was an ancient right given to carriers in the days of sailing 
ships and in the days when there was no telegraph, little science of the sea, and there 
were no steel ships. Error as a defence should now be removed from carriage of 
goods.”1478 As poetic as this statement is, it is wholly inaccurate. A history of carrier 
liability demonstrates that nautical fault arose during the time of steam and steel, half a 
century after Morse patented the telegraph, and was incorporated into statute three years 
shy of the advent of wireless technology.1479 Certainly, communication has improved 
immeasurably, and as such, shipowners are able to exercise increased control over their 
  
1477 See Chapter 3: Rationale for the Nautical Fault Exemption.
1478 Gold, E. et al. “New Hague Rules” in New Directions in Maritime Law (1978) Gold, E. (Ed.) Dalhousie 
University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, at p. 112. 
1479 In 1896, Guglielmo Marconi sent his first radio signal, thus ushering in the wireless age. 
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servants and agents. There nevertheless remains a grain of truth to the historical rationale. 
The aspect of this rationale that retains both its relevance and its truth is the recognition 
of the perils of shipping. Despite advances in technology, carriers remain exposed to 
dangers unique to sea carriage, unparalleled in other forms of transport. Even in the 
jurisdiction that is arguably the most hostile to nautical fault, France, a court recently 
remarked that maritime activities remain perilous, involve high risk, and sailors must 
grapple with a myriad of elements, and accordingly denied the claim for a container lost 
overboard.1480 This sentiment has also been echoed by a Canadian court, in noting that 
“sea traffic involves a constant struggle with incalculable and unusual possibilities of 
peril.”1481 This notion ties in with the rationale that imposing liability for decisions made 
in the heat of the moment, that with the benefit of hindsight were unwise or erroneous, 
would negatively impact the decision making process at sea. On this basis, despite being 
rooted in the 19th century, these justifications still hold true today. Sea carriage remains 
inherently dangerous and perilous, and despite improved communications, spur of the 
moment navigational and managerial decisions when faced with perilous situations, will 
still need to be made. One could therefore argue that the exemption for nautical fault 
retains both its relevance and its justification. 
As with any contentious issue, proponents on either side of the nautical fault 
debate will undoubtedly find justifications for their position. Nevertheless, the above 
arguments do demonstrate that nautical fault is not a completely unjustified concept. 
What are most persuasive, however, as justifications of nautical fault are the arguments 
relating to commercial compromise and the implications of change. The lessons of the 
Hague and Hamburg Rules have taught us that where a mutually beneficial commercial 
compromise is reached, uniformity in shipping is fostered. Indeed, during the push for 
reform of the U.S. carriage law in the 1990s it was argued; “If we succeed in changing 
COGSA through truly commercial compromise, then we will have restored the path 
blazed by the Harter Act a century ago. There is no better way to celebrate the Harter 
Act’s centenary than by reinforcing the example of commercial compromise as a superior 
  
1480 Tribunal de Commerce de Marseille, 12 décembre 2003, (Ville de Tanya), DMF 2004, 630, at p. 633.
1481 Seaway Distributors v. Newfoundland Container Lines (1982) 52 N.S.R. (2d) 566 (N.S. Dist. 1), at p. 
573. 
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model to political compromise. If we succeed, then perhaps, once again, it will be the 
spark for a comprehensive international solution.”1482 Moreover, where sweeping 
changes in carrier liability are made without taking into account their interplay with other 
fundamental concepts in carriage, key commercial interests will be resistant to such 
efforts aimed at unifying the law of carriage. In the past, eliminating nautical fault from 
uniform law has contributed to the disunity present in carriage law today.1483 Arguably, 
what is paramount in the international carriage of goods by sea is uniformity. In 1860, the 
jurist Mancini said: “The sea with its winds, its storms and its dangers never changes and 
this demands a necessary uniformity of juridical regime.”1484 Uncertainty has long been 
seen to be generally harmful to both shipping and commerce.1485 The Supreme Court of 
the United States has commented on the importance of uniformity in shipping; 
“…conflicts in the interpretation of the Hague Rules not only destroy aesthetic symmetry 
in the international legal order but impose real costs on the commercial system the Rules 
govern.”1486 It is not surprising thus that one commentator has acknowledged that “on one 
point all are agreed: ocean carriers, whose ships are subject to seizure for outstanding 
claims as they move from port to port, desperately need uniform rules.”1487 The words of 
the chairman of the Bill of Lading Committee of the International Chamber of Commerce 
in 1927 hold equally true today: “uniformity of the most important thing. It does not 
matter so much precisely where you draw the line dividing the responsibilities of the 
  
1482 Chandler, G. “After Reaching a Century of the Harter Act: Where Should We Go From Here?” (1993) 
24 JMLC 43, at p. 47. 
1483 “The piecemeal adoption of the Hamburg rules is responsible for much of the current lack of uniformity 
and also leads to jurisdiction shopping. (e.g. when a Hague or Hague-Visby country is exporting to a 
Hamburg country).” (Institute of Chartered Shipbrokers, replies to the UNCITRAL questionnaire on the 
draft instrument, found in UNCITRAL, “Preparation of e draft instrument on the carriage of goods [by 
sea]: Compilation of replies”, 31 January 2003, UN Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.28, at p. 7.)
1484 Quoted in Griggs, P. “Obstacles to Uniformity of Maritime Law” (2003) 34 JMLC 191, at p. 192. 
1485 Karan, H. “The Carrier’s Liability for Breach of The Contract of Carriage of Goods by Sea Under 
Turkish Law” (2002) 33 JMLC 91, at p. 91: “Commerce abhors a mystery. Any doubt with regard to the 
law applicable to commerce impairs merchants in their computation of potential risks and expenses, and 
deters them from trading.”
1486 Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 1995 AMC 1817 (S.C. 1995), at p. 1824.
1487 Honnold, J. “Ocean Carriers and Cargo; Clarity and Fairness – Hague or Hamburg?” (1993) 24 JMLC 
75, at p. 81. As well, Collins, D. “International Uniformity and the Carriage of Goods by Sea” (1985) 60 
Tul. L. Rev. 165, at p. 165 notes that “[m]an has long recognized that the conduct of maritime commerce is 
enhanced by the existence of a stable and uniform legal frame of reference.” The importance of uniformity 
is also recognized by the judiciary. For example, a Belgian court has underscored the primacy of uniformity 
by holding that the Hague-Visby Rules were intended to create uniform rules of law and as such transcend 
national law and must be interpreted in an autonomous manner in light of the Convention (Rechtbank van 
Koophandel te Antwerpen, January 11, 1993 (The M.S. OOCL Europa V032) [1993] ETL 251).
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shipper and his underwriter from the responsibility of the carrier and his underwriter. The 
all important question is that you draw the line somewhere and that that line be drawn in 
the same place for all countries and for all importers.”1488 At present, there are three 
international regimes in force, and a whole host of domestic enactments.1489 Currently, 
the commercial compromise, including nautical fault, continues to govern relationships 
between the parties to the carriage of goods by sea. What one hopes was considered with 
every amendment and decision made with respect to the Draft Convention, is whether a 
regime was being created that has a very real chance of success. It is in this respect that 
the impacts of the removal of nautical fault were possibly not sufficiently considered, or 
perhaps were overcompensated for with the provisions concerning volume contracts. As 
uniform carriage law is the end goal, if commercial interests cannot be brought on board, 
then we are embarking on a futile exercise. Simply adding a fourth regime truly provides 
no benefit for anyone. One association has already expressed concern; “[t]he instrument 
is too broad in its scope, and contains too many new concepts, terms and provisions 
(some of them controversial), arranged in an unfamiliar structure and sequence, to have 
any chance of garnering the degree of multilateral adherence required in the next few 
years if we are to stem the tide of legislative disunity, let alone convince States which 
have already “gone it alone” to return to an international regime.”1490 In the context of the 
Draft Convention therefore, the presence or absence of nautical fault can only be justified 
in so far as it serves to broker a commercial compromise that will usher in a successful, 
modern, and international regime on the carriage of goods by sea. 
  
1488 Statement of Charles S. Haight before a Subcommittee of the US Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, cited by Sturley, M. “Uniformity in the Law Governing the Carriage of Goods by Sea” (1995) 26 
JMLC 553, at p. 557.
1489 It has been noted that by the late 1990s there was eight different regimes in force: (1) countries where 
the Hague Rules apply amended by the Visby Protocol and the SDR Protocol; (2) Countries bound by the 
Hague-Visby Rules; (3) Countries where the Hague Rules are observed; (4) Countries having incorporated 
the Hague Rules into their national legislation without having ratified the Rules; (5) Countries having 
adopted the Hague-Visby Rules or SDR Protocol without ratifying it; (6) Countries with their own unique 
domestic legislation; (7) Countries who observe the Hamburg Rules; and (8) national legislations 
combining one of the above systems with their own rules. (Pavliha, M. “The Impact of International 
Transport Law on the Slovenian Legislation” [2000] ETL 465, at p. 472-473).
1490 Weale, J. “Re: CMI International Sub-Committee on Issues of Transport Law Proposed Instrument on 
Carriage of Goods by Sea” (2000), position paper from the Association of Maritime Arbitrators of Canada. 
Available on line at: www.amac.ca
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What is disconcerting with respect to the Draft Convention is despite the pressing 
need of uniformity in carriage of goods by sea, the provisions on volume contracts create 
the potential for differential liability and disunity on a scale unseen since the years prior 
to the Harter Act. Should the Draft Convention be successful, with approximately 80-
95% of the world’s shipping currently falling within the definition of volume contract, 
freedom of contract will be revived. Lord Sumner has noted with respect to the Hague 
Rules, that “the intention of this legislation in dealing with the ability of a shipowner as a 
carrier of goods by sea undoubtedly was to replace a conventional contract, in which it 
was constantly attempted, often with much success, to relieve the carrier from every kind 
of liability, by a legislative bargain, under which he should be permitted to limit his 
obligation to take good care of the cargo by an exception, among others, relating to 
navigation and management of the ship.”1491 If the absence of nautical fault does not aid 
in fostering uniformity in shipping, and a return to the conventional contract is the way 
forward for the law of carriage of goods by sea, can the existence of nautical fault be 
justified? Only time will tell. Whether nautical fault will remain justified in modern 
carriage, should the Draft Convention be successful, will be truly dependent on whether 
the parties to the contract of affreightment and other contractual arrangements retain the 
exemption. The presence and relevance of nautical fault will therefore become subject to 
market-based forces. 
  
1491 Gross Millerd v. Canadian Government Merchant Marine [1929] A.C. 223 (H.L.), at p. 236. See also 
Wolfson, R. “The English and French Carriage of Goods by Sea Enactments” (1955) 4 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 
508, at p. 508, describing the demand for legislative action to remove the chaos and abuse that had resulted 
from the existence of an unlimited freedom of contract.
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Chapter 12
Conclusion
This thesis has challenged the misconceptions surrounding the nautical fault 
exemption, and sought to demonstrate that the exemption is not simply an anachronistic 
holdover that can be removed from carriage law without consequence. Rather, nautical 
fault has formed an integral part of the law of sea carriage for well over a century. Born 
out of 19th century market forces favourable to shipowners, incorporated into uniform 
law, and subsequently expanding into essentially all major areas of carriage law, the key 
role played by nautical fault in relation to liability amongst the parties to the common 
adventure is undeniable. Nautical fault remains to this day, part and parcel of the 
allocation of risk between the parties involved in carriage in the context of bills of lading, 
charterparties, general average, towage, lighterage, pilotage, and insurance. 
Nautical fault has been eliminated from the Draft Convention. To argue that it 
should not have been or to propose re-evaluating its removal at this point in time would 
be akin to tilting at windmills. Regardless, the death toll for the nautical fault exemption 
has yet to ring. With the exception of State parties to the Hamburg Rules, and certain 
countries such as Korea who have opted for domestic carriage regimes based on 
Hamburg, nautical fault is present in the law of the vast majority of the nations with 
unilaterally adopted domestic regimes, along with those who are parties to the Hague and 
Hague-Visby Rules. Experience has shown that it is standard practice to incorporate 
nautical fault, either by virtue of a clause paramount or by express provision, into 
charterparties and other contractual arrangements not governed by the Hague or Hague-
Visby Rules. Moreover, recent uniform law has, as of yet, done little to restrict the 
availability of the exemption in practice. Furthermore, the P&I Clubs have ensured that 
their members will not incur any liabilities other than those of Hague or Hague-Visby, 
unless obligated to do so by a State party to the Hamburg Rules. Finally, certain 
continental European courts have been averse to applying the Hamburg Rules, opting 
instead for the Hague or Hague-Visby Rules. Currently, nautical fault is in no immediate 
danger of either being eliminated or marginalized as an exemption from liability.  
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The question must be asked, what does the future hold for nautical fault? The 
answer is threefold. Firstly, in the short to medium term, very little will change. The 
shipping industry is a deeply conservative industry that can in many ways be highly 
resistant to change. Indeed, even if the Draft Convention is palatable to all involved, 
implementation may take years, if not decades. Given the importance of nautical fault to 
carrier interests, and its current status as an integral part of carriage, change will likely 
not come unless it is legislatively imposed.
Secondly, the Draft Convention will be presented to the Commission in June of 
2008, and if it proves successful, then we sail into uncharted waters. Acceptance of the 
Draft Convention by the major trading nations will result in widespread freedom of 
contract in shipping. For the first time in the history of carriage, carriers will be subject to 
both a mandatory regime and the freedom to contract out of it. The removal of nautical 
fault from the Draft Convention is thus rendered academic. The prevalence of the 
exemption under the new regime will therefore depend on market forces and the relative 
bargaining power between carrier and cargo interests. Much like the mid-19th century, 
any superiority in bargaining power could very well lead to abuse. At the moment, the 
liner trade is highly competitive, however small shippers or non-sophisticated parties 
could still find themselves entering contracts of affreightment with little or no liability on 
the part of the carrier. One may speculate that it will take a significant increase in the 
bargaining power of cargo interests before the carriers will agree to relinquish the time-
honoured list of exempted perils, including nautical fault.   
 Thirdly, should the Draft Convention follow in the infamous footsteps of the 
Hamburg Rules, the result in practice will likely be similar to the current situation. 
Uniformity in carriage of goods by sea will continue to be undermined by the adoption of 
domestic carriage regimes. Despite the divergent nature of certain domestic regimes, 
there are many similarities, which serve as examples for future reform. These domestic 
solutions are reflective of modern bargains made with the commercial interests of those 
nations. They exemplify acceptable compromises on pressing issues, amongst the various 
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interests in the shipping community. Provisions dealing with delay, higher limitation, 
jurisdiction, arbitration, period of responsibility or port-to-port, and waybills/EDIs, 
appear to be the key issues in need of reform.1492 What is instructive is the prevalence of 
nautical fault in the domestic regimes, thus indicating that it remains part and parcel of 
commercial compromises made over a century after the Harter Act.   
What can be concluded is that regardless of whether the Draft Convention is 
widely successful or not, nautical fault will not disappear in the foreseeable future. It has 
become too ingrained in the international carriage of goods by sea to be legislatively 
removed overnight or “judicially nibbled to death.”1493 By no means does this thesis 
propose that nautical fault will remain in the law of carriage in perpetuity, nor that it 
would be justified in doing so. Nevertheless, as long as nautical fault is present in the 
international carriage of goods by sea, the debate surrounding the exemption will 
continue to exist. As with any contentious issue, the ensuing debate needs to be an 
informed debate. Political decisions that are made in haste and based on misconceptions, 
impact negatively on shipping and commerce. This thesis therefore proposes a careful 
and complete examination of the potential consequences of any decision made with 
regard to nautical fault. In the future, should a decision be made to eliminate nautical 
fault from either statutory or uniform law, a measured, cautious and informed approach to 
its removal is advocated.  
  
1492 See Chapter 9 addressing the domestic amendments to carriage regimes. 
1493 To borrow Gilmore & Black’s wonderful turn of phrase concerning limitation of liability (Gilmore, G. 
& Black, C. The Law of Admiralty 2nd Ed. (1975) Foundation, Minneola, N.Y., at p. 846: “The 
developments of the past twenty years suggest that, although the Limitation Act may never come in for a 
‘general overhaul’, its most likely fate, if it is not repealed outright, is that it will be judicially nibbled to 
death.”)
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